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Foreword
Inequality is a dominant challenge to development. It influences economic growth 
and redistribution, and feeds into power asymmetries that can jeopardize democ-
ratization and human rights, trigger conflict, and entrench chronic poverty. 
Inequality is at the core of the United Nations mandate, and is one of the seventeen 
goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Goals.
While global inequality fell, by and large, towards the end of the twentieth 
century, since the start of this century within-country inequality has been steadily 
rising—underpinning intense public and academic debates to the extent that it 
has become a prevailing policy concern of many countries and in all multilateral 
agencies.
There has been strong interest for decades in bringing both developed and 
developing countries together in the analysis of global inequalities and the forces 
shaping them. Initially the lack of adequate data for such was a fundamental 
handicap. To address this, UNU-WIDER established the (freely downloadable) 
World Income Inequality Database (WIID) which compiles income inequality 
information from primary sources for developed, developing, and transition 
countries. In turn, the WIID increased the volume of the voice for analytical 
research on between-country and within-country inequalities. Hence the launch 
of UNU-WIDER’s Inequality in the Giants project—as part of a broad inter nation al 
effort designed to shed light on a set of new questions on such inequalities, by 
generating integrated datasets and applying a consistent methodology to investigate 
the determinants of inequality dynamics in ten of the world’s largest economies: 
Brazil, China, France, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, the UK, 
and the US.
Employing advances made in recent decades on the measurement of in equal ity, 
as well as in the development of better data to analyse the processes which generate 
inequality, this book is the result of rigorous scientific work by a large team of 
international experts, each highly qualified within their respective research niches. 
I sincerely thank the editors—Carlos Gradín, Murray Leibbrandt, and Finn Tarp—
for their sharp analytical and editorial skills, which result in  giving us a more 
 layered, more nuanced understanding of inequality in developing countries.
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the support and financial contributions to 
its research programme by the governments of Finland, Sweden, and the UK. Without 
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This book has roots in discussions in late 2013/early 2014 between Francois 
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Leibbrandt, to discuss a project idea put forward by Nora Lustig and referred to as 
‘Inequality in the Giants’. The team developed the preliminary set of notes from 
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Cortes Neri, joined the project, while Carlos Gradín joined the coordination 
team. The coordinators and their respective teams of authors produced several 
studies on each country, which were published in the WIDER Working Paper 
series. Much of this work also reached academic journals.
We felt, however, that a comprehensive book and coherent statement was 
called for. We therefore put together a proposal that included both the attempt 
at analysing in-depth inequalities within our group of five large developing 
countries that jointly account for more than 40 per cent of the world’s population 
and the relationship with global inequality issues. Accordingly, we proposed 
to  frame five country syntheses by broader contributions from development 
 economists who are leaders in the field of inequality measurement, trends, 
impact, and pol icies. They agreed and each provided an excellent take on a set 
of key framework-setting issues that contextualize the country case studies and 
put them in perspective.
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Their early notes and engagement in the work session organized with UNU-
WIDER in September 2015 has been of great value. We would also like to express 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/02/21, SPi
viii Acknowledgements
our most sincere gratitude to the chapter authors in this book for their willingness 
to participate in the research project and for their many insightful contributions. 
The same goes for the extensive and excellent group of collaborators on the 
background papers on each country case, synthesized here in this book.
Warm thanks are also due to UNU-WIDER for institutional support and never 
failing collaboration. We wish in particular to thank Lorraine Telfer-Taivainen, 
UNU-WIDER Editorial and Publishing Associate, for sound advice, hard work, 
and making the collaboration with Oxford University Press run smoothly. Adam 
Swallow, Economics and Finance Commissioning Editor at Oxford University 
Press, and his colleagues provided expert guidance with the publication process, 
and we do wish to acknowledge the anonymous referee reports that helped 
sharpen our focus and change the organization of the book.
Finally, a word of thanks to the donors of UNU-WIDER—Finland, Sweden, 
and the UK—for their core support to the work programme of UNU-WIDER, 
without which this book would not have been possible.
Carlos Gradín, Murray Leibbrandt, and Finn Tarp
Helsinki, Cape Town, and Copenhagen
June 2020
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/02/21, SPi
Contents
List of Figures xi
List of Tables xiii
List of Abbreviations xv
Notes on Contributors xvii
PART I .  INTRODUCTION
 1. Setting the Scene 3
Carlos Gradín, Murray Leibbrandt, and Finn Tarp
PART I I .  GLOBAL INEQUALIT Y AND  
INEQUALIT Y WITHIN C OUNTRIES
 2. What Might Explain Today’s Conflicting Narratives on Global 
Inequality? 17
Martin Ravallion
 3. Comparing Global Inequality of Income and Wealth 49
James Davies and Anthony Shorrocks
 4. Empirical Challenges Comparing Inequality across Countries: 
The Case of Middle-Income Countries from the LIS Database 74
Daniele Checchi, Andrej Cupak, and Teresa Munzi
PART I I I .  INEQUALIT Y IN FIVE  
DEVELOPING GIANT S
 5. Brazil: What Are the Main Drivers of Income Distribution  
Changes in the New Millennium? 109
Marcelo Neri
 6. China: Structural Change, Transition, Rent-Seeking and 
Corruption, and Government Policy 133
Shi Li, Terry Sicular, and Finn Tarp
 7. India: Inequality Trends and Dynamics: The Bird’s-Eye and the 
Granular Perspectives 157
Hai-Anh H. Dang and Peter Lanjouw
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/02/21, SPi
x Contents
 8. Mexico: Labour Markets and Fiscal Redistribution 1989–2014 180
Raymundo Campos-Vazquez, Nora Lustig, and John Scott
 9. South Africa: The Top End, Labour Markets, Fiscal Redistribution, 
and the Persistence of Very High Inequality 205
Murray Leibbrandt, Vimal Ranchhod, and Pippa Green
PART IV.  INEQUALIT Y IN A BROADER C ONTEXT
 10. Economic Inequality and Subjective Well-Being Across the World 233
Andrew E. Clark and Conchita D’Ambrosio
 11. China and the United States: Different Economic Models But 
Similarly Low Levels of Socioeconomic Mobility 257
Roy van der Weide and Ambar Narayan
 12. From Manufacturing-Led Export Growth to a Twenty-First 
Century Inclusive Growth Strategy: Explaining the Demise of a 
Successful Growth Model and What to Do about It 284
Joseph E. Stiglitz
PART V.  SYNTHESIS  AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
 13. Synthesis and Policy Implications 321
Carlos Gradín, Murray Leibbrandt, and Finn Tarp
Index 339
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/02/21, SPi
List of Figures
 2.1. Global inequality and its between- and within-country components 19
 2.2. Inequality within the developing world 21
 2.3. Relative inequality and growth in household income per capita 22
 2.4. Global inequality for various weights on (log) national mean income 30
 2.5. The elephant graph of Lakner and Milanovic 32
 2.6. Lorenz curves for global income 1988 and 2008 33
 2.7. Consumption floor for the developing world 36
 2.8. Elephant or serpent? 38
 2.9. Absolute inequality and growth in household income per capita 39
 2.10. Plot of changes in absolute poverty against changes in absolute in equal ity  
across developing countries 40
 3.1. Income inequality trends 2000–15, selected indices 56
 3.2. Trends in wealth inequality vs income inequality, selected indices 57
 3.3. Alternative decomposition routes 60
 3.4. Between-country and within-country components of income in equal ity 61
 3.5. Between-country and within-country components of wealth in equal ity 64
 3.6. Counterfactual trends in income inequality 67
 3.7. Counterfactual trends in wealth inequality 68
 4.1. Impact of non-monetary incomes 79
 4.2. Labour income availability at the individual level 80
 4.3. Taxes and social security contributions as a percentage of total gross income 81
 4.4. Extent of missing or zero income 83
 4.5. Trends in income inequality (Gini index) in selected middle-income  
countries (USA as benchmark) 87
 4.6. Evolution of income shares held by households with incomes below the  
50th, and above the 90th and 95th percentiles 88
 4.7. Inequality decomposition in labour incomes 91
 4.8. Income inequality (Gini index) versus selected macroeconomic country  
characteristics 94
 6.1. China’s Gini coefficient 134
 6.2. Growth incidence curves for China 136
 6.3. The composition of household income in China 137
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/02/21, SPi
 6.4. Primary sector employment in China as a share of total employment  
(per cent) 1980–2015 139
 6.5. Wage growth of rural–urban migrant workers in China (%) 140
 6.6. The shares of fiscal spending on education, medical insurance, social  
security, and agriculture in total budgetary expenditures in China 141
 6.7. Growth of exports and imports of China (million US$) 142
 7.1. Disparities in human capital outcomes, by social group 160
 7.2. Impacts of upward mobility on consumption growth (at different  
percentiles: IV regression 1 (90% confidence bound) 175
 8.1. Gini coefficient, 1989–2014 182
 8.2. Decomposition of differences in the distribution of earnings: 1989–2014 185
 8.3. Relative returns and relative supply of workers by education, college,  
and high school vs rest 187
 8.4. Fiscal incidence analysis, core income concepts 194
 8.5. Government transfers (% of GDP), 1988–2018 195
 8.6. Fiscal policy and inequality, 1996–2015 196
 8.7. Fiscal policy and poverty, 2008–15 197
 9.1. Difference in estimated mean taxable income between NIDS and PIT  
by income bracket 214
 9.2. Total effects of different variables over the distribution of earnings 218
 9.3. Concentration curves for direct taxes 221
 9.4. Distribution of selected fiscal benefits 222
 9.5. The progressivity of each of the three main social cash transfers  
in South Africa 222
 9.6. Socioeconomic class sizes, 2008–17 224
 10.1. The distribution of the dependent variables 240
 11.1. Great Gatsby Curve 263
 11.2. Income mobility versus education mobility 264
 11.3. Intergenerational mobility in education 266
 11.4. Intergenerational mobility versus GDP per capita 268
 12.1. Simulated manufacturing output shares 295
 12.2. Manufacturing value added (% of GDP) in sub-Saharan Africa 296
 12.3. Distribution of active population according to education level 304
xii List of Figures
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/02/21, SPi
List of Tables
 3.1. Shorrocks–Shapley decomposition of global income inequality 61
 3.2. Shorrocks–Shapley decomposition of global wealth inequality 64
 3.3. Shorrocks–Shapley decomposition of changes in global income and  
wealth in equal ity 70
 4.1. Descriptive statistics of variables used in the empirical analysis 92
 4.2. Regression analysis: OLS including all contextual variables 95
 4.3. Regression analysis: country fixed effects selecting some contextual variables 98
 4.4. Regression analysis: country fixed effects selecting some contextual  
variables—most recent observations (year > 2000) 100
 5.1. Inequality in Brazil by topic, technique, dataset, period of time, and income 
concept 111
 5.2. Income, equality, and social welfare: contribution to growth ordered  
by dis pos able income 124
 6.1. China’s regional and urban/rural income gaps 135
 6.2. Gini coefficients of urban wages and income per capita in China, 1988–2013 144
 7.1. Inequality trends in real consumption expenditure 159
 7.2. Income shares in Palanpur over time (%) 165
 7.3. Inequality of individual incomes 166
 7.4. Decomposing inequality in India 169
 7.5. Welfare transition dynamics based on synthetic panel data, India 
1987/88–2011/12 (%) 172
 8.1. Bound and Johnson decomposition: 1989–94; 1994–2006; 2006–14  
(assuming an elasticity of substitution σ = 2 and comparing college and  
high school-educated workers with rest of workers) 188
 9.1. Real annual growth rates in South Africa since 1990 206
 9.2. Income components in per capita terms (real 2014 prices, rand) 209
 9.3. Household composition from 1993 to 2014 210
 9.4. Dynamic decompositions including household composition and  
re-rankings, 1993–2008 211
 9.5. Gini coefficients at different thresholds 215
 9.6. Labour market summary statistics, 2000, 2011, and 2014 217
 10.1. Descriptive statistics: Afrobarometer 241
 10.2. Descriptive statistics: Asianbarometer 241
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/02/21, SPi
xiv List of Tables
 10.3. Descriptive statistics: Latinobarometer 242
 10.4. Descriptive statistics: Eurobarometer 242
 10.5. Economic conditions and inequality: OLS results in the Afrobarometer 244
 10.6. Economic conditions and inequality: OLS results in the Asianbarometer 244
 10.7. Economic conditions and inequality: OLS results in the Latinobarometer 245
 10.8. Economic conditions and inequality: OLS results in the Eurobarometer 245
 10.A1. List of items per dataset 249
 10.A2. Number of observations per country per wave: Afrobarometer 250
 10.A3. Number of observations per country per wave: Asianbarometer 250
 10.A4. Number of observations per country per wave: Latinobarometer 251
 10.A5. Number of observations per country per wave: Eurobarometer 252
 10.A6. Economic conditions and inequality: OLS results in the  
Afrobarometer—all controls 253
 10.A7. Economic conditions and inequality: OLS results in the  
Asianbarometer—all controls 254
 10.A8. Economic conditions and inequality: OLS results in the  
Latinobarometer—all controls 255
 10.A9. Economic conditions and inequality: OLS results in the  
Eurobarometer—all controls 256
 12.1. Manufacturing share of GDP (%) 285
 12.2. Deindustrialization in sub-Saharan Africa 296
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/02/21, SPi
List of Abbreviations
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa group
CCT conditional cash transfer
CES constant elasticity of substitution
CFPS China Family Planning Survey
CHIP China Household Income Project
DHI disposable household income
DISE District Information System for Education
ENIGH National Survey on Households’ Income and Expenditures
FDI foreign direct investment
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCIP Global Consumption and Income Project
GDIM Global Database of Intergenerational Mobility
GDP gross domestic product
GGC Great Gatsby Curve
GIC growth incidence curve
GNI gross national income
HDI Human Development Index
IBGE Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
IHDS India Human Development Surveys
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPR intellectual property rights
LIS Luxembourg Income Study
LIT learning, industrial, and technology
LSMS World Bank Living Standard Measurements Surveys (LSMS)
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MLD Mean Log Deviation
MRP mixed recall period
NBS National Bureau of Statistics
NIDS National Income Dynamics Study
NSS National Sample Survey Organization
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
PIT personal income tax
PME Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego
PNAD Pesquisa Nacional de Amostras a Domicílio
PNADC Pesquisa Nacional de Amostras a Domicilio Contínua
PPP purchasing power parity
PSID Panel Study of Income Dynamics
QE quantitative easing
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/02/21, SPi
xvi List of Abbreviations
QLFS Quarterly Labour Force Survey
R&D research and development
RAIS Registro Anual de Informações Sociais
RIF re-centred influence function
SARS South African Revenue Services
SCs Scheduled Castes
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SIA scale invariance axiom
SNA System of National Accounts
SOEs state-owned enterprises
SSA sub-Saharan Africa
SWIID Standardized World Income Inequality Database
TSTSLS two-sample two-stage least squares
US United States
WID World Inequality Database
WIID UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database
WIPO World International Properties Rights Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/02/21, SPi
Notes on Contributors
Raymundo Campos-Vazquez  obtained his PhD in economics from the University of 
Califormia, Berkeley in 2009. Since then, he has worked as a professor in El Colegio de 
Mexico in Mexico City. He has publications in the American Economic Review, Oxford 
Development Studies, and American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, among others. 
Currently he is on academic leave at the Banco de Mexico.
Daniele Checchi is a professor of economics at the University of Milan. He also serves as a 
Secretary General of the LIS Cross-National Data Center in Luxembourg. He has published 
in journals such as Economic Policy, Journal of Public Economics, European Sociological 
Review, and others, and his research interests range from inequalities in educational 
attainments to educational policies, from wage inequalities to the role of labour market 
institutions in shaping inequalities of opportunities.
Andrew  E.  Clark  is CNRS research director and a professor of economics at the Paris 
School of Economics. He pioneered the introduction of subjective well-being in econom-
ics in the early 1990s, and its use for the analysis of contextual effects. He has more than 
30,000 citations on Google Scholar, and nine papers cited more than 1000 times each. He was 
among the ‘Highly Cited Researchers 2018’—the list that recognizes world-class researchers 
selected for their performance, demonstrated by production of multiple highly cited 
papers that rank in the top 1 per cent by citations for field and year in the Web of Science.
Andrej Cupak  works as a data expert and research associate at the LIS Cross-National 
Data Center in Luxembourg. He is also affiliated with the National Bank of Slovakia. His 
research interests include household consumption and financial behaviour, human cap ital, 
income and wealth inequality, survey data, and applied microeconomics more generally.
Conchita D’Ambrosio is a professor of economics at the Department of Behavioural and 
Cognitive Sciences, University of Luxembourg. Her research interests revolve around the 
analysis and measurement of individual well-being, both theoretically and empirically. In 
this respect, she has proposed a number of different axiomatically characterized well-being 
indices, including measures of social exclusion and of poverty over time, that disentangle 
the effects of chronic and persistent poverty. She has also worked on the empirical analysis 
of these indices using data from a variety of different countries. She has published widely 
in the fields of social-index numbers and income distribution.
Hai-Anh  H.  Dang  is an economist in the Analytics and Tools Unit, Development Data 
Group, World Bank. His main research is on international development, poverty, in equal ity, 
human development topics, and methodology to construct synthetic (pseudo) panel 
data from cross-sections. He has published in various development journals, including 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Journal of Development Economics, Journal of 
Development Studies, World Bank Economic Review, World Development, and has chapters 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/02/21, SPi
xviii Notes on Contributors
in books published by leading academic publishers. He also serves as a co-editor of Review 
of Development Economics, and on the editorial boards of other journals.
James Davies is a professor of economics in the Department of Economics, University of 
Western Ontario in London, Canada. His field is public economics and his research has 
ranged over many topics, from tax policy to inequality measurement. In recent years he 
has focused on policy to mitigate the economic impacts of climate change and nat ural dis-
asters, and on the global distribution of personal wealth.
Carlos Gradín   is a research fellow at the United Nations University World Institute for 
Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) in Helsinki, and a professor of applied 
economics at the University of Vigo (on leave of absence). His main research interest is the 
study of poverty, inequality, and discrimination in both developed and developing countries, 
especially inequalities between population groups (i.e. by gender, race, or ethnicity). His 
research deals with enhancing the empirical evidence as well as methodological tools 
for the measurement and understanding of those issues. His research has been widely 
published in international journals.
Pippa Green is a South African journalist and writer. She has served as deputy editor for a 
number of South African newspapers, as head of Radio News at the South African public 
broadcaster, and as a visiting professor of journalism at Princeton University. She is South 
Africa’s Press Ombudsman and before this worked in SALDRU, editing and writing on 
employment, inequality, and inclusive growth in South Africa.
Peter Lanjouw  is a professor at the School of Business and Economics, VU University 
Amsterdam. His research focuses on the measurement of poverty and inequality as well as the 
analysis of rural development, notably via the study of a village economy in rural India and the 
broader process of rural non-farm diversification. He has co-authored several books and has 
also published in such leading economics journals as Econometrica and the Economic Journal, 
as well as numerous field journals. He is currently editor of the World Bank Research Observer.
Murray Leibbrandt  holds the National Research Foundation Chair in Poverty and 
Inequality Research at the University of Cape Town and is a senior research fellow of 
UNU-WIDER. He is the director of the Southern Africa Labour and Development 
Research Unit and the African Centre of Excellence for Inequality Research. He has pub-
lished widely in development economics using survey data and especially panel data to 
analyse South Africa’s poverty, inequality, and labour-market dynamics.
Shi Li is a professor of economics at Zhejiang University, director of the China Institute for 
Income Distribution at Beijing Normal University, non-resident senior research fellow at 
UNU-WIDER, and a research fellow at IZA. His research focuses on income and wealth 
distribution, poverty, labour markets, and rural migration and the labour market in China. 
He has published in journals such as Review of Income and Wealth, Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, Economic Development and Cultural Change, and Journal of 
Development Economics. His publications include several edited volumes, including Rising 
Inequality in China (with H. Sato and T. Sicular, Cambridge University Press 2013).
Nora Lustig is Samuel Z. Stone Professor of Latin American Economics and the founding 
director of the Commitment to Equity Institute (CEQ) at Tulane University. She is also a 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/02/21, SPi
Notes on Contributors xix
non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, the Center for Global Development, 
and the Inter-American Dialogue. Her research on economic development, inequality, and 
social policies has been published across more than sixty articles, close to ninety chapters, 
and twenty-five books and edited volumes. Professor Lustig is a founding member and 
President Emeritus of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA) 
and serves on the editorial board of the Journal of Economic Inequality. She received her 
doctorate in economics from the University of California, Berkeley.
Teresa Munzi  is the director of operations at the LIS Cross-National Data Center in 
Luxembourg, where she is responsible for managing and overseeing all operations in the LIS 
office. Her research interests include the comparative study of welfare systems and their 
impact on poverty, inequality, and family wellbeing; and gender differences in employment 
and earnings.
Ambar Narayan is a lead economist in the Poverty & Equity Global Practice of the World 
Bank. He leads and advises teams conducting policy analysis, evaluations, and research in 
development from a microeconomic perspective, and has published research papers and 
policy briefs on issues that reflect the eclectic mix of topics on which he has worked over 
the years. He has been a lead author for large World Bank studies, including a recent global 
report on intergenerational mobility, and regional or country reports on inequality of 
opportunity, poverty, and the impact of economic shocks. He has a PhD in economics 
from Brown University in the United States.
Marcelo Neri is director of FGV Social at the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV). He holds 
a PhD in economics, Princeton University. Previously he was the secretary-general of the 
Council of Economic and Social Development (CDES), president of the Institute for 
Applied Economic Research (Ipea), and Minister of Strategic Affairs in Brazil. He has 
evaluated policies in more than a dozen countries and also designed and implemented 
policies at three government levels in Brazil. Neri’s research focuses on social policies, 
microeconometrics, and well-being. He teaches graduate and undergraduate courses at 
EPGE/FGV, writes regularly in scientific journals, and has published ten books.
Vimal Ranchhod is a professor at the School of Economics and the Deputy Director of the 
Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit. He is a labour economist who 
has published widely on labour markets, education, and poverty and inequality.
Martin Ravallion  currently holds the inaugural Edmond D. Villani Chair of Economics 
at Georgetown University. Prior to joining Georgetown in 2013 he was director of the 
World Bank’s research department, the Development Research Group. Martin’s main 
research interests over the past thirty years have concerned poverty and policies for 
fighting it. He has published extensively on this topic and advised numerous governments 
and international agencies.
John Scott  is a professor-researcher at the Economics Department at the Centro de 
Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) in Mexico City, and academic researcher at 
the Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL), a 
public institution responsible for poverty measurement and the evaluation of social pro-
grammes in Mexico. He has a BA in philosophy from NYU and an M.Phil in economics 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/02/21, SPi
xx Notes on Contributors
from the University of Oxford. His principal research areas include redistributive pol icies, 
social and fiscal incidence analysis, poverty and inequality analysis, evaluation of social 
policy, rural development policies, agricultural and energy subsidies, and health and social 
security.
Anthony Shorrocks  is an honorary professor at Manchester University and director of 
Global Economic Perspectives Ltd, having previously served as director of UNU-WIDER 
from 2000 to 2009. He has published extensively on topics concerned with income and 
wealth distribution, inequality, poverty, and mobility. His recent research on the level and 
distribution of global household wealth has been published annually in the Credit Suisse 
Global Wealth Report and Databook.
Terry Sicular  is a professor of economics at the University of Western Ontario. She has 
conducted research on China’s economy since the 1980s and has published works on topics 
ranging from China’s economic transition to China’s rural households and rural economy, 
and education in China. Her current research focuses on topics related to income distribu-
tion and poverty in China. She has edited and contributed to several books, including 
Rising Inequality in China (with S. Li and H. Sato, Cambridge University Press 2013). She 
has served as a consultant to international organizations such as the World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank, and UNU-WIDER.
Joseph E. Stiglitz is a professor at Columbia University. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in 
Economics in 2001 for his work on asymmetric information. He is the co-chair of the 
High-Level Expert Group on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social 
Progress at the OECD. He served as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors under 
President Clinton and as chief economist of the World Bank.
Finn Tarp is a professor of development economics at the University of Copenhagen, and 
was director of UNU-WIDER from 2009 to 2018. His field experience covers more than 
two decades of in-country work in thirty-five countries across Africa and in the developing 
world more generally. Professor Tarp’s research focus is on issues of development strategy 
and foreign aid, with an interest in poverty, income distribution and growth, micro- and 
macroeconomic policy and modelling, agricultural sector policy and planning, and house-
hold and enterprise development. He has published widely and is a member of a large 
number of international committees and advisory bodies.
Roy van der Weide  is a senior economist in the Poverty and Inequality Research team 
within the Development Research Group of the World Bank. He leads the poverty and 
inequality mapping research within the department. His other research is concerned with 
the empirics of inequality of opportunity and poverty reduction, and axiomatic approaches 
to income measurement. His work has been published in a range of academic journals, 
including the American Economic Review, the Journal of Econometrics, the Journal of 
Applied Econometrics, and the World Bank Economic Review. He holds a PhD from the 
University of Amsterdam.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 28/01/21, SPi
PART I
INTRODUCTION
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 28/01/21, SPi
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 28/01/21, SPi
1
Setting the Scene
Carlos Gradín, Murray Leibbrandt, and Finn Tarp
1  Introduction
Inequality has emerged as a key, perhaps the key, development challenge of the 
past decade. It holds implications for economic growth and redistribution, and 
some of the most influential social science of the first half of the past decade 
showed that it also translates into power asymmetries that can endanger democ-
ratization and human rights, create conflict, and embed social exclusion and 
chronic poverty (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010; Stiglitz  2012; Deaton  2014; 
Piketty 2014). As such, inequality is at the core of the United Nations’ mandate, 
and ‘reducing inequality within and among countries’ is one of the seventeen 
goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Goals (SDGs) approved by the UN 
General Assembly in September 2015. Positioning inequality (SDG 10) as a 
stand-alone goal confers high visibility upon it. Moreover, the way in which the 
associated, more specific targets have been formulated links the inequality goal 
with many of the other SDGs, meaning that ‘reducing inequality’ is one of the 
most heavily inter-linked themes of the 2030 SDG agenda.
These concerns also underpin intense public and academic debates, to the 
extent that inequality has become a dominant policy concern within many coun-
tries, in all multilateral agencies, and even for the World Economic Forum (World 
Bank  2016; Ostry et al.  2019; World Economic Forum  2020). It would be very 
worrying if the possibility of investigating inequality in the real world in greater 
depth than was previously the case had not accompanied this intense public con-
cern with inequality. Fortunately, there have been a number of advances in recent 
decades regarding measurement of inequality, as well as in the development of 
better data to analyse the processes generating inequality and changes in 
inequality.
The empirical literature began with a focus on analysing inequality in the 
industrialized world in detail. The scarcity of in-depth analyses focused on devel-
oping countries was associated with a lack of adequate data and research capacity 
and was not helped by a stubborn and widespread misconception that inequality 
was not a relevant and pressing issue in poorer countries. This idea, which had its 
roots in the work of the classical economists of the eighteenth century, generally 
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held that reducing inequality could conflict with higher priorities such as  boosting 
growth or reducing poverty, by reducing the incentives of the most pro duct ive 
people. Within development economics, a more nuanced version of this view 
held that there was no need to push for a more equal society because this would 
be an automatic outcome that would eventually result from higher development, 
in line with the inverted-U hypothesis proposed by Simon Kuznets. A more tex-
tured understanding of inequality in developing countries was facilitated by 
gradual improvements in the available data. The intense research focus on 
in equal ity in both developed and developing countries over the past decade has 
replaced these ideas with a growing consensus that all highly unequal societies 
are dysfunctional in many ways, including compromised growth and poverty 
reduction.
This interest in inequality has also crossed the traditional national borders. 
There has been much analysis of cross-country comparisons of inequalities, in 
general. This was complemented by a focus on specific issues such as the middle 
class or the effects of the great recession (see Gornick and Jäntti 2013; Jenkins 
et al. 2013; Nolan 2018, among others). The gradual emergence of large data-
bases, such as the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) discussed in detail in 
Chapter  4 of this book, facilitated this research, providing researchers with 
easy access to harmonized microdata for many countries. Initially focused on 
developed countries, LIS has more recently been successful in incorporating 
several key middle-income countries.
Increasing interest in analysis of global inequalities and the role of forces like 
globalization in shaping them has brought developed and developing countries 
together. Two recent books by Bourguignon (2016) and Milanovic (2016) are 
prominent examples. Initially, the lack of adequate data for such work was a clear 
handicap. As reviewed in Ferreira et al. (2015), in response to this there have been 
many efforts to provide compilations of data from different sources, such as the 
UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID), which collates infor-
mation from many primary sources such as LIS, the World Bank (PovCalnet) and 
other international organizations, Eurostat and National Statistical Authorities, 
and research studies. Another good example of this new age of inequality analysis 
with a global perspective is the 2018 World Inequality Report by the World 
Inequality Lab at the Paris School of Economics (Facundo et al. 2018). This initia-
tive pursues an ambitious research agenda that includes producing new distribu-
tional data combining survey, administrative data, and national accounts, with 
special attention given to the top of the distribution.
Global inequalities are the result of combining between-country and within-
country inequalities. While according to, for example, the widely used Gini meas-
ure, global relative income inequality has been falling steadily for more than three 
decades, this trend reflected convergence in GDP per capita across nations. 
Relative inequality within countries remained roughly constant in the 1990s and 
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has been rising since 2000. This increase in average within-country relative 
in equal ity arose from a very heterogeneous picture among countries and regions, 
and the same goes for the associated and very sizeable increases in absolute 
in equal ity (see Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2017).
Inequalities between countries mostly reflect how successful developing 
regions have been in accelerating economic growth as compared to richer coun-
tries. Asian countries have been quite successful in using their particular export-
oriented model and development strategies, as argued in Nayyar (2019). While 
African countries have experienced robust growth and poverty reduction since 
2000 (see Addison et al. 2017), they have struggled to escape from a complex set 
of initial conditions and have seen more difficulties in finding a pathway to devel-
opment. However, in these and all other contexts, inequalities within countries 
are much more heterogeneous. The same forces that can reduce inequality 
between countries—like globalization—might contribute to higher inequality 
within both developed and developing countries. Other forces, such as techno-
logical progress, have contributed to increased market inequalities everywhere 
and to increasing profit-shares. Some countries have been more successful in 
using active policies to curb the market processes that push for higher inequality 
or, at least, to compensate them using taxes and benefits. In this respect, develop-
ing countries—traditionally small states with weak policy capability and generally 
regressive welfare regimes—face clear disadvantages.
This book aims to contribute to the literature and public debate on inequality 
by bringing together an analysis of global inequality and a new and comprehen-
sive view of the trends in inequality in five of the world’s largest developing 
countries—Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa—jointly accounting 
for more than 40 per cent of the world’s population. While this is not a majority 
population share and omits other important developing country inequality 
contexts—such as Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and Russia—each 
of these cases are important inequality contexts. Understanding inequalities in 
these emerging economies is of great value in coming to grips with contemporary 
in equal ities worldwide. This remains difficult due to both data and analytical 
challenges.
For this reason, UNU-WIDER engaged with a group of highly qualified inter-
national researchers to develop the five country case studies within a common 
framework under its Inequality in the Giants project.1 These country case leaders, 
together with their respective country teams, produced a series of in-depth stud-
ies for each of these countries. The objective of each country project was to assess 
1 The outputs of the project can be accessed at www.wider.unu.edu/project/inequality-giants. The 
main findings of the project were presented in a special panel during the UNU-WIDER Think 
Development—Think WIDER development conference held in Helsinki, September 2018. Videos are 
available on the conference website www.wider.unu.edu/parallel-session/inequality-developing-giants.
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the level and trend of income inequality and to understand the processes driving 
this quantitative picture. Use was made of the best available data and techniques. 
Most countries have developed a system of household surveys providing rich 
information to measure inequality as well as to investigate its drivers. The limita-
tions of these household surveys, in terms of underestimation of certain sources 
of income or consumption and the misrepresentation of certain population 
groups, are well known. For that reason, other complementary sources such as 
administrative data, public listings, or big data were used in order to correct for 
lack of response when this was an issue in underestimation of the top income 
sources and shares. In some cases, researchers produced new data sets for the 
research.
Using these rich data sources, different decomposition techniques and the use 
of regression analyses facilitated identification of the main inequality drivers. 
Each of these country cases summarize the main findings about long-run trends 
in income inequality and its driving factors. They contain detailed analyses of 
three issues: (i) the role of earnings inequality and its determinants; (ii) the role of 
top incomes (when administrative records or other sources can be combined with 
household surveys); and (iii) the distributive impact of public policies. Yet, we 
tailored each country study to its specific needs and authors discuss specific 
issues  that are important to that country, such as spatial inequalities or inter-
generational mobility.
The country case studies are summarized in Part III of this book. It is impera-
tive to contextualize this type of fine-grained analysis of within-country in equal ity 
within the global context. Therefore, for Part II of this volume, we invited a 
 number of outstanding researchers to provide their take on a set of key framework-
setting issues to precede and put them in perspective. Accordingly, Part II focuses 
on global inequalities in income and wealth, the role of globalization, and chal-
lenges in analysing cross-country comparisons. The aim is to provide an overview 
of the state of the art in our knowledge of inequalities between and within coun-
tries, of the main practical and conceptual challenges in undertaking these analyses, 
and of the necessary steps to move forward in this crucial field of social and eco-
nomic inquiry. With this as the global context, the five country synthesis studies 
form Part III. In Part IV, this volume then returns to analysing economic inequality 
in a broader context. It contains three chapters, which profile, respectively, 
 subjective wellbeing across the world, socioeconomic mobility in China and the 
United States against the context of seventy-three other countries, and the need for 
a new growth and development model in developing economies. Collectively, 
these three substantive parts contain much detail on global and local inequalities 
and, in Part V, we synthesize key findings and outline policy implications.
Before proceeding, in what follows we provide a synopsis of the eleven individual 
chapters that make up Parts II–IV of this book to help set the scene and give some 
up-front guidance on what to expect.
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2  Global Inequality and Inequality within Countries
Part II starts with Chapter 2, in which Martin Ravallion clarifies the underlying 
assumptions behind the conflicting narratives on what has been happening to 
global income inequality in the past decades. After reviewing the main issues 
involved, with regard to assessing global trends, he identifies a set of elements that 
put into perspective the fact that many prominent international scholars produce 
solid evidence in support of a conventional view according to which global 
in equal ity has been declining since the 1990s, while at the same time other prom-
in ent scholars produce solid evidence for the opposite view that it has been rising. 
These elements include people’s main reference group—their country or the 
world—and what type of income growth keeps inequality constant, which 
depends on the relative versus absolute view. Crucially, and unlike the measure-
ment and analysis of poverty, a focus on inequality requires the inclusion of the 
full distribution of wellbeing. This is true whether it is explicitly recognized by the 
analyst or not, and Ravallion shows that opposing empirical pictures of the trends 
in global inequality can be understood by being explicit about the ethical weight 
given to the poor or the aversion to inequality from the top of the distribution 
that is being assumed in each of these analyses. Conclusions drawn about what 
has happened depend critically on the exact combination of assumptions made.
Understanding the drivers of inequality, even income inequality, requires an 
analysis of how many dimensions of inequality intersect to produce a given 
in equal ity outcome. In Chapter 3, James Davies and Anthony Shorrocks empha-
size this important point by analysing the joint distribution of wealth and income 
and their decomposition into between- and within-country components. This is a 
particularly insightful approach because both of these metrics feature prom in-
ent ly in the discussions of contemporary inequality, with most contention being 
about the relationship between them. The authors make this contribution draw-
ing on the Credit Suisse Global Wealth Report and Credit Suisse Global Wealth 
Databook which they have produced (Davies et al.  2018a,  2018b). The chapter 
contrasts the trends in these wealth data, which have featured prominently in 
international inequality deliberations, with income data from the WIID. For both 
income and wealth, and for all the inequality indices considered, the degree of 
inequality attributable to differences in mean income and wealth across countries 
accounts for much, if not most, of the level of global inequality. As regards chan-
ging inequality over time, changes in mean income, mean wealth, and population 
size have induced a strong downward element in the trend in global inequality, 
regardless of the inequality index selected.
In Chapter  4, the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) team (Daniele Checchi, 
Andrej Cupak, and Teresa Munzi) investigates the development patterns in eco-
nomic inequality for several low- and middle-income countries, including the 
five country cases analysed in depth in Part II. They, along with Russia, now form 
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part of the LIS harmonized data, which has so far largely focused on developed 
economies. Thus, these data are a valuable source of information on inequality 
within the BRICS and the chapter splices a discussion of Russian inequality into 
the book. The authors describe the process by which each country data set is pre-
pared for inclusion in the harmonized LIS data. This is invaluable in making clear 
the many challenges in moving from within-country data and analysis to well-
grounded cross-country analyses of inequality for developing countries, and then 
to analysis to inform strategies to overcome inequality. Without explicit descrip-
tion of what was done to the data in moving from country data sets to a com par-
able cross-country data set, and even to merged global data sets, one does not 
have a clear sense of the extent to which the observed inequality levels and trends 
are driven by differences in the underlying data rather than in the forces driving 
inequality.
3  Inequality in Five Developing Giants
Part III begins with Chapter 5, in which Marcelo Neri puts forward his synthesis 
of how, from the dawn of the new millennium, Brazil—one of the world’s most 
prominent high-inequality countries—experienced an unprecedented decline in 
income inequality that lasted until 2014, with a reversion after that date. Lower 
earnings inequality was the main driver behind this downward trend. Neri dis-
cusses a number of different possible channels that might have helped to reduce 
earnings inequality. These include heterogeneity among firms and the role of a 
higher minimum wage. The expansion of education, alongside falling returns, 
stands out among the driving factors helping to mitigate the particularly high 
inter-generational inertia. The chapter also addresses the complementary role of 
tax redistribution and conditional cash transfers in underpinning the reduction 
in educational and health inequalities among the Brazilian populace.
In Chapter 6, Shi Li, Terry Sicular, and Finn Tarp present China as a country 
with a classic development trajectory characterized by structural change, 
increased market integration, and labour absorption, moving along the upward 
side of the Kuznets inverted-U curve. This process has generated strong economic 
growth and poverty reduction. However, an incomplete transition from a planned 
to a market economy has generated increased differentiation of incomes, while 
creating continued opportunities for rent-seeking, corruption, and hidden 
income. More recent countervailing factors include expanding government 
efforts to moderate inequality, especially through social and welfare programmes. 
Whether the country has already started moving along the downward section of 
the Kuznets curve will depend on the direction of future reforms.
Hai-Anh Dang and Peter Lanjouw offer in Chapter 7 a comprehensive analysis 
of inequality trends in India over the past three decades. As with Brazil and 
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China, the backdrop was one of strong growth and poverty reduction. In the 
Indian context, this was accompanied by rising inequality in all dimensions, but 
to differing degrees depending on the dimension considered and the measure-
ment method employed. In order to reconcile these growth, poverty, and in equal ity 
levels and changes, the authors interrogate inequality trends across and within 
the national, state, and microscopic village levels. They show that local-level 
in equal ity accounts for the bulk of overall inequality in India. They explore these 
inequality dynamics further, using synthetic panel data constructed at the house-
hold level, to examine intra-generational income mobility over time. This mobil-
ity has risen over time, implying that lifetime inequality will be lower than 
cross-sectional inequality. However, while poverty has fallen, most of the poor 
who have escaped poverty continue to face high risks of falling back into poverty. 
Particularly concerning is the fact that intragenerational educational mobility is 
low and not improving. Moreover, those who remain poor are increasingly 
chronically poor, and may be particularly difficult to reach via the introduction or 
expansion of safety nets.
In Chapter 8, Raymundo Campos-Vazquez, Nora Lustig, and John Scott inves-
tigate the ‘rise–decline–rise again’ pattern in income inequality in Mexico. The 
growth and poverty context for these inequality changes is itself much less posi-
tive and more variable in Mexico than in Brazil, China, and India. As in the case 
of Brazil, the evolution of labour income inequality is key to understanding this 
inequality pattern, with the skill premium being the key determinant of earnings 
inequality. The authors highlight two key implications. The first is the need to 
continue the expansion of access to higher levels of (quality) education and the 
increase in minimum wages to their 1980 levels. The authors also show that direct 
cash transfers, including the famous Progresa programme, largely targeted the 
poor in Mexico, but also that their overall redistributive impact remains limited 
because of their small coverage. Furthermore, the redistributive effect of the 
entire fiscal system has declined significantly since 2010, as transfers have become 
less progressive and net indirect taxes have increased.
Murray Leibbrandt, Pippa Green, and Vimal Ranchhod show in Chapter  9 
that, in a context of sluggish growth but some reduction in poverty rates, in equal-
ity has remained exceptionally high in post-apartheid South Africa. This stub-
bornly high level of aggregate inequality masks a number of important changes in 
the texture of this inequality. Again, the dynamics of the labour market are key to 
understanding this. Education policy has effected a reduction in inequality in 
years of schooling driven by increases in average education levels. Under the con-
ditions prevailing in the mid-1990s this would have reduced inequality. But over 
the intervening years the patterns of growth and employment were such that 
earnings inequality increased as the result of strongly increased returns to tertiary 
education and to experience, and strongly decreasing returns to levels of educa-
tion lower than complete secondary. Using tax data, the authors also show that 
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those at the top end of the income distribution have experienced much higher 
rates of real income growth than the remainder of the population. This is linked 
to the rising labour market inequality and to strong returns to capital income 
sources that are only found at the top end of the income distribution. While gov-
ernment grants played an important role in reducing inequality (and poverty) by 
supporting households at the bottom of the income distribution, these effects 
have become weaker more recently. The direct tax system is progressive overall, 
and social benefits are well targeted, but some of the tax benefits are indeed 
regressive.
4  Inequality in a Broader Context
Part IV of the book moves the analysis from the detail in our country cases back 
to a broader context of global inequality. Thus far, the chapters in the book have 
interrogated the measurement and analysis of money-metric inequalities at global 
and national levels. Full interrogation of these inequalities has required an under-
standing of their intersection with inequalities in education, gender, race, eth ni-
city, space, and many other dimensions. These are complicated interactions and 
they raise the question of how perceptions of wellbeing are correlated with sub-
jective and measured inequalities. In Chapter 10, Andrew E. Clark and Conchita 
D’Ambrosio empirically explore exactly this question. They explore whether indi-
viduals’ subjective evaluation of their present and future living conditions is asso-
ciated with their own current levels of functioning, their subjective assessment of 
their position relative to other members of the society, and the level of measured 
economic inequality in their country. Using data from a series of Barometer sur-
veys conducted in 76 countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Europe, com-
bined with money-metric measures contained in the WIID data, the authors are 
able to look in particular at how these relationships differ across the four world 
regions. Their results confirm that, across the world, those whose lives are more 
objectively deprived have lower subjective evaluations of current living standards 
and, to a lesser extent, lower expectations regarding future living conditions. 
While they also find evidence about the implications of relative comparisons, 
these are more heterogenous across world regions. In the developed countries of 
Europe, those who see themselves as better off relative to others in their country 
have higher levels of subjective wellbeing. In developing countries this is not a 
strong relationship. Indeed, Hirschman’s famous tunnel effect seems to prevail, 
especially in Latin America and Africa, in that seeing oneself as worse off relative 
to others is positively correlated with subjective wellbeing in the present and the 
future. Finally, the higher the aggregate level of inequality in the country of resi-
dence, the higher the expectations of future living conditions globally, with more 
mixed results on present living conditions also depending on the region.
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In Chapter 11, Roy van der Weide and Ambar Narayan examine the trends and 
patterns in inter-generational mobility for China and the United States. They 
draw lessons from ‘Fair Progress? Economic Mobility Across Generations Around 
the World’, a 2018 World Bank report, which was one of the first attempts to ana-
lyse the critical issue of social mobility in the developing world. This allows the 
chapter not only to focus on China and the United States, but also to compare this 
detailed analysis to estimates of inter-generational income mobility from seventy-
three other countries. Although socioeconomic mobility was relatively high in 
China before the transition from a planned to a market economy, mobility sub-
stantially declined during the period of rapid economic growth. As a result, China 
converged to the historical low levels of income and education mobility shown by 
the United States. The study links China’s declining mobility to its rising in equal-
ity. It finds further support for this ‘Great Gatsby Curve’ in a negative correlation 
between income mobility and inequality that is found looking across all seventy-
five countries. In showing this, the chapter offers a stark example of a central 
theme of the book as whole; namely, how high inequality undermines the max-
imum use of human potential and therefore economic growth and economic 
development.
Part IV ends with Chapter 12, in which Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz sets out 
the present-day framework in which development takes place. He begins by dis-
cussing the export-led growth strategy. This allowed East Asian countries to reach 
unprecedented growth rates in the recent past and has been the main factor 
explaining the decline in between-country inequality. However, it is no longer the 
reference for developing economies. Stiglitz proceeds to formulate a new and 
comprehensive development strategy, entailing a combination of policies address-
ing manufacturing, agriculture, services, and natural resources—for which active 
and innovative industrial policies will be necessary—as well as a global reserve 
system that can provide the critical resources. He is boldly making the point that 
international and national policy communities are obligated to deal with the 
global and national economic circumstances that actually prevail, rather than 
those they wished were in place or had been in place three decades ago. Read 
alongside the detailed interrogations of global and national inequalities in the 
preceding chapters, this chapter provides a grounded platform for the discussion 
of the policies needed to address inequality and promote inclusive development 
in the contemporary world.
In Part V (Chapter 13), which concludes the volume, we synthesize and draw 
together the multi-faceted lessons that emerge from this volume about data, 
measurement, and the analysis of inequality and outline the main implications 
for policy. In sum, and in line with the Stockholm Statement,2 we point out that 
2 See www.wider.unu.edu/news/stockholm-statement-%E2%80%93-towards-new-consensus- 
principles-policy-making-contemporary-world.
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present inequalities of income and wealth and inequality in access to basic 
 services—such as health and education—are ethically indefensible. They under-
mine social cohesion and economic progress. Policies must be socially and eco-
nom ic al ly inclusive, including initiatives that work through the labour market as 
well as through redistributive social policies, keeping in mind throughout the 
long-term goal of promoting social mobility to break inter-generational inequalities.
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What Might Explain Today’s Conflicting 
Narratives on Global Inequality?
Martin Ravallion
1 Introduction
Public attention to the global distribution of income is probably greater today than 
at any prior time in history.1 Yet we hear two very different narratives about global 
inequality.2 Many economists claim that inequality has been falling in the world 
since around 1990.3 For example, a New York Times article by Cowen (2014) car-
ried the headline ‘Income Inequality Is Not Rising Globally. It’s Falling’.4 This has 
been seen as being driven by falling inequality between countries—the disparities 
in their mean incomes relative to the global mean. Some observers have been led 
to anticipate a far more equal world ahead. In this vein, Beddoes (2012) writes 
that: ‘The gap between the world’s rich and poor will be far narrower in 2050.’
This stands in marked contrast to the claims one often hears about the rising 
gap between the world’s rich and poor. There are many examples. The website of 
Oxfam International refers to ‘A world getting more unequal’ and an ‘inequality 
crisis’. Similarly, in a book on global inequality, Hickel (2017: 16) writes that 
‘in equal ity has been exploding’. Many observers point to the new ‘super-rich’. For 
example, as evidence of ‘today’s huge global inequality’, Basu (2018) observes that 
the ‘three richest persons have more wealth than all people of three nations—
Angola, Burkina, Congo DR’.
1 For their comments the author is grateful to Conchita D’Ambrosio, Marc Fleurbaey, Ravi 
Kanbur, Max Kasy, Paul Segal, Milan Thomas, Dominique van de Walle and participants at the 
UNU-WIDER conference, Think Development, Think WIDER, the Normative Ethics and Welfare 
Economics conference, University of Pennsylvania, and a seminar at the School of Foreign Service, 
Georgetown University.
2 Evidence for the claim of high public interest can be found by entering ‘global inequality’ and 
‘global poverty’ in the Google Ngram Viewer; here you will find the plot of the incidence of these 
phrases in all digitized text since 1950.
3 See Bourguignon (2016), Milanovic (2016), Anand and Segal (2017), and Niño-Zarazúa et al. (2017).
4 Cowen was drawing on the evidence in a working paper subsequently published in Lakner and 
Milanovic (2016a).
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Deciding which (if either) of these narratives one believes is clearly an im port ant 
aspect of how one evaluates overall social progress, and the efficacy of existing 
economic and political institutions. Here too one hears different views. For 
ex ample, Cowen (2014) argues that falling global inequality is a sign of our suc-
cess and reduces the need for public redistribution, while Hickel (2017) sees ris-
ing global inequality as indicative of a ‘development delusion’ perpetuated by 
international financial institutions striving to justify global capitalism.
This chapter tries to make some sense of these differing narratives. One might 
dismiss one side or the other as poorly informed, or as some ideologically driven 
conspiracy to hide the truth. But these are not very satisfactory responses. Both 
sides have their data; indeed, their sources are mostly the same. Conspiracies to 
delude are unlikely to work for long. The chapter tries to probe more deeply into 
the foundations of current evidence and debates. The focus is on income in equal-
ity. Of course, there are also inequalities in wealth, and in ‘non-income’ dimen-
sions of welfare, such as health, education, rights, and freedoms. But income 
inequality is the obvious place to start, given the attention it receives. The chapter’s 
intended audience is not specialists on measurement, but economists and others 
in the public at large using and interpreting data on inequality.
The chapter demonstrates that the view one takes of global income in equal ity—
the stylized facts one identifies—can be highly sensitive to relaxing some of the 
(often implicit) assumptions made in measurement. Those assumptions relate to 
both how one deals with certain systematic data deficiencies, and to the concept 
of ‘inequality’ one uses, including its ethical premises. The concepts favoured by 
economists and statisticians can differ substantially from those of the population 
at large. While the chapter does not come to a definitive conclusion as to which of 
the two narratives described above is closer to the truth, it is hoped that by mak-
ing the assumptions explicit and comprehensible, a more constructive debate will 
be possible.
The next section provides an overview of what we already know about global 
income inequality, based on the prevailing approach in economics, though with 
some new empirics for developing countries. Section 3 turns to issues pertaining 
to the underlying survey-based data, recognizing that perceptions of inequality 
may be sensitive to aspects of reality not adequately captured in standard data 
sources. The rest of the chapter takes the data as given and turns instead to two 
conceptual issues. Section  4 examines the issue of what trade-offs one accepts 
among different levels of living, and points out that with sufficient ethical aver-
sion to extreme inequality—in either tail of the distribution—one will conclude 
that global inequality is in fact rising. Section 5 turns to the distinction between 
absolute and relative inequality. The widespread use of relative measures rests on 
a ‘scale invariance axiom’ that is routinely assumed by economists measuring 
global inequality but it is unlikely to be widely endorsed by the public at large. 
Focusing instead on absolute inequality, there can be little doubt that global 
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in equal ity is rising. But this also points to a potential trade-off between absolute 
inequality and absolute poverty—an important trade-off that has received rather 
little attention.
2 An Overview of the Evidence on Global Income Inequality
Looking back over 200 years, the best available evidence suggests that global 
income inequality was on a rising trend until about 1990 (Bourguignon and 
Morrisson 2002). This was mainly driven by much of today’s rich world taking off 
economically from the early nineteenth century. Indeed, average inequality 
within countries was stagnant or even falling over much of this period, most 
notably over the middle fifty years of the twentieth century.
This is believed to have changed dramatically around the end of the twentieth 
century. The same measures suggest that an overall pattern of falling inequality 
between countries emerged, alongside rising average inequality within countries. 
Figure 2.1 shows the series of global inequality measures from Bourguignon (2016). 
We see the fall in global inequality, markedly so in the new millennium.5 This has 
been driven by a decline in inequality between countries, which accounts for the 
bulk of total inequality.6 Average inequality within countries has edged upwards.
5 Anand and Segal (2008) provide a compilation of estimates of global inequality over the period 
1960–2000 that suggest an ambiguous picture, although most estimates show a decline in the 1990s. 
However, since their series only goes up to 2000 it misses the more marked decline in the new millen-
nium (Figure 2.1).
6 Unlike the popular Gini index, for the Theil class of indices (one of which is used in Figure 2.1), 
the within and between components add up exactly to total inequality. (Exact aggregation for the Gini 



















Figure 2.1 Global inequality and its between- and within-country components
Source: Estimates from Bourguignon (2016: Table 1).
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With falling global inequality and a rising global mean income, global measures 
of poverty are expected to fall when judged against poverty lines that are fixed in 
real terms over time and across countries. This is intuitive, although it is the or -
etic al ly possible for any standard poverty measure to respond perversely to lower 
inequality alongside a rising mean (Datt and Ravallion 1992). Nonetheless, Chen 
and Ravallion (2010) show that the intuitive expectation is confirmed by the data; 
indeed, falling poverty measures are found over a very wide range of poverty lines 
(and measures), up to (and beyond) the US official line.7
‘Globalization’ has been seen as a major driver of these changes. A number of 
observers have argued that globalization simultaneously decreased inequality 
between countries while increasing it within them; see, for example, Bourguignon 
(2016) and Milanovic (2016). While the role of globalization in determining 
global inequality is not the topic of this chapter, it can be noted that its causal role 
is not beyond dispute. Elsewhere, I have raised questions about the thesis that 
globalization has produced the pattern in Figure 2.1, drawing on the evidence 
from research on both growth and distributional changes (Ravallion 2018a).
There is much heterogeneity across countries and over time in the changes in 
the aggregate statistics for within-country inequality in Figure 2.1. Inequality has 
been rising in a majority of countries in the rich world, but not everywhere.8 In a 
compilation of national Gini indices, estimated on a reasonably consistent basis, 
Atkinson and Morelli (2014) find that inequality has been increasing in recent 
years for about two-thirds of the 25 countries studied. (Only seven of the twenty-
five are developing countries, and inequality has been increasing in four of those.) 
There appears to have been even more heterogeneity within the developing world. 
The developing countries with a trend increase in inequality over the past twenty 
years or so include the two most populous, China and India, which are clearly 
putting upward pressure on the (population-weighted) within-country compo-
nent of global inequality, such as in Figure 2.1. However, inequality is falling in 
many developing countries; for example, there are clear signs that inequality has 
stabilized in China in recent years (Kanbur et al. 2017; Cai et al. 2018). There is 
also evidence of a process of inequality convergence across countries, with 
in equal ity tending to fall in high-inequality countries and rise in low-inequality 
countries, though the process appears to be slow (Ravallion 2003a).
To provide an overall description for the developing world, Figure 2.2a plots 
one of the Theil indices of inequality, namely the Mean Log Deviation (MLD) 
(also called Theil(0)), for the developing world only, and its within- and 
7 For recent evidence on both absolute and relative poverty see Ravallion and Chen (2019). For the 
latest estimates of absolute poverty measures across multiple poverty lines see the World Bank’s 
PovcalNet site.
8 Depending on the time period, one finds falling inequality in (for example) Belgium, France, 
Greece, Hungary, and Spain (OECD 2011; Morelli et al. 2014; Atkinson and Morelli 2014).
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between-country components.9 The change in direction over the past few years 
appears to be mainly due to growth in China, which has surpassed the mean for 
the developing world. Panel (b) of Figure 2.2 gives a breakdown of MLD by 
region. Latin America and the Caribbean is the region with the highest average 
inequality among its countries, though it has been falling since the early 2000s. 
There has been a trend increase in average inequality among the countries of East 
Asia. Other regions have shown little trend either way.
9 See Theil (1967). For an overview of these and other inequality measures see Cowell (2000).
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Figure 2.2  Inequality within the developing world
Source: Author’s calculations using PovcalNet.
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These observations indicate that the idea of a common global force of economic 
integration driving up inequality everywhere can be readily dismissed. Inequality 
appears to fall in some developing countries when they are opened up to trade 
and grow in the aggregate, while inequality increases in other countries (Ravallion 
2006). There are clearly many other forces in play. Indeed, during periods of eco-
nomic growth we have seen falling inequality within developing countries about 
as often as we have seen rising inequality. This was first demonstrated by Ravallion 
and Chen (1997), and more recently by Ravallion (2004), using the longest avail-
able periods (‘spells’) between two national surveys for the same country with the 
same welfare indicator (either consumption or income). Using survey data up to 
the late 1990s, Ravallion (2004) found for 120 spells that the simple correlation 
coefficient between proportionate changes (annualized difference in logs) in the 
Gini index and those for mean household consumption or income was −0.06. 
Figure 2.3 provides an update to Ravallion (2004) using an extra ten or more 
years of survey data, thus capturing the higher growth rates we have seen since 
2000; the median date of the second survey in the 144 spells is 2012. Inequality 
increased in about half the spells (70/144 for the Gini index and 68/144 for MLD). 
The update in Figure 2.3 indicates a small positive correlation (r = 0.18),10 which is 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
So there is more of a sign that the higher growth rates of mean household 
income seen in the new millennium have often come with increases in income 
inequality in developing countries. However, it is hardly a strong feature of even 
the new data in Figure 2.3. There are many instances of falling inequality in 
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Figure 2.3 Relative inequality and growth in household income per capita
Source: Author’s calculations.
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growing economies. Indeed, inequality is falling in half (59/119) of the countries 
with positive growth in the mean in Figure 2.3. There is clearly a lot more to the 
story of what is driving the country-level distributional changes observed in the 
developing world.
This chapter will not go any further into explaining these changes in inequality 
at the country level. Rather, the focus will be on the numbers on global inequality, 
including both their statistical veracity and their conceptual basis.
3 Data Concerns
There are many data issues, related to the ways in which consumption and income 
are measured in practice, the design of the household surveys used, the price 
indices, and the census data.11 This discussion focuses on those issues that are 
likely to be important to global inequality measures.
Let us begin by summarizing the standard practices underlying the estimates 
in the previous section. Almost all household surveys use personal interviews.12 
The household data refer to either consumption expenditure or disposable 
income, as reported by respondents for stipulated (often rather short) recall 
 periods. Standard practice by statistics offices uses a survey instrument that 
can cover all income sources and/or market goods and services consumed, 
including imputed values for consumption from own production, as is important 
for farm households. However, while cash transfers received from government 
are included in the income aggregates, it appears to be rare to include imputed 
values for in-kind public services consumed. Consumption is used more often 
in developing countries, while income is more common in rich countries and 
Latin America. (Consumption is often preferred to current incomes as the lat-
ter tend to be more variable over time, especially in rural-based economies. 
Given that such variability is to some degree predictable, consumption will be 
a better indicator of current welfare.) When this chapter refers to ‘income’ this 
can be taken as an abbreviation for either consumption expenditure or dispos-
able income.
It is well recognized that household income is not a sufficient statistic for aver-
age economic welfare within the household. The aim is typically to obtain a mon-
etary metric of the typical welfare level within a household. The most common 
11 Further discussion of the data issues can be found in (inter alia) Gottschalk and Smeeding 
(1997), Anand and Segal (2008), and Ravallion (2016a, Part 2).
12 The main option is phone interviews, though these are mainly found in rich countries. All the 
data issues discussed here apply to phone interviews. There is evidence (for Austria) that phone inter-
views impart an additional (downward) bias to inequality measures (Fessler et al. 2018).
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method in practice is to divide household income (or consumption) by a deflator 
that reflects both prices and demographics (household size and composition).13
3.1  Surveying Errors
There are sampling errors, of course, though the national surveys used in measur-
ing global inequality have large samples, and aggregating globally will probably 
further reduce the mean error. However, there are reasons to suspect that the 
within-country component in Figure 2.1 is systematically underestimated due to 
non-sampling errors.
An important source of bias is selective compliance with the randomized 
assignments done in sampling, such that there is a lower probability of rich 
 people being included in the final sample used to estimate inequality measures. 
Such non-random compliance in surveys is a concern almost everywhere, and 
may be becoming more worrying over time. Traditional survey instruments are 
time consuming, often requiring many hours, often including multiple house-
hold members. With rising living standards, the opportunity cost of time doing 
surveys is likely to rise; yet surveys do not appear to be getting any shorter. 
Higher income households are likely to have a higher marginal cost of survey 
participation given the opportunity cost of time. It can also be hard to reach 
rich households due to gated communities and/or residences.
In theory, such selective compliance has ambiguous effects on the Lorenz curve 
and so does not necessarily imply that inequality measures are underestimated 
(Korinek et al. 2006). However, the evidence we have suggests that there is a bias. 
On re-weighting the data for the US, Korinek et al. (2006) estimate that correcting 
for selective compliance adds five percentage points to the Gini index, bringing it 
from 0.45 to around 0.50. This method requires a common support assumption; 
this fails if (for example) none of the super-rich participate in the survey.
There are also concerns about under-reporting of incomes even when there 
is a response, especially income from capital and illicit income sources. This too 
has theoretically ambiguous effects on standard inequality measures; if some-
one living well above the mean underreports their income in the survey then 
13 The deflator is interpretable as a ‘poverty line’ (the personal cost of a fixed reference utility level) 
and the ratio is variously called ‘real income’ (up to a scalar) or the ‘welfare ratio’ (Blackorby and 
Donaldson 1987). This is only an exact money metric of utility under homothetic preferences. More 
generally, one requires an equivalent income function giving the monetary income needed to attain 
the current utility level at fixed reference prices and household characteristics (King 1983). This idea 
can also be applied with heterogeneous (non-homothetic) preferences (see, e.g., Fleurbaey and 
Blanchet 2013). Applications are still scarce. An example in the context of measuring poverty can be 
found in Ravallion and van de Walle (1991).
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this need not reduce the popular Gini index (and may even increase it), though 
such under-reporting will always reduce MLD.14
Reflecting both selective compliance and under-reporting, estimates using 
income tax records have indicated larger ‘high-end’ incomes than are found in 
surveys (Atkinson et al. 2011). Unlike household surveys, income reporting for 
tax purposes is required by law, often with penalties for non-compliance or false 
reports. However, the narrow coverage of income tax schemes in most developing 
countries makes this a less convincing approach in such settings, though the data 
from tax records that do exist can still provide a useful clue. Drawing on income 
tax records, Chancel and Piketty (2017) provide estimates (requiring many 
assumptions) of inequality measures for India that suggest considerably higher 
income inequality than those underlying the numbers for South Asia in Figure 
2.2. Similarly, the finding in Figure 2.2 of relatively low inequality in the Middle 
East and North Africa, based on household surveys, changes when one draws on 
these other data sources to better reflect the high-end; see World Inequality Lab 
(2018) using their World Inequality Database (WID). Anand and Segal (2017) 
estimate global inequality measures by combining survey-based distributions 
with data on top incomes from the WID. Then the decline in global inequality is 
only evident from 2005, with little sign of a trend either way prior to that.
My expectation is that inequality within countries is both higher and rising 
more than the data in Figure 2.1 suggest, on the presumption that many newly 
affluent respondents are reticent to fully reveal their gains or even to participate 
in surveys. It is unclear what bias if any would be imparted to Figure 2.3.
3.2  Two Neglected Sources of Bias
Two data issues that are relevant to inequality measures stand out as especially 
neglected in the literature. The first relates to intra-household inequality. The 
standard (indeed, near universal) assumption is that there is equality within the 
household. This is almost certainly wrong, and the direction of bias is clear: we 
will underestimate overall inequality. Evidence on the magnitude of this bias is 
scarce. In one of the few cases in which we can estimate the distribution of con-
sumption within households, Lambert et al. (2014) find a Gini index in Senegal of 
0.60 when one attributes to each person the average per capita consumption of 
his or her household. If instead each individual is attributed the per capita con-
sumption of his or her subgroup within the household, then the Gini index rises 
14 This follows from a result in Cowell and Flachaire (2018), namely that, when comparing two 
distributions that differ in one person’s income, the greater the distance from equality, the higher the 
inequality.
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to 0.63.15 It is unclear how this source of bias would affect the time profile of 
in equal ity, though there is some evidence that gender inequalities are declining in 
some relevant domains, notably schooling (World Bank 2011). Then we might 
conjecture that the impact of this omission is becoming less important over time. 
If so, then this source of bias may attenuate the rise in average inequality within 
countries.
The second issue relates to prices. Differences in prices between countries are 
dealt with using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates of exchange. Since price 
 levels tend to be higher in richer countries (especially due to higher wage rates, 
implying higher prices of non-traded goods), using PPPs rather than official 
exchange rates tends to reduce the level of inequality between countries. For 
example, Milanovic (2005) shows that the global Gini index using PPPs is 0.65, 
as compared to 0.81 using official exchange rates. PPPs are systematically revised 
at times in the light of the new price surveys across countries (as used to esti-
mate the PPPs) and methodological changes. The PPPs from the 2011 round of 
price surveys saw upward revisions in the estimated real incomes for some 
developing countries (notably in Asia) implying lower global inequality meas-
ures (Inklaar and Rao 2017). It is well known that the price surveys that feed 
into the PPPs are biased toward urban areas, but the extent of this bias has var-
ied across regions of the world. Ravallion (2018c) argues that the 2011 price 
surveys were less urban-biased in Asia than for prior years or other regions, and 
that this change accounts for some share of the impact of the PPP revisions on 
global inequality.
It is not common to include deflators for geographic cost-of-living differences 
within counties. Within-country inequality is likely to be overestimated due to 
this omission. Using the data that are available on regional price differentials for 
Canada and the US, Lessmann (2014) confirms that standard methods (ignoring 
spatial price differences) overestimate inequality measures, though the trends 
over time are little affected. For developing countries, however, the expectation is 
that spatial price differentials will be attenuated with economic development 
(notably through lower transport costs due to better infrastructure). Then cor-
recting for this bias can be expected to reveal a steeper increase over time in 
in equal ity within countries.
Thus these two omissions in standard data sources—intra-household in equal-
ity and sub-national prices—point in opposite directions, both in terms of the 
levels and the trends over time.
15 One subgroup is the head; others comprise one or more of the wives and her children. Other 
evidence can be found in Haddad and Kanbur (1990), Sahn and Younger (2009), and De Vreyer and 
Lambert (2018).
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3.3  The Role of Nationality
In the prevailing practice among economists, ‘countries’ only have salience as 
arbitrary groupings of people. There is no concept of ‘nationality’ underlying 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2. Yet, many people seem to care more about inequality within 
their country of residence than globally.
There are competing views on the relevance of national borders to inequality 
and policy responses. Philosophers such as Singer (2010) argue that national bor-
ders, or distance, are not morally relevant to the case for helping disadvantaged 
people whom we can help. By this view, one should care about everyone, no mat-
ter where they live. This has been dubbed the ‘cosmopolitan view’.16 In the litera-
ture on inequality measurement, this view is seen as an implication of the 
‘anonymity’ (or ‘symmetry’) axiom, which says that it does not matter who has 
which income. This is an ethical premise of standard global inequality and pov-
erty measures. Against this view, there is a nationalistic approach whereby ‘global’ 
inequality is simply the average level of inequality in the world. For example, this 
is how Eurostat (2015) measure overall inequality in Europe. Brandolini and 
Carta (2016) postulate a social welfare function that treats people equally within 
the country of residence but puts lower weight on foreigners.
This chapter takes the cosmopolitan view. This does not deny that nations exist 
and that their governments typically take actions to address inequality within 
their borders. The institutional fact of nation states and the limitations of global 
institutions constrain what global redistribution can be achieved in practice. 
These real-world constraints do not, however, diminish the moral case for a 
cosmo pol itan perspective on ‘global inequality’—a perspective that values all 
people of the world equally, no matter where they may happen to live.
The cosmopolitan view still allows a role for nationality, independently of 
‘own-income’. The issue can be thought about in terms of omissions/errors in 
measuring individual welfare. Inequality and poverty measures are summary 
stat is tics of a distribution of money-metrics of welfare. The type of global in equal-
ity measure found in this literature implicitly characterizes individual welfare in a 
rather narrow way, as solely a function of individual consumption or income as 
measured in surveys. One way in which national income may matter in de pen-
dent ly of ‘own-income’ stems from the longstanding idea of relative deprivation. 
This postulates a welfare loss from economic gains to (say) co-residents that are 
not shared with the person in question. Then we can rationalize a nationalistic 
view that ‘global inequality’ is just the average national inequality across 
16 See the discussions in Caney (2005), Nagel (2005), and Brandolini and Carta (2016).
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countries. This emerges as the limiting case in which only one’s relative income 
within the country of residence matters.17
Against this view, it can be argued that there are also (positive) external welfare 
gains from living in a richer country that would not be reflected in survey-based 
‘own-incomes’. A case in point is Wagner’s Law (Musgrave 1969), namely that the 
share of national income devoted to public services rises with income.18 While 
Wagner’s Law need not apply to all types of public spending or all countries, it is a 
plausible assumption that richer countries have better public goods and that these 
deliver gains in economic welfare that are not adequately captured in the survey-
based measures of current disposable income or consumption expenditure used 
in measuring global inequality. Administrative and judicial capabilities tend to 
improve, creating more secure economic opportunities that need not be well 
reflected in current incomes. Mean income can also pick up income op por tun-
ities not reflected in the recall periods used in surveys. Studies of global subjective 
welfare suggest that people feel better off in richer countries at a given level of 
own household income; one such study concludes that ‘a richer person in a rich 
nation would be better off than a rich person in a poor country’ (Diener et al. 
2013: 273).
In short, one can point to plausible arguments and some evidence to support 
the view that there are positive external effects of living in a richer country at 
given own income. This can stem from the likely positive correlation between 
national income and factors conducive to a higher long-run personal income, 
better public services, and greater security. None of these gains are likely to be 
properly reflected in current incomes as measured in surveys.
The implication is clear: the (large) differences in average incomes found 
between rich and poor countries create an extra (horizontal) inequality between 
their residents, not reflected in their observed current incomes. This is a source of 
downward bias in prevailing measures of the between-country component of 
global inequality. Yet the likelihood that living in a richer country delivers gains 
to economic welfare that are not reflected in survey-based incomes has been 
entirely ignored by past measures of global inequality. What does this imply 
quantitatively for measures of global inequality?
3.4 Testing Sensitivity to Allowing National Income to Matter
To test the sensitivity of global inequality measures to allowing national income 
to matter to individual welfare, one needs to adjust survey-based incomes. It is 
17 Note that the national mean of the ratio of own income to the national mean is unity for all 
countries, leaving no inequality between countries.
18 For evidence of this see Akitoby et al. (2006) and Afonso and Alves (2017).
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assumed that this adjustment does not change (relative) inequality within countries. 
All incomes within a given country are then multiplied by the constant that depends 
on the national mean, preserving the distribution within countries. Specifically, 
the adjusted income is m yjt ijt
α  where yijt ( ).> 0 denotes the surveyed income of 
household i in country j at time t, mjt  is the corresponding mean in j, and α  is a 
parameter reflecting the extra value attached to (log) national income.19 Global 
inequality is then measured using the distribution of these adjusted incomes. The 
standard approach among economists (such as used in the estimates reported in 
Section 2) has α = 0.  When α = −1  we have the strongly relative view of Easterlin 
(1974) and others, whereby only relative income matters ( / ).*y y mijt ijt jt=  (A value 
of α < −1  can be ruled out under the assumption that yijt*  is non-decreasing in 
own income at given relative income.) For α− < <1 0, the welfare metric depends 
positively on both own income and relative income.20 Then the adjusted (log) 
income is a weighted mean of log survey-based income and log relative income 
(i.e., the log of adjusted income is ( )In In / )).1+ −α αy mijt ijt jt(y  However, we can 
also allow that (on balance) a higher national mean implies higher real income at 
given own-income, based on the surveys, that is, α > 0.  Clearly this will yield a 
higher between-country component of global inequality. The higher the value 
of α ,  the greater the between-country inequality (Ravallion 2018b).
A clue to the value of a can be found in the literature on subjective welfare. In 
most of that literature, either the samples are micro-data drawn for one country, 
or the analysis is based on comparisons of means across countries. What we need 
is a study of ‘global’ micro-data. One such study is Helliwell et al. (2010), which 
reports regression coefficients of subjective wellbeing on own-income and national 
income (GDP per capita), both in logs; the ratio of the coefficient on log national 
income to that on log own-income gives an estimate of α .21 The regressions 
 suggest a positive value with an upper bound estimate around α = 0.5.  However, 
there are also indirect effects of national income through the other control variables 
used in Helliwell et al., so the true value of α  is likely to be higher. For example, the 
indirect effect via life expectancy alone would add about 0.05 to the effect of log 
national income on satisfaction with life, which would raise the upper bound 
estimate for α  to around 0.6 (Ravallion 2018b).
How much does the choice of α  matter empirically? Clearly the strong 
form of relative deprivation theory α = −( 1)  implies that global interpersonal 
in equal ity is far lower than prevailing measures suggest since it is then entirely 
19 Alternatively, the effect of national income could be additive 
 
( )./*y y mjt jti ijt≡ α  There are two 
 reasons to question this. First, it does not seem plausible that the gain from living in a rich country is 
constant for everyone in that country; it would seem more plausible that it is greater for higher-
income households. Second, the additive form does not allow for relative de priv ation whereby 
adjusted income has a positive weight on y mijt jt/ .
20 This is the special case considered by Ravallion and Chen (2013) and Milanovic and 
Roemer (2016).
21 Also see Helliwell (2008) and Diener et al. (2010).
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within countries. This changes dramatically when one attaches a positive value to 
national income (at given own-income), such as when living in a richer country 
brings benefits in terms of access to non-market goods and services, and better 
opportunities for private support. Figure 2.4 shows how the global MLD varies 
with α for 1993 and 2012. Global inequality falls as long as α > −0 6. .22 Also 
notice that the upward adjustment to the measure of global inequality rises 
sharply with higher α.
For even moderate α, (positive) global inequality is far higher than prevailing 
measures suggest, and far higher than found in the most unequal country. Indeed, 
the differences in levels of inequality due to even rather modest differences in 
how one values national mean income tend to swamp the differences seen over 
time in standard measures, or the differences we see between countries. They are 
also large relative to the impact of even a substantial underestimation of the 
incomes of the rich. Suppose, for example, that incomes of all the richest 1 per 
cent in the world are actually double the numbers in Lakner and Milanovic 
(2016a) for 2008.23 This would add about 0.1 to MLD,24 which is about the same 
as adding 10 per cent of log national mean income to log own income to allow for 
the gains from living in an economically-better off country.
22 The intersection point is at α = −0.66.
23 Lakner and Milanovic estimate that in 2008 the world’s richest 1 per cent had an average income 
of US$64,213 (converted at PPP for 2005) while the overall mean was US$4,097.
24 Let all incomes of the richest pr  proportion of the population, with income share sr,  be under esti­
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Figure 2.4 Global inequality for various weights on (log) national mean income
Source: Based on Ravallion (2018b).
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In summary, the stylized fact that overall inequality has been falling since 
around 1990 is not robust, though one only finds rising inequality with a seem-
ingly high negative weight on national income, such as due to a strong welfare 
effect of relative deprivation. The finding of falling between-country inequality 
since 1990 is robust whatever value (positive or negative) one attaches to national 
income in assessing individual economic welfare.
This discussion has focused on data-related issues. The rest of the chapter will 
largely take the data as given and focus on the conceptual foundations of prevail-
ing measures.
4  Ethical Aversion to Extremes in Either Tail
It has long been recognized that an inequality index can be thought of as a sum-
mary statistic of the normative judgements made about how different levels of 
income are weighted in assessing social welfare. This was made explicit in Dalton 
(1920) and developed further in Atkinson (1970) who proposed a class of in equal-
ity measures in which the aversion to inequality is represented by an ethical 
parameter, reflecting the trade-offs allowed between incomes at different levels. 
(The discussion will return to this measure.)
We must first unpack Figure 2.1 to see how income gains were distributed. 
Milanovic (2013) and Lakner and Milanovic (2016a) provide an informative 
 picture of the evolution of income distribution in the world. They plot the pro-
portionate gain in income over 1988–2008 against fractiles of the income 
 distribution, as reproduced in Figure 2.5; this is a version of a ‘growth incidence 
curve’ (GIC) (Ravallion and Chen 2003).25 Figure 2.5 has been dubbed the 
‘ elephant chart’ since it traces the shape of an elephant’s head with its trunk held 
high. On the right side we see rising inequality in the rich world; between the 
80th percentile (from the bottom) and the top 1 per cent globally we see a steeply 
positive curve (the elephant’s raised trunk), rising from near zero growth to over 
a 60 per cent gain for the top percentile. But we also see something striking—the 
25 The methodology used to construct the GIC in Figure 2.4 is explained in Lakner and Milanovic 
(2016a). Note that the version of the GIC in Lakner and Milanovic gives growth rates for ventiles 
(with the top 1 per cent separated out) rather than percentiles. This smooths their curve. The per cen-
tile version can be found in Corlett (2016). This shows negative growth rates among the poorest and in 
a neighbourhood of the eightieth percentile. These have been averaged out in the Lakner and 
Milanovic version, as also used in Milanovic (2016). The negative values at the bottom probably reflect 
compositional effects, given that the set of countries is not held fixed. This is consistent with the fact 
that the ‘quasi-non-anonymous’ GIC in Lakner and Milanovic (2016a: Figure 5) does not show any 
negative growth rates.
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marked proportionate rise in incomes for those near the middle of the global 
distribution (the elephant’s massive and expanding head). This came with consid-
erably slower growth for the poorest decile.
Based on the elephant graph, Milanovic (2016) argues that the rich world’s 
lower-middle class—by interpretation, those living around the 80th percentile of 
Figure 2.5—have seen little or no gain from globalization. This is in marked con-
trast to the middle class of the developing world, who have seen substantial gains 
in the wake of the falling incidence of absolute poverty.26 The largest percentage 
gain in the elephant graph is close to the global median. In Milanovic’s inter-
pretation, the emerging middle class in the developing world have been the big 
gainers from globalization, while the losers were the (relatively) poor and middle 
class within the rich world.
Whether or not one agrees with Milanovic on the importance of globalization 
to the elephant graph, it is clear that this is a much more ambiguous picture of 
distributional change than suggested by the claim that ‘global inequality is 
26 Ravallion (2010) argues that the developing world’s middle class can be defined as those who are 
not poor by typical standards in poor countries, but are poor by standards of rich countries. By this 
definition the middle class has expanded greatly, and is now a huge segment of the population—
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Figure 2.5 The elephant graph of Lakner and Milanovic
Source: Based on estimates in Lakner and Milanovic (2016a).
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falling’. The global Lorenz curves intersect internally, both at low percentiles 
and in the second decile from the top, as can be seen in Figure 2.6. While the 
overall Gini index fell (from 72 per cent to 71 per cent) this came with a 
marked inward shift of the Lorenz curve around the middle—between the 30th 
and 80th percentiles—and an outward shift among the top decile, and a declin-
ing share for the poorest 5 per cent. The Lakner–Milanovic estimates imply that 
the share of the world’s top 1 per cent rose from 12 per cent to 15 per cent 
between 1988 and 2008. Some valid inequality measures (such as the Gini index 
and the Theil index, as in Figure 2.1) can show a decrease while other equally 
valid measures do not. This is an implication of the fact that there is not Lorenz 
dominance in Figure 2.6.27
Consider now the Atkinson (1970) index. This has a parameter ε reflecting the 
aversion to inequality; a higher value of ε implies that one is willing to incur a 
greater loss when transferring money from the rich to the poor (i.e., a lower share 
27 Lorenz dominance requires that one Lorenz curve is entirely within the other up to its end 
points. Such dominance implies an unambiguous ordering for all measures satisfying the Pigou–
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Figure 2.6 Lorenz curves for global income 1988 and 2008
Source: Based on estimates in Lakner and Milanovic (2016a).
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actually reaching the poor) and yet still judge that social welfare has increased. 











ε ε/( )  
where
 
yi is the income of person i = 1, . . .,n while the overall mean is ȳ, and where ε > 1 is 
the ethical parameter reflecting inequality-aversion;28 the higher the value of the 
greater the loss one is willing to incur when transferring money from the rich to 
the poor and yet still judge that social welfare has increased. In Ravallion (2018a) 
I calculate that the Atkinson index of global in equal ity has fallen over 1988–2008 
for ε ≤ 4 but that inequality has risen for ε = 5. This is a high value for the Atkinson 
parameter compared to those found in the literature, which are rarely above 2. 
(Atkinson’s (1970) illustrative calculations of his index tested sensitivity up to 
2.5.) The upshot of these observations is that with sufficiently strong aversion to 
inequality, one will judge that global in equal ity has risen over this period.
Similarly to the Gini and Theil indices, the Atkinson index satisfies the Pigou– 
Dalton transfer axiom, namely that any (mean-preserving) income transfer for 
which the donor has a higher initial (and final) income than the recipient must 
reduce inequality. This axiom need not be universally accepted. In a survey I did 
in 2018 of my undergraduate students (using a confidential computer-based sur-
vey tool) I asked which of these two distributions had higher inequality: A: (2, 4, 
6, 10) or B: (2, 5, 5, 10). About half (36/71) said A, consistent with the transfer 
axiom. But 31 per cent said B. I also asked the same question using the an onym-
ous polling tool in Twitter. Out of 214 respondents in a 24-hour period, I again 
found that about half (53 per cent) ranked the two distributions consistently with 
the transfer axiom. By contrast, 21 per cent said B was more unequal while the 
remainder said that the extent of inequality was no different between A and B.
In exploring this further with my students, I found that almost all (92 per cent) 
said that (2, 4, 6) was more unequal than (3, 4, 5), consistent with the transfer 
axiom. So it is not that those who thought that (2, 5, 5, 10) was more unequal 
than (2, 4, 6, 10) generally rejected the transfer axiom. Rather (as came out in 
class discussion), they put extra weight on the greater inequality in the tails, not-
ably among the ‘rich’. The fact that the richest person, with an income of 10, had 
even more in B than the next richest was troubling to my students, and out-
weighed the more equal middle. This is an example of what can be called an 
 ethic al aversion to ‘high-end inequality’, and it may override the Pigou–Dalton 
principle, and not be reflected in any standard inequality index.
Of course, the fact that growth is positive for such a large segment of the popu-
lation in Figure 2.5 is good news. This assures that we see a reduction in any 
standard measure of absolute poverty (for which the poverty line is fixed in real 
28 For ε = 1 the Atkinson index is one minus the ratio of the geometric mean to the arithmetic mean.
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terms over a wide range of possible poverty lines). Indeed, one finds first-order 
dominance over this period, for a very wide range of poverty lines, up to and 
beyond the US official line (Chen and Ravallion 2010, 2013).29
However, there has been much less progress for the world’s poorest, who can 
reasonably be said to have been ‘left behind’. We already saw a hint of this in the 
elephant graph (Figure 2.5). But this graph is highly aggregated at the bottom. We 
need a lens with higher magnification, and we need to fix the set of countries to 
avoid selection bias. To see how the poorest are doing we need to measure the 
floor to living standards—below which their density is zero and above which it is 
positive. The floor cannot be reliably measured by the lowest observed consump-
tion or income in a survey, which is likely to be a noisy indicator. Elsewhere I 
have proposed that the floor should be estimated instead as the weighted mean 
consumption of those living below some level, with higher weight on people with 
lower observed consumption (Ravallion 2016b). When the weights decline lin-
ear ly, the expected value of the floor is z SPGPG1−( ),  where Z is the income level 
above which there is no chance of being the poorest person while SPG and PG are 
the squared-poverty gap and poverty gap indices using z as the poverty line. This 
measure indicates only very modest growth in the floor of the distribution of per-
manent consumption in the world, which is still barely above a survival level 
(Ravallion 2016b).
For the purpose of this chapter, Figure 2.7a provides an update of the estimates 
in Ravallion (2016b). I have set z at the World Bank’s international poverty line of 
US$1.90 per person per day at 2011 purchasing power parity. From around 2000, 
the developing world has seen a substantial increase in the mean consumption, 
but this has clearly not been shared by the poorest. We see both absolute and rela-
tive divergence between the floor and the mean. One caveat on Figure 2.7a is that 
the data include income surveys (about one-third of the 2,400 household surveys 
on which the Figure 2.7 is based). Incomes can be zero or negative, but this need 
not be indicative of living standards. However, the results are essentially the same 
if one takes out the income surveys and only uses consumption, as can be seen in 
Figure 2.7b.
This finding that the poorest have seen rather little progress raises a serious 
moral concern about how the distribution of income is evolving in the world. 
The concern echoes social policy discussions, which have often put emphasis 
(at least in their rhetoric) on the need to raise the floor—for example, the desire 
29 First-order dominance implies an unambiguous poverty ranking for all additive measures 
(Atkinson  1987). Note that first-order dominance is not implied by the Lakner–Milanovic 
GIC. However, this reflects the fact that the set of countries is not fixed; when one holds countries 
constant, one obtains positive growth rates at all percentiles in their dataset (Lakner and Milanovic 
2016a: Figure 5).
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to ‘leave no one behind’ is prominent in the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). In the period from the middle of the nineteenth to 
the middle of the twentieth century, during which time today’s rich world virtu-
ally eliminated extreme absolute poverty, more progress appears to have been 
made in raising the consumption floor than we are seeing in the developing 
world today (Ravallion 2016b).
We have seen that introducing a stronger ethical aversion to inequality changes 
the assessment of whether global inequality is increasing. If one puts a very high 
weight on the poorest then one will also conclude that global inequality is rising. 
The same is true if one introduces greater aversion to rising high-end inequality. 
These two factors—the lack of progress for the poorest, and steep gains to the 
richest—thus point in the same direction.
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Figure 2.7 Consumption floor for the developing world
Source: Author’s calculations.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/02/21, SPi
Martin Ravallion 37
The findings of this section also point to the limitations of some widely used 
inequality measures. As noted, the fact that there is not Lorenz dominance 
implies that some measures will show a decrease in global inequality and some 
will show an increase. This relates to the underlying differences in the ethical 
weights attached to changes at different income levels. Measures such as the 
ratio of the mean to the median and the inter-quartile range may be quite 
insensitive to what is happening at the tails, among the poorest and the richest, 
though (by the same token) they will be more robust to errors in the tails than 
other measures.
5  Absolute Inequality
The empirical literature has focused almost solely on measures of relative in equal-
ity, whereby the measure depends on the ratios of incomes. This class of measures 
follows from the scale invariance axiom (SIA) in the theory of inequality 
 measurement, which says that the measure of inequality does not change when all 
incomes are multiplied by a constant. However, this is an axiom. It need not be 
accepted. The alternative axiom is translation invariance, which says that the 
in equal ity index is unaffected by adding a constant. This yields absolute in equal-
ity measures that depend instead on the absolute differences (not normalized by 
the current mean). The choice depends entirely on what axiom one prefers—scale 
invariance or translation invariance. There is no right or wrong answer, as the or-
et ic al papers on inequality measurement have long recognized.30 Yet the bulk of 
the applied work on global inequality has used relative measures.31 Indeed, this is 
typically done without even noting the fact that the option exists of using absolute 
measures.
Two examples illustrate the difference. Consider first the Gini index. The 
 absolute Gini index is simply the average absolute difference between all pairs of 
incomes, Σ Σi j i jy y n| | /− 2
2  (one can normalize by a fixed reference mean). By 
contrast, in  calculating the relative Gini index all household incomes are nor-
malized by the current mean. The second example is the standard deviation, 
s y yi i= −( )Σ ( ) .
/2 1 2 This is clearly an absolute inequality measure, since adding a 
constant to all incomes leaves it unchanged. (The same is true of the variance) 
Consider instead the coefficient of variation, s2) This is the corresponding rela-
tive inequality measure, in that multiplying by a constant leaves the measure 
unchanged.
30 See, for example, Dalton (1920), Kolm (1976), Blackorby and Donaldson (1980), Chakravarty 
and Tyagarupananda (1998), and Bosmans and Cowell (2010).
31 Exceptions are Ravallion (2003b, 2004, 2014), Atkinson and Brandolini (2010), Anand and Segal 
(2015), and Niño-Zarazúa et al. (2017).
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There is no sign of a popular consensus on this issue. A number of experiments 
(all with university students to my knowledge) have found that 40–60 per cent of 
participants (in the UK, Israel, Germany, and the US) think about inequality in 
absolute rather than relative terms.32 In the aforementioned surveys of my stu-
dents at Georgetown I have found that the majority do not accept the SIA. For 
example, when asked which of the two income distributions, (1, 2, 3) and (2, 4, 6), 
has higher inequality (if either), 258 (56 per cent) out of 460 students said it was 
the latter distribution. When comparing (2, 4, 6) with (4, 8, 12), 57 per cent said 
that the latter had higher inequality. Similarly, in my aforementioned Twitter sur-
vey, out of 247 responses in a 24-hour period (21/22 November 2018), 48 per cent 
said that (2, 4, 6) had higher inequality than (1, 2, 3), while 45 per cent said 
in equal ity was the same. While these are hardly random samples drawn from any 
well-defined population, they are at least consistent with the view that many 
 people view inequality as absolute, not relative.
Even if relative inequality does not change during a period of growth in mean 
income, the absolute income gains to the rich will obviously be greater than those 
for the poor, given existing inequality. We saw in the previous section that a focus 
on the poorest suggests rising inequality, both relative and absolute. Figure 2.8 
32 The literature on survey-based perceptions of inequality has followed Amiel and Cowell (1992), 
who found that 40 per cent of the university students they surveyed (in the UK and Israel) thought 
about inequality in absolute rather than relative terms. Harrison and Seidl (1994) report similar find-
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Figure 2.8 Elephant or serpent?
Note: Incidence of the absolute income gains corresponding to Figure 2.5.
Source: Author’s calculation using the estimates made by Lakner and Milanovic (2016a).
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gives the absolute GIC—the US$ gains across percentiles of the whole distribu-
tion. Compared to Figure 2.5, the elephant’s head has shrunk greatly relative to 
the trunk. Over this 20-year period, the absolute gain in mean daily income of the 
poorest 5 per cent was 7 cents per person, while for the richest 1 per cent it was 
almost US$70 (and the latter number could well be an underestimate, as noted in 
Section 2). In absolute terms, the developing world’s middle class and (especially) 
its poor have gained rather little; it is only because they started off so poor that the 
elephant’s head is so large in the (relative) GIC in Figure 2.5. While the relative 
Gini index fell slightly (from 0.72 to 0.71) the absolute version rose appreciably 
(from 0.72 to 0.90).33
We saw in Figure 2.3 that there is weak correlation between changes in the rela-
tive Gini index and growth rates. This becomes much stronger when one switches 
to the absolute Gini index, as can be seen in Figure 2.9. Higher rates of growth in 
the overall mean come with steeper increases in absolute inequality. This is hardly 
surprising, given that the absolute Gini index is (up to a scaler) the relative index 
times the mean. However, the comparison of Figures 2.3 and 2.9 underlines the 
sensitivity of statements about inequality and growth to the axiomatic founda-
tions. Switch out one axiom and the picture changes a lot. The (many) people who 
view inequality as absolute rather than relative will probably see sharply rising 
inequality in growing economies. They are not wrong; they simply have a differ-
ent concept of what ‘inequality’ means.
When combined with the tendency for measures of absolute poverty to fall 
with growth in mean income, the (strong) tendency for absolute inequality to rise 
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Figure 2.9 Absolute inequality and growth in household income per capita
Source: Author’s calculations.
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with that growth points to a trade-off between reducing absolute inequality and 
reducing poverty, as discussed in Ravallion (2005). Figure 2.10 illustrates this 
point, by plotting the annualized growth rate of the headcount index of absolute 
poverty (using US$1.90 a day) against the corresponding growth rate in the abso-
lute Gini index (as used in Figure 2.9).34 This pattern suggests that those who see 
inequality as absolute and give high priority to reducing it may well find them-
selves living in an absolutely poorer world. Greater clarity is needed on what 
trade-offs one is willing to accept between reducing absolute inequality and 
reducing absolute poverty.
Will we see absolute inequality start to decline at some point in the future? 
That depends on what absolute gaps we focus on and whether relative inequality 
is declining. If we are talking about the world’s richest 1 per cent (say) and the 
poorest 1 per cent then it is plain that we will not see a declining absolute gap in 
the foreseeable future if recent trends continue, since we are not even seeing fall-
ing relative inequality between the two groups of people.
There is a range of ‘middle’ incomes for which recent trends do suggest declin-
ing absolute inequality over the next few decades. Compare the world’s middle 
incomes—the 50th–60th percentiles, say (just above the global median)—with 
the income of the 80th–90th percentiles, that is, the group that Milanovic (2016) 
identifies as the rich world’s ‘middle class’. The elephant graph (Figure 2.5) shows 
that the former group saw incomes growing strongly at 3.6 per cent per annum 
over 1988–2008, while the latter group saw little growth (0.23 per cent per 
34 The correlation coefficient of −0.37 (n = 136) is significant at the 1 per cent level. If one drops the 
outlier with the highest rate of increase in the poverty rate (Figure 2.10) then the correlation coeffi-
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Figure 2.10 Plot of changes in absolute poverty against changes in absolute inequality 
across developing countries
Source: Author’s calculations.
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annum). The ratio of mean incomes in 2008 was 5.7 (Lakner and Milanovic 
2016a: Table 3). Then it can be readily verified that absolute inequality between 
the two will decline, though it will take fifty-three years for the two income levels 
to converge if recent trends continue.35 One might question whether a near zero 
growth rate of the rich world’s middle class is sustainable. Suppose instead that 
this income group sees a 1 per cent per annum growth rate, with all else 
unchanged. Then absolute divergence between the rich world’s middle class and 
the world’s middle will rise for the next twenty years, and only then start to fall, 
vanishing after about seventy years.
Such calculations should be taken with a grain of salt. They only serve to illus-
trate that absolute inequality is likely to persist for some time even with falling 
relative inequality. Indeed, with current trends, the gap will rise between the 
world’s richest and poorest, and may well also do so between the rich world’s 
middle class and the new middle class of the developing world.
6  Conclusions
It is important to know how robust prevailing measures of global income in equal-
ity are to relaxing the (often implicit) assumptions made in measurement. This is 
not just an academic question. The measures used to inform public debates 
should accord with popular perceptions of what ‘inequality’ means. That is almost 
certainly not the case at present. And that provides a clue to understanding the 
differing narratives one hears on what is happening to inequality.
Within-country measures based on standard data sources may well underesti-
mate inequality, though some data deficiencies point in the opposite direction. 
There are many issues, but one stands out in my view: selective compliance with 
the randomized assignments in surveys. This is a serious and (possibly) increas-
ing concern for measuring inequality almost everywhere. This does not necessar-
ily imply that inequality measures are underestimated, but the evidence so far 
suggests that they are. Appropriate re-weighting methods can address this prob-
lem in a way that is internally consistent with the survey, but may still miss the 
extremes. Triangulation with other data sources (such as income tax records 
when coverage and compliance are adequate) can also help correct the problem. 
Going forward, the technology of surveying may need to adapt if it is to produce 
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yi is the base year income of group i = 0,1 (where y1 > y0) and gi is the corresponding growth factor 
(1+growth rate).
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distributional data that represent well the relevant populations. Better linkage 
across survey and administrative data bases will also help.
When one considers the conceptual foundations of prevailing approaches, one 
finds further reasons to question the robustness of the claim that global income 
inequality has been falling over the past thirty years. With sufficient ethical aver-
sion to lack of progress by the poorest, or to steeply rising top incomes, one con-
cludes that global inequality has been rising. A focus on the middle of the global 
distribution suggests that relative inequality is falling, though it will clearly be a 
long time (fifty or more years) before the developing world’s emerging middle 
class catches up on average with the rich world’s middle class.
Rising global inequality is also indicated if one holds a very strong concern 
about relative deprivation (or, equivalently, a highly nationalistic perspective on 
global inequality). However, a more serious omission in prevailing measures may 
well be that they do not allow for the benefits of living in a richer country at any 
given level of own-income as measured in surveys. With even a seemingly mod-
est positive effect of national income on individual welfare, global inequality is far 
higher than we think, though still falling over time.
A credible argument suggesting that global inequality may in fact be rising is 
found in concerns about the commonly assumed (but contentious) ‘scale invari-
ance axiom’. It appears that many people do not accept the relativism implied by 
this axiom; instead, they look to the absolute gaps between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ in 
assessing inequality. Then we see clear signs of rising absolute inequality in grow-
ing economies. We also see that the world’s poorest are being left behind in the 
wave of higher rates of economic growth in the new millennium. While there are 
fewer people living near the world’s floor of living standards, that floor has risen 
little despite overall economic growth. A measure based on the income gaps 
across the whole distribution indicates that absolute inequality has been rising 
globally with economic growth, and that can be expected to continue for some 
time given the level of current inequality.
The measurement issues reviewed here are salient to the debates on glo bal iza-
tion. Different sides in that debate appear often to hold different ideas about what 
‘inequality’ means (though at times one also hears claims that have no imaginable 
basis in reason or fact). Those who talk about the widening gap between rich and 
poor appear to have in mind absolute inequality, not relative inequality. Yet one 
cannot say that one of these concepts is right and the other wrong—the difference 
is solely based on the choice between two rival axioms in the theory of inequality 
measurement. The standard definition in terms of relativities can be questioned; 
if one does not accept the scale invariance axiom then one can justifiably reject 
relative measures in favour of absolute ones (satisfying the translation invariance 
axiom). In this respect, the measurement tools used in this literature appear to be 
woefully incomplete for informing the public discourse about ‘inequality’.
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In conclusion, the claim that global income inequality has been falling over 
the past few decades holds over a subset of the defensible measures, but only a 
subset. This ambiguity belies the (confident) claims one often hears, with one 
side predicting a far more equal world ahead, and the other claiming that 
development has failed. Given the scope for sensible people to disagree on the 
desirable properties of an inequality measure—and there is no scientific case 
for the near monopoly of relative measures in applied work by economists—
more productive debates on globalization and development might be possible 
if both sides better understood what concepts of inequality they are using. To 
talk about ‘inequality’ without making explicit whether one means absolute or 
relative inequality is especially problematic. The non-robustness found in this 
chapter also points to the limitations of both a single concept of inequality and 
any single overall measure, such as the popular Gini index. A single measure is 
unlikely to be acceptable to everyone. Thankfully, the more flexible tools that 
are now available for representing distributional change, such as (absolute and 
relative) growth incidence curves, can be used to better inform public debates 
on this topic.
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Comparing Global Inequality of  
Income and Wealth
James Davies and Anthony Shorrocks
1 Introduction
The past half century has seen a huge expansion in the quantity and quality of 
available information on income distribution throughout the world.1 Sample sur-
veys are conducted more frequently, and in more countries, using methods for 
data collection and analysis that have improved beyond recognition. This has led 
growing numbers of researchers to study inequality trends over time within 
countries and to undertake comparisons between countries. More adventurous 
researchers have gone further and attempted to provide estimates of the distribu-
tion of income for the world as a whole.
This line of work prompted us a decade ago to initiate similar research on the 
distribution of global wealth, reported first in Davies et al. (2008, 2011) and con-
tinued more recently in the Credit Suisse Global Wealth Report and Databook 
(see Davies et al. 2018a, 2018b). The global wealth estimates are obtained from a 
synthetic wealth sample representative of all adults in the world and totalling 
more than a million observations in each year. For the present study, we have 
constructed a similar global income sample using the World Income Inequality 
Dataset. Together, these two synthetic datasets provide a unique opportunity to 
apply the same research methodology to both the income and wealth samples, 
enabling us to compare and analyse—for the first time—the level and trend of 
global income and wealth inequality this century.
To set the scene, Section 2 reviews past work on global income and wealth 
inequality. In Section 3 we discuss the choices faced in constructing our income 
and wealth samples, and the degree to which the income and wealth concepts are 
comparable. The trends in global income and wealth inequality this century are 
examined in Section 4. Section 5 explores the different ways in which between-
country and within-country factors contribute to global inequality. Finally, in 
1 We thank Rodrigo Lluberas and Cinar Baymul for help in producing the global wealth and 
income microdata.
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Section 6, we decompose the inequality trend since the year 2000 to show the 
separate influence of changes in inequality within countries and changes in mean 
income or wealth combined with population size. All of our decomposition exer-
cises apply the Shorrocks–Shapley approach, which allows any inequality meas-
ure to be decomposed in an attractive manner.
2 Previous Studies of Global Inequality
Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) provided the first estimates of global income 
inequality by combining data on the average level of income across countries with 
information on the distribution of income within countries, as captured by the 
quintile income shares. They concluded that global income inequality rose from 
the early nineteenth century up to the Second World War, and was then fairly 
steady until about 1980. These findings have been broadly confirmed in subse-
quent studies: see Anand and Segal (2008), Niño-Zarazúa et al. (2014), and Van 
Zanden et al. (2014).
Improved coverage and quality of data after 1980 expanded the opportunities 
for research, but also led to more variation regarding both the methodological 
approaches and the results. Bhalla (2002), Dowrick and Akmal (2005), and Sala-i-
Martin (2006) are in broad agreement, reporting Gini values for global income 
inequality averaging 67.5 per cent around 1980. They also agree that global 
in equal ity rose slightly, or showed no change, from 1980 to the early 1990s, after 
which it declined (see Niño-Zarazúa et al.  2014 for details). Milanovic (2002, 
2005) comes to a different conclusion for the period 1980–90, when he finds a 
noticeable rise in the Gini coefficient.2 Dowrick and Akmal (2005) compared 
results derived using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates, finding a 
downward trend using PPP values but an upward trend using market, or ‘official’, 
exchange rates. While, in principle, PPP rates may be preferred, Dowrick and 
Akmal (2005) concluded that both methods were subject to biases, and that if 
these are corrected there appears to be no trend.
Anand and Segal (2008) surveyed the literature, identifying limitations of the 
data and the methodology which led them to conclude that there was no firm 
evidence of either an upward or a downward trend in recent decades. Subsequent 
studies have tried to correct the problems identified by Anand and Segal. 
Examples are provided by Niño-Zarazúa et al. (2014) and Lakner and Milanovic 
(2016): both studies find a downward trend since 1990, but starting from a higher 
level than reported in previous studies—a Gini value above 70 per cent for 
1985–8, for example.
2 See table 1 of appendix 1 in Lakner and Milanovic (2013) for a summary of Milanovic’s evolving 
estimates over his 2002, 2005, and 2012 articles.
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In recent years much attention has been paid to data deficiencies in the top tail, 
which some authors have tried to correct by adjusting the tail to conform to a 
Pareto distribution. Atkinson (2007) revised the Bourguignon and Morrisson 
(2002) estimates in this way. Lakner and Milanovic (2016) found that such an 
adjustment increased the Gini by around 5 percentage points, but found also that 
the downward trend from 1988 to 2008 disappears. Similar conclusions were 
reached by Anand and Segal (2015), who adjusted the top tail by replacing the sur-
vey income share of the top 1 per cent by the share of the top 1 per cent in the 
World Top Income Database (Alvaredo et al.  2013). This adjustment raises the 
world Gini to 70.5 per cent in 1988 and to an even higher level (71.0 per cent) in 
2005, resulting in a flat overall trend. Alvaredo et al. (2018) use the World Wealth 
and Income Database (successor to the World Top Income Database) to estimate 
the world distribution of income up to 2016, using top-tail-adjusted national 
income distributions. The results show that the shares of the top 1 per cent and 
10 per cent trended upward from 1982 to 2006, and declined after 2007. The 
decline after 2007 was gradual for the share of the top 10 per cent but abrupt for 
the share of the top 1 per cent, being concentrated in the years 2008 and 2009.
Another recent development has been the evolution of world income databases, 
including attempts to produce consistent standardized series, and to fill in gaps in 
the temporal record (Lahoti et al. 2016; Solt 2009). The most advanced example is 
the Global Consumption and Income Project (GCIP), which generates distribu-
tions of both income and consumption for each year from 1960 to 2015. Lahoti et al. 
(2016) report that the Gini value for global consumption inequality fell from a 
high of 71 per cent in the 1970s and 1980s to a low of 64 per cent in 2013.
A common theme in studies of world income inequality is the divergence 
between inequality within countries, which has often moved upwards, and 
in equal ity between countries, which has generally trended down. Dowrick and 
Akmal (2005), Milanovic (2005), Anand and Segal (2008), and Lakner and 
Milanovic (2016) discuss the global inequality trend in terms of the net outcome 
of these two underlying factors, with the decline in between-country inequality 
due largely to the rise of mean income in China and, to an extent, in India.
Estimating the global distribution of household wealth was first attempted by 
Davies et al. (2008, 2011) for the year 2000. The overall strategy involved three 
main steps. First, estimates of the level of wealth per adult were produced for each 
country using household balance sheets where available, survey evidence for a 
few countries, and regression-based results elsewhere for countries with suitable 
data. Evidence on wealth distribution within countries was then assembled and 
combined with the wealth level estimate for each country to produce a large syn-
thetic sample of wealth observations. Processing this sample yielded estimates of 
wealth distribution within each country and region, and for the world as a whole. 
Improvements and updates of these estimates have been reported each year since 
2010 in the annual Global Wealth Report and Global Wealth Databook published 
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by the Credit Suisse Research Institute (Davies et al. 2018a, 2018b). Davies et al. 
(2017) provides further details of the methodological revisions.
The level of world wealth inequality is exceptionally high. Davies et al. (2011) 
reported a Gini coefficient of 89.2 per cent for global wealth in the year 2000 
using official exchange rates. Our more recent estimates make an adjustment to 
the top tail to try to correct for non-sampling error in wealth surveys. This adjust-
ment tends to raise the estimated figure for global inequality, although more 
accurate data on average wealth levels across countries have mitigated its impact. 
Our latest estimates for 2000 suggest a Gini value of 90.4 per cent, and a figure of 
84.8 per cent for the share of the global top 10 per cent, close to the 85.1 per cent 
reported in Davies et al. (2011).
To date, no other research team has offered an estimate of the global distribu-
tion of wealth—in sharp contrast to the world income distribution literature.3 
There are a number of reasons for this neglect of the wealth dimension of global 
inequality. One is that income may be considered more important than wealth, 
covering the flow of purchasing power from both human and non-human wealth, 
and hence appearing to be more comprehensive. Another reason for the neglect 
of global wealth inequality concerns data quality and availability. Although the 
number of countries with good wealth data continues to increase, there are cur-
rently only about thirty-five countries with a national household wealth survey. 
From our viewpoint this is not a stumbling block, because this list includes all the 
wealthiest countries as well as the most populous countries. We estimate that 
these countries cover about two-thirds of the global population and 95 per cent of 
world household wealth. To round out the picture, imputations can be made for 
the missing countries, as explained in Davies et al. (2017).
3 Data Issues
The results obtained for income or wealth distributions are often sensitive to the 
choices made in the construction of the income or wealth samples and in the way 
the samples are processed to obtain the results. Comparing income and wealth 
series raises additional issues, because there are potentially more dimensions 
which can affect comparability. It is therefore important to understand the way 
that the data are assembled and analysed.
3 There has, however, been significant research on related aspects. Global wealth aggregates were 
studied by Goldsmith (1985) and the World Bank (2006, 2011), while many international compari-
sons of wealth distribution have been reported: see e.g. Bönke et al. (2017), Kessler and Wolff (1991), 
Klevmarken et al. (2003), and Wolff (1987). The Luxembourg Wealth Study (LIS Data Center 2016; 
Sierminska et al. 2006) and the ECB-coordinated Household Finance and Consumption Surveys in 
eighteen eurozone countries plus Poland and Hungary have made consistent wealth distribution data 
available across many countries. And increased interest in wealth distribution from an international 
perspective is reflected in Piketty (2014) and Alvaredo et al. (2018).
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Our income sample is based on a revised version of the WIID database, 
adjusted to control for a variety of household characteristics. We use the adjusted 
Lorenz curve data corresponding to net household income per household mem-
ber for the period 2000–15, which provides an observation for each country and 
year for which a record exists in the WIID database. Gaps in the database are 
filled by estimating Lorenz curves for countries and years which lack a WIID 
record. For each country and year, we then construct a synthetic income sample 
which conforms exactly to the Lorenz data, and scale the sample values and sam-
ple weights to match per-capita income and population size, respectively. Pooling 
these samples enables estimates of global inequality values to be produced.
The wealth sample refers to net household wealth per adult and is drawn from 
the micro wealth database underlying the material published in Davies et al. 
(2018a, 2018b). This yields a slightly longer series covering end-of-year values for 
2000–17. The wealth sample differs from the income sample with regard to the 
reference population—adults rather than all individuals—and because the top tail 
values have been adjusted to match evidence from the Forbes billionaire records. 
In other respects, however, the global inequality estimates for wealth are pro-
duced in a similar way to those for income.
The definitions and methods used in our estimation of global income and 
wealth distributions reflect choices made with regard to a range of data issues. 
The options and choices made are outlined below in order to indicate how ana-
lysts could in principle produce different sets of results.
3.1 Income and Wealth Definitions
Several alternative income definitions have been used in the literature. The latest 
WIID dataset focuses on three of these: gross income, net income, and consump-
tion. Gross income includes all sources of money income with no deduction for 
taxes. Net income is the same as gross income but is net of direct taxes—princi-
pally income tax. Consumption is measured by consumer expenditure. We work 
with net income in this chapter since it reflects the actual flow of purchasing 
power for a household.
In principle, our wealth definition corresponds with that in the official System 
of National Accounts (SNA): that is, the value of all assets owned by households 
minus household debts (European Commission et al. 2009). Both financial assets 
and real (or ‘non-financial’) assets are included. Real assets include producer 
durables and real estate, while financial assets include both liquid and non-liquid 
assets, the latter including the value of employer-based pension funds and private 
retirement savings. Human capital and state pensions are excluded, as is all cap-
ital owned by sectors other than households—for example, assets in public own-
ership. While the household balance sheet data we use are part of the SNA and 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/02/21, SPi
54 Comparing Global Inequality of Income and Wealth
therefore conform to this definition, household wealth surveys generally omit 
some assets or debts, perhaps because the benefits of including them are judged 
to be outweighed by the costs (e.g., in lengthening questionnaires and therefore 
reducing response rates).
3.2 Target Population
The target population for income could be restricted to its legal recipients, and 
that for wealth could be confined to its legal owners. In practice, distributional 
studies often aggregate both income and wealth within families or households, 
and the latter are taken as the target population. There is a good argument for that 
approach in the case of income, since a family’s income is usually assumed to be 
used for the benefit of all its members. However, wealth represents deferred 
spending, and benefits of that future spending are more likely to accrue to the 
owners of the family’s wealth, who are mainly its adult members, than equally to 
all current family members. For this reason, we take adults as the target popu la-
tion for wealth.
3.3 Income Sharing Rule
The default assumption in much work on income distribution is equal sharing of 
income within the family. This motivates looking at income on either a per capita 
or a household equivalent basis. In the case of wealth, however, this approach is 
not the natural one. First, as argued above, adults are the appropriate target popu-
la tion. Second, even within marriage the presumption of fully equal sharing only 
applies in a community property regime, which is observed in relatively few juris-
dictions around the world (World Bank 2012). Much more common is a limited 
community property regime in which the property brought to a marriage or 
inherited while married is under individual ownership. And there are many 
countries, particularly in South Asia and Africa, in which property ownership 
within marriage is separate. Hence the most natural variable to consider, in prin-
ciple, is individual adult wealth. In practice, it is often difficult to obtain estimates 
on that basis, but we prefer to use such estimates whenever they are available.
3.4 Exchange Rates
In order to pool income or wealth distributions across countries one must use 
some system of exchange rates. In the case of income, there is a strong argument 
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for using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates. For wealth, however, it is not clear 
that PPP rates are superior to market or ‘official’ exchange rates. Wealth is highly 
concentrated, and the value of assets to wealthy owners is not determined solely 
by consumer prices in their home country. It also depends on consumer prices 
abroad if they spend a significant amount of time and money in other countries, 
and on asset prices both at home and abroad unless they do all their saving and 
investment domestically. While recognizing the case for using PPP rates, for 
 reasons of both convenience and comparability, we applied official exchange rates 
to both the income and wealth data in this study.
3.5 Inequality Index
In studying economic inequality, it is important to use a range of summary 
 indices which reflect inequality in different portions of the distribution. Here we 
use the shares of the top 10 per cent and the top 1 per cent as well as the Gini 
coefficient. We also report the ratio of the median to the mean. This index is not 
commonly reported, but it is intuitively attractive and experience suggests that it 
captures important aspects of inequality trends. For the decomposition exercises 
which we discuss below, there is a natural case for using indices from the Entropy 
family. However, the more sophisticated decomposition procedures that we 
employ circumvent most of the disadvantages of the other indices, making inclu-
sion of the Entropy indices unnecessary.
3.6 Top Tail Adjustments
As noted earlier, some researchers have used top tail adjustments in their estimation 
of global income inequality. We make such adjustments to the wealth data, based 
on the annual Forbes world list of billionaires.4 However, no top tail adjustment 
is made to incomes, as we have not yet found a satisfactory way to do that with 
our large sample of countries. This no doubt leads to a downward bias in our 
estimated level of global income inequality relative to the global wealth inequality 
figures. As mentioned previously, Anand and Segal (2015) and Lakner and 
Milanovic (2016) found that making a top tail adjustment removes the down-
ward trend in global income inequality otherwise found in the period from 
about 1988 to 2008, so that observation should be borne in mind when inter-
preting our results.
4 Available at: https:/www.forbes.com/billionaires/#64531bab251c (accessed 10 December 2018).
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3.7 Time Period
Our wealth data are only available for this century, and any attempt to provide 
satisfactory estimates for earlier years poses great difficulties due to data limita-
tions. The WIID data allow reasonable estimates to be constructed back to at least 
1980, and possibly 1960. However, for reasons of comparability, we confine atten-
tion to income and wealth inequality trends over the course of this century.
4 Trends in Income and Wealth Inequality
We begin by considering the income inequality trajectory during the period 
2000–15 for each of the selected indices. As displayed in Figure 3.1, the Gini coef-
ficient value eased down from 78.9 per cent in 2000 to 77.4 per cent in 2005, after 
which the decline speeds up until 2010 and then levels off, the Gini reaching 
73.3 per cent in 2015. The share of the top 10 per cent shows a similar pattern, 
falling from 67.9 per cent in 2000 to 61.4 per cent in 2015: in fact, the total decline 
(6.5 percentage points) over the fifteen-year period is almost identical to the total 
drop (6.6 percentage points) in the Gini value. The mean/median ratio also 
 echoes this pattern, although the percentage decline is much greater, falling more 
than 40 per cent from an initial ratio of 6.4 in 2000 to a multiple of 3.7 in 2015. 
The outlier, so to speak, among the inequality indices is the share of the top 1 per 
cent, which is relatively flat over the period under consideration, declining just 
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Figure 3.1 Income inequality trends 2000–15, selected indices
Source: Original estimates by the authors.
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This assessment of inequality trends is broadly in line with the findings of 
 previous studies. Niño-Zarazúa et al. (2014) and Lakner and Milanovic (2016), 
who looked at the trend up to about 2008, agree with us that inequality declined 
from 2000 to 2008 in the absence of a top tail adjustment. Alvaredo et al. (2018) 
found the opposite when the top tail is adjusted using income tax records, but, 
like us, they found a decrease in the period after 2007.
The wealth inequality series differ from the income inequality series in a num-
ber of important respects. As is evident from Figure  3.2, in every year and for 
each of the indicators, wealth inequality is significantly higher than income 
in equal ity. In part, this reflects the fact that top tail adjustments have been applied 
to the wealth sample, but not to the income sample. It may also reflect the fact 
that the wealth data refer to the distribution across adults while the income data 
refer to the distribution across individuals. However, even allowing for these con-
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Figure 3.2 Trends in wealth inequality vs income inequality, selected indices
Source: Original estimates by the authors.
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inequality values, as numerous past studies have shown. And it is unlikely that the 
way in which the sample data are constructed makes much difference to the pat-
tern of inequality trends over time.
The trends in income and wealth inequality differ in various ways according to 
the inequality index selected. For the Gini coefficient, both series show a steady 
decline until 2008. But in the period since the global financial crisis, the wealth 
Gini shows no downward movement, and in fact is slightly higher (90.3 per cent) 
in 2017 than in 2008 (89.6 per cent). This levelling-off since 2008 contrasts with 
the continuing decline registered in the income inequality series. The initial simi-
larity and the contrasting experience since 2008 are also apparent in the income 
and wealth shares of the top 10 per cent, and are evident as well in the compari-
son between the mean/median ratios for income and wealth, where the wealth 
series shows a very marked decline until 2008, followed by a mild upward trend 
in recent years.
Differences between the inequality trends for income and wealth are most 
apparent in the series for the share of the top 1 per cent. The wealth share declines 
markedly from 47.1 per cent in 2000 to 42.6 per cent in 2008 and on to 42.1 per cent 
in 2011, considerably more than the fall recorded for the income share of the top 
1 per cent over this period. But since 2011 the wealth share of the top 1 per cent has 
climbed back to reach 47.5 per cent in 2016, more than reversing the earlier 
decline. This recent rise in the wealth share of the top 1 per cent likely reflects the 
prolonged and pronounced gains in equity prices seen in most countries over the 
past decade, and the disproportionate gains made by the very wealthiest indi-
viduals. If top tail adjustments are applied to the income series, a similar reversal 
in recent years might also appear, although it is unlikely to be as pronounced as in 
the wealth series, as suggested by the Alvaredo et al. (2018) results.
In summary, comparison of the inequality series for income and wealth suggest 
significant differences. First, the global inequality values for wealth are consistently 
higher than the corresponding values for income. Second, while both income and 
wealth inequality appear to have declined in the first decade of the century, the pat-
tern has diverged in more recent years, with income inequality continuing to fall at 
a modest rate while wealth inequality has levelled off and probably even risen at the 
very top of the distribution. Both of these conclusions may be tempered if the 
income and wealth series are aligned by applying top tail adjustments to the income 
series. It is, however, likely that the differences would still persist.
5 Decomposing the Level of Income and Wealth Inequality
For a given population structure across countries, the level of global inequality is 
completely determined by the mean income or wealth of each country and the 
corresponding Lorenz, so we can write:
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 I F m m m L L Ln n= … …( , , ; , , , ),1 2 1 2  (1)
where I is an inequality indicator, and mk  and Lk  are respectively the mean and 
Lorenz curve of country k n= …1 2, , , .  Expressed more simply, this becomes
 I F B W= ( , )  (2)
where B m m mn= …( , , ),1 2  is the ‘between-country’ factor capturing differences in 
the average level of income and wealth between countries, and W L L Ln= …( )1 2, , ,  
is the ‘within-country’ factor representing relative differences in income and 
wealth within countries. To understand the determinants of the level and time 
path of global income and wealth inequality, it is useful to begin by identifying 
the contributions of these two core factors.
Let ( , )B W1 1  denote the observed means and Lorenz curves, let B0 refer to a 
situation in which all countries have the same mean income or mean wealth, and 
let W0 indicate the situation in which income or wealth differences have been 
eliminated within all countries (so each country registers zero inequality). Then 
F B W( , )0 0  represents complete equality in global terms. Note that F B W( , )0 0 0=  
for the Gini coefficient, but F B W( , )0 0 10=  per cent when the share of the top 10 
per cent is used as the indicator, and the corresponding baseline values for the 
share of the top 1 per cent and the mean/median ratio are 1 per cent and 1, 
respectively. The decomposition exercise therefore becomes one of splitting total 
inequality F B W F B W( , ) ( , )1 1 0 0−  into the between-country and within-country 
components.
In the context of income inequality, the between-group contribution CB  is 
typically captured by calculating the level of inequality which would arise if the 
only source of inequality were differences in country means: in the above 
notation,
 C F B W F B WB = −( , ) ( , )1 0 0 0  (3)
It is then natural to regard the remainder
 F B W F B W F B W F B W F B W B W( , ) ( , ) [ ( , ) ( , )] ( , ) ( , )1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0− − − = −  (4)
as the within-group contribution. However, to be consistent with (3), the within-
group contribution should be expressed as
 C F B W F B WW = −( , ) ( , ),0 1 0 0  (5)
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in other words, the inequality which would occur if each country had its own 
observed Lorenz curve but the same mean income as all other countries (which 
implies that CW  is obtained by averaging the Lorenz curves across countries using 
the population sizes as weights). The remainder
 F B W F B W F B W F B W F B W B W( , ) ( , ) [ ( , ) ( , )] ( , ) ( , )1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1− − − = −  (6)
then yields an alternative estimate of the between-group contribution. The prob-
lem for most researchers is that while CB  in equation (3) is relatively easy to com-
pute (since it requires only information on country means), CW  in equation (5) is 
a more complex calculation requiring distributional information for all countries. 
Our global income micro database gives us a unique capacity to make the appro-
priate calculation, as we report later.
There remains the problem that CB  in (3) and CW  in (5) do not sum to total 
inequality, so the relative importance of the two factors is not immediately apparent. 
However, inspection of the alternative decompositions captured in Figure  3.3 
suggests a simple solution: average the contributions across the two routes, as 
suggested by the Shorrocks–Shapley decomposition (Shorrocks 2013).
This yields the revised formula
 C F B W F B W F B W B WB = − + −[ ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )]/1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 2  (7)
 C F B W F B W F B W B WW = − + −[ ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )]/ .0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 2  
These between-country and within-country contributions sum to total inequality 
and are the ones reported presently.
The values we obtain for the between-country and within-country contribu-
tions to total global income inequality are illustrated in Figure 3.4 and recorded 
in more detail in Table 3.1. A clear picture emerges. For the Gini coefficient, the 
between-country component is roughly twice the level of the within-country 
term. Thus differences in mean incomes across countries account for about two-
thirds of total inequality. However, the between-country component has trended 
+
total inequality




F (B1, W1) – F (B1, W0) 
between-country contribution
F (B1, W0) – F (B0, W0) 
within-country contribution
F (B0, W1) – F (B0, W0) 
between-country  contribution
F (B1, W1) – F (B0, W1) 
Figure 3.3 Alternative decomposition routes
Source: Authors.
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Figure 3.4 Between-country and within-country components of income inequality
Source: Original estimates by the authors.
Table 3.1 Shorrocks–Shapley decomposition of global income inequality
  Raw inequality values  Shorrocks–Shapley 
contribution
 Year Total Between Within Baseline Between % Within %
Gini 2000 78.9 71.3 43.5 0 53.4 67.6 25.5 32.4
 2001 78.8 71.0 43.7 0 53.0 67.3 25.7 32.7
 2002 78.6 70.7 44.1 0 52.6 66.9 26.0 33.1
 2003 78.3 70.2 44.3 0 52.1 66.5 26.2 33.5
 2004 77.9 69.8 44.3 0 51.7 66.3 26.2 33.7
 2005 77.4 69.3 43.8 0 51.4 66.5 26.0 33.5
 2006 76.8 68.6 43.7 0 50.9 66.2 25.9 33.8
 2007 76.1 67.9 43.1 0 50.5 66.3 25.7 33.7
 2008 75.6 67.2 42.9 0 50.0 66.1 25.7 33.9
 2009 74.8 66.1 42.6 0 49.1 65.7 25.6 34.3
 2010 74.3 65.6 42.4 0 48.8 65.6 25.6 34.4
 2011 74.0 65.2 42.4 0 48.4 65.4 25.6 34.6
 2012 73.8 64.7 42.9 0 47.9 64.8 26.0 35.2
 2013 73.6 64.4 43.0 0 47.5 64.5 26.1 35.5
 2014 73.4 63.9 43.2 0 47.0 64.1 26.3 35.9
 2015 73.3 63.6 43.5 0 46.7 63.7 26.6 36.3
Share 2000 67.9 54.8 37.5 10 37.6 64.9 20.3 35.1
top 10% 2001 67.8 54.6 37.7 10 37.4 64.6 20.5 35.4
 2002 67.6 54.4 38.0 10 37.0 64.2 20.6 35.8
 2003 67.3 54.3 38.3 10 36.6 64.0 20.6 36.0
 2004 66.8 53.9 38.3 10 36.2 63.7 20.6 36.3
 2005 66.2 53.6 37.8 10 36.0 64.1 20.1 35.9
 2006 65.5 52.9 37.6 10 35.4 63.8 20.1 36.2
 2007 64.5 52.1 37.0 10 34.8 63.9 19.7 36.1
Continued
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  Raw inequality values  Shorrocks–Shapley 
contribution
 Year Total Between Within Baseline Between % Within %
 2008 63.8 51.4 36.8 10 34.2 63.5 19.6 36.5
 2009 63.0 50.8 36.6 10 33.6 63.4 19.4 36.6
 2010 62.4 50.4 36.4 10 33.2 63.4 19.2 36.6
 2011 62.0 50.1 36.4 10 32.9 63.2 19.1 36.8
 2012 61.9 49.9 36.9 10 32.5 62.6 19.4 37.4
 2013 61.6 49.9 36.9 10 32.3 62.5 19.4 37.5
 2014 61.5 49.5 37.2 10 31.9 62.0 19.5 38.0
 2015 61.4 49.6 37.5 10 31.7 61.7 19.7 38.3
Share 2000 21.2 6.5 17.8 1 4.4 21.9 15.7 78.1
top 1% 2001 21.3 6.3 18.0 1 4.3 21.3 15.9 78.7
 2002 21.3 6.3 18.4 1 4.1 20.2 16.2 79.8
 2003 21.2 6.5 18.7 1 3.9 19.5 16.2 80.5
 2004 21.2 6.4 18.7 1 4.0 19.6 16.2 80.4
 2005 20.9 6.4 18.0 1 4.2 20.9 15.8 79.1
 2006 20.6 6.3 17.8 1 4.0 20.6 15.5 79.4
 2007 20.2 6.0 17.1 1 4.1 21.2 15.1 78.8
 2008 20.2 6.0 16.9 1 4.2 21.7 15.1 78.3
 2009 19.8 6.1 16.6 1 4.1 22.0 14.6 78.0
 2010 19.5 6.1 16.4 1 4.1 22.1 14.4 77.9
 2011 19.5 6.0 16.4 1 4.1 22.0 14.4 78.0
 2012 19.9 6.0 16.9 1 4.0 21.0 14.9 79.0
 2013 19.8 5.9 17.0 1 3.9 20.6 15.0 79.4
 2014 20.0 5.8 17.3 1 3.8 19.9 15.2 80.1
 2015 20.4 5.8 17.7 1 3.7 19.2 15.7 80.8
Mean/ 2000 6.4 4.6 1.5 1 4.3 79.4 1.1 20.6
median 2001 6.2 4.4 1.5 1 4.1 77.6 1.2 22.4
 2002 6.0 4.0 1.5 1 3.8 75.3 1.2 24.7
 2003 5.8 3.7 1.5 1 3.5 73.5 1.3 26.5
 2004 5.6 3.5 1.5 1 3.3 72.0 1.3 28.0
 2005 5.3 3.3 1.5 1 3.1 70.9 1.3 29.1
 2006 5.0 3.0 1.5 1 2.8 69.0 1.3 31.0
 2007 4.7 2.7 1.4 1 2.5 66.8 1.2 33.2
 2008 4.5 2.5 1.4 1 2.3 64.6 1.3 35.4
 2009 4.2 2.2 1.4 1 2.0 62.3 1.2 37.7
 2010 4.1 2.1 1.4 1 1.9 60.8 1.2 39.2
 2011 4.0 2.0 1.4 1 1.8 59.4 1.2 40.6
 2012 3.9 1.9 1.4 1 1.7 57.7 1.2 42.3
 2013 3.8 1.9 1.4 1 1.6 57.8 1.2 42.2
 2014 3.7 1.9 1.4 1 1.6 59.1 1.1 40.9
 2015 3.7 2.1 1.5 1 1.7 61.8 1.0 38.2
Source: Original estimates by the authors.
Table 3.1 Continued
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downward for the whole of this century while the within-country  element has 
been quite stable, and has actually risen slightly since 2010. So while  differences 
in country means still dominate global inequality, they have become progressively 
less important over the years. This suggests that rapid growth in the developing 
world, especially in China, has reduced income differences across countries and 
hence contributed substantially to the decline in overall global income inequality 
discussed in Section 4.
Decomposition of the share of the top 10 per cent reveals a similar pattern, 
although the contribution of differences in country mean income is somewhat 
less, and declines from 64.9 per cent in 2000 to 61.7 per cent in 2015. As regards 
the mean/median ratio, the between-country contribution was more than four 
times the within-country contribution in 2000 and accounted for 80 per cent of 
total inequality. But the relative contribution fell rapidly until 2010, after which it 
stabilized. Mean income differences across countries now account for a little over 
60 per cent of the mean/median income ratio, almost exactly the same as for the 
Gini coefficient and the share of the top 10 per cent.
As might be expected, decomposition of the share of the top 1 per cent gives a 
very different outcome. Income differences within countries alone would produce 
a share of about 15 per cent for the top 1 per cent, considerably higher than the 
share of around 4 per cent associated with differences in mean incomes across 
countries. Furthermore, the proportion of global inequality attributable to within- 
country differences has remained close to 80 per cent for the entire period under 
consideration. The small contribution of the between-country component helps us 
understand why the downward trend in mean income differences across countries 
has not translated into a reduction in the income share of the top 1 per cent.
The corresponding decomposition of global wealth inequality is displayed in 
Figure 3.5. There are many similarities with Figure 3.4, but also many important 
differences. As regards the between-country component, the levels for each of the 
indicators are broadly similar, although for the share of the top 10 per cent and 
for the mean/median ratio the wealth values are roughly double those obtained 
for income. In addition, the flattening-out since 2010 is more evident in the 
wealth figures than in the income graphs. For the within-country component, the 
time profile remains flat for the mean/median ratio, but for the other indicators 
the trend is clearly upwards for most of the period under consideration.
The most significant difference between the wealth and income graphs is the 
much higher within-country contribution to global inequality. In fact, when the 
Gini coefficient, the share of the top 10 per cent, or the mean/median ratio is 
used, the within-country component is broadly similar to the between-country 
component, indicating that both factors account for roughly half of global wealth 
inequality. Furthermore, the contribution of within-country country differences 
has been increasing over time. For each of the selected inequality indicators, the 
contribution of within-country differences in wealth now exceeds the  contribution 
of between-country differences (see Table 3.2 for details).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/02/21, SPi

















2000 2005 2010 2015 2017
Within-country inequality
 Gini  share of top 10%
 share of top 1%  mean/median
 Gini  share of top 10%
 share of top 1%  mean/median
Figure 3.5 Between-country and within-country components of wealth inequality
Source: Original estimates by the authors.
Table 3.2 Shorrocks–Shapley decomposition of global wealth inequality
  Raw inequality values   Shorrocks–Shapley 
contribution
 Year Total Between Within Baseline  Between % Within %
Gini 2000 91.9 77.5 73.0 0  48.2 52.4 43.7 47.6
 2001 91.6 76.9 72.7 0  47.9 52.3 43.7 47.7
 2002 91.1 75.8 72.1 0  47.4 52.0 43.7 48.0
 2003 91.2 75.3 72.8 0  46.9 51.4 44.4 48.6
 2004 91.3 75.4 73.2 0  46.7 51.2 44.6 48.8
 2005 91.2 75.0 74.4 0  45.9 50.3 45.3 49.7
 2006 91.1 74.2 75.2 0  45.0 49.4 46.1 50.6
 2007 90.4 72.2 75.5 0  43.5 48.2 46.9 51.8
 2008 89.6 71.1 74.0 0  43.4 48.4 46.2 51.6
 2009 90.1 71.0 75.6 0  42.8 47.5 47.4 52.5
 2010 89.9 69.5 76.2 0  41.6 46.3 48.3 53.7
 2011 89.4 69.3 75.8 0  41.5 46.4 48.0 53.6
 2012 89.6 68.9 76.5 0  41.0 45.8 48.6 54.2
 2013 90.0 69.4 77.2 0  41.1 45.7 48.9 54.3
 2014 89.8 69.4 77.4 0  40.9 45.5 48.9 54.5
 2015 89.9 69.9 77.3 0  41.3 45.9 48.7 54.1
 2016 90.4 70.5 77.9 0  41.5 45.9 48.9 54.1
 2017 90.3 70.4 77.7 0  41.5 46.0 48.8 54.0
Share top 10% 2000 88.5 62.0 61.5 10  39.5 50.3 39.0 49.7
 2001 87.9 61.1 61.0 10  39.0 50.0 38.9 50.0
 2002 87.4 58.4 60.2 10  37.8 48.8 39.6 51.2
 2003 87.7 56.5 61.0 10  36.6 47.1 41.1 52.9
 2004 87.8 56.8 61.4 10  36.6 47.1 41.2 52.9
 2005 87.6 57.4 62.9 10  36.1 46.5 41.5 53.5
 2006 87.3 57.5 64.1 10  35.4 45.8 41.9 54.2
 2007 86.1 55.3 64.3 10  33.5 44.0 42.6 56.0
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 2008 84.7 52.7 62.1 10  32.6 43.7 42.1 56.3
 2009 85.4 52.2 64.2 10  31.7 42.0 43.7 58.0
 2010 84.8 51.2 65.0 10  30.5 40.8 44.3 59.2
 2011 83.8 51.5 64.4 10  30.4 41.2 43.4 58.8
 2012 83.8 51.1 65.2 10  29.8 40.4 44.0 59.6
 2013 84.2 52.1 66.2 10  30.0 40.5 44.2 59.5
 2014 83.8 52.8 66.5 10  30.1 40.7 43.7 59.3
 2015 84.0 53.4 66.3 10  30.5 41.3 43.4 58.7
 2016 84.8 54.2 67.2 10  30.9 41.3 43.9 58.7
 2017 84.6 53.6 66.7 10  30.7 41.2 43.9 58.8
Share top 1% 2000 47.1 6.8 31.2 1  10.9 23.6 35.2 76.4
 2001 47.1 7.0 30.6 1  11.3 24.4 34.9 75.6
 2002 44.6 6.5 29.7 1  10.2 23.4 33.4 76.6
 2003 45.0 6.2 30.5 1  9.9 22.4 34.2 77.6
 2004 45.1 6.3 31.3 1  9.5 21.6 34.5 78.4
 2005 46.1 6.5 33.2 1  9.2 20.5 35.9 79.5
 2006 45.8 6.3 34.5 1  8.3 18.4 36.5 81.6
 2007 44.3 6.2 35.0 1  7.3 16.9 36.0 83.1
 2008 42.6 6.1 32.1 1  7.8 18.8 33.8 81.2
 2009 42.9 6.5 34.5 1  6.9 16.6 35.0 83.4
 2010 43.1 6.4 35.4 1  6.6 15.6 35.6 84.4
 2011 42.1 6.4 34.5 1  6.5 15.8 34.6 84.2
 2012 42.9 6.6 35.3 1  6.6 15.8 35.3 84.2
 2013 44.1 6.4 35.7 1  6.9 16.0 36.2 84.0
 2014 45.5 6.5 37.0 1  7.0 15.8 37.5 84.2
 2015 46.3 6.6 36.7 1  7.6 16.9 37.7 83.1
 2016 47.5 6.8 37.9 1  7.7 16.6 38.8 83.4
 2017 46.9 6.8 37.3 1  7.7 16.8 38.2 83.2
Mean/median 2000 21.0 7.3 2.8 1  12.3 61.3 7.7 38.7
 2001 18.6 6.4 2.8 1  10.6 60.3 7.0 39.7
 2002 17.5 6.1 2.7 1  9.9 60.2 6.6 39.8
 2003 17.7 6.1 2.8 1  10.0 59.9 6.7 40.1
 2004 17.7 5.7 2.8 1  9.8 58.6 6.9 41.4
 2005 17.0 4.8 3.0 1  8.9 55.5 7.1 44.5
 2006 16.6 4.4 3.1 1  8.5 54.3 7.1 45.7
 2007 14.5 3.7 3.2 1  7.0 52.0 6.5 48.0
 2008 12.1 2.8 2.9 1  5.5 49.5 5.6 50.5
 2009 13.5 2.6 3.2 1  5.9 47.7 6.5 52.3
 2010 12.4 2.4 3.3 1  5.2 46.1 6.1 53.9
 2011 12.4 2.5 3.2 1  5.3 46.7 6.1 53.3
 2012 12.6 2.4 3.4 1  5.3 46.0 6.2 54.0
 2013 13.6 2.7 3.5 1  5.9 46.7 6.7 53.3
 2014 13.4 2.7 3.5 1  5.8 46.8 6.6 53.2
 2015 13.8 3.8 3.5 1  6.5 50.9 6.3 49.1
 2016 14.3 3.5 3.6 1  6.6 49.7 6.7 50.3
 2017 14.2 3.2 3.6 1  6.4 48.6 6.8 51.4
Source: Original estimates by the authors.
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The evidence discussed in Section 4 suggests that global income inequality is 
on a downward trend. Wealth inequality also shows no significant upward trend 
since 2000, although there is evidence of a rise since the financial crisis in 2007–8. 
These facts are at variance with the widespread feeling that both income and 
wealth inequality have risen in recent years. Our decompositions of global income 
and wealth inequality into the between-country and within-country components 
cast light on this conundrum. In global terms, between-country differences have 
been an equalizing influence; but within-country differences show no significant 
decline over time and some tendency to increase. This is particularly true in the 
context of wealth inequality, where there is strong evidence that wealth differ-
ences within countries have increased significantly during this century.
6 Decomposing the Inequality Trend of Income and Wealth
The evidence discussed in the previous section hints at the relative contributions 
of within-country and between-country factors to the trend in inequality over 
time. It suggests that changes in country means are likely to dominate changes in 
income inequality over time for inequality indices other than the share of the top 
1 per cent, but that changes in inequality within countries have a more significant 
impact when it comes to wealth inequality over time. However, when changes 
over time are examined, we also have to make allowance for changes in the popu-
la tion size of countries. This could be considered as an additional factor, but given 
that its contribution is likely to be limited, we treat it as part of the between-country 
component.
It is useful to start by considering two counterfactual questions. First, what 
would the global inequality trend look like if inequality within countries was 
 frozen at the year 2000 values, but the mean incomes and population sizes of 
countries changed in the way observed since the turn of the century? Second, 
how would the global inequality trend appear if mean incomes and population 
sizes were kept at the 2000 values, but inequality within countries changed as 
observed in the intervening years? Figure 3.6 displays the corresponding income 
inequality graphs for each of our chosen inequality indices. The results are strik-
ing. First, changes in the mean incomes and population sizes of countries have 
had a continuous equalizing impact for all of this century. Second, for three of the 
indicators—the Gini coefficient, the share of the top decile, and the mean/median 
ratio—if income distribution within each country had remained unchanged this 
century, global inequality would still have evolved in almost exactly the way that 
transpired. For these three indicators, therefore, changes in mean incomes and 
population sizes account for virtually all of the downward movement in income 
inequality, and this is largely true of any subperiod too.
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For the share of the top 1 per cent, the picture is slightly different. Over the 
whole period 2000–15, changes in mean incomes and population sizes again 
account for almost 100 per cent of the fall in global inequality; but in the period 
2000–10, the share of the top 1 per cent fell by roughly twice as much as would 
have been predicted from the changes in mean incomes and population sizes, 
leaving a significant residual due to inequality reductions within countries. 
Then this process went into reverse, with the top 1 per cent rising sharply within 
countries after 2010, overcoming the continuing equalizing effect of changes in 
means and popu la tion to produce a significant increase in the global share of the 
top 1 per cent.
For wealth inequality, the results of the counterfactual exercises are even more 
striking in some respects, although slightly different. When inequality within 
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Figure 3.6 Counterfactual trends in income inequality
Source: Original estimates by the authors.
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wealth and population sizes cause global wealth inequality to fall sharply during 
the first decade of this century. This is similar to the findings for income, although 
unlike income the trend reverses in recent years for each of the indices considered.
The most noticeable difference between the wealth and income graphs concerns 
the time path traced out when mean wealth and population sizes are held at the 
year 2000 values. Once country growth rates are discounted in this way, for each 
of the indicators global wealth inequality rises markedly over the course of this 
century, and more or less continuously. For the share of the top 1 per cent there is 
even evidence that the rise in wealth inequality accelerated in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis. While wealth inequality may have fallen in certain individ-
ual countries, the results show that, on balance, wealth inequality within coun-
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Figure 3.7 Counterfactual trends in wealth inequality
Source: Original estimates by the authors.
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As regards the time path of wealth inequality discussed in Section 4, it now 
becomes evident that the observed trend is a compromise between two strong 
opposing forces: the evolution of the between-country factors tending to reduce 
global wealth inequality for at least the first decade, and the evolution of within-
country inequality driving movement in the opposite direction. The observed 
series suggest that the between-country factors dominated in the early years of 
the century, while the rise in within-country inequality has been the decisive 
force more recently.
To provide a more formal assessment of the between-country and within-
country contributions to the income and wealth inequality change since the year 
2000, we revert to the terminology used in the previous section and express the 
change in inequality from time 0 to time T as
 ∆I F B W F B W S ST T B W= − = +( , ) ( , )0 0  (8)
where
 S F B W F B W F B W F B WB T T T T= ( ) − + −
1
2 0 0 0 0
( , ( , ) ( , ) ( , ))  (9)
and
 S F B W F B W F B W F B WW T T T T= ( ) − + −
1
2 0 0 0 0
( , ( , ) ( , ) ( , ))  (10)
denote the Shorrocks–Shapley between-country and within-country components, 
respectively. Note that SB  is the change in inequality obtained using the fixed 
within-country distributions observed in the initial year averaged with the change 
in inequality using the fixed within-country distributions observed in the final 
year. The within-country contribution SW  has a parallel interpretation.
The results recorded in Table 3.3 confirm the impressions gained from Figures 
3.6 and 3.7. When the change in income inequality over the period 2000–15 is 
split into the two components, the between-country component is seen to account 
for virtually all of the reduction in inequality, leaving little or no contribution 
from the within-country changes. This is true for each of the inequality indicators 
considered. Thus we can conclude that the fall in income inequality this century 
is almost entirely attributable to changes in country mean incomes and popu la-
tion sizes.
For the change in wealth inequality over the period 2000–17, the between-
country factor again dominates. However, the overall decline in wealth inequality 
is seen to be the net outcome of a substantial fall in inequality due to changes in 
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country means offset by an increase in inequality caused by a rise in wealth 
in equal ity within countries. Broadly speaking, the magnitude of the (negative) 
between-country component is roughly double the contribution of the (positive) 
within-country component, although the contributions are similar (and hence 
almost net out to zero) for the share of the top 1 per cent.
7 Conclusion
There is a widespread belief—among researchers as well as the general public—
that economic inequality has been rising in recent years. However, it is difficult to 
square this belief with the numerous studies which show that income inequality 
has declined this century, and our previous work on wealth inequality, which 
suggests little change.
Our findings help to reconcile the two viewpoints. For both income and 
wealth, and for all the inequality indices considered, the degree of inequality 
attributable to differences in mean income and wealth across countries accounts 
for much, if not most, of the level of global inequality. As regards changing 
in equal ity over time, changes in mean income and wealth and population sizes 
have induced a strong downward element to the trend in global inequality regard-
less of the inequality index selected. There has been little underlying movement in 
income inequality within countries to offset the between-country trend. However, 
the evidence suggests that the underlying wealth inequality has risen significantly 
this century, although not by enough to offset the between-country contribution.
Table 3.3 Shorrocks–Shapley decomposition of changes in global income and wealth 
inequality
  Counterfactual values   Shorrocks–Shapley  
contributions
  F B ,WD D( ) F F ,WD T( ) F F WT D( ), F B WT T( ),   SB SW Total
Income           
Gini 78.9 78.8 73.4 73.3  −5.5 −0.1 −5.6
Share top 10% 67.9 67.5 61.7 61.4  −6.2 −0.4 −6.5
Share top 1% 21.2 21.3 20.3 20.4  −0.9 0.1 −0.8
Mean/median 6.4 6.4 3.7 3.7  −2.7 0.0 −2.7
Wealth           
Gini 91.9 93.2 88.2 90.3  −3.3 1.7 −1.6
Share top 10% 88.5 90.3 81.1 84.6  −6.6 2.6 −4.0
Share top 1% 47.1 49.9 43.0 46.9  −3.5 3.4 −0.2
Mean/median 21.0 27.0 12.1 14.2  −10.9 4.0 −6.8
Source: Original estimates by the authors.
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One may ask what policy implications this study could have. The answer 
depends partly on what future trends are expected. An important driver of rising 
within-country wealth inequality since 2008 has been the rise in equity prices, 
which has raised the share of the top 1 per cent in particular. In part that rise has 
been due to low interest rates. If interest rates rise towards more normal levels, 
stock market performance will likely be affected. It is also possible that wide-
spread concern about rising inequality will lead to higher taxes on top incomes 
and perhaps also wealth. These trends could stabilize within-country inequality. 
On the other hand, the decline of between-country inequality may slow or come 
to a halt since further increases in China’s mean income and wealth, both now 
above the global means, will begin to raise between-country inequality, rather 
than reduce it, as in the past.
Our conclusion is that global income and wealth inequality are not likely to fall 
significantly in the near future, and may show little trend for some time. One may 
therefore ask what steps could be taken to lower global inequality. More progres-
sive income taxation and/or the introduction of wealth taxes have been recom-
mended by some observers. Others worry about the possible consequences for 
growth. Fortunately, there are policies that should be able both to reduce in equal ity 
and stimulate growth. Keeping inflation low, providing tax-sheltered retirement 
saving opportunities, ensuring the availability of sound mortgage finance, and 
making education universally accessible at all levels through grants and loans, for 
example, are sound policies that can make ordinary people better off and increase 
both their income and wealth. In addition, cracking down on crony capitalism 
and breaking up monopolies and oligopolies would reduce wealth concentration 
at the top and increase growth by fostering stronger competition. These policies 
are likely to reduce not only within-country inequality but also between-country 
inequality, since they would have their most dramatic impact in poor countries. 
Between-country inequality could also be attacked through improvements in the 
ways in which foreign aid is provided and by opening first-world markets fully to 
imports from the third world.
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Empirical Challenges Comparing 
Inequality across Countries
The Case of Middle- Income Countries  
from the LIS Database
Daniele Checchi, Andrej Cupak, and Teresa Munzi
1 Introduction
In the past few decades, the focus in research on income inequality has been 
predominantly on the high- income OECD countries (see, e.g., Atkinson and 
Brandolini 2001). More recently, research has turned to an analysis of top- income 
share and its historical development (e.g. Atkinson et al.  2011), again covering 
mostly high- income Anglo- Saxon and Nordic countries. The research analysing 
income inequality in middle- income and developing countries from the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region, Asia, sub- Saharan Africa, and Latin 
America is still evolving.
Some of the recent examples, and perhaps the closest studies to ours in 
terms of the focus on middle- income countries, are studies by Alvaredo and 
Gasparini (2015) and Lakner and Milanovic (2016). Lakner and Milanovic 
(2016) analyse global income inequality with international data (combining 
different household surveys) covering the period 1988–2008. The authors show 
that the global Gini index reached 70.5 per cent in 2008 and report that the 
income inequality levels were quite stable over the analysed time period, though 
inequality levels varied between sub- regions. The lowest income inequality 
was observed for India, with the Gini spanning from 31.1 per cent in 1988 to 
33.1 per cent in 2008. Mature economies experienced growth in the Gini from 
38.2 per cent to 41.9 per cent during the same time period. The highest 
in equal ity levels were observed in sub- Saharan Africa, increasing from 
53.5 per cent in 1993 to 58.3 per cent in 2008. According to the authors, the 
fastest increase in inequality was observed in China, where the Gini index rose 
from 32.0 per cent in 1988 to 42.7 per cent in 2008, overall representing an 
increase of 33.5 per cent.
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Alvaredo and Gasparini (2015) show that national income inequality for 
developing countries first increased during the 1980s and 1990s, and then 
dropped during the 2000s. They also explore possible determinants of changing 
inequality over time and across countries, finding an inverse U- shaped relation-
ship between the Gini coefficient and log gross national income (GNI) per capita, 
consistent with the Kuznets hypothesis. Despite caveats related to consistency and 
com par abil ity of microdata from low- income countries, the authors highlight 
that significant progress has been made in measuring and monitoring income 
inequality and poverty.
Other examples studying income inequality and poverty in developing and 
middle- income countries are those by Assaad et al. (2016, 2017) for the MENA 
countries, Piketty and Qian (2009) for China and India, Gasparini et al. (2011) 
for Latin America, and Novokmet et al. (2017) for Russia. Regarding the empir-
ical evidence based on the LIS data, Gornick et al. (2009) were among the first 
to report inequality trends for the Latin American countries. More recently, the 
LIS data source has been utilized to demonstrate income inequality and (child) 
poverty in middle- income countries; see, for example, Rasch (2017) and Evans 
et al. (2018).
The main goal of our study is to update the existing evidence on income and 
expenditure/consumption inequality, focusing on a set of middle- and high- income 
countries from Asia (East and South), the MENA region, and Latin America. To 
present the results in a comparative perspective, we also add high- income countries 
from neighbouring areas. Before going into data analysis, we take advantage of 
LIS Datacentre experience in harmonizing income and consumption microdata 
from middle- income countries to illustrate some caveats to be considered when 
executing cross- country comparative research involving both affluent and less 
developed countries.
From the empirical point of view, the main contribution of this study is two-
fold. First, we extract household- and individual- level income and consumption 
aggregates for which we compute various inequality measures. Then we merge 
the computed indicators (country- level averages) with macroeconomic charac-
teristics obtained from the World Bank Indicators database. Our final database 
covers almost forty years (from 1976 to 2016), with an unbalanced panel of 
twenty countries, summing to 150 observations.
By using descriptive and regression analyses, we aim to uncover possible 
 correlations between recent trends in income and expenditure/consumption 
in equal ity measures and compositional population statistics related to educa-
tional attainment and gender participation in the labour market. We also explore 
the different magnitudes of correlation between our inequality measures and 
some institutional indicators capturing countries’ economic stage development. 
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As such, our empirical analysis updates the findings of Alvaredo and Gasparini 
(2015) and Lakner and Milanovic (2016) on inequality trends in middle- income 
countries by including more recent years. In the second part, we contribute to 
the  macro- level analysis of Roine et al. (2009), who analyse macroeconomic 
de ter min ants of economic inequality in a panel of sixteen high- income countries.
The chapter unfolds as follows. Section 2 discusses the main challenges when 
harmonizing microdata from developing and middle- income countries. In Section 3 
data and variables are presented, while Section 4 describes the applied methodology. 
Empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 con-
cludes and offers policy implications.
2 The Challenges of Harmonizing Data from 
Middle- Income Countries
From its inception in the 1980s, LIS has been historically focused on high- income 
countries. A pilot project was carried out in 2007 with the collaboration of a team 
at the World Bank in order to study the feasibility of including middle- income 
countries in the LIS database. Following the decision to go ahead with this 
 expansion, LIS has made some conceptual adjustments and changes to its list of 
 har mon ized variables in order to accommodate more diverse labour market 
characteristics, social benefit structures, consumption patterns, transnational 
income flows, and within- country variability.
Among the main changes achieved with the major template revision, which 
took effect in 2011, the following were mostly aimed at, at the same time, 
maximizing its applicability to datasets from both high- and middle- income 
countries:
 • Adjustment of the disposable household income (DHI) concept, such that it 
also includes non- monetary income from labour and from public and pri-
vate third parties. The main reason for this enlargement of the DHI concept 
stemmed from the fact that in many middle- income countries the proportion 
of non- monetary incomes from own- consumption and social and/or private 
assistance- based transfers was too important to be left out, and in fact these 
amounts are much more often available in middle- income countries than in 
high- income countries, where many data providers do not even collect 
them, given their irrelevance.
 • Adjustment of the concept of household member to ensure that persons 
who are physically present in the household but whose incomes do not con-
tribute to the household income (namely live- in domestic servants, boarders, 
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and lodgers) are not accounted for in the creation of total household income 
or the calculation of the equivalence scale. 
 • Inclusion of a number of living arrangement variables allowing for a better 
analysis of multi- unit/multi- generation households, so that, if available, 
information on partnership and parenthood of adults outside the nuclear 
family is retained.
 • Inclusion of variables containing information on an array of new topics, 
including rural/urban indicator, farming activity indicator, type of dwell-
ing, involvement in marginal/informal work, and characteristics of a 
second job.
Additional challenges are typically found when dealing with income microdata 
from these sources, as discussed presently. Because of the diversity of rural versus 
urban areas, in many middle- income countries income surveys either only cover 
urban areas, where it is easier to capture incomes, or use very different instru-
ments (including different sampling and questionnaires) for the urban and 
rural areas.1
The definition of household membership (and ensuing treatment of individual 
incomes when creating household- level incomes) is of particular relevance in 
middle- income countries. Family members temporarily absent are sometimes 
treated as household members, sometimes not, and it is often difficult to 
 distinguish the two situations—this is particularly challenging when adults are 
tem por ar ily absent to work elsewhere (e.g. the case of absent household heads or 
spouses) as it considerably changes the way their incomes should be accounted 
for (include their total income as labour incomes or only the part that they send 
back to the family as remittances).
Multi- generational households, and more generally large or complex house-
holds, are much more common; depending on who is defined as the household 
head (the older or middle generation in the case of three- generational house-
holds), the characteristics of the household—often based on the head and its 
nuclear family—will differ. In the case of polygamy, many of the usual indicators 
that are typically based on the head and a single spouse become much more 
 difficult to create.
When turning to the labour market information, and especially to the employ-
ment definition, it should be noted that in many surveys of middle- income coun-
tries, the labour market module follows the method of the ‘catch- all’  question on 
1 This issue proved particularly challenging with the Chinese survey, where the integration of the 
three different samples (urban, rural, and rural- to- urban migrants) into a unique national sample 
required some adjustments to the weights and to the variables themselves that risked the quality of the 
resulting file (to the point that for the year 2007, where the issue was particularly severe, LIS decided 
not to make the Chinese data public).
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employment: after responding that he or she does not have a job or does not 
work, an interviewee is asked a series of questions to determine whether he or she 
has done any activity in order to help the family (such as cultivating fruits and 
vegetables, selling products in the street, carrying out services for other persons, 
helping out in a household business, etc). Given the large extent to which these 
activities are performed by women and children in many middle- income 
 countries, considering these activities as ILO employment (under the argument 
that they fall under either the category of paid work for at least one hour, or of 
unpaid family work) increases the employment rates considerably, creating large 
gaps between population with positive earnings and population employed, as 
well as potentially creating a bias versus those countries that do not include 
such questions.2
A related point concerns child labour. In most middle- income countries, infor-
mation about the labour market is collected for children as well, in order to ana-
lyse its diffusion. Some surveys have a special section for children only; in other 
cases (some of) the same questions asked for adults are also asked for children. In 
both cases, the creation of a fully comparable labour market participation rate (or 
employment rate) between those different countries becomes very tricky. In add ition, 
there are typically many questions on unofficial work, non- regular ac tiv ities, 
household production, and illegal labour (not registered, not covered by social 
insurance, not taxed) in order to capture some measure of informal labour. These 
questions are typically very different from survey to survey (often referring to the 
institutional set up of the country), and are almost impossible to harmonize.
Finally, the wide extent of persons having multiple jobs makes the harmoniza-
tion (and hence ensuing comparison) of job characteristics challenging, especially 
when the questionnaires ask about different types of work in different sections of 
the questionnaire (e.g. work in a family business separately from work on the 
farm separately from other jobs). This is troublesome because (a) it is often not 
clear if the persons report the same jobs in several sections of the questionnaire, 
hence incurring the risk of double- counting the jobs; (b) it becomes difficult to 
determine which is the main job.
When looking at the income variables, several issues are at stake when consid-
ering middle- income countries. First and foremost, indicators of inequality, pov-
erty, and well- being are still prevalently based on consumption rather than income 
2 A very clear example of this arises in Peru (with data from the National Household Survey—
ENAHO), which, together with Switzerland, is the country that exhibits the highest employment rate 
of all LIS countries. Like in the surveys of most other Latin American countries, individuals are first 
asked if they have a job; if they respond that they do not, then they are asked if they have carried out 
any activity to help out the family, and the question includes a long list of possible marginal activities. 
The very high number of persons who answer negatively to the first question and positively to the 
second implies that the employment mostly consists of marginal employment. It is, however, very 
likely that the way the question is formulated invites many people who would not have answered posi-
tively with a different question, to answer positively.
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data, which often implies that income microdata are either non- existent or insuf-
ficient for the purpose of calculating robust income indicators (not collected, col-
lected but not provided, collected but not exhaustive to capture the totality of 
household income). As already mentioned, the enlargement to the  middle- income 
countries group has been followed by a necessary adjustment of the concept 
of  total disposable income to include also non- monetary incomes from labour 
( notably own- consumption of products stemming from farming activities) and 
public and private transfers (notably public and private assistance as benefits 
 in- kind): see Figure 4.1.
Whereas the adjustment was necessary to get a more unbiased picture of the 
households’ standards of living in those countries, the inclusion of those incomes 
in the data has often proven to be particularly tricky. The first problem is due to 
the fact that the coverage of the non- monetary incomes collected by the different 
surveys differs widely across countries, hence implying a situation in which com-
par abil ity is at stake. For example, in surveys that are mostly focused on con-
sumption, the value of most goods and services consumed but not paid for (either 
because they are own- produced or because they are received from the employer, 
the government, charitable institutions, or other private households) is collected 
with great detail and precision, whereas in other types of surveys the data on the 
availability of those goods becomes much more scarce.
Another problem arises with the non- monetization of quantities of goods and 
services; at this stage, LIS has taken the approach of only including those incomes 
that have been monetized by the data provider, thus increasing the potential bias 




















































































































































































% of non-cash incomes in dhi % change in gini
Figure 4.1 Impact of non- monetary incomes
Source: Authors, based on data from the LIS database.
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reasons, the final income concept includes more non- monetary incomes than is 
the case in others.
Somewhat arbitrary assumptions are to be made in the case that non- monetary 
incomes are collected in different sections of the questionnaire (among the 
 consumption variables, among the household- level incomes from household 
ac tiv ities, and among individual- level labour incomes); it becomes clear that 
those amounts will certainly overlap to some extent, and the creation of a final 
amount that does not include any under- or over- counting of some income 
sources proves extremely hard to obtain.
Independently from (but related to) the issue of the non- monetary incomes, 
another problematic area is that of the self- employment incomes in general—
especially those from farming activities and informal activities. As those incomes 
are more irregular and difficult to measure by nature, the reliability of a total 
household income variable which is composed in large part of those types of 
incomes naturally becomes much more difficult. In addition, when it is collected 
at the household level only (as is often the case in middle- income countries where 
 surveys have specific sections about the household activities), the creation of a 
comprehensive measure of total individual labour income becomes impossible, 
hence restricting the possibility of using such an important variable in many 
analyses: see Figure 4.2.
Other than the measurement of the income itself, its classification into the differ-
ent income subcomponents can also become more problematic in middle- income 
countries. One particular issue refers to the classification of employer- provided 
pensions and benefits into labour income versus social security: while benefits pro-
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Figure 4.2 Labour income availability at the individual level
Source: Authors, based on data from the LIS database.
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basic wage income) have typically been considered as labour income in 
 high- income countries, when moving to middle- income countries it becomes 
clear that some of those benefits were actually replacing an almost non- existent 
social security and were thus much closer to social security benefits than labour 
income. Similarly, the usual distinction between social insurance, assistance, and 
universal benefits has often proved irrelevant in middle- income countries, where 
the employment- related benefits stem purely from the willingness of the employer 
and not from the benevolence of the government, and most of the—strictly 
speaking, public—benefits are targeted to the very poor.
The treatment of taxes and social security contributions also differentiates 
 middle- from high- income countries (Figure  4.3). The issue in high- income 
countries is centred on the difference between the countries/surveys that provide 
income data gross of taxes and contributions and those that provide the data after 
such deductions. More specifically, in the first case all the incomes provided are 
gross, and the totality of taxes and contributions are deducted from total gross 
income to obtain the concept of disposable income; on the other hand, for 
 countries that provide each income source already net of taxes and contributions, 
the sum of all income subcomponents is already net of taxes and contributions, 
and hence corresponds to the concept of disposable income. As a result, while at 
the level of total disposable income the variables are perfectly comparable, the 
comparability is reduced by the fact that at the subcomponent level some datasets 
provide gross incomes and others net incomes. For middle- income countries the 
challenge concerning the treatment of taxes is rather different. The very low reli-
ance on direct taxes in most middle- income countries makes the above- mentioned 
issue almost irrelevant, as the difference between ‘gross’ and ‘net’ datasets is very 


































































































































Figure 4.3 Taxes and social security contributions as a percentage of total 
gross income
Source: Authors, based on data from the LIS database.
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between gross and net, as the situation is either a mixture of the two (in some 
cases with only wage income being gross of taxes and contributions and all 
 others net), or simply is not defined at all by the data provider itself.3 Several 
middle- income countries even provide the income data only in gross terms, with-
out indication of the amount of taxes and contributions paid on them, which 
results in having to simulate taxes and contributions in order to obtain a measure 
of disposable income comparable to other countries.4 In any case, even in the 
presence of full information on taxes and contributions, the low reliance on direct 
taxes relative to indirect ones in middle- income countries adds a bias to the com-
parability of well- being indicators based on DHI. If indirect taxes were also taken 
into account, the true difference in high- and middle- income countries’ in equal ity 
might even be greater than is shown by the figures.
From a more technical point of view, an issue that can often become serious, 
especially in data from middle- income countries (but not necessarily confined to 
those), is the presence of a large number of observations with missing (or incon-
sistent) data. When the percentage of households with missing (or zero) total 
disposable income goes beyond a certain threshold,5 and especially when the data 
provider does not account for this in the calculation of the weights, the potential 
bias due to the non- random distribution of those households is large enough to 
put at risk any country- level analysis of the income distribution. See Figure 4.4 
for an overview of the percentage of households with missing DHI in a selection 
of LIS countries.
All in all, in spite of the efforts made at the various levels of the data production 
chain (survey conception, implementation, data editing, and data harmonization), 
there remain some important gaps in order to ensure perfect consistency of the 
income micro- datasets coming from high- and middle- income countries, and 
the question of whether those two sets of data can be analysed within the same 
framework or whether they should be kept separate remains an important one. 
LIS has adopted the view that a common framework is possible, but cannot 
stress enough the importance of highlighting all the caveats that go with such 
an approach.
3 This is the case, for example, in India, where, given the almost irrelevance of taxes, the data 
 provider does not specify whether the incomes should be reported before or after such deductions. 
The end result is therefore a mix of the two depending on the observations, without any indication as 
to what the situation is for each observation.
4 This is the case in the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) of Brazil, the Colombian 
Great Integrated Household Survey (GEIH), and the Continuous Household Survey (ECH) 
of Panama.
5 LIS typically uses 10 per cent as the threshold requiring some careful treatment, and 20 per cent 
as the maximum acceptable threshold for reliable income estimates. For Tunisia, for example, LIS 
obtained data from the only existing income microdata (the Tunisian Labor Market Panel Survey—
TLMPS), but after data inspection decided not to include it in the LIS database due to an excessively 
large portion of the sample having missing household income (about half of the households).
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3 Data and Variables
3.1 Dataset
The present sample of countries is drawn from the LIS database, the largest avail-
able income database of harmonized microdata collected from about fifty  countries, 
spanning five decades. In addition to broad coverage of countries across the 
world, its advantage is a large set of standardized variables, making the results 
directly comparable. LIS datasets contain household- and individual- level data, 
such as labour income, capital income, social security and private transfers, 
taxes and contributions, expenditures, employment conditions, and usual 
demographics.
In our empirical analysis we primarily focus on middle- income countries, 
including Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia, and South Africa. To present the 
results in a comparative perspective, we consider other middle- income countries 
(Colombia, Paraguay, Uruguay) and some high- income countries (Chile, 
Hungary, Israel, Mexico, Poland, Slovenia, South Korea, Taiwan, and the USA) as 
potential benchmarks. In the regression analysis, we expand the country sample 
to include other high- income countries (Australia, Austria, Italy, and Peru).6
6 The choice of the benchmark countries is mostly influenced by the country’s sample length, reli-
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Figure 4.4 Extent of missing or zero income
Source: Authors, based on data from the LIS database.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/02/21, SPi
84 Empirical Challenges Comparing Inequality
3.2 Variables
Our main outcome (household- level) variables are household pre- tax market 
income (consisting of labour and capital income), household disposable income, 
and household monetary consumption, as well as the total individual- level labour 
income. Note that values in all outcome variables were bottom- and top- coded7 
and equivalized, applying the square root scale. The covariates, which are further 
used in the empirical part, include basic information on gender, education, and 
employment status of individuals.
In addition to variables used in the microeconomic inequality analysis, we 
consider a set of macroeconomic country- level characteristics that have been 
shown to be significant determinants of economic inequality (e.g., Alvaredo and 
Gasparini 2015; Davies et al. 2017; Roine et al. 2009). Similarly to previous stud-
ies, the macroeconomic characteristics considered include GDP per capita, share 
of agriculture in GDP, share of urban households, life expectancy, age depend-
ency ratio and share of government spending in GDP.8 A natural question here is 
what the associations between inequality and such macroeconomic indicators 
should look like. Following Roine et al. (2009), we summarize the impact of the 
main contextual variables. First, standard Kuznets theory predicts different 
in equal ity levels across a country’s development path, suggesting an inverse 
U- shape relationship between GDP per capita and inequality. Standard theory 
also suggests that the growth of financial markets goes hand in hand with lower 
inequality. In terms of trade liberalization, the standard Heckscher–Ohlin theory 
predicts that trade openness should favour the rich, hence increasing inequality 
levels. Finally, central government spending (as a proxy for the welfare state) is 
believed to equalize incomes of households.
4  Methodology
In our empirical analysis, we first compute a set of inequality indicators for 
income and consumption aggregates, as well as for major population subgroups. 
Then we correlate the estimated inequality measures with some country- level 
macroeconomic indicators. We obviously anticipate that in all cases causality may 
respect to the core countries (i.e. matching gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, trade openness, 
financial development, etc). A comprehensive overview of the sample countries and years available is 
presented in Table A1 of Checchi et al. (2018). In Table A2 of the same paper we report descriptive 
statistics for the covariates.
7 The values in main outcome variables were bottom- coded at 0 and top- coded at ten times the 
median of the corresponding non- equivalized variable.
8 A full list of country characteristics along with their definitions is presented in Table A3 of 
Checchi et al. (2018).
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go in both directions, and therefore these are to be considered as mere descriptive 
statistics. In the next two subsections we briefly summarize our methodological 
framework.
4.1 Inequality Measures
In this section we describe the inequality measures that we apply to the main out-
come variables: household- level disposable income and total consumption, and 
individual- level labour income. For the reader’s convenience, we briefly recall the 
definition of the main inequality indicators we are going to use in the analysis. 
Following Cowell (2011), let us consider a population of households (in di vid uals), 
indexed by i n= …1, ,  with income (consumption) yi ,  the arithmetic mean of the 
income (consumption) for the population is given by y n yii
n
=
=∑1 1 .  The main 
 inequality indicator that we present through the paper is the Gini index, which can 
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where ∈  represents the weighting parameter measuring aversion to inequality. In 
our case, we compute the Atkinson index for ∈  taking values of 0.5, 1, and 2. The 
higher the parameter, the stronger the expression of inequality aversion captured 
by the index.
The third and final inequality measure we consider is the mean log deviation 


















and has the advantage of being exactly decomposable in a between- group and 
within- group component. In our case, we consider groups created out of gender 
and three educational categories.
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In addition to the three inequality metrics discussed previously, we compute 
some percentile ratios and income shares. The percentile ratio exhibits the propor-
tion of one income group over the other. Instead of analysing the distribution as a 
whole, it compares two points of the distribution. In our case we compare the aver-
age income of the richest 90 per cent of the households (individuals) to the poorest 
10 per cent. The income shares measure gives an overview of what share of the total 
income is held by a certain subpopulation group. In our analysis, we focus on the 
bottom 50 per cent, top 90 per cent, and 95 per cent of households (earners).
4.2 Regression Analysis
In the second stage of our empirical framework, we run a set of country- level 
regressions in which we correlate the computed (average) inequality measures to 
macroeconomic indicators capturing the country’s economic development. We 
estimate the relationships by the following linear regression:
 = + + +0 ’X ,it it i ituβ β δInequality  
where the left- hand side variable is a specific inequality indicator estimated for 
country i in period t, ’itX  and presents a vector of country- level characteristics 
including indicators such as GDP per capita, employment rate, educational 
attainment in the population, life expectancy, etc, along with the corresponding 
coefficients β  to be estimated. We also control for country fixed effects iδ  in the 
regressions. Note that controlling for time fixed effects is more problematic, since 
the survey years are not coincident among countries.
5 Results
5.1 Descriptive Analysis
We start our analysis of inequality trends by showing the inequality levels for the 
BRICS middle- income countries (Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa). 
We also add figures for the USA as a benchmark country. To cross- check the pic-
ture emerging from the LIS database, we also include inequality measures and 
income shares from external sources: for inequality measures we collected add-
ition al data from the UNU- WIDER WIID database,9 whereas for income shares, 
we considered data from the World Inequality Database.10
9 www.wider.unu.edu/project/wiid- world- income- inequality- database.
10 https://wid.world.
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In Figure  4.5, the first aspect to be considered is that inequality in market 
incomes is always higher than inequality in disposable incomes, the average dif-
ference being around 5 percentage points, with consumption inequality (when 
available) taking an intermediate value (this is true in Russia and South Africa).11 
One might notice that household consumption is covered only for a subset of 
 countries in the LIS database. Pearson correlation between the Gini index of 
household disposable income and the Gini index of household (monetary) con-
sumption is 0.87. This might imply that where information on consumption is 
not available, we could infer a trend for consumption inequality based on the 
income inequality data, and vice versa.
Moving on now to consider inequality trends, from Figure 4.5 we observe that 
inequality is on a declining trend in the case of Brazil: for example, the Gini index 
of household disposable income declined from 50 per cent in 2006 to 46 per cent 
in 2013. The decline in inequality in Latin America is a known phenomenon 
11 The average Gini indices for BRICS countries in LIS are 0.51, 0.46, and 0.47 for gross market 
incomes, disposable incomes, and consumption respectively. The corresponding averages obtained 
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Brazil China India
Russia South Africa US
market income (LIS) disposable income (LIS)
consumption (LIS) disposable income (WIID)
consumption (WIID)
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Household equivalized income/consumption - Gini indices
Figure 4.5 Trends in income inequality (Gini index) in selected middle- income 
countries (USA as benchmark)
Note: Gini indices obtained from the WIID database are per capita, therefore they exhibit higher levels 
compared to the equivalized LIS numbers (except India for consumption).
Source: Authors, based on data from the LIS database and WIID database.
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(see  Cornia  2014) that extends to most Latin American countries available in 
our dataset. Among the suggested explanations, one may consider a drop in the 
skill premium following an expansion of secondary education and the adoption 
of a new development model by a growing number of progressive governments 
which adopted prudent but more equitable macroeconomic, tax, social assistance, 
and labour policies. For example, Lustig et al. (2013) argue that overall decrease 
in income inequality in Latin American countries was dominated by a decline in 
labour income inequality that occurred due to expansion of employment and 
hours worked. These changes raised the incomes of, especially, the poor (roughly 
defined as the bottom half of the distribution), at the expense of the élites (again 
roughly identified as the top 5 per cent or 10 per cent in the distribution; see 
Figure 4.6).
Going back to Figure 4.5, for China and India we can hardly talk of any trend, 
as there are only two data points available for each country in the LIS database. 
With this caveat in mind, we observe that in the case of China inequality in mar-
ket income is on the rise, while the (admittedly limited) redistributive activities of 
the public sector contained this trend, leading to a constant inequality in terms of 
disposable incomes: in fact, the Gini index of pre- tax market incomes rose from 
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Income shares
Figure 4.6 Evolution of income shares held by households with incomes below the 
50th, and above the 90th and 95th percentiles
Source: Authors, based on data from the LIS database and the WIID database.
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household disposable income spans around 40 per cent.12 The rising trend in 
pre- tax income inequality is confirmed in other studies, though it may hide an 
even higher peak reached around the year 2008 (Jain- Chandra et al.  2018; 
Ghosh 2012). Income shares observed in Figure 4.6 suggest that most of the gains 
from growth accrued to the richest 10 per cent (though LIS data underestimate this 
share due to inability to capture the top incomes, as detectable when comparing 
with WID top incomes data). Contrary to the Latin American experience, differ-
ences in educational attainment at tertiary level and the skill premium are identified 
as drivers of the increase in income inequality (Jain- Chandra et al. 2018).
According to LIS data, India experienced a similar increase in market income 
inequality between 2004 and 2011, with the Gini index of pre- tax household income 
rising from 0.49 to 0.52, while the corresponding figures for disposable incomes 
rose from 0.48 to 0.49 (confirming that in middle- and low- income countries the 
distinction between the two income concepts is conceptually weak—see 
Section 2). In the case of India, we can only compare the consistency of our results 
against the WIID database for household consumption, showing that the trends 
for consumption inequality are very similar between LIS and WIID (see again 
Figure 4.5). Income shares indicate a robust expansion of the élites, though it is 
weaker than what is recorded by corresponding WID data for the top 10 per 
cent: see Figure 4.6. The rising trend would reverse a declining trend detected 
in the beginning of the previous decade, as a consequence of trade liberaliza-
tion undertaken by local governments at the end of the previous century 
(Krishna and Sethupathy 2012). Chancel and Piketty (2017), in a recent paper, 
conclude that economic transformation from a socialist planning to a capitalist 
economy was the main driver of unequal distribution of income and wealth in 
India. Over a comparable time interval, we do not find an equivalent trend in 
income inequality for countries available in the LIS database, since both Taiwan 
and South Korea exhibit rather stable inequality trends: see Checchi et al. (2018: 
Figure A2).
Inequality trends for Russia presented in Figure 4.5 indicate a declining trend 
in income inequality, with the Gini index of household disposable income drop-
ping from 41 per cent in 2000 to 33 per cent in 2013.13 A possible reduction in 
inequality found in LIS data stands in sharp contrast to results from top incomes 
analysis: Novokmet et al. (2017) claim that official inequality estimates vastly 
underestimate the concentration of income in Russia. While income shares of the 
top 10 per cent exhibit a declining trend in LIS survey data, tax records indicate 
12 In the case of China, the LIS figures for household disposable income inequality are somewhat 
lower compared to numbers from the external WIID database (due to different equivalency scale 
applied). Note that trends in both cases are very similar, with the two lines being almost parallel.
13 As in the case of India, we can only compare the validity of our computed inequality measures 
for household consumption: Figure 4.5 shows that consumption inequality computed on LIS data is 
somewhat lower than corresponding figures from the WIID database.
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an opposite trend.14 The Russian declining trend in inequality is partly in contrast 
with other Central and Eastern European countries (Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovenia), as detectable in Checchi et al. (2018: Figure A3).
Finally, we consider income inequality trends for South Africa (see again 
Figure 4.5). Among all the countries considered here, income inequality in South 
Africa, measured by all three indices, is by far the highest. Based on the Gini 
index of DHI, this inequality was as high as 63 per cent in 2008. It had gradually 
dropped to 57 per cent by 2015. As regards consistency with external data sources, 
we can only compare consumption inequality against the WIID figures. As there 
are only two points available, we cannot confirm whether the trends are well 
captured. Nevertheless, one might notice that consumption inequality has 
opposite trends between 2008 and 2010 based on LIS and WIID figures. When 
cross- checking with national sources, the problem of data quality (coverage, 
weights, imputations) emerges immediately, since various data imputations of 
missing income values may produce alternative trends, though all of them are on 
the rise.15 This is also confirmed by the trend in income shares of the top 10 per cent 
from WID, while in the LIS data the corresponding top- income share would have 
lost approximately 10 percentage points. In the case of South Africa, there is no 
other sub- Saharan country available in the LIS database. The closest country to 
compare the trends against is Israel, where the ethnic divide is also rather pro-
nounced. Apart from the lower level of aggregate inequality, in the latter country 
inequality seems also to be declining (see Checchi et al. 2018: Figure A4).
Overall, we may conclude that the inequality trend in BRICS countries exhibits 
different patterns, with Latin America and Eastern Europe on a declining trend 
while Eastern Asia and South Africa are on the rise. Despite the enormous differ-
ences in economic structure among these countries, we make an attempt to inves-
tigate whether common causes may underlie these changes. We resort to the 
common within/between decomposition analysis based on the mean log de vi ation 
index, and we focus on personal labour earnings, where the identification of com-
mon sources of inequality (like gender and education) is easier. In Figure 4.7 we 
report the result of such a decomposition, where two covariates are con sidered—
gender and education—and consequently the employed population is divided into 
14 ‘The Gini coefficient jumped from about 0.3–0.4 in self- reported survey data to over 0.6 using 
the leaked tax data, and the top 10% income share moved from about 30% to over 50% of total income’ 
(Novokmet et al. 2017: 13).
15 ‘Using Sequential Regression Multiple Imputation (SRMI) to impute values for reported zero or 
missing incomes, Yu (2009) found a strong increase (seven or eight points) in the Gini coefficient 
between 1996 and 2001 (Table 4.3). Supporting evidence comes from other studies employing alterna-
tive measures: Leibbrandt et al. (2006) found an increase in the Gini from 0.68 to 0.73 using one 
method, and from 0.74 to 0.79 using another; Simkins (2004) found that the Gini coefficient for 
households grew from 0.66 to 0.69; and Ardington et al. (2005) concluded that the Gini coefficient 
rose from 0.74 to 0.82. There is thus agreement about the trends, though the levels vary widely’ (Van 
Der Berg 2010: 12).
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six groups (two genders by three educational attainments). The between- group 
component (the inequality that would have been observed had each group mem-
ber an income equivalent to the group mean) is intended to  capture the return to 
education and/or the gender gap contributions to inequality: in all countries this 
dimension declines, though from different starting points. In previously centrally 
planned economies, this dimension of inequality was almost non- existent, while 
for the other countries it reached between one- third and one- half of observed 
earnings inequality. Within- group inequality (namely the inequality that can be 
attributed to unobserved components) is on the rise in India and South Africa, 
while a strong reduction can be observed in China. The limitation of this approach 
is the exclusion of people without labour earnings from the analysis, which makes 
these countries not strictly comparable. Nevertheless, the decomposition indi-
cates that traditional inequality drivers—gender and education—see a reduction 
of their explanatory power with reference to income inequality.
5.2 Regression Results
We now turn to a multivariate analysis in an expanded sample that includes other 
countries in the same area and/or at a similar level of development. Detailed 











2000 2005 2010 2015 2000 2005 2010 2015 2000 2005 2010 2015
Brazil China India
Russia South Africa US
labour income between gender/education
within gender/education
Year
Decomposition of personal labour earnings—Mean log deviation
Figure 4.7 Inequality decomposition in labour incomes
Source: Authors, based on data from the LIS database.
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Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics of variables used in the empirical analysis
Variable Obs. Countries Mean Std. 
dev.
Min. Max.
Gini index equivalized household 
factor income
148 21 0.43 0.08 0.27 0.71
Gini index equivalized disposable 
household income
150 21 0.37 0.10 0.21 0.63
Atkinson index equivalized household 
factor income e = 0.5
148 21 0.17 0.06 0.06 0.43
Atkinson index equivalized household 
factor income e = 1
148 21 0.35 0.09 0.12 0.74
Atkinson index equivalized household 
factor income e = 2
148 21 0.82 0.13 0.31 1.00
Income share bottom 50 per cent  
(based on household factor income)
144 21 0.19 0.05 0.03 0.30
Income share top 10 per cent (based  
on household factor income)
147 21 0.33 0.07 0.22 0.60
Income share top 5 per cent (based  
on household factor income)
147 21 0.21 0.06 0.12 0.43
Income share top 1 per cent (based on 
household factor income)
147 21 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.17
Gini index personal labour earnings 143 20 0.40 0.08 0.21 0.57
Atkinson index personal labour 
earnings e = 0.5
143 20 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.27
Atkinson index personal labour 
earnings e = 1
143 20 0.28 0.10 0.08 0.50
Atkinson index personal labour 
earnings e = 2
143 20 0.60 0.19 0.18 0.97
MLD personal labour earnings 143 20 0.34 0.15 0.08 0.69
MLD personal labour earnings—
between six groups (sex and education)
143 20 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.22
MLD personal labour earnings—within 
six groups (sex and education)
143 20 0.26 0.11 0.07 0.53
Decile ratio p90/p10 of personal  
labour earnings
143 20 9.92 7.18 2.50 32.00
Employment rate among men (16–65) 150 21 0.72 0.09 0.40 1.00
Employment rate among women 
(16–65)
150 21 0.51 0.12 0.20 1.00
Share female low education 15–65 150 21 0.25 0.11 0.07 0.47
Share female high education 15–65 150 21 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.28
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see that our countries differ in terms of the computed inequality indicators (e.g. 
Gini index of the household disposable income ranges from 0.20 to 0.63), but also 
in terms of underlying social conditions (e.g. life expectancy ranges from 53 to 
83 years).
We also explore existing correlations between income inequality measures and 
a set of institutional variables.16 We present four scatterplots in Figure 4.8. The 
results of these unconditional correlations suggest that income inequality (cap-
tured by the Gini index of household disposable income) is negatively correlated 
with the log of GDP per capita (measured in current US dollars), share of public 
expenditure (percentage of GDP), and life expectancy (years). On the other hand, 
the age dependency ratio is positively linked with income inequality. This might 
suggest that in countries with an ageing population and limited replacement 
 pension systems, income inequality becomes an issue. We are fully aware that 
such graphs do not imply any causal relationships and do not consider potential 
co vari ance among these variables. To cope with these problems in a more consist-
ent approach, we move to multivariate regressions.
16 Note that from now onward we extend the sample of country/year in order to get a more precise 
estimation of the variable correlations. We are thus working with 21 countries and 150 observations, 
with an average of 7.4 surveys per country. The countries are (number of surveys in brackets): 
Australia (8), Austria (9), Brazil (4), Chile (12), China (2), Colombia (4), Hungary (8), India (2), Israel 
(11), Italy (12), South Korea (4), Mexico (12), Paraguay (6), Peru (4), Poland (9), Russia (5), Slovenia 
(6), South Africa (4), Taiwan (11), the USA (12), and Uruguay (5). Note that for South Korea personal 
labour earnings are not collected.
Share male low education 15–65 150 21 0.23 0.10 0.08 0.46
Share male high education 15–65 150 21 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.19
Age dependency ratio (% of  
working- age population)
138 20 0.52 0.09 0.36 0.90
Life expectancy at birth (years) 138 20 75.13 4.85 53.72 83.09
Log GDP per capita 135 20 9.30 0.95 6.43 10.96
Urban population (% of total) 139 20 0.73 0.13 0.29 0.95
Government expenditure (% of GDP) 129 20 0.29 0.11 0.11 0.51
Government spending on education  
(% of GDP)
103 19 4.63 0.99 2.25 6.70
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing,  
value added (% of GDP)
122 20 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.20
Market capitalization of listed  
domestic companies (% of GDP)
107 19 61.96 49.29 2.08 246.47
Source: Authors, based on data from the LIS database and the World Bank Indicators database.
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The results of our multivariate analysis are presented in Tables  4.2–4.4. In 
Table 4.2 we consider three outcome variables (factor household income, DHI, 
and personal labour earnings), three inequality indicators (Gini index, Atkinson 
index with alternative risk aversion coefficients— 0.5∈=  and 2∈=  —and alter-
native income shares). Since we do not control for country fixed effects (though 
residuals are clustered at country level), these are to be intended as simple condi-
tional correlations, meant to explore the data. Among the most persistent results 
we notice that compositional variables (employment rates and educational attain-
ment by gender) exhibit significant correlations, though with inconsistent pat-
terns. On the contrary, GDP per capita turns out always to be insignificantly 
correlated with any inequality measure, similarly to proxies for production com-
position (agriculture share, trade openness) and public ex pend iture. Two vari-
ables exhibit positive correlation with inequality: one is a proxy for financial 
development (the market capitalization of listed domestic companies) and the 
other is a measure of urbanization (though it is positively associated with total 
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Figure 4.8 Income inequality (Gini index) versus selected macroeconomic country 
characteristics
Note: Gini index of DHI (top- coded and equalized according to the OECD equivalence scale) 
presented on the vertical axis.
























Table 4.2 Regression analysis: OLS including all contextual variables
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8 9  10 11 12



























0.13 0.07 –0.40* 0.19** 0.09 0.09  0.26 0.19 –0.24  0.63*** 1.28*** 47.16***




0.06 0.06 0.34** –0.15** –0.01 –0.02  –0.07 –0.04 0.3  –0.09 0.06 2.49
 [0.114] [0.101] [0.133] [0.061] [0.078] [0.062]  [0.120] [0.080] [0.386]  [0.093] [0.227] [13.946]
Share female low 
education 15–65
–1.22*** –0.68*** 0.76 0.41 –0.88*** –0.79***  –0.96 –0.55 –2.51***  –0.67** 0.35 –19.8
 [0.302] [0.230] [0.677] [0.264] [0.277] [0.199]  [0.572] [0.351] [0.835]  [0.254] [0.588] [45.905]
Share female high 
education 15–65
–0.60** –0.43** –0.52 0.2 –0.39* –0.34*  –0.29 –0.18 –1.52*  –1.05*** –1.82 –85.09**
 [0.236] [0.199] [0.707] [0.225] [0.213] [0.174]  [0.311] [0.199] [0.855]  [0.282] [1.198] [37.238]
Share male low 
education 15–65
1.25*** 0.80*** –0.32 –0.34 0.82*** 0.75***  0.97* 0.60* 2.40***  0.67*** 0.29 28.92
 [0.290] [0.234] [0.742] [0.309] [0.275] [0.210]  [0.545] [0.336] [0.658]  [0.191] [0.773] [43.557]
Share male high 
education 15–65
0.01 0.06 0.64 0.29 –0.13 –0.12  –0.01 0 0.99  1.71** 4.42* 145.17*


























Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8 9  10 11 12

























ratio (% of 
working- age 
population)
0.27** 0.14* –0.31* –0.19*** 0.16* 0.1  0.26* 0.13 0.43  0.30* 0.3 29.95
[0.098] [0.079] [0.151] [0.063] [0.076] [0.059]  [0.137] [0.093] [0.363]  [0.155] [0.465] [20.890]
Life expectancy at 
birth (years)
–0.01*** –0.01** 0 0.00** –0.01*** –0.01***  –0.01* –0.01* 0  –0.01*** –0.01 –0.53*
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]  [0.005] [0.003] [0.010]  [0.003] [0.006] [0.278]
                           
Log GDP per 
capita
0.01 0.01 0.09** 0 0 0  –0.02 –0.02 0.02  0.01 0.04 3.24
 [0.018] [0.016] [0.033] [0.012] [0.014] [0.013]  [0.023] [0.016] [0.065]  [0.026] [0.067] [3.560]
Urban population 
(% of total)
0.15** 0.07 –0.17 –0.12*** 0.17** 0.15**  0.17* 0.09 –0.32*  –0.09 –0.71*** –32.75***
 [0.064] [0.054] [0.116] [0.037] [0.062] [0.060]  [0.082] [0.062] [0.184]  [0.096] [0.192] [8.638]
Government 
expenditure (% of 
GDP)
–0.08 0.03 0.06 0.08 –0.07 –0.06  –0.11 –0.03 –0.14  –0.21** –0.40* –8.21
 [0.067] [0.049] [0.207] [0.050] [0.053] [0.044]  [0.133] [0.086] [0.255]  [0.093] [0.218] [13.887]
Government 
spending on 
education (% of 
GDP)
0 0 –0.04** –0.01 0.01 0  0 0 –0.09*  0.03*** 0.06** 2.73***



























added (% of GDP)
0.2 –0.07 –0.02 –0.37* 0.22 0.23  –0.06 –0.2 –0.6  0.07 –1.23 19.6
[0.314] [0.268] [0.644] [0.181] [0.293] [0.284]  [0.522] [0.362] [1.155]  [0.617] [1.573] [75.907]
Trade openness 
(% of GDP)
0.02 0.01 –0.05 0 0.01 0.01  0 0 –0.27***  0.05 0.16 6.82




companies (% of 
GDP)
0.06*** 0.05*** 0.01 –0.02*** 0.05*** 0.04***  0.08*** 0.05*** 0.16**  0.09*** 0.14** 7.28**
[0.014] [0.013] [0.030] [0.007] [0.012] [0.012]  [0.019] [0.014] [0.057]  [0.025] [0.056] [2.604]
Observations 75 75 75 74 75 74  77 77 77  71 71 71
R- squared 0.85 0.793 0.515 0.795 0.88 0.872  0.857 0.848 0.556  0.831 0.669 0.632
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors clustered at country level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
























Table 4.3 Regression analysis: country fixed effects selecting some contextual variables
Variables 1 2 3 4 5  6 7  8 9 10
  Household factor income (labour + capital)   Household disposable 
income


















Employment rate among men 
(16–65)
–0.26** 0.12 0.18** –0.19* –0.11  –0.13 –0.71**  –0.34** –0.66 3.72
 [0.113] [0.138] [0.076] [0.101] [0.080]  [0.095] [0.325]  [0.122] [0.410] [15.151]
Employment rate among women 
(16–65)
0.12 –0.40*** –0.04 0.06 0.02  0 0.26  0.28** 0.44 –1.84
 [0.087] [0.129] [0.069] [0.082] [0.072]  [0.079] [0.220]  [0.120] [0.400] [16.612]
Share female low education 
15–65
0.14 –0.48 –0.12 0.14 0.19**  0.02 –0.86  0.13 –0.13 –15
 [0.144] [0.426] [0.101] [0.091] [0.085]  [0.114] [0.552]  [0.094] [0.267] [17.744]
Share female high education 
15–65
–0.08 –0.44 0.32 –0.11 –0.1  0.03 –0.04  –0.23 –0.42 –92.87***
 [0.212] [0.639] [0.238] [0.213] [0.150]  [0.209] [0.777]  [0.160] [0.778] [31.871]
Share male low education 15–65 0.23** –0.13 –0.03 0.18 0.16*  0.04 0.59**  0.08 –0.42 –22.99
 [0.102] [0.161] [0.108] [0.108] [0.087]  [0.133] [0.265]  [0.094] [0.332] [19.263]
Share male high education 15–65 0.97*** 0.99 –0.63*** 0.84*** 0.70***  0.4 3.25**  1.09*** 3.33*** 136.31***
 [0.177] [1.045] [0.185] [0.175] [0.160]  [0.234] [1.278]  [0.340] [0.980] [40.248]
Age dependency ratio (% of 
working- age population)
0.05 –0.31** –0.09 0.02 0.06  0.03 0.34  –0.18** –0.63*** –33.59**
[0.112] [0.150] [0.122] [0.112] [0.084]  [0.116] [0.417]  [0.077] [0.158] [12.440]
Life expectancy at birth (years) 0.01 0.02** 0 0 0  0 0.01  0.01** 0.02** 1.62**
























Log GDP per capita –0.02 –0.01 0.01 –0.02 –0.01  –0.02 –0.09**  –0.05** –0.13*** –4.57**
 [0.016] [0.025] [0.012] [0.015] [0.014]  [0.014] [0.033]  [0.017] [0.039] [1.987]
Urban population (% of total) 0.08 –0.4 –0.4 0.37 0.44**  0.06 –0.12  –0.98** –3.15*** –188.85***
 [0.328] [0.659] [0.311] [0.305] [0.209]  [0.305] [1.072]  [0.374] [0.809] [61.310]
Government expenditure (% of 
GDP)
–0.19* –0.2 –0.03 –0.15 –0.11  –0.12 –0.51  –0.12 –0.07 3.18
 [0.098] [0.220] [0.076] [0.093] [0.075]  [0.104] [0.313]  [0.125] [0.335] [15.923]
Observations 127 127 123 126 126  129 129  122 122 122
R- squared 0.289 0.271 0.326 0.234 0.216  0.179 0.331  0.373 0.332 0.311
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21  21 21  20 20 20
               
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors clustered at country level. Country fixed effects included. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
























Table 4.4 Regression analysis: country fixed effects selecting some contextual variables—most recent observations (year > 2000)
Variables 1 2 3 4 5  6 7  8 9 10




















Employment rate among men 
(16–65)
0.11 0.54 0.07 0.1 0.13  0.16 0.37  –0.06 –0.42 2.05
 [0.170] [0.348] [0.114] [0.143] [0.145]  [0.108] [0.389]  [0.146] [0.508] [26.774]
Employment rate among women 
(16–65)
–0.25 –0.79* 0.12 –0.21 –0.22  –0.24** –0.78**  0.05 0.07 9.72
 [0.146] [0.388] [0.115] [0.133] [0.127]  [0.092] [0.365]  [0.166] [0.629] [32.745]
Share female low education 15–65 –0.29 –2.05 –0.04 –0.11 –0.2  –0.62 –5.16***  –0.08 –0.68 –29.26
 [0.565] [1.984] [0.421] [0.502] [0.474]  [0.413] [1.798]  [0.488] [2.336] [83.711]
Share female high education 15–65 0.07 0.47 –0.07 0.19 0.14  0.11 –0.8  –0.22 –1.59 –101
 [0.400] [1.279] [0.286] [0.292] [0.227]  [0.261] [1.124]  [0.731] [1.956] [130.952]
Share male low education 15–65 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.31  0.43 1.66  –0.33 –1.65 –96.12
 [0.527] [1.345] [0.357] [0.513] [0.500]  [0.434] [1.175]  [0.450] [1.987] [66.203]
Share male high education 15–65 –0.31 –1.45 0.33 0.08 0.22  0.02 1.9  –0.47 0.33 –99.34
 [0.433] [1.039] [0.201] [0.332] [0.289]  [0.347] [1.269]  [0.695] [2.645] [100.619]
Age dependency ratio (% of 
working- age population)
0.13 –0.86* –0.07 –0.04 –0.12  0.02 0  0.4 1.31* 66.45
[0.189] [0.428] [0.140] [0.147] [0.116]  [0.151] [1.007]  [0.267] [0.689] [50.825]
Life expectancy at birth (years) 0 0.01 0 –0.01 0  0 0  0 0.01 1.04
 [0.005] [0.008] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]  [0.003] [0.008]  [0.005] [0.014] [0.936]
Log GDP per capita –0.01 –0.07*** 0.01 –0.01 –0.01  –0.02* –0.17***  –0.01 –0.02 1.35
























Urban population (% of total) –0.08 –0.62 –0.03 0.11 –0.07  –0.39 –0.72  –0.08 –0.32 –137.18
 [0.641] [1.211] [0.393] [0.499] [0.429]  [0.481] [1.005]  [0.662] [1.734] [105.797]
Government expenditure (% of 
GDP)
–0.09 –0.52 –0.04 –0.05 –0.06  –0.17** –0.89**  –0.1 –0.72* –2.74
[0.095] [0.405] [0.092] [0.080] [0.065]  [0.074] [0.335]  [0.157] [0.391] [21.288]
Observations 83 83 81 83 82  83 83  79 79 79
R- squared 0.306 0.243 0.354 0.359 0.287  0.428 0.346  0.196 0.15 0.198
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21  21 21  20 20 20
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors clustered at country level. Country fixed effects included. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Source: Authors, based on data from the LIS database and the World Bank Indicators database.
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main limit of this approach is the missing values on some variables (as can easily 
be detected in Table 4.1, where market capitalization and public ex pend iture are 
absent in one- third of the sample).
For this reason, in Table 4.3 we adopt a more parsimonious model, in order to 
raise the number of observations. We also abandon the Atkinson index (with 
0.5∈= ), given its high correlation with the Gini index ( 0.98ρ =  for household 
factor income), and we introduce country fixed effects.17 We currently find that 
educational attainment in the male population tends to polarize the income dis-
tribution, thus raising inequality, while employment rates reduce it. The GDP per 
capita and the population urban share are now negatively associated with labour 
market inequality, though still uncorrelated with total income inequality. 
However, the timespan covered by these regressions is rather wide, spanning 
from 1974 to 2016. Therefore, we have chosen to restrict the sample period to 
most recent observations, in order to obtain a model more compatible with the 
BRICS sample (which is only observed after the year 2000).
In Table 4.4 we present our preferred model, which contains a limited number 
of statistically significant coefficients, especially when looking at inequality in fac-
tor incomes or in personal labour earnings. However, more consistent results 
emerge when considering household disposable incomes (columns 6 and 7 of 
Table 4.4), irrespective of whether we use the Gini index or the Atkinson index 
with 2,∈=  which focuses more on lower values: inequality declines when more 
women enter the formal labour market (female employment rate), when public 
expenditure increases, and when GDP per capita rises.18
6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have presented recent developments in income and consump-
tion inequality, focusing on a set of middle- income countries (Brazil, China, 
India, Russia, and South Africa) that have been recently added to the LIS database 
and for which there is limited coverage and comparability in the empirical 
literature.
We started by discussing the main challenges when harmonizing income and 
consumption survey microdata from the middle- income countries, and what 
implications this has for the analysis of economic inequality.
In our empirical exercise, we first estimated a variety of income (consumption) 
inequality indicators separately for each country and year for the whole 
17 Year fixed effects cannot be included since LIS surveys are available in neighbouring years, but 
not necessarily coincident ones.
18 We have also considered a random- effect model, as well as relaxing the error clustering assump-
tion, without finding more statistical significance in the results. Only life expectancy obtains a signifi-
cant negative sign, but we acknowledge that causality may go in both directions.
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population, as well as for subpopulation groups. We described the trends of 
these five countries against of the trends of neighbouring countries, finding 
declining trends in inequality in Brazil, Russia, and South Africa, against rising 
trends in East Asia (India and China). By then merging inequality indicators 
with World Bank Indicators data, we created an unbalanced panel database 
covering around twenty- one countries over the time period from 1976 to 2016. 
Our panel data analysis updates the findings of Roine et al. (2009), who 
 estimated macroeconomic determinants of economic inequality for fifteen 
high- income countries.
Results from the country- level panel regressions revealed the following pat-
terns. For our analysed sample of countries, the relationship between income 
inequality and GDP per capita exhibits a negative correlation, jointly with the 
(female) employment rate. It is also negatively correlated with public ex pend-
iture in GDP, while other controls (such as trade openness, share of agriculture, 
financial openness) come out as not significant when country fixed effects are 
taken into account. None of the country- level correlation results implies a causal 
relationship. However, the robustness of the results would be reinforced were 
more countries to be available in the sample—especially the low- income ones, 
which differ in many economic circumstances from the high- income countries. 
Therefore, the LIS Datacenter aims in future to acquire more microdata from 
other low- and middle- income countries, in addition to those already covered in 
the database.
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What Are the Main Drivers of Income Distribution 




Since the beginning of the 1970s, Brazil has been known as one of the most 
un equal countries in the world (Bacha and Taylor 1978; Fishlow 1972; Langoni 
1973; Ramos 1993).1 Its per capita income inequality presented high instability 
but no clear trend until 2001. After the start of the new millennium, inequality 
fell every single year until 2014 (Barros et al. 2006; Kakwani et al. 2014; Neri 2004). 
Earnings inequality also presented a falling trend in this period (Ferreira et al. 
2016; IPEA 2013; Neri and Camargo 2002).
In 2003, the income-equalizing movement was coupled with an acceleration of 
GDP growth and, on top of that, mean household income grew even faster. The above- 
mentioned inequality trend has a clear parallel with the rest of Latin America, while 
its household income growth is at odds with other countries of the region and with 
Brazil’s own National Accounts statistics. As a result, until 2014, Gini index-based 
social welfare grew three times faster than GDP. In this period, Brazil followed a 
‘middle path’, in which the well-being distribution improved simultaneously on these 
three fronts. Roughly speaking, social welfare growth was evenly divided between: 
(i) falling inequality of household income; (ii) the differential of mean income 
between surveys and National Accounts; (iii) and real GDP growth (Neri 2014).
This chapter describes the evolution of Brazilian income distribution and its 
close determinants between 1994 and 2015. Encompassing both inequality and 
1 The Brazilian component of the UNU-WIDER Inequality in the Giants project comprises seven 
studies co-authored by Marcelo Neri (FGV, lead), Tiago Bonomo (FGV), Marcos Hecksher (IPEA), 
Cecilia Machado (FGV), Valdemar Neto (FGV), José Nogueira (UFPE), Manuel Camillo Osorio (FGV), 
Pedro Silva (IBGE), and Rozane Siqueira (UFPE). Neri (2018) presents a more complete version of this 
chapter. The papers that were the basis of this study were presented at the UNU-WIDER conferences 
held in Helsinki and Quito and at the National Meetings of Brazilian Economists (ANPEC) held in 
Natal, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao Paulo. We are grateful for the comments provided at these conferences.
Marcelo Neri, Brazil: What Are the Main Drivers of Income Distribution Changes in the New Millennium? In: Inequality in 
the Developing World. Edited by: Carlos Gradín, Murray Leibbrandt, and Finn Tarp, Oxford University Press (2021).  
© United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER). 
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198863960.003.0005
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mean income rates of growth is key to providing a comprehensive picture of 
impacts in terms of social welfare within Brazil and world inequality. Moreover, 
measurement and causal issues that affect inequality have implications on the 
mean income, and vice versa. This means analysing the second moment of income 
distribution without losing sight of the first moment, or of the existing synergies 
between them. The other general point in all the contributions to this project is 
that changes of inequality and mean income should be emphasized, not only their 
respective levels. This helps us to address the various period-of-analysis restric-
tions across different datasets. Differences across time are also a way to deal with 
measurement issues and to identify causality.
The key objective here is to assess the relative role of different public policy 
ingredients in income distribution changes. The channels behind these changes 
are diverse, such as increasing education levels; falling education and experience 
premiums; the diffusion of social programmes such as conditional cash transfers 
(CCTs); the expansion of contributory and non-contributory social security 
 benefits and other programmes linked to the minimum wage, which also rose 
sharply in this period, to name just a few examples.
1.2 Organization
In these studies, we offer a description and an interpretation of the main causes 
of income distribution changes in Brazil in the past twenty-five years. Section 2 
presents an overview of the main socioeconomic developments and the main 
economic challenges ahead. We attempt to time the evolution of income distribu-
tion and surveys methodology, setting 2003–15 as the central period of analysis. 
We also assemble the main aspects of mean income growth and inequality trends 
in this period using household surveys.
The rest of the chapter attempts to fill the gaps about income distribution 
changes in the previous literature. I connect the main questions of the overall 
project and specific contributions by exploring new empirical possibilities, applying 
various techniques to a vast array of datasets. Table 5.1 presents a schematic view 
of the main empirical strategies pursued, described in sequence.
Identified administrative records such as RAIS (Registro Anual de Informações 
Sociais from the Labour Ministry) allows us to look at the upper part of the 
 earnings distribution and test the main determinants of overall earnings distri-
bution changes. In particular, RAIS makes it possible to construct merged 
employer–employee records and to measure the role of firms mediating labour 
earnings inequality (Section 3).
Next, the 1996 and 2014 special supplements to the national household survey 
PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional de Amostras a Domicílio from the Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics (IBGE)), with additional information on the individuals’ 
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education background, is also used. This information allows us to assess 
 intergenerational education changes before and after the bulk of Brazilian income 
inequality reversal, in addition to better analyse the changes in the returns to 
education—in particular, how measurement errors and omitted variables biases 
affect education’s impact on the earnings distribution (Section 4).
Besides exploring new data sources, the project analyses available  surveys through 
a new lens. Although PNAD is the main Brazilian household survey used in 
inequality studies, it is the only official survey with no explicit imputation for 
missing incomes values. A new imputation methodology is another by-product 
proposed here. Brazil has a well-established tradition of welfare measurement but 
has not paid much attention to issues such as imputed rents and income measure-
ment period, an issue also addressed here (Section 5). In particular, PNAD does not 
ask questions on direct or indirect taxes and some of the questions on the official 
cash transfers are not very detailed. Consequently, we developed a microsimulation 
framework that details the role played by individual fiscal instruments in income 
distribution changes using actual data across different points in time (Section 6).
Finally, Brazil recently released detailed personal income tax (PIT) tabulations 
from the Brazilian Internal Revenue Service. Combining these with household 
surveys gives us a clearer view of the top end of the income distribution. Once 
again, we address mean income growth and social welfare changes and their 
Table 5.1 Inequality in Brazil by topic, technique, dataset, period of time, and 
income concept
Paper/Inequality topic Technique Dataset/Period used Income 
concept
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causes, adding new insights to the previous literature (Section 7). Section 8 presents 
the main conclusions of the chapter.
2  Brazilian Social and Economic Developments
This section presents the big picture of Brazilian evolution in the past three decades, 
using international social indicators such as the Human Development Index (HDI), 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), with an emphasis on poverty and shared prosperity goals. We connect 
these developments with the economic policy agenda, especially regarding struc-
tural reforms. We also attempt to relate Brazilian income distribution changes to 
related measurement issues. Finally, we assess the role played by different policy-
related components in income distribution trends for the 2003–15 period. The 
overall objective here is to set the stage for the specific contributions of the project.
2.1 Poverty
The first and main goal of the MDGs was to reduce poverty by 50 per cent 
between 1990 and 2015. In this period, the proportion of extremely poor fell by 
73.3 per cent in Brazil and 70.2 per cent worldwide. This global poverty reduction 
occurred due to the combined economic miracles in China and India, nations 
that once housed half of the world’s poor (Deaton  2013). Throughout the 
1990–2015 period, Brazil had direct elections for president, and since 1994 it has 
achieved price stability, which is no small achievement for a nation that held the 
world inflation record between 1970 and 1995. Poverty reduction in Brazil 
between 1990 and 2015 had a roughly equal contribution from two components: 
income growth and inequality reduction. This trend reversed in 2015, when extreme 
poverty rose by 23.5 per cent.
2.2  Human Development
In 1991, about 85 per cent of all Brazilian municipalities had very low HDI. In 
2010, this statistic was 0.6 per cent. There was a profound social transformation. 
The problem is that Brazilian governments disconnected its social policy from its 
economic agenda and, as a result, presented stagnated labour productivity and 
increasing fiscal imbalances.
The inconsistencies between social and economic progress can be captured in 
the three HDI components. Federal public spending as a proportion of GDP in 
Brazil rose from 10.8 per cent in 1991 to 19.7 per cent in 2016. The main driving 
force of public spending was social security payments. In 1980, life expectancy 
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was 62.5 years; by 2016, it reached 75.8 years. That is, in every three-year period, 
life ex pect ancy advanced by more than a year. Fertility also fell sharply. The popu-
lation pyramid aged considerably, yet Brazil did not implement broad pension 
reform. Brazil spends 13 per cent of its GDP on pensions and retirement benefits, 
while Japan, the longest-living nation in the world, spends 10 per cent. Japan’s 
share of people over 65 years old is currently 350 per cent higher than Brazil’s. 
However, Brazil’s elderly population share is set to multiply by five in the next 
fifty years.
Education has also advanced in Brazil. In 1990, 16 per cent of children aged 
between 7–14 were out of school. By 2018, this share was less than 2 per cent, 
with low quality of inputs. Brazil increased school enrollment but required only 
four hours a day of school time. In 1980, the adult population had only three 
years of schooling, on average, while in 2015 it had eight years. Although edu-
cation has increased, labour productivity has not. In 1980, Brazil’s productivity 
was equal to South Korea’s. Today it is just one third of the Korean productivity 
level, due to several factors, including lack of education quality and connection 
with economic demands, an inhospitable business environment, closure to 
immigration, and a lack of engineers. Brazil has followed an educational agenda 
focused on expanding citizenship that has its merits, as the above-mentioned 
life-expectancy increase suggests, but that has had little impact on labour 
productivity.
In addition, there has been an increase in mean labour remuneration above 
mean labour productivity (Neri 2014). Disaggregated data reveal that the wage 
gains distribution has not been accompanied by improvements in the re mu ner-
ation fundamental, namely productivity distribution (Alvarez et al.  2017). The 
social advancements manifested in the transformation of the trilogy of HDI com-
ponents were largely disconnected from productivity and fiscal adjustment con-
siderations, the two main Brazilian macroeconomic challenges.
2.3 Inclusive Growth
From 1930 to 1980 Brazil had the second highest GDP growth worldwide, behind 
only Japan. From 1980 onwards, growth reduced but there was progress with 
regard to democracy and in terms of social dimensions. After 2000, inequality fell 
every single year until 2014. In 2003, the income-equalizing movement was 
 coupled with an acceleration of GDP growth, and mean household income grew 
even faster.
The inequality fall was around the mean for Latin America countries, while the 
excess of household income growth with respect to GDP is Brazil-specific. 
Between 2002 and 2012 Brazil was third among the seventeen Latin American 
countries in terms of household income growth but tenth in terms of GDP 
growth. In most of the world’s emerging or developed countries, the growth in 
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GDP was larger than the rise in household incomes and inequality. These contrasts 
make Brazil an interesting case to study.
In late 2015, the main Brazilian household surveys, PNAD and PME (Pesquisa 
Mensal de Emprego), were replaced by a new national survey, PNADC (Pesquisa 
Nacional de Amostras a Domicilio Contínua), which shows a major reversal of all 
previous distributive-growth trends. In particular, from the first quarter of 2015 
onwards, every annual variation showed an inequality increase, until the third 
quarter of 2019. This means that per capita labour inequality rose for eighteen 
quarters in a row, which is a duration unprecedented in Brazilian series. Therefore, 
it should be noted in PNADC data a rise and fall of Brazilian mean earnings and 
their equality between 2012 and 2019. Social welfare trends based on labour 
income sources also depict a mountain shape graph throughout the period, where 
2012 and 2017 both represent the basis of the mountain and 2014 its peak.
2.4 Shared Prosperity
Given the major revision in the main Brazilian household surveys at the end of 
2015 and the changing inequality trends noted above, we focus on the 2003–15 
period, looking first at individual incomes of different groups to capture horizon-
tal inequality trends. Mean income grew in real terms by 3.79 per cent per year, 
while the income of traditionally marginalized groups grew at faster yearly rates: 
blacks (4.8 per cent), females (5 per cent), north-east region (5 per cent), rural 
areas (5.3 per cent), illiterate individuals (5.6 per cent), mulattos (6 per cent), and 
spouses (6 per cent).2
SDG 10 captures inequality by focusing on the income growth of the poorest 
40 per cent of the population (Basu 2001; Kakwani et al. 2014). It is interesting to 
compute how much the yearly growth rate between 2003 and 2015 in the mean 
income of the whole population (3.79 per cent) differs from that of the bottom 
40 per cent (6.39 per cent). The −2.60 per cent difference in favour of the bottom 
40% of the population is a useful measure of in equal ity trends. We can disentangle, 
in an additive fashion, the main  drivers of this inequality fall, namely: other income 
sources (-0.65 per cent); years of schooling (−2.02 per cent); hourly wages per 
year of schooling (−0.51 per cent); hours worked (0.29 per cent); occupation 
rate (0.09 per cent); and labour supply (0.41 per cent). This labour ingredients 
decomposition suggests that the faster growth of the bottom 40 per cent is 
mostly due to an expansion in population’s years of study and a decrease of income 
returns from schooling. The other point worth noting is that the impact of 
2 Other productive attributes of workers that are in general positively related to earnings, such as 
technical education, formalization, job tenure, and firm size, increased their share in the workforce, 
but individuals without those attributes presented the highest wage growth rates in the period of 
falling inequality (Neri 2014).
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other income sources on mean growth and inequality is relatively small, suggesting 
the dominance of labour earnings effects in inequality trends.
Another policy perspective is to disentangle different per capita income 
sources inequality trends. Fiscal microsimulation exercises reveal that in the 
2003–15 period market incomes inequality fell by 2.2 per cent per year; when 
we add to that official cash transfers, gross income inequality fell 2.7 per cent. If 
we consider the effect of direct taxes, inequality fell by 2.69 per cent, a similar 
amount. Finally, when we consider the effects of indirect taxes, final income 
in equal ity fell by 2.56 per cent. Section 6 provides details using the Gini index, 
the role played by specific private income sources, and official cash transfers.
Disposable income-based mean and inequality trends are similar to those 
based on gross income. If we move to the upper disposable income shares, the 
respective 2003–15 period yearly growth rates fall: whereas the bottom half grows by 
5.91 per cent, the upper half grows by 3 per cent, the top 10 per cent by 2.19 per cent, 
and the top 1 per cent by 2.02 per cent.
Finally, we need to complete the missing pieces of the pure growth puzzle. 
Household income grew on average 1.88 per cent a year above GDP in the 
2003–15 period. This difference is almost the same as the difference between 
labour remuneration and labour productivity. We are able to decompose for the 
2003–13 period the 1.9 per cent a year difference. Only 18 per cent is due to 
nominal and timing differences, which is good news—first, because for social 
welfare purposes consumer price index is more relevant than implicit deflators; 
and second, because it puts the burden of the difference explanation outside 
National Accounts versus household surveys information sets.
Instead, we must look at differences between the GDP implicit deflator and the 
official consumer price index (IPCA) inflation rates. We see that 20.7 per cent of the 
residual gap is due to terms of trade (meaning domestic demand over total demand 
in an open economy); 29.3 per cent is due to differences between private consump-
tion and domestic demand; and the residual half is due to differences between 
consumer price index and the private consumption implicit deflator. Social welfare 
growth cannot be sustained if the costs of goods and services purchased in the 
markets rises less than the cost of producing them captured by the implicit deflator.
We have based our understanding of income distribution trends in Brazil during 
this century and their main policy determinants on the main national household 
survey (PNAD). This takes into account the impact of different income sources 
(labour, rents, social security, official cash transfers) and of classical labour 
ingredients (participation, unemployment, working hours, hourly wages, school 
premiums). We have also decomposed the reasons behind the gap between mean 
household income and GDP growth (nominal differences), and related to deflators 
(terms of trade, domestic demand, and consumption). In the rest of the chapter 
we will incorporate, step by step, new data and methodological possibilities explored 
in the project to provide a more detailed picture.
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3 Are Firm Effects Driving Formal Earnings Inequality?
The vast majority of the empirical literature on income distribution in developing 
countries uses household surveys.3 Brazil established this tradition in the early 
1970s. Recently, a series of studies have documented inequality changes based on 
PIT records. Establishment-level administrative records are also available in 
Brazil, but these have rarely been used in studies on income inequality. RAIS 
(Registro Anual de Informações Sociais) is a matched employer–employee database 
containing around 30 million observations per year on workers over the past two 
decades. RAIS depicts formal employment and wage differentials dynamics. It is a 
powerful complement to other data sources (Alvarez et al.  2017; Engbom and 
Moser 2017). This section documents the evolution and the main determinants of 
earnings inequality in the Brazilian formal sector from 1994 to 2015 using RAIS.
A broad inequality diagnosis using Lorenz curves and the main inequality 
indexes used in the literature, such as earnings ratios across different percentiles, 
the Gini index, and the Theil indexes, shows a consistent formal earnings in equal-
ity fall. Using RAIS, we also compare these results with broader household sur-
veys, which also present falling trends. For example, the Gini of labour earnings 
in RAIS fell by 12.5 per cent between 1995 and 2015, while the concentration 
index obtained with PNAD data fell by 19.3 per cent in the same period.
3.1 Top Earnings
RAIS allows us to measure wages at the very upper end of the formal earnings 
distribution. In spite of the overall fall in inequality, the monotonic decrease of 
earnings growth throughout the income distribution continues only until the 
ninetieth percentile; above this point the trend is reversed. This evidence is in line 
with PIT data, which is explored in Section 7 (Medeiros et al. 2015a, 2015b).
J-Divergence measures allow us to disentangle the role played by specific cat-
egor ies of different variables, including income itself. The share of inequality 
explained by the top 10 per cent, 1 per cent, and 0.1 per cent rose between 1995 
and 2015: by 20.2 per cent, 43.1 per cent, and 90.1 per cent, respectively. Similarly, 
despite falling mean schooling returns, the share of inequality explained by those 
with a high school diploma rose by 29.5 per cent in the same period (Hecksher 
et al. 2017; Rohde 2016).
3 This section is based on Neri et al. (2018a). Machado et al. (2018), which also belongs to this 
project on gender inequality using RAIS, was omitted to align with the topics studied in other coun-
tries’ studies.
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3.2 Breaking Down Inequality
Standard inequality decompositions based on information theory help us to 
understand the main determinants of formal earnings dispersion. These include 
workers’ characteristics (such as gender, race, age, education, and spatial location) 
and firms’ characteristics (sector of activity, firm size, legal nature, etc). In general, 
the results indicate the predominant role played by the ‘within’ component in 
explaining total inequality, for the entire historical series of 1994–2015. However, 
looking at the ‘between’ effect for the educational categories, we observe a relatively 
higher contribution. For instance, in 1994, schooling explained 24.1 per cent of 
the total inequality measured by the J-Divergence index, while in 2015 this statistic 
reached 32.8 per cent.
As we found for several individual workers’ characteristics above, the 
‘between-within’ decomposition for firms’ characteristics shows the predominance 
of the ‘within’ component in determining total inequality. Nonetheless, when 
we look at a highly disaggregated level by considering firm fixed effects (i.e. each 
firm being a category itself), the results show a remarkable contribution of indi-
vidual firms. For the 1994–2015 period, the contribution of firm-specific factors 
explains around 65 per cent of total inequality in each year considered. In 2015 
the portion of the total inequality, as measured by the J-Divergence index, 
explained by the between component reached 64.7 per cent.
Taken together, our findings suggest that, among several workers’ characteris-
tics, differences in schooling were a primary factor in explaining total inequality 
in the Brazilian formal labour market. Firm fixed effects have an even more pro-
nounced explanatory power.
3.3 Inequality Changes
When one looks at the changes observed from 1994 to 2015, the power of indi-
vidual firm effects to explain the fall in inequality observed is 64.5 per cent. 
Applying the same type of analysis across time to different characteristics, we also 
found the following contributions to inequality fall: education (−4.3 per cent), 
gender (2.55 per cent), age (8.8 per cent), macroregion (1.96 per cent), sector of 
activity (9.92 per cent), nature of the firm (−2.61 per cent from 1995 to 2015), and 
firm size (3.06 per cent). The firm effects explain the total inequality fall between 
1994 and 2015 around three times more than the combined contribution of all 
the other characteristics considered.
The other striking result is the increasing impact of education on inequality in 
this period, which is not intuitive. This effect disappears with a more recent 
period of analysis. From 2001 onwards, there is a clearer inequality downward 
trend; hence, it may also be advisable to consider this period. Education explained 
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33.3 per cent of the marked inequality fall observed and thus assumes the role of 
the second highest explanatory variable on the inequality fall observed from 2001 
to 2015. Once again, firm effects explain most (75.9 per cent) of the inequality fall 
observed between 2001 and 2015. This means that the gross explanatory power of 
individual firms to explain inequality in the Brazilian formal labour market is 
almost twice that for education. In sum, in the context of inequality change, firms 
also appear as the main driving variable.
We mention here only the results for people who finished high school but have 
no college education, to discuss the broader determinants of inequality within 
education groups (Alvarez et al. 2017; Machado et al. 2018). The baseline model 
with basic sociodemographic categories explains 25.8 per cent of the overall vari-
ance of logs of earnings. When we add occupation and sectoral dummies, the 
cumulative explanatory power reaches 39.7 per cent. If we add firm fixed effects, 
it reaches 77.8 per cent.
3.4 Main Findings
This section has documented the evolution and the main close determinants of 
earnings inequality in the Brazilian formal sector from 1994 to 2015 using 
establishment-level administrative records. Changes in the earnings distribution 
in the formal sector share are among the trends observed in household surveys, 
which evidence, in particular, a marked fall in inequality between 2001 and 2014. 
However, the distributive decompression is observed only until the ninetieth per-
centile, which is in line with PIT-based evidence. The analysis of specific groups 
shows that the share of inequality explained by the top 1 per cent and 0.1 per cent 
income-earners rose by 43 per cent and 91 per cent, respectively. We will come 
back to top income issues, looking at broader income concepts, in Section 6.
In 2015, schooling explained 33 per cent of overall inequality. Firm effects explain 
65 per cent of total inequality. Firms are also central to explaining the marked 
inequality fall observed. Moreover, firms seem to drive overall inequality in devel-
oped countries such as the US and Germany (Card et al. 2013; Song et al. 2015).
4 What Is the Role of Educational Background?
Education changes are often viewed as the main driver of changes in earnings 
distribution.4 In the case of Brazil, there is low intergenerational mobility and 
strong dependence on family background. In contrast with most other countries, 
4 This section is based on Neri and Bonomo (2018).
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Brazil has experienced a strong reduction in educational premiums in the past 
two decades. However, omitted variable and measurement error biases possibly 
affect the econometric estimates of these effects.
There was also a sharp fall in individual labour earnings inequality between 
1996 and 2014. Coincidentally, supplements to the national household sample 
survey (PNAD) on family background in these two specific years allow us to 
clarify the role played by falling education returns. This section takes advantage 
of this information to provide new estimates of the returns to education in Brazil 
using traditional Mincerian regressions, quantile regressions, and pseudo- panels. 
We also study the intergenerational transmission of education in Brazil using 
Markovian regressions.
The main questions posed here are: How has intergenerational mobility in 
education evolved? (Behrman et al.  2001; Ferreira and Velloso  2003; Lam and 
Schoeni 1993). What has been the evolution of wage premiums with respect to 
schooling? And, in particular, how has parents’ education affected the returns and 
the educational level of their children? (Card 2001; Lam et al. 2015).
4.1 Intergenerational Inertia
Brazil is a country marked by low intergenerational mobility in education. For 
example, in 2014, in households where the father had completed higher education, 
70.7 per cent of their children achieved the same level and 7.09 per cent got a 
Master’s or a PhD degree. But how has educational mobility evolved in recent years? 
A simple Markovian model shows a strong reduction in the mean intergenerational 
per sist ence of education between the years 1996 and 2014, which went from 0.7 to 
0.47. It is important to stress that this result still places Brazil among the countries 
with the highest levels of education inertia across generations (between Germany 
with 0.2 in 1997 and Colombia with 0.7 in 2001). Indeed, Brazil is now closer to 
where Mexico and Peru were placed at the end of the last century.
Cohort effects regarding intergenerational mobility show that the fall in the 
persistence of education is stronger for younger cohorts, coinciding with the fall 
in education premiums when we take into account family background data in the 
regressions.
Finally, quantile regressions enable us to assess how the intergenerational per-
sist ence in education changed along the income distribution between 1996 and 
2014. Comparing directly the coefficients for the two years, we find that, except 
for the first tenth, the persistence is smaller for 2014 than for 1996, especially in 
the middle and upper part of the income distribution. In fact, we find stronger 
reductions in the intergenerational persistence of education for the richest 
individuals.
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4.2 Education Premiums
The two PNAD supplements allow us to address econometric issues of omitted 
variable and attenuation bias. First, omitting parents’ education information 
while accounting for selectivity issues reduces education premium estimates by 
24 per cent. Perhaps more importantly, the fall in education premium is heavily 
underestimated when we do not take into account family background. Quantile 
regressions show that the highest fall in returns occurred for intermediary levels of 
education and income. Cohort effects also show that the reduction in the education 
premium has been going on over several generations.
Information on which member of the family responded to the survey question-
naire was used to assess measurement error, controlling for availability bias. We find 
evidence of attenuation bias, reducing schooling returns by between 14 per cent and 
32 per cent.
4.3 Main Findings
The empirical exercises performed show that the fall in education premium in 
Brazil is underestimated when we do not take into account family background 
impacts. In particular, when we measure omitted variables bias for the years 1996 
and 2014, we find that they did not cancel each other out over time. This result 
reinforces the importance of using two points in time to address the close deter-
minants of earnings inequality fall.
Although the fall in the intergenerational persistence of education in Brazil 
(from 0.7 in 1996 to 0.47 in 2014) is contemporaneous with the introduction and 
dissemination of CCT programmes such as Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Familia with 
the same objectives, a causal connection between these factors cannot be estab-
lished at this point.
5 Does Missing Income Affect Distribution?
Incomes are information-sensitive and vulnerable to non-response in any house-
hold survey.5 PNAD, collected by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 
(IBGE), is the main household survey used in inequality studies in Brazil (the 
others are the Demographic Census, PME, PNADC, and POF). However, it is the 
only one with no explicit imputation for missing income values. The incidences 
of missing values and null incomes are in proportions that vary over time. 
5 This section is based on Hecksher et al. (2018).
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The trend of inequality reduction observed in PNAD in the twenty-first century 
might be affected by the treatment that is given to both the null and unavailable 
incomes. In addition, some inequality indexes with useful special properties cannot 
be estimated in the presence of null incomes. This section opens with a description 
of the new imputation methodology developed. Then follows a  thorough analysis 
of the impact of null and unavailable incomes on income  distribution-related 
statistics.
5.1 New Imputation Method
PNAD investigates multiple sources of income that were received in a given 
month, relative not only to the people interviewed, but to all eligible residents of 
each sampled household. Generally, income non-response on surveys tends to be 
more frequent at top incomes. This is identified as differential non-response and 
therefore requires a statistical treatment to correct the resulting estimates for 
potential bias. This issue results from the way the survey is conducted (on the 
PNAD, the reference period corresponds to one month only) and does not occur 
with comparable surveys in many other countries (De Waal et al. 2011).
The income imputation process began by fitting the regression models with 
observations classified as potential donors. The expected theoretical relations 
between the income variables to be imputed and all the other variables available 
in PNAD guided the initial choice of the potential predictor variables to be con-
sidered in each model. Then, using 2015 data, model selection was performed 
considering the complex sampling design of PNAD when testing the statistical 
significance of the predictor variables. In 2015, 2.9 per cent of the (weighted) 
sample had per capita household income altered by the imputation procedure.
The process of imputing individual incomes generally resulted in higher mean 
incomes and slightly higher levels of inequality than the ones estimated in 2001 
and 2015 without the imputation. The increase in mean incomes caused by 
im put ation is higher in 2001 than in 2015. Therefore, after imputation in these 
two years, real growth in labour income decreases from an annual average of 
1.52 per cent to 1.48 per cent, and the annual growth in per capita household 
income decreases from 2.53 per cent to 2.46 per cent. On the other hand, the 
estimates of the Gini index for labour income and per capita household income 
increase by 0.003 in 2001 and 0.002 in 2015. Thus, the Gini index fall in both 
indicators between 2001 and 2015 becomes only 0.001 more intense.
We also study the behaviour of inequality in terms of poverty alleviation 
ob ject ives. The idea is to increase the weights given to the bottom part of the per 
capita income distribution since traditional measures such as the Gini index place 
more weight on the upper part of the income spectrum. Any income increase up to 
the seventy-fifth percentile approximately yields Gini index reductions in Brazil.
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Here we focus on the P1 measure using the US$3.20/day PPP poverty line, in 
which the imputation process reduces 2015 poverty by 16.8 per cent or 0.9 per-
centage points. Poverty differences across time are much smaller, not exceeding 
0.4 percentage points. In our benchmark scenario, these differences amount to 
0.1 percentage point. Although poverty levels present some differences, poverty 
change estimates—at least in the 2001–15 period—are not affected by imputation 
pro ced ures. Imputation procedures in PNAD provide a bridge to the new PNADC, 
bringing poverty rates closer.
5.2 Policy-Related Marks and Imputed Rents
Our analysis takes advantage of strong points of the methodology to add a rent 
imputation into income-based social measures and to study ‘pressure points’ 
associated with minimum wage law in Brazil. With respect to the latter, in our 
simulated income exercises, social security benefits and earnings among informal 
employees are affected by wage floors together with low-skilled formal employees, 
preserving key policy-related features of Brazilian income distribution.
Poverty with imputed rent estimates is, as expected, lower. For example, in 
2015 using the US$3.20/day PPP line, the poverty gap (P1) is 48.9 per cent lower. 
The P1 between 2001 and 2015 falls from 8.4 to 5.8 percentage points using 
imputed rents. Using Datt–Ravallion-type decomposition the share of poverty fall 
explained by inequality reduces from 45.87 per cent to 30.38 per cent. Although 
imputed rent does reduce the relative importance of the inequality component of 
poverty reduction, it does not affect the Gini coefficient trends.
5.3 Main Findings
Missing income data in Brazilian surveys is more frequent among people expected 
to be extremely poor or extremely rich than in the middle of predicted income 
distribution, potentially affecting inequality measurement. We propose a new 
imputation method and apply it to PNAD. Our method preserves both random 
variability and empirical relations between variables. It also preserves discontinuities 
related to Brazilian institutional factors such as labour earnings and various 
official cash transfers with values exactly equal to the minimum wage. The imputed 
values preserve yearly specificities of different income sources distributions 
among different groups (e.g. employers, self-employed, formal employees, and 
informal employees). From 2001 to 2015, imputation increases the level of mean 
income, decreases the main poverty indicators, and slightly increases inequality 
indexes. It reduces the mean income growth rate but does not affect inequality or 
poverty trends in the period.
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6 How Did Taxes and Transfers Steer Distributive Changes?
After being stuck around 0.60 for decades, the Gini coefficient declined every 
year from 2001 to 2014, reaching a Gini of 0.52.6 However, the main Brazilian 
household surveys neither provide information on taxes paid by households nor 
on some relevant transfers. International comparisons of income inequality show 
that Brazil presents high market income inequality and the state does a poor 
redistributive job when transforming it into disposable income inequality. Previous 
studies assessed the distributional incidence of the Brazilian tax and benefit sys-
tem at specific points in time (Higgins and Pereira 2013; Immervoll et al. 2009; 
SEAE/MF 2017). There is no previous microsimulation study in Brazil using dif-
ferent surveys over time.
The objective here is to shed light on the role of fiscal policy in determining 
inequality and poverty trends in Brazil. For this purpose, we estimate the redis-
tributive effects of the fiscal system in the period 2003–15 using PNAD surveys 
plus nationwide expenditure surveys (POF). We also applied microsimulation 
techniques, and public tax and spending accounts.
6.1 Welfare Decomposition
The decomposition methodology derived step by step in the original paper allows 
us to evaluate causes and consequences in an integrated manner through growth 
and inequality components pointing to Gini social welfare function and standard 
poverty measures. It enables the assessment of the societal well-being level in a 
given year through its two main components (mean income and equality). The 
method also allows us to disentangle the contribution of specific official spending 
and taxation to both mean income and social welfare growth over time. The 
decomposition methodology further yields direct policy targeting indicators, 
comparing the welfare gains generated through each policy in comparison with 
its associated fiscal costs. Table 5.2 synthesizes the outcome of this methodology 
with additive static and dynamic properties.
We have focused on simulated per capita disposable income changes between 
2003 and 2015. Gini index-based social welfare grew by 4.86 per cent per year in 
this period. This annual welfare increase can be disentangled into a component of 
mean income growth (3.48 per cent per year) on the one hand, and a component 
of equality growth (1.37 per cent) on the other. The respective welfare growth rate 
for disposable income is higher than those for initial income (4.36 per cent) and 
final income (4.47 per cent), but not for gross income (4.91 per cent). The only 
6 This section is based on Neri et al. (2018b).
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two cash transfers that had a higher contribution to equality than to mean income 
growth were the Family Grant and the Poor Elderly/Disability Benefits (69 per cent 
and 30 per cent, respectively). Direct and indirect taxes contributed negatively to 
welfare growth, reducing the annual growth rate. However, direct taxes contributed 
to inequality reduction, since the PIT contribution to equality growth (0.13 per cent) 
offset the negative impact of the workers’ contribution to social security on income 
distribution (−0.03 per cent). Indirect taxes also had a negative impact on equity 
(−0.29 per cent), thus increasing inequality.
6.2 Poverty
Our analysis of inequality links with concentration curves and emphasizes the 
impact of fiscal policies on poverty indicators, increasing the weight attributed to the 
lower end of the income distribution. We apply standard Ravallion–Datt poverty 
decomposition to growth and inequality components to assess their relative roles. 
Around 57 per cent of our benchmark poverty measure fall was explained by the 
mean income growth component, and 43 per cent by the inequality fall component. 
Using the same US$3.20/day line, the poverty fall in the 2003–15 period amounted 
to approximately 69 per cent. This means that the poverty fall in Brazil was nearly 
twice the one expected by the UN’s first MDG, in less than half the period.
The model outcomes allow us to assess the anti-poverty role played by specific 
fiscal instruments among various taxes and cash transfer programmes. The Family 
Table 5.2 Income, equality, and social welfare: contribution to growth ordered by 
disposable income
Income type 2003–15 (annual)
Mean income Equality Welfare
Initial income 0.0276 0.0072 0.0349
 Cash transfers 0.0110 0.0055 0.0165
  Public pensions 0.0083 0.0016 0.0099
  Poor elderly/disability benefits 0.0010 0.0013 0.0023
  Wage bonus + Family wage 0.0004 0.0003 0.0008
  Unemployment benefit 0.0004 0.0004 0.0008
  Family grant 0.0013 0.0022 0.0034
Gross income 0.0387 0.0127 0.0514
 Direct taxes 0.0038 −0.0010 0.0028
  Personal income tax 0.0018 −0.0013 0.0005
  Social security contribution 0.0021 0.0003 0.0023
Disposable income 0.0348 0.0137 0.0486
 Indirect taxes 0.0080 0.0029 0.0109
Final income 0.0269 0.0108 0.0377
Source: Author’s calculation based on PNAD/IBGE microdata.
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Grant, the best targeted policy, was in action between 2003 and 2015. If one 
 compares the Family Grant poverty impact with the second-best targeted cash 
transfer programme, each monetary unit spent generated a 119.7 per cent higher 
impact. The Family Grant concentration curve dominates the perfect equity line 
and all official cash transfers considered. Thus, the Family Grant gives relatively 
more to the poorest. Its contribution to the rise of social welfare is 2.7 times its 
 contribution to the rise of mean income. However, since its creation in 2003, the 
programme has become less and less targeted towards the poor, maybe as a 
 consequence of its steep expansion over time (Campello and Neri 2013).
Targeting differences also affects aggregate demand multipliers on GDP. 
Campello and Neri (2013) presents these multipliers within a social accounting 
matrix framework: Family Grant (1.78); Poor Elderly/Disability Benefits (1.19), 
Wage Bonus and Family Wage (1.06), unemployment insurance (1.06), and social 
security benefits (0.53, including public pensions). This means that the contrac-
tionary effects of fiscal adjustments, in particular social security reforms, can be 
mitigated by increasing pro-poor public spending, such as through the Family 
Grant. Incidentally, the minimum wage7 acts as the numeraire of the benefits 
and/or eligibility criteria of almost all official cash transfers, including social 
security benefits. The only relevant transfer insulated from min imum wage effects 
is the Family Grant. This means that minimum wages do not have a very progres-
sive impact profile in terms of Brazilian government transfers. The highest min-
imum wage impact is a little above the median per capita income.
6.3 Main Findings
This section interacts household survey data with fiscal rules and explores an ana-
lytical framework applied to cover income distribution and poverty changes 
observed over two decades of Brazilian fiscal policy. Per capita disposable income 
for the poorest fifth of the population in 2015 was 153 per cent higher than in 
1995, compared with a growth of 20 per cent for the richest fifth, once inflation 
was accounted for. The welfare growth of 4.86 per cent per year between 2003 and 
2015 is due more to mean income growth (72 per cent) than inequality reduction 
(28 per cent).
The Gini coefficient reduction caused by cash benefits increased from 3.5 per-
centage points in 1995 to 8.9 percentage points in 2015. The results suggest that 
official cash transfers accelerated the growth of social welfare (+1.65 per cent), while 
direct and indirect tax changes operated in the opposite direction (reductions of 
0.28 per cent and 1.09 per cent, respectively). In a time of tight fiscal constraints, 
7 The Brazilian minimum wage increased by 79 per cent in real terms in the 2003–15 period.
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the Family Grant should be a model for all official cash transfers, vindicating any 
budget adjustment decisions in terms of cost-efficiency. Gini reductions due to 
the introduction of more progressive taxes are still limited in Brazil and are 
another area of reform towards higher equality.
The poverty gap fall according to the US$3.20/day poverty line was explained 
almost equally by income growth and inequality reduction between 2003 and 2015. 
This indicates that Brazil followed a sort of middle path driven by distributive and 
growth dimensions.
7 Combining PIT Records and Surveys: Words of Caution
7.1 A Wider Scope
The assumption that Brazilian PIT tabulations for 2007–15 are representative of 
top incomes trends suggests that mean income experienced an unnoticed ‘eco-
nomic miracle’, while household surveys, national accounts, and other sources 
incurred underestimation errors.8 We evaluate the impacts of combining surveys 
with PIT in terms of growth, inequality, and social welfare. While the previous 
literature focused on the impacts of these data combination exercises on in equal-
ity, there are new sources of understanding about the economic causes and social 
consequences behind them (Medeiros et al. 2015a, 2015b).
First, if the level of inequality measured rises when higher top incomes replace 
previous lower estimates based on surveys, this same exercise also increases 
un equivo cal ly, by construction, the mean and the social welfare level associated 
with it. Not only is this true for social welfare functions found in the economic 
literature, but it also satisfies the Pareto efficiency criteria; that is, everyone is bet-
ter off, or at least remains the same as before. We refer to a country more unequal 
but more prosperous, or the same for all segments in the population.
Second, a similar story seems to hold for income distribution comparisons across 
time. While the empirical evidence analysed here shows that the movement of these 
combined estimates presents a slower inequality trend fall, income mean growth 
trends also rise at a much faster pace, which poses possibly higher social welfare 
growth rates than suggested by household surveys and new measurement-related 
issues. In fact, the social welfare index proposed by Sen (1973)—which results from 
multiplying mean income by the Gini inequality index complement—grows faster 
when PNAD’s top incomes are replaced by PIT data.
After combining PNAD and PIT, the poorest 60 per cent of the adult popula-
tion still increased their share of the total income. The richest 10 per cent also had 
8 This section is based on Neri and Hecksher (2018).
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a growth rate (3.2 per cent) higher than average (2.9 per cent), but not as high as 
rates observed in the third and fourth tenths (7.5 per cent and 3.8 per cent, 
respectively).
7.2  Is All This Money New?
Annual growth of PIT taxpayers’ average declared income (10.1 per cent) was 
much higher than that of GDP (3 per cent) from 2007 to 2011. Would the rich 
filers of PIT have experienced an ‘economic miracle’ unnoticed by the National 
Accounts? Not necessarily. Deflators and formalization can explain the difference. 
From 2007 to 2015, this income growth gap is smaller: 4.88 percentage points per 
year (ppy), reduced to 2.75 ppy when we use nominal values neutralizing differ-
ences in deflators used. Almost all the remaining difference can be explained by 
the formalization of incomes, which reduces the gap by 2.56 ppy to 0.19 ppy—less 
than 4 per cent of the original discrepancy.
As part of the formalization movement, new laws encouraged 5.7 million 
 people to register, from 2009 to 2015, as individual microentrepreneurs, whose 
incomes, up to a legal ceiling imposed, could be declared as exempt by PIT filers 
or dependants, allowing an extra tax deduction in the last case. These new incen-
tives may have increased the declared share of small business exempt incomes—
the ones that grew the most among all declared income sources.
7.3 Taxpayers vs Demography
The use of income tax data to adjust for estimates about the income distribution 
assumes that individuals earn at least what they declare to the government, on 
the basis that no one would want to pay higher taxes than necessary. But the 
argument does not apply to non-taxable income sources, which grew three times 
faster than taxable incomes from 2007 to 2015.
The observed rise of exempt retirement income of people 65 years old or above 
is consistent with a reduction in the number of elderly declarants and their re allo-
ca tion as dependants of their sons and daughters. From 2007 to 2015, the declar-
ant population aged 41 or above fell by 15.9 per cent, while in PNAD it grew by 
30.3 per cent. At the same time, the number of dependants per person up to 
40 years of age doubled. All of this was in contrast with well-established demo-
graphic trends. What seems to explain this discrepancy is new incentives intro-
duced in the tax system.
After 2008, the obligation to submit a PIT form in order to obtain a valid fiscal 
number (CPF) was abandoned, which may have affected the choice to move to 
dependant status in the PIT records. Tax legislation allows the individual to declare 
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as dependants their parents and grandparents and to incorporate their social 
security benefits and pensions up to a threshold as exempt income. This institutional 
change created an additional incentive for younger people to in corp or ate their 
 parents’ incomes in their PIT declarations as dependants. Besides explaining the gap 
in age structure between PNAD and PIT, this may also have contributed to the 
marked rise in exempt income after 2008 and its impact on PIT income growth.
7.4 Main Findings
In the economic evaluation of income distributions, one should not look at their 
second moment without considering the first. A wider scope also leads to add-
ition al evidence with respect to measurement issues. Trying to correct top incomes 
of PNAD based on PIT tabulations slows the inequality fall from 2007 to 2015 but 
accelerates both mean income and social welfare growth. This difference was 
more dramatic in the 2007–11 period. The annual growth of PIT taxpayers’ mean 
declared income (10.1 per cent) was much higher than that of GDP (3 per cent). 
Deflators and formalization of workers can explain most of this gap.
We document a rise in exempt non-taxable incomes and changes in the profile 
of tax filers and their dependants that are very different from the well-known 
demographic changes in Brazil. Exempt incomes drove PIT income growth. As the 
population ages, PIT taxpayers become younger and declare more dependants 
and non-taxable incomes. At least part of this difference is linked to changes in 
the incentives provided by Brazilian tax laws. It is risky to make conclusions on 
the trend of Brazilian inequality taking available PIT tabulations at face value.
8 Conclusions
This paper synthesizes the main results of the Brazilian component of the UNU-
WIDER ‘Inequality in the Giants’ project. We assess the main drivers of income 
distribution changes and related measurement issues during the past quarter of a 
century. We provide the beginnings of an integrated picture of Brazilian income 
distribution using household surveys, disentangling the effects of various policy-
related components on inequality, mean income, and social welfare growth rates. 
The chapter fills the blanks of this analysis using other data sources and various 
techniques.
In 1990, after fifty years of strong growth performance and dismal social indi-
cators, Brazil’s social performance began to trend upwards. Up to 2015, there was a 
poverty reduction of 73 per cent, above the global fall of 70 per cent. There was 
also an improvement of the Brazilian HDI above global trends. Life expectancy at 
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birth increased by one year in every three-years period. However, social security 
parameters remained unchanged, implying increasing fiscal deterioration. At the 
same time, the recovery of part of the secular delay in Brazilians years of study 
occurred without any noticeable progress in labour productivity. Similarly, the 
gain in individual labour remuneration was independent of prod uct iv ity gains. It 
was as if the social improvement observed missed the economic fundamentals 
that could provide greater long-term sustainability. The recent Brazilian crisis 
illustrates that. The crisis emerged initially in macroeconomic indicators in 2012 
but social indicators kept improving and suffered only a major deterioration from 
2015 onwards.
Nevertheless there was a major income distribution change in this millennium 
that is worth analysing. In the 2003–15 period, Gini-based social welfare grew 
three times faster than GDP, while for the bottom 5 per cent it was a fivefold dif-
ference. Social welfare growth was roughly evenly divided into falling inequality, 
real GDP growth, and the differential of mean incomes between surveys and 
National Accounts. We decompose these different pieces of income distribution 
trends considering the impact of different income sources, labour market ingre-
dients, and price deflators. Social programmes’ expansion, education expansion’s 
impacts on earnings distribution, and consumer price inflation below producers’ 
costs inflation were the highlights.
We brought in new data and methods to create a more detailed picture. When 
PIT data are used to substitute the top end of income distribution in household 
surveys, inequality falls less but mean incomes and social welfare growth rates are 
also much higher. We are also able to reconcile these discrepancies with the 
expansion of non-taxable income sources. Income inequality was very high and 
had no clear trend until 2001, but after that, according to most data sources, it 
experienced a falling trend that lasted until 2014. Most of the inequality fall was 
driven by earnings inequality, which was dominated by firm effects, at least in the 
formal sector. Minimum wage rises seemed to affect this channel, creating a 
wedge between labour productivity and remuneration but also affecting informal 
employees. Falling schooling returns also played a key role in earnings inequality, 
especially if one takes into account the effects of parents’ educational background. 
Education expansion reduced intergenerational education inertia.
Missing values did not affect income inequality measured trends. Nor did the 
choice of whether to use gross or disposable incomes concepts. Direct and in dir-
ect taxes played against the inequality reduction trend, while official monetary 
benefits worked in the other direction, in particular conditional cash transfer 
programmes. The Family Grant programme had a much lower fiscal cost/social 
benefit ratio than all other programmes, most of which were indexed to the rising 
minimum wage in Brazil. Minimum wage hikes exerted a direct effect on fiscal 
accounts without much impact on the bottom part of the income distribution.
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Structural Change, Transition, Rent-Seeking  
and Corruption, and Government Policy
Shi Li, Terry Sicular, and Finn Tarp
1 Introduction
In the late 1970s, China embarked on a major programme of economic transition 
and reform. Since that time, China’s economy has been transformed from a 
socialist planned economy to a predominately market economy characterized by 
a combination of state, private, and mixed ownership forms. This transformation 
has been accompanied by remarkable economic growth and structural change, 
with positive consequences for household incomes and standards of living. Over 
the past forty years household incomes have risen six-fold, poverty has declined 
dramatically, and in recent years a new class of the ultra-rich has emerged.
These developments have naturally led to questions about trends in inequality 
in China, the topic of a growing literature that has employed a variety of empirical 
approaches and available data. Here we give a summary of the major trends in 
household income inequality in China, but our main aim is to go one step further 
and explain these trends in the context of China’s broader economic development 
and transition.
In our view, the evolution of income inequality in China over the past forty years 
is the net result of four interleaved stories. The first is a standard development story 
characterized by structural change, growing market integration, and labour absorp-
tion, which together are associated with a Kuznets inverted-U path of in equal ity. The 
second is an economic transition story, in which the shift from a planned to a market 
economy generates increased differentiation of incomes. The third is a story of 
incomplete transition, which generates opportunities for rent-seeking, corruption, 
and hidden income, with obvious implications for in equal ity. The fourth is a story of 
government efforts to moderate inequality, which efforts have expanded over time 
and led to the establishment of a range of new social and welfare programmes.
Below, we discuss in turn each of these stories and their relationship to the 
evolution of China’s income inequality. We begin with a review of major trends in 
income inequality in China since the late 1980s.
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2  Income Inequality in China: Major Trends
Although different studies provide somewhat different estimates of China’s Gini 
coefficient and related variables, general agreement exists regarding the key 
trends. Here we highlight several of the main trends and report inequality estimates 
mainly from a recent set of studies based on the China Household Income Project 
(CHIP) surveys—specifically, Cai and Yue (2018), Gustafsson and Wan (2018), 
Li et al. (2018), and Luo et al. (2018)—as well as chapters from Sicular et al. (2020). 
The CHIP surveys are large, nationwide, repeated (1988, 1995, 2002, 2007, and 
2013), cross-section household sample surveys spanning all major regions of 
China. Using the CHIP data, researchers have traced a consistent, detailed picture 
of incomes and inequality in China from the late 1980s through to 2013. The 
findings of the CHIP studies are generally consistent with those reported 
elsewhere.
What are the main findings of these studies? First and most importantly, from 
the late 1980s through to 2007 China experienced a long-term increase in income 
inequality. As shown in Figure  6.1, which shows estimates based on the CHIP 
data as well as official estimates from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 
during these two decades China’s income Gini rose from 0.38 to 0.49, so that by 
2007 inequality in China was at a level similar to that in Mexico and not much 












1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
CHIP NBS
Figure 6.1 China’s Gini coefficient
Note: The NBS Gini coefficients are those published by the NBS using its estimates of household 
income per capita. The CHIP Gini coefficients are calculated using the CHIP survey data and an 
estimate of household income per capita that adjusts the NBS income variable in several ways, 
such as to include estimates of imputed rent on owner-occupied housing and of the implicit 
subsidies on subsidized rental housing.
Source: Authors’ illustration based on Luo et al. (2018), Department of Household Surveys 
(NBS 2016b: 407), and China Net (2017).
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standards. More recent estimates, however, reveal that thereafter inequality began 
to decline.
The recent decline in China’s inequality is the subject of some discussion and 
debate. It is generally believed that household survey samples do not fully capture 
the ultra-rich population and that consequently income inequality estimates 
based on household survey data understate actual inequality. In China this prob-
lem has recently become a concern due to the expansion of private wealth and the 
emergence of a growing class of the super-rich.
Some recent studies attempt to address this problem. Li et al. (2018) use avail-
able information about the income and wealth of China’s super-rich to construct 
a top-income dataset, which is then combined with the CHIP household survey 
data as the basis for revised estimates of inequality. The results are striking. 
China’s 2013 Gini coefficient jumps to over 0.6, noticeably higher than the Gini 
calculated from the original CHIP survey data. Luo et al. (2020) carries out a 
similar exercise. This study uses data from the Hurun and Forbes rich lists to con-
struct the top tail of the income distribution. The resulting estimates of China’s 
Gini coefficient are higher in both 2007 and 2013, but especially in 2013. This 
study’s estimates imply that between 2007 and 2013 China’s Gini coefficient 
increased by at least 10 per cent and perhaps by as much as 40 per cent. Such 
exercises necessarily rely on incomplete information, and so the resulting esti-
mates are imprecise. Nevertheless, they raise questions about the apparent decline 
in China’s inequality since 2007.
A second main finding is that China’s twenty-year-long rise in inequality was 
not due to declining incomes of poorer segments of the population. In fact, 
incomes rose substantially throughout the income distribution, including for the 
poor. The income increases, however, were more rapid for richer segments of the 
population. This pattern is apparent in the growth incidence curves of household 
income per capita between various rounds of the CHIP survey (Figure 6.2).
Third, the trends in China’s inequality both before and since 2007 are associ-
ated with changes in regional and sectoral income gaps, specifically the widening 
and then narrowing of income gaps between urban and rural areas and among 
regions. As shown in Table 6.1, the ratio of urban to rural incomes rose from 
2.5 in 1988 to a high of 4.0 in 2007, after which it declined back to 2.6. The ratio 
Table 6.1 China’s regional and urban/rural income gaps
 1988 1995 2002 2007 2013
Urban/Rural 2.45 2.58 3.2 4.02 2.56
East/Centre 1.42 1.75 1.86 1.84 1.53
East/West 1.62 2.16 2.05 2.23 1.59
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from CHIP (China 
Institute for Income Distribution n.d.) and Luo et al. (2018).
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between incomes in the relatively rich East and in the poorer Centre and West 
regions shows a similar rise and fall.
Fourth, trends in China’s inequality have been associated with underlying 
changes in the sources of household income and their distribution. The rise in 
inequality from the 1980s through to 2007 was associated with a declining share 
of income from more equally distributed sources, especially agriculture, and an 
increasing share of income from more unequally distributed sources of income 
such as assets (Figure  6.3). It also reflects changes in the distribution of some 
major sources of income. Notably, inequality in the distribution of wage earnings, 
which since the early 2000s has been the largest single source of household 
income, rose from 1988 through to 2007, after which it declined.
Wages are the most important component of income but only part of the 
in equal ity story. In urban China the share of wage earners has in fact been declin-
ing and non-wage sources of income have played an increasingly important role in 
income distribution. An important component of non-wage income in China is 
government transfers. A study by Cai and Yue (2018) finds that during the period 
2002–13 government social security transfers increased substantially and became 
more equalizing. Nevertheless, China’s largest single transfer programme—
pensions—is very unequally distributed. Pensions, which on average account for 


















Figure 6.2 Growth incidence curves for China
Note: Growth of household income per capita, constant prices, by ventile.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from CHIP (China Institute for Income Distribution n.d.) 
and Luo et al. (2018).
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minority of the population—urban retirees. Without pensions, urban retirees 
would be poor, but the size of urban pensions is so large that their pension 
incomes make them relatively rich. Consequently, on the margin, government 
pensions are dis-equalizing.
3 Economic Development, Structural Change,  
and the Kuznets Inverted U
The Kuznets inverted-U hypothesis postulates that, with growth and development, 
inequality will initially increase but eventually, at higher levels of per capita 
income, will level off and decline. Evidence on whether countries follow the 
Kuznets inverted U is mixed; nevertheless, the hypothesis provides a useful 
framework for understanding key mechanisms that can drive inequality during 
development.
One mechanism underlying the inverted U is the spread of growth across the 
economy through linkages. Economic growth typically starts in a few sectors and 
regions. The benefits of initial growth go to a relatively small share of the 
1988 1995 2002 2007 2013
Asset income 0% 1% 1% 2% 3%
Imputed rent on owned
housing 7% 10% 6% 9% 14%
Housing rent subsidies 7% 5% 2% 1% 1%
Pensions 2% 5% 10% 10% 13%
Net non-ag business income 6% 8% 8% 10% 10%
Wage earnings 30% 44% 64% 63% 56%
Net agricultural income 39% 24% 14% 9% 5%








Figure 6.3 The composition of household income in China
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from CHIP (China Institute for Income Distribution n.d.) 
and adaptation from Luo et al. (2018).
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population in those sectors and regions, thus creating inequality. Over time, if 
linkages exist to the rest of the economy and if growth continues, the benefits can 
spread more widely. For example, if factor markets are sufficiently developed to 
permit mobility, then labour and capital with low returns can move to op por tun-
ities that yield higher returns. Over time, such movement will equalize the returns 
to cap ital and incomes. The resulting regional catch-up, migration, and structural 
change help move the economy along to the downward section of the inverted U.
In countries with surplus labour the inverted U is associated with a Lewis-type 
path of economic development. In such economies, during the initial stages of 
growth most of the population is in the traditional sector, which is characterized by 
low productivity, surplus labour, and underemployment or disguised un employ-
ment. Surplus labour in the traditional sector supplies cheap labour to the modern 
sector and allows a ‘grace period’ during which the modern sector can expand 
rapidly with low wage costs. Growth during this phase benefits in vest ors and entre-
preneurs as well as relatively better paid workers in the modern sector, causing 
inequality to rise. With continued growth, however, the labour surplus is absorbed 
and eventually exhausted. In the later stages of development, labour scarcity leads 
to rising wages nationwide, thus moderating inequality. According to this scenario, 
the inverted U is associated with structural change, labour mobility, and changes in 
the composition of income between incomes from capital versus labour.
Studies of income inequality in China show evidence of regional catch-up 
associated with structural change, migration, and changes in employment and 
income composition. As shown in Table  6.1 and consistent with the Kuznets 
hypothesis, inter-regional income gaps in China widened from 1988 through 
2007, during which period income growth in relatively rich eastern China out-
paced that in central and western regions. From 2007 to 2013, however, the 
between-region gaps shrank, reflecting regional catch-up. Of relevance to the 
Lewis model, the urban–rural income gap also widened and reached a maximum 
of 4.0 in 2007, a very high level by international standards. After 2007, this trend 
reversed and the urban–rural income gap narrowed (Table 6.1).
China’s experience of ongoing, large-scale migration—and, in recent years, ris-
ing wages and shortages of unskilled labour—is consistent with the Lewis story. 
At the start of the economic reform era, China was generally believed to have 
been a labour surplus economy characterized by a large labour force overwhelm-
ingly employed in low-productivity agriculture. The shift from collective farming 
to household farming increased farm productivity and freed rural workers, who 
then began to transfer into higher productivity non-farm employment. The 
aggregate statistics in Figure 6.4 reveal the structural change in employment that 
has been ongoing since the 1980s, such that by the early 2000s fewer than half of 
employed workers in China were primarily employed in agriculture.
This shift out of agriculture and into other sectors is visible in household sur-
vey data. Using data from a nationally representative rural household survey, 
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Huang and Rozelle (2012) trace changes over time in the proportion of rural 
workers engaged in on-farm versus off-farm work. They find that the proportion 
employed solely in agriculture declined from about 70 per cent in 1995 to 45 per 
cent in 2007. Conversely, the proportion engaged in off-farm employment rose 
from 30 per cent in 1995 to 55 per cent in 2007. Roughly one-third of those with 
off-farm employment, however, also continued to engage in farming.
Changes in incomes and inequality are broadly consistent with the Lewis 
story. The Lewis story predicts that the structural shift in employment from agri-
culture to other sectors will not immediately lead to rising wages for urban 
workers or incomes for the remaining rural population. Such has been the case 
for China. Hoken and Sato (2017) analyse long-term growth in rural incomes 
using the CHIP survey data and find that rural income per capita grew slowly 
over the period 1988–2002. Thereafter, growth in rural income accelerated to 
about 8 per cent between 2002 and 2007 and to more than 10 per cent between 
2007 and 2013. Wages for migrants and for unskilled labour in urban China 
followed a similar path.
With respect to the wage patterns of rural–urban migrant workers, as discussed 
in Lu (2012), in the late 1990s the wage growth for migrant workers was quite low, 
but after 2002 it began to increase. Figure 6.5 shows the average annual growth rate 
of wages of rural–urban migrant workers since the early 2000s, revealing slow wage 
growth in 2002 followed by wage growth of 6 per cent or faster thereafter.
These trends in rural incomes and migrant wages influenced the urban–rural 














































Figure 6.4 Primary sector employment in China as a share of total employment  
(per cent) 1980–2015
Note: Share of employed persons at year end based on primary sector of employment.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBS (2016c) data.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 28/01/21, SPi
140 China
national inequality. Decomposition of national inequality by groups between and 
within the urban and rural sectors reveals that the urban–rural income gap’s 
contribution to overall inequality rose from roughly 30 per cent in the late 1980s 
and mid-1990s to 40 per cent in 2002, and further to 50 per cent in 2007, finally 
dropping back to 30 per cent in 2013 (Luo et al. 2018).
Although China’s path of development is broadly consistent with the Lewis 
story, several factors modified or distorted its evolution. First, a baby boom in 
the 1960s caused a demographic bulge that resulted in rapid growth of the 
working-age population from the 1980s through the early 2000s, creating 
downward pressure on wages. Thereafter, the effects of the one-child policy 
began to kick in, causing a marked slowdown in growth in the labour supply 
after 2000.
Second, as will be discussed more fully below, incomplete transition has led to 
ongoing labour market segmentation and hindered labour mobility. Restrictions 
on migration through the household registration (hukou) system have loosened 
over time but have not yet been removed. Also, the incomplete reform of farm-
land property rights has affected the willingness of rural households to leave 
farming. Knight et al. (2011) argue that ongoing segmentation of the labour mar-
ket has caused labour scarcity in urban areas and labour surplus in rural areas to 
coexist. Recent increases in the wages of unskilled workers and migrant workers 
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Figure 6.5 Wage growth of rural–urban migrant workers in China (%)
Note: Wage growth is in real terms (constant prices).
Source: Authors’ calculations for 2009–17 are based on the NBS Rural Migrant Workers Survey 
(NBS 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016a, 2017a); for 2002–8 the estimates are based on Lu (2012).
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Aside from structural change and the absorption of surplus labour, economic 
development can influence income distribution through several other mech an isms. 
With development comes strengthened fiscal capacity, which allows the public 
sector to play a larger role in redistribution through taxes and transfers and as a 
provider of social programmes. China’s public sector was large during the Maoist 
era, but with the implementation of economic reforms fiscal revenues shrank 
considerably, reaching a low point in the mid-1990s (Lin 2009). Following fiscal 
reforms in 1994 and with continued economic growth, China’s public sector 
recovered (Lin 2009). With that recovery, and especially since 2003, more resources 
began to be devoted to building a stronger social welfare system.
Figure 6.6 shows expenditures on education, social security, and welfare pro-
grammes such as dibao (the minimum income guarantee) as a share of total 
budgetary expenditures, which have grown during this period.1 Government 
spending on social security and employment programmes has remained at around 
11 per cent of total budgetary expenditures. The shares of budgetary spending on 
health and agriculture have increased. The rising share of ex pend itures on 
agriculture reflects a series of pro-rural policies starting under the Hu–Wen 
administration. These pro-rural policies have included grain subsidies and farm 
1 Apart from budgetary revenue and expenditures, the government also has extra-budgetary 
 revenue and expenditures, which are currently around 10 per cent of their budgetary counterparts. 
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Figure 6.6 The shares of fiscal spending on education, medical insurance, social 
security, and agriculture in total budgetary expenditures in China
Note: Calculated using budgetary fiscal expenditure data published by the National Bureau of 
Statistics.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBS (2017b) data.
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supports, in addition to the new rural pension scheme, new rural medical insur-
ance scheme, and new rural poverty-alleviation programmes such as the rural 
dibao programme. Many poor and low-income rural households have bene fit ed 
from these policies. The distributional impact of China’s expanding social welfare 
programmes will be discussed more fully in Section 5.
Development can go hand in hand with increased trade and globalization, with 
implications for income distribution through its differential impact on regional 
development as well as on the distribution of wage earnings. China has in fact 
ex peri enced a marked increase in its levels of trade, especially since its entry into the 
WTO at the end of 2001 (Figure 6.7). China’s trade expansion did not occur equally 
among regions and provinces. It started in the eastern coastal region, which is closest 
to international markets, and gradually spread inland to the central and western 
regions. Consequently, China’s opening to international markets contributed to the 
widening of regional income gaps. Furthermore, rapid growth of exports increased 
the demand for unskilled workers and helped to accelerate the absorption of China’s 
rural surplus labour. The trade story thus helps explain why the wages of unskilled 
workers and rural migrant workers have increased more rapidly than the wages of 
other workers in recent years. The role of trade in China’s distributional story has 














































Figure 6.7 Growth of exports and imports of China (million US$)
Note: Calculated using data published by the National Bureau of Statistics.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NBS (2017b) data.
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4  Economic Transition
Socialist economies differ from market economies in three major regards. First, 
the allocation of goods, labour, and capital is done through planning rather than 
markets. Second, wages are set administratively, and the distribution of income is 
based on labour or work performed and governed by the principle of egalitarian-
ism. Third, private ownership is minimized; capital and assets are owned by the 
state and collectives. Private individuals do not receive income from capital.
During much of the Maoist era, these three pillars of socialism characterized 
China’s economy. In rural areas, home to most of the population, production was 
carried out by collective farms that organized labour and paid workers in an 
egalitarian fashion based on work points. Urban labour was governed by planned 
allocation of workers to jobs, typically for lifetime employment in the same work 
unit, with wage scales fixed by planners. The wage structure minimized wage 
differ en tials, which were largely based on seniority. In both rural and urban areas, 
individuals and households did not own private property, although rural house-
holds were allowed to construct their own housing. This system did not eliminate 
income gaps—gaps persisted between the urban and rural sectors, and in rural 
areas between richer and poorer localities—but overall income inequality was 
exceedingly low. Available estimates of the Gini coefficient for the 1970s are gen-
erally at or below 0.3, very low by international standards, especially for a large, 
diverse economy (Xue et al. 2014).
Economic transition refers to reforms in these three pillars of socialism. 
Starting in 1978, China embarked on such a transition. The transition in rural 
areas began in the early 1980s with the replacement of collective farming by 
household farming under the household responsibility system. Although the 
household responsibility system did not constitute full privatization—land con-
tinued to be collectively owned—some property rights were transferred to house-
holds. Households were now given the rights to make production decisions and 
to keep the earnings from their productive activities. Incomes were now deter-
mined by the returns to farming by individual households rather than through 
egalitarian distribution by collective farms.
Concurrently, the government transformed the system of allocation in rural 
areas. Step by step it eliminated the planning of farm production, procurement 
and sales, and prices. By the 1990s agricultural products were largely allocated 
through markets. The government also lifted restrictions on the expansion of 
local rural industry. The ensuing rapid development of the so-called township 
and village industries, which operated outside of the plan, generated employment 
and income for the rural population, although with variation among regions and 
localities so that access to such employment and income was uneven.
Not surprisingly, these transition measures led to a marked upswing in rural 
inequality. Most estimates of the Gini coefficient in rural China for the late 1970s 
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and early 1980s are around 0.2 (Xue et al. 2014). Estimates based on the CHIP 
data for 1988 (Hoken and Sato  2017) show a substantially higher 0.353, rising 
further to 0.419 in 1995.
After the mid-1990s, rural inequality declined and then remained fairly stable 
through 2007 (Hoken and Sato 2017; Luo et al. 2018). The decline and then sta bil-
iza tion of rural inequality suggests that by the mid-1990s the increase in in equal ity 
associated with the rural economic transition in ownership, allocation, and 
income distribution had played out. Meanwhile, the ongoing expansion of off-
farm employment, which by the mid-1990s had become pervasive both due to 
local township and village enterprises and increasingly through migration, also 
began to moderate inequality.
Transition in the urban sector progressed more slowly. The planned allocation 
of labour and wages continued through the 1980s; however, firms were encour-
aged to pursue profits and were given more flexibility to decide on worker pay, for 
example through bonuses tied to performance. Flexibility in terms of labour allo-
cation also increased as new workers were increasingly hired on contracts outside 
of the plan instead of being allocated to lifetime jobs in work units.
In this initial period of transition, urban workers retained substantial job 
se cur ity, but wage inequality began to increase. Table 6.2 shows an increase in the 
Gini of urban wage earnings from 0.23 in 1988 to 0.30 in 1995; inequality of 
urban household income per capita also rose.
These gradual transition steps continued until the late 1990s, when China 
undertook a radical restructuring of the urban economy. At this time the govern-
ment opened the door to the bankruptcy, mergers, and ownership reform of inef-
ficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and collective enterprises. Enterprises 
were now permitted to fire and lay off workers. The result was the breaking of the 
‘iron rice bowl’. Millions of urban workers were laid off or became unemployed, 
with adverse effects on their incomes. In the short term, urban income inequality 
rose, primarily due to layoffs and unemployment (Meng 2004). The restructuring, 
however, was accompanied by a reduction of restrictions on the private sector 
and the reinvigoration of the medium and small-scale enterprises, which were 
sold off or converted to shareholding. Expansion of these sectors generated jobs. 
Table 6.2 Gini coefficients of urban wages and income per capita in China, 
1988–2013
 1988 1995 2002 2007 2013
Wage earnings 0.230 0.301 0.345 0.379 0.384
Household income per capita 0.231 0.332 0.311 0.335 0.352
Notes: Calculated using the CHIP data for urban workers and individuals with urban household 
registration.
Source: Authors’ illustration based on Gustafsson and Ding (2017), and Gustafsson and Wan (2018).
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Consequently, by the early 2000s urban employment had largely recovered 
(Gustafsson and Wan 2018).
A more lasting effect of the urban restructuring was the transformation of the 
urban wage structure. Seniority-based wage differentials shrank, and wage differ-
en tials based on productivity, for example as reflected in rapidly increasing 
returns to education, widened (Deng and Li  2009; Gustafsson and Wan  2018; 
Zhang et al.  2005). As wages increasingly reflected heterogeneous productive 
characteristics such as ability and education, the Gini of urban wages rose further 
to 0.345 in 2002 (Table 6.2).
Notably, despite rising inequality of wage earnings, during these same few 
years the inequality of urban household income per capita declined (Table 6.2). 
This apparent inconsistency between inequality trends for urban wages and urban 
household income per capita reflects the growing importance of other sources of 
urban income, including government social programme transfers.
From the early 2000s on, the government has generally refrained from direct 
interventions in the labour market, relying on indirect regulatory measures such 
as the labour contract and minimum wage laws and stimulus spending. Urban 
wage inequality has continued to rise, with the Gini of urban wage earnings reach-
ing 0.384 in 2013 (Table 6.2). Unlike in previous decades, however, these recent 
trends are largely due to shifts in the demand and supply for labour, resulting, for 
example, from changes in labour demand due to growth, structural change, and 
technological change, and in labour supply due to education expansion and demo-
graphic changes. From the early 2000s the inequality of urban income per capita 
has also increased, with the Gini rising to 0.35 in 2013 (Table 6.2).
The urban restructuring involved reforms in ownership. For the first time in 
decades, urban individuals and households became property owners. As noted 
already, at this time the government officially condoned the development of private 
ownership of businesses and enterprises, which generated not only employment but 
also business income and profits for owners and investors. At the same time the 
government undertook the privatization and marketization of urban housing.
Experiments with urban housing reform had started earlier, but in 1998 the 
central government adopted the policy nationwide. Within four years (by 2002), 
80 per cent of urban public housing had been sold to occupants (Wang  2001; 
Yang and Chen 2014: Chapter 2). The housing reforms meant that although many 
urban workers lost their jobs, they gained ownership of their housing, and at con-
cessionary prices.
The distribution of benefits from the housing reform was not equal, however. 
Households that happened to be located in work units that had more resources or 
that were located in more favourable districts or cities, and individuals who had 
more status, seniority, or power within their work units, obtained a larger transfer 
of housing wealth. Furthermore, the housing reform only benefited workers with 
formal urban employment, not informal workers or migrant households. In the 
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ensuing years, urban housing prices have appreciated rapidly but unevenly. The 
consequences for income distribution are evident in the rising share of asset and 
property income in total income and their growing contribution to income 
in equal ity (Figure 6.3; Luo et al. 2018).
Transition has affected not only each of the rural and urban sectors, but also 
the linkages between the two sectors. Under the planned economy, China’s house-
hold registration (hukou) system highly restricted geographic mobility. Aside 
from the return of sent-down urban youth to their cities of origin in the early 
1980s, mobility continued to be very limited until the mid-1990s, when rural 
workers began to engage in short-term migration. Migration increased over time, 
and especially from 2000. Since 2000, the pace of urbanization has also acceler-
ated. In the early 1990s more than 80 per cent of China’s population was rural 
and rural–urban migration was minimal; in 2002 the rural population share was 
64 per cent and rural–urban migrants accounted for 3 per cent of the population; 
in 2013 the rural population share had fallen to 46 per cent and the rural–urban 
migrant share had risen to 13 per cent (Luo et al. 2018).
The resulting massive human relocation from rural to urban China has had 
implications for inequality. Luo et al. (2020) obtain a rough estimate of the impact 
of migration on inequality by calculating the Gini coefficient including and 
excluding rural–urban migrants. For 2013, including migrants reduces the 
national Gini modestly from 0.45 to 0.43. This calculation likely understates the 
impact of migration on inequality because it does not capture the indirect and 
general equilibrium effects of migration.
Migration and also urbanization have expanded income-earning op por tun-
ities for and transformed the composition of income of the rural population. 
They have affected urban labour markets, greatly expanding the supply of 
unskilled and low-skilled labour (Gustafsson and Wan 2018). They have influ-
enced trends in the urban–rural income gap, a major contributor to national 
inequality (Luo et al. 2018).
Since 2000, the composition of household income has also changed due to the 
growing private sector as well as self-employment, rising housing prices, the age-
ing population, and increasing public transfers. At the national level, the share of 
wage income decreased from 2002 to 2013 by 5.5 percentage points (Figure 6.3). 
Moreover, wage income has become more equally distributed among households, 
as its concentration rate decreased from 0.64 in 2002 to 0.48 in 2013 (Luo et al. 
2018). This has contributed to the reduction in income inequality.
Nevertheless, trends in wage income have differed between the urban and rural 
sectors. From 2002 to 2013, urban households experienced a declining share of 
wage income from 83 per cent to 60 per cent, while for rural households the share 
of wage income rose from 32 per cent to 34 per cent (calculated from Luo et al. 
2018). The declining share of wage income of urban households was ac com pan ied 
by increasing shares of pension income, which rose from 16 per cent to 19 per cent; 
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family business income, which rose from 3 per cent to more than 6 per cent; and 
imputed rent on owner-occupied private housing, which rose from 7 per cent to 
15 per cent. It is important to realize that although these growing income com-
ponents have become more equally distributed, their distribution remains rela-
tively unequal. Pension income, for example, is more unequally distributed than 
wage income (Luo et al. 2018).
5 Incomplete Transition
Although China has made much progress in its economic transition over the past 
forty years, aspects of the transition remain incomplete. Here we discuss several 
aspects that have significant consequences for inequality.
Well-functioning markets require strong underpinnings in the form of mar-
ket regulations, corporate governance, and enforceable legal systems. In China 
these underpinnings are weak. The resulting problems are most visible in asset 
markets. In both urban and rural areas, property rights to land and housing are 
not enforceable. Local governments can expropriate land and housing from 
individual households to make way for new development. The affected house-
holds are often compensated poorly, while the new development enriches local 
officials and developers. Stock markets, which were established in the 1990s and 
expanded rapidly in the 2000s, remain extremely volatile. Elliott (2015) explains 
the volatility as arising due to incomplete reforms and ongoing direct govern-
ment intervention:
Firms are almost totally shielded by government policy from the possibility of a 
hostile takeover or a forced change of management unless there is a dominant 
shareholder. Similarly, many company heads can determine dividend levels 
without great concern over shareholder preferences. Further, corporate govern-
ance is weak enough that management is often in a position to divert company 
assets for their own purposes. Widespread corruption makes this even more of a 
problem, especially for the many firms where a government entity owns a sub-
stantial stake.
Incomplete transition in these areas of property rights contributes to a growing 
concentration of asset wealth and income. Individuals with existing wealth, con-
nections, or power can take advantage of the incomplete market reforms to enrich 
themselves. Recent studies on the distribution of wealth in China find that wealth 
inequality has increased substantially (Knight et al. 2017; Li and Wan 2015). The 
combination of high income inequality, the rapid rise of housing prices, privatiza-
tion of SOEs and other assets, and corruption of government officials contributes 
to growing wealth inequality.
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The unequal distribution of wealth contributes to income inequality. Nearly a 
quarter of household income growth during the period 2007–13 was due to 
increases in income from property, including asset income plus imputed rents on 
owner-occupied housing (Luo et al. 2018). During this same period the share of 
income from property increased from less than 10 per cent of household income 
in 2002 to 17 per cent in 2013 (Figure 6.3). Because property income is unequally 
distributed, these trends have had negative implications for income inequality.
Incomplete transition in capital and land property markets has contributed to 
the emergence of an ultra-rich class and the rapid growth of their assets. China’s 
capital market is subject to government intervention and manipulation, enabling 
those close to government officials to have more opportunities to obtain bank loans 
and become successful businessmen. Li et al.’s (2018) top-income dataset reveals the 
importance of land and real estate markets. Most of the super-rich in this dataset 
come from the real estate and IT industries. The Forbes Rich List has also shown 
growth in the number of billionaires from these two sectors in recent years.
Incomplete reform of the state enterprise sector has contributed to weak cor-
porate governance. State ownership in China has declined substantially but con-
tinues to dominate key sectors and firms. SOEs have been transformed into 
shareholding corporations in which the state owns the majority of, or controlling, 
shares. Despite these reforms, SOEs continue to have privileged status and receive 
special treatment in terms of industrial policies and access to loans and finance. 
Their relationship with the state and the Communist Party remains murky, such 
that corporate governance is compromised. With respect to income distribution, 
these characteristics of SOEs create opportunities for corruption and unequal 
wealth accumulation.
In addition, the insulation of SOE employment and compensation from labour 
market forces contributes to inequality in wage earnings and benefits. Gustafsson 
and Wan’s (2018) estimates of Mincer urban wage equations for each year of the 
CHIP survey reveal that after controlling for individual characteristics such as 
education and experience, SOE wages remain higher than those in all other own-
ership sectors except the foreign-owned enterprise sector; moreover, since 1995 
the magnitude of the SOE wage premium has increased.
The hukou system is another area of incomplete transition. Despite substantial 
loosening of restrictions on migration, a variety of policies and related factors 
continue to impede labour mobility. The result is ongoing segmentation of the 
labour market, which tends to elevate wage differentials among regions and 
between urban and rural workers. Rural migrant workers with rural hukou are 
discriminated against in terms of employment opportunities, compensation, and 
access to public services in urban areas. They are referred to as ‘second class’ 
(Démurger et al. 2009).
Another important area of incomplete transition is rural land ownership. Rural 
households have only partial property rights to their farmland. They have the 
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right to cultivate and earn income from their land, and increasingly they have 
the right to transfer land through rental markets, but they do not have the right to 
sell their land or use it as collateral. Moreover, they are not protected against con-
fiscation of their land by local governments. The incomplete reform of rural land 
property rights distorts the distribution of income in ways that increase in equal ity. 
It creates an imbalance between poorer rural and richer urban households in 
terms of their ability to benefit from their real property. It reduces farm prod uct-
iv ity and thus depresses income from agriculture, which is the most equalizing 
component of income. The depressed income from agriculture creates heightened 
incentives to seek off-farm work. Yet, the fact that rights to the land can be lost if 
it is not cultivated hinders mobility. These factors distort patterns of income and 
inequality.
6 Distributional Policies
In the first decades of the economic reform, China followed a development strat-
egy that emphasized growth of the ‘productive forces’, that is, a strategy that 
placed priority on growth of GDP, development of the underlying factors of pro-
duction, and improved productivity. In reaction to the overly egalitarian policies 
of the Cultural Revolution, distributional concerns were placed on the back 
burner, especially after Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992, when he pro-
claimed that China should ‘let some people get rich first’. China did not totally 
ignore distributional issues at that time—for example, it invested in a major pro-
gramme of rural poverty alleviation. Less attention, however, was paid to distri-
butional trends elsewhere. Through the 1980s and 1990s, China’s rapid GDP 
growth was accompanied by unprecedented increases in income inequality. By 
the late 1990s, income inequality in China was approaching levels found in coun-
tries considered to be relatively unequal by international standards.
Concerns about rising inequality led to a shift in development strategy in the 
early 2000s, when China launched the ‘Hu–Wen New Policies’ (Hu–Wen xinz-
heng), including the ‘Scientific Outlook on Development’ (kexue fazhan guan) 
and ‘harmonious society’ (hexie shehui) programmes, which emphasized sustain-
able and equitable growth. Over the following decade China embarked on an 
ambitious programme to improve its social welfare system, with the aim of 
achieving universal coverage of social security and social insurance programmes. 
As of 2013, the main components of these programmes were largely in place, and 
improvements have continued since.
The major components of China’s social welfare system are pensions, health 
insurance, and cash transfers to the poor. Pensions had previously only existed for 
urban workers with formal employment. In 2009, the government extended pen-
sions to rural China with the launch of the New Rural Pension Scheme. By 2012, 
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this new programme reportedly covered 100 per cent of China’s rural counties 
(Wang 2014). Although the amount of rural pension payments has remained low, 
it has increased over time. Still, rural pension benefit levels differ among prov-
inces and counties, with higher payments in the more developed regions. In 2015, 
for example, rural pension income was 470 yuan per person per month for rural 
residents of Beijing, as compared to 85 yuan in the western province of Gansu.
In 2011, China extended pension benefits in urban areas with the introduction 
of the new basic urban pension scheme, which was aimed at urban residents 
without formal employment and those who were ineligible for the pre-existing 
urban employee pension programmes. In 2014, the new rural and urban basic 
pension schemes were merged. According to official NBS statistics, enrolment in 
the combined rural and urban basic pension programmes grew rapidly from 
essentially zero in 2007 to 497.5 million in 2013. As of 2015, enrolment exceeded 
500 million, and pension recipients numbered 148 million.
Like pensions, health insurance had previously been limited to formal sector 
urban employees. In 2009, health insurance was extended to rural areas nation-
wide with the adoption of the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme. According 
to official statistics, the programme’s coverage increased from 252 million people 
in 2007 to 487 million people in 2013, with a coverage rate exceeding 95 per cent; 
during the same period, contributions from individuals and governments rose 
from about 50 yuan per person to more than 300 yuan per person (Meng and 
Xu  2014). In 2007 the government took a further step and initiated Urban 
Resident Basic Medical Insurance, a voluntary programme providing health 
insurance to urban residents who do not have formal employment. By 2009, this 
programme was offered in almost all of China’s cities (Liu and Zhao  2014). 
Enrolment in the programme rose from 43 million people in 2007, its first year, to 
296 million people in 2013, and further to 377 million people in 2015.
By increasing the affordability of medical care, these health insurance pro-
grammes have the potential to improve health outcomes and labour productivity, 
and thus reduce the use of household savings for self-insurance. In these ways 
China’s health insurance programmes can have an indirect but positive impact on 
household income. Nevertheless, participant contributions and levels of reim-
bursement vary regionally, and levels of reimbursement remain low.
China has pursued an active poverty reduction agenda in rural areas since the 
1980s. In the early years, China’s rural poverty programmes were designed to 
reduce poverty by developing the local economy. They funded economic develop-
ment in designated poor rural regions and counties, with the idea that low eco-
nomic development in the poor localities was the main cause of poverty. This 
strategy, together with macroeconomic growth more broadly, contributed to a 
marked reduction in poverty.
By the 2000s, the pattern of poverty in China had become more dispersed and 
required a different approach. In response, China adapted its poverty alleviation 
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strategy and began targeting smaller areas (e.g. villages instead of counties) and 
households. The Minimum Livelihood Guarantee or dibao programme, a means-
tested cash transfer programme targeted at households, was first established in 
cities in 1999 and was expanded significantly in urban areas in the early 2000s. 
Official statistics indicate that by 2007 the number of recipients in the urban 
dibao programme was 23 million, since which time the numbers have remained 
at about 20 million.
A similar, rural dibao programme was initiated on a pilot basis in 2004 and 
adopted in rural areas nationwide in 2007. The rural dibao programme grew 
rapidly to 54 million recipients in 2013. Concurrently, the generosity of the 
rural programme rose, with rural dibao expenditures per recipient increasing 
from 446 yuan per person per year in 2007 to 1,609 yuan per person per year in 
2016 (Golan et al.  2017). The expansion of the urban and rural dibao pro-
grammes has had both direct and indirect impacts on measured income levels 
and inequality.
Cai and Yue (2018) evaluate the distributional impact of China’s expanding 
social welfare programmes, specifically the impact of China’s pension pro-
grammes (formal sector, urban resident, and rural resident pension programmes), 
the minimum guaranteed income or dibao programme, medical insurance reim-
bursements, farmer subsidies, and some other smaller programmes. The study 
compares the impact of these social security programme transfers in 2002, at the 
start of the new efforts to build a comprehensive social welfare system, to that in 
2013, when much of the system was in place.
The study finds that the amount of social security transfers increased markedly 
between 2002 and 2013, rising from 9 per cent to 14 per cent of household income 
before taxes and transfers. The effects of the programmes on income inequality, 
however, were mixed. On the positive side, the transfers reduced inequality in the 
sense that measured inequality including the transfers is lower than that exclud-
ing the transfers. Moreover, the transfers became more equalizing over time, a 
reflection of the introduction and expansion of programmes to previously 
un covered rural and informal urban residents.
On the negative side, the extent to which China’s social welfare programmes 
served as a mechanism for redistribution was compromised by the fact that their 
benefits went disproportionately to the wealthier, urban population. This imbal-
ance is largely due to the formal sector pension programme, which accounted for 
more than 80 per cent of total social welfare transfers in both 2002 and 2013. 
Importantly, formal sector pensions went almost entirely to the relatively well-off 
formal urban population (Cai and Yue 2018).
Aside from China’s pension, dibao, health, and other social welfare pro-
grammes, a few other government programmes with distributional objectives 
deserve mention. First, since the late 1990s the Chinese government has adopted 
major initiatives to expand rural secondary education and to increase university 
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enrolments. Official statistics indicate that the progression rate from junior to 
senior secondary school rose from 50 per cent in 2000 to 81 per cent in 2007, and 
further to 91 per cent in 2013. According to UNESCO data, gross enrolment rates 
in secondary education rose from 61 per cent in 2000 to 73 per cent in 2007, and 
further to 96 per cent in 2013; tertiary enrolment rates rose from 8 per cent in 
2000 to 21 per cent in 2007 and 30 per cent in 2013.
The expansion of secondary and tertiary education has helped narrow gaps in 
education levels (e.g. between women and men). These changes in educational 
attainment have implications for recent trends in income and inequality. For 
example, Gustafsson and Wan (2018) reports that the returns to education rose 
from 1988 to 2007 but declined thereafter. Gustafsson and Wan (2018) attributes 
the decline in the returns to education in part to the increased supply of workers 
with university education.
Second, minimum wage policies, initially adopted in the 1990s, have targeted 
the low-wage segment of China’s urban labour market. In the early years of these 
programmes, minimum wage levels were low and not strictly enforced. After 
implementation of the New Labour Contract Law in 2008, minimum wage levels 
and their enforcement have increased. To some extent these efforts are the result 
of political competition by local governments responding to the central govern-
ment’s call for a higher wage share in national income. For instance, in July 2010 
Hainan province and Henan province increased their provincial minimum wages 
by 30 per cent and 33 per cent, respectively. In 2011, at least five provinces raised 
their minimum wages by more than 20 per cent, and in 2012–13 twenty-seven 
provinces increased their minimum wages (Li et al. 2014). Several studies have 
investigated the consequences of these minimum wage policies on the urban 
wage distribution (Li and Ma 2015; Lin and Yun 2016; Ma and Li 2017).
7  Conclusions
From the late 1970s through the early 2000s, income inequality in China rose 
from a low level to one that is relatively high by international standards. Standard 
estimates indicate that the level of inequality has plateaued and declined modestly 
since 2007, suggesting that China may have turned the corner in the Kuznets 
inverted U.  Potential bias in recent estimates of China’s inequality due to the 
increased difficulty of capturing China’s emerging ultra-rich class, however, raises 
questions about the path of China’s inequality in the past decade.
China is both a developing economy and an economy in transition. 
Consequently, conventional development theories only go partway to explaining 
China’s story of inequality. The special dynamics of income inequality in China 
during the past forty years need explanations that reflect China’s unique develop-
ment path, the completed aspects of its economic transition, and the still incom-
plete facets of its economic transition. China’s economic transition has been 
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successful in many regards, but some facets of the transition remain incomplete. 
The transition aspect of China’s economy may have elongated the rise of income 
inequality beyond what one would expect based on Lewis’s two-sector model, and 
China’s incomplete transition has likely dampened the mechanisms that would 
normally bring about the downturn in the Kuznets inverted U.
Incomplete reform of the hukou system has contributed to a persistent income 
gap between urban and rural households, despite the large number of rural 
migrants moving into cities. Delayed political reform has led to continued, 
excessive government intervention into economic activities, corruption, rent-
seeking, and an excessive number of super-rich businessmen and disguised rich 
officials. Partial reform of the state-owned enterprise sector has preserved its 
monopolistic position in some sectors and has contributed to wage differentials 
among sectors.
How does China’s experience with rising income inequality relate to that in 
other developing countries? First, China’s experience highlights the importance 
of income growth for poor and low-income households. Despite the increase in 
income inequality, China has not yet experienced severe social in stabil ity. This is 
likely due in part to the fact that, unlike some other developing countries, poor 
and lower-income households have enjoyed substantial income growth. Thus, 
even though income inequality has risen to a relatively high level, the poor as 
well as the rich enjoyed the benefits of China’s rapid economic growth. By some 
 definitions, then, Chinese economic growth has been inclusive.
Second, China’s experience highlights the importance of redistributive govern-
ment policies and programmes. Evidence suggests that in recent years the expan-
sion of redistributive policies has begun to play a role in moderating income 
inequality. Such policies are important not only for their actual impact on income 
distribution, but also for their symbolic function. They signal the regime’s com-
mitment to a certain vision of social welfare.
What will be the direction of China’s income inequality in the future? China’s 
past experience suggests that future trends will depend on whether China is able 
to address several challenges. First, the contribution of labour market segmenta-
tion and incomplete and distorted capital markets to widening income inequality 
highlights the need to pursue measures that promote well-functioning, equitable 
market mechanisms. Second, direct redistributive policies must be accompanied 
by steps to fight the corruption and rent-seeking that result from government 
interventions and weaknesses in the political system.
Third, recent, encouraging trends in income inequality may not be sustainable 
if wealth inequality continues to rise. Steps are needed to address the widening 
inequality of wealth and broaden opportunities for wealth accumulation by 
lower-income groups. Our findings thus suggest that China’s future ability to 
transition from a high-inequality to a low-inequality economy is not guaranteed. 
It will require ongoing vigilance, further economic and political reforms, and the 
strengthening and expansion of redistributive policies.
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Inequality Trends and Dynamics:  
The Bird’s-Eye and the Granular Perspectives
Hai-Anh H. Dang and Peter Lanjouw
1 Introduction
Income inequality is a topic of longstanding interest in India. Historically,  attention 
has tended to focus on the lower tail of the welfare distribution—on poverty—
rather than on overall income inequality.1 This would seem appropriate given the 
very high levels of absolute poverty that have long prevailed in India. Recently, 
however, as economic growth in India has accelerated, and as absolute poverty 
rates have started to fall fairly rapidly, there has been a turn also to questions about 
the broader distributional impact of India’s growth trajectory. There are deep con-
cerns about the possible consequences of rising inequality for social stability.
An important dimension of inequality in India pertains to widespread hori-
zontal inequalities. India’s complex caste structure translates into significantly 
different opportunities and aspirations across population segments. Religious, 
gender, and even spatial differences also play a role in shaping wellbeing. It is 
important to accommodate these horizontal inequalities into any analysis of the 
evolution of India’s overall income distribution.
This chapter reports on a recently completed research project that seeks to 
inform the debate on inequality in India by offering a bird’s-eye view of inequality 
trends and dynamics at the all-India level over three decades up to 2011/12, and 
contrasting this with similar evidence at the level of the Indian village or the 
urban block. We explore dynamics by reporting ‘snapshots’ of inequality at differ-
ent time periods, but also by tracing the movement of people within the income 
1 This chapter is part of a larger study on inequality in India, which itself is part of the UNU-
WIDER project, Inequality in the Giants, looking at inequality in a set of populous countries. We are 
grateful to UNU-WIDER and in particular to Finn Tarp and Carlos Gradín for supporting this work. 
We have benefited from conversations with and guidance from Chris Elbers, Himanshu, Murray 
Leibrandt, Shi Li, Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay, Rinku Murgai, Marcelo Neri, Nicholas Stern, David 
Garcés Urzainqui, Roy van der Weide, and participants at the 2018 UNU-WIDER conference Think 
Development, Think WIDER in Helsinki. Any errors are our own.
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distribution over time. We ask, for example, whether a rise in inequality is charac-
terized by a simple stretching-out of the income distribution, or is also associated 
with switches in relative position within the income distribution. We consider, 
further, aspects of income mobility within, and across, generations.
We start, in Section  2, with a review that assesses the available evidence on 
inequality trends and dynamics in India from a variety of perspectives. At the 
all-India level, inequality is broadly found to have risen between 1983 and 
2011/12, particularly in the early 2000s, but to differing degrees depending on the 
dimension considered and the measurement method employed. Section 3 goes 
on to interrogate the all-India-level evidence, with the detailed story of economic 
development in the north Indian village of Palanpur since the late 1950s. 
Inequality has also risen in Palanpur—the consequence of a process of structural 
transformation that can also be discerned at the all-India level. Section 4 shows 
that local-level inequality (within-village in rural areas; within-block in urban 
areas) accounts for the bulk of overall inequality in India; understanding what 
occurs at the local level is thus important for understanding overall inequality. 
The importance and direction of change of local-level inequality is, moreover, 
argued to vary considerably across India’s states.
Section  5 reveals that nationally representative data point to rising intra-
generational income mobility over time. This is consistent with the idea that 
 inequality of lifetime income may be lower than what is observed in a given year. 
However, the evidence also suggests that while poverty has fallen, most of the 
poor who have escaped poverty continue to face a high risk of falling back into 
poverty. Moreover, those who remain poor are increasingly chronically poor, and 
may be particularly difficult to reach via the introduction or expansion of safety nets.
Section 6 moves on to examine inter-generational education mobility in India. 
There is little conclusive evidence of improved mobility over time. We enquire 
into the possible impact of promoting greater inter-generational mobility (thereby 
reducing the stark inequalities of opportunity that prevail). Not only would such 
efforts promote social justice, but evidence is presented to show that they could 
also stimulate inequality-dampening economic growth. A plausible route through 
which this could occur is via rising education levels, particularly among the poor. 
Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Inequality Levels and Trends in India: A Bird’s-Eye View
Himanshu (2019) scrutinizes evidence from India to present a general picture of ris-
ing inequality in recent decades. While the picture is fairly consistent, the patterns 
are not always equally pronounced across all indicators of wellbeing. Tax data from 
the World Inequality Database (WID) database are examined to assess extent of 
income/wealth concentration at the top of the income distribution. The analysis 
proceeds further to briefly consider inequality in human development indicators.
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2.1 Monetary Inequality
Since the 1950s the National Sample Survey (NSS) Organization has fielded a 
series of national household surveys suitable for tracking household consumption. 
Himanshu (2019) draws on the ‘thick’ rounds (with larger sample sizes) of the NSS 
surveys to examine trends between 1983 and 2011/12 (the most recent available 
round). His inequality measures are based on the mixed recall period (MRP) con-
sumption aggregates that are the basis of India’s official poverty estimates.2
Table 7.1 reports Gini indexes between 1993/4 and 2011/12 after correcting for 
spatial cost-of-living differences using the deflators implicit in India’s official pov-
erty lines. Such price indices are not available for the 1980s. Consumption 
in equal ity at the all-India level can be seen to have risen moderately since the 
early 1990s. The trend increase is more marked when based on the variance of log 
of consumption expenditure—which gives higher weight to inequality at the 
lower tail of the income distribution. The increase was sharpest between 1993/4 
and 2004/5 and most pronounced in urban areas.
2 Most NSS consumption rounds collect data using a uniform recall period (URP) of thirty days 
for all consumption items. A mixed recall period (MRP) aggregate with longer (365 days) recall for 
some (mainly non-food) items was introduced, alongside URP consumption, in the mid-2000s. For 
earlier years, Himanshu (2019) reconstruct a comparable MRP aggregate using the unit-record data.
Table 7.1 Inequality trends in real consumption expenditure
 Gini coefficient of consumption expenditure
 Nominal MPCE Real MPCE
 Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total
1983 0.27 0.31 0.30 n/a n/a n/a
1993/94 0.26 0.32 0.30 0.25 0.31 0.28
2004/05 0.28 0.36 0.35 0.27 0.36 0.31
2009/10 0.29 0.38 0.36 0.27 0.38 0.32
2011/12 0.29 0.38 0.37 0.27 0.37 0.33
 Variance of log of consumption expenditure
 Nominal MPCE Real MPCE
 Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total
1993/94 0.20 0.31 0.26 0.19 0.29 0.23
2004/05 0.22 0.39 0.32 0.21 0.37 0.26
2009/10 0.24 0.42 0.35 0.21 0.40 0.29
2011/12 0.25 0.41 0.36 0.21 0.39 0.29
Notes: Real mean per capita expenditures (MPCE) are MRP consumption 
estimates corrected for cost-of-living differences across states, between rural and 
urban areas, and over time, using deflators implicit in the official poverty lines.
Source: Himanshu (2019). Reproduced here with permission of UNU-WIDER.
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Figure  7.1 reports the Gini index of income inequality from the 2004/5 and 
2011/12 India Human Development Surveys (IHDS). The IHDS is a nationally 
representative household panel survey that collects data on both consumption 
and income. Estimates based on this survey indicate that nominal income 
in equal ity in India was about 0.54 in both 2004/5 and 2011/12, but showed a mar-
ginal increase in terms of real income.3 IHDS-based estimates of consumption 
inequality are lower than estimates of income inequality but, as in the NSS, show 
3 Corrected for spatial price differentials, the Gini coefficient of real incomes is 45.3 in 2005 and 
45.9 in 2012.
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Figure 7.1 Disparities in human capital outcomes, by social group
Note: Reproduced here with permission of UNU-WIDER.
Sources: Himanshu (2019). Nutrition outcomes from the National Family Health Surveys (2005/06 
and 2015/16), literacy outcomes from the 2011 Population Census, and dropout rates from the 
National University of Education Planning and Administration (2015).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/02/21, SPi
Hai-Anh H. Dang and Peter Lanjouw 161
an increase over time. It is noteworthy that estimates of income inequality place 
India among the highest inequality countries internationally.
As suggested previously, an important note of caution in assessing survey-based 
levels and trends in inequality is that household surveys may not capture well the 
economic status of richer households. This seems particularly problematic with 
(NSS) consumption-based analysis in the light of the growing gap over time 
between aggregate consumption from the NSS surveys and private consumption 
in the national accounts (NAS). There are good reasons why the two aggregates 
should differ (for instance, due to differences in definition) but the gap in India is 
particularly large.4 It is difficult to know how much of the gap is due to errors in 
NAS consumption versus NSS survey methods, with the possibility of errors on 
both sides. To the extent that under-reporting of consumption or non-compliance 
is likely to be greater among the rich, inequality would be underestimated.
An emerging set of studies attempt to overcome the limitations of survey data 
on the rich by drawing on income tax data, in combination with household 
 survey-based income or consumption data, to examine the changing shares of 
income accruing to rich households across a range of countries. For India, 
Chancel and Piketty (2017) have extended an earlier analysis by Banerjee and 
Piketty (2005) to develop a time series from 1922 to the present.
While there has been some debate on the reliability of inequality estimates 
based on combining household survey and tax data, the evidence compiled by 
Chancel and Piketty (2017) combines to present a picture of extreme inequality in 
India.5 By 2016, India was second only to the Middle Eastern countries in terms 
of the income share of the top 10 per cent. But it was also the country with the 
highest increase in the share of top incomes in the past thirty years, the share of 
the top 10 per cent increasing from 31 per cent in 1980 to 56 per cent in 2016 
(World Inequality Lab 2018).
Rongen (2018) offers an alternative approach to gauging the impact of under-
coverage of the rich from the NSS surveys. His approach combines survey data 
with a database of house prices that can be used as predictors of income or 
 consumption.6 Rongen (2018) re-estimates inequality in Mumbai by this method 
and finds little support for the contention that the NSS survey data underesti-
mate inequality in that city. Further research into the suitability of this method 
to empirical application with NSS data is warranted, but the results do suggest 
that debates about the levels and trends of monetary inequality in India are 
unlikely to end soon.
4 The ratio of NSS to NAS consumption declined from about 60 per cent in 1991 to 39 per cent in 
2011/12 (Datt et al. 2016).
5 While the method adopted by Piketty and others is similar to what has been used in other coun-
tries where tax data have been used to estimate income distribution for the entire population, there 
have been concerns over the appropriateness of the method—for details see Atkinson (2007: 18–42); 
Leigh (2007); Leigh and Posso (2009); and Sutch (2017).
6 Van der Weide et al. (2018) developed this approach in a study of inequality in Egypt. Correcting 
for under-coverage of the rich in Egypt in this way raises the estimated Gini from 0.39 to 0.52.
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2.2 Non-Monetary Indicators: Health and Education
India has made substantial gains in health and education outcomes in the past 
few decades. Himanshu (2019) documents that over the period 1991–2013 life 
expectancy at birth increased by more than seven years, the infant mortality rate 
fell by half, the share of births in health facilities more than tripled, the maternal 
mortality ratio fell by about 60 per cent, and the total fertility rate fell to almost 
replacement level. India’s District Information System for Education (DISE) indi-
cates that the education system has also expanded rapidly, leading to gross enrol-
ment ratios of 100 and 91 in primary and upper primary grades, respectively.7
But the picture is not uniformly positive. While India has outpaced the world 
in reductions in consumption poverty, progress on nutrition outcomes has been 
less remarkable. Child stunting (associated with poorer socioeconomic outcomes 
later in life), which affected nearly half (48 per cent) of the under-five child popu-
lation in 2005/6, has reduced, but still afflicted 38 per cent of children in 2015/16. 
Under-five child wasting (weight-for-height) has shown no improvement, stag-
nating at one-fifth of the population. India also ranks poorly in global indices 
such as the Global Hunger Index and the Human Capital Index, reflecting the 
challenges that remain and the need for sustained progress.8
National averages mask disparities across social groups, states, and rural– 
urban areas, reflecting inequalities in opportunity to access basic services. 
Figure  7.1 shows differences in selected health and education outcomes by 
social groups. Although there have been improvements across all social groups, 
Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Scheduled Castes (SCs) persistently have worse 
 outcomes.9 In 2015/16, 44 per cent of under-five children in STs were stunted, 
compared with 31 per cent of children from general caste households. Even larger 
disparities are evident in the rates of underweight children, and those gaps are 
not closing.
Gaps between social groups are also evident in education outcomes, although 
outcomes are better in education than in health, and gaps in enrolment rates 
among school-age children have been closing (Himanshu 2019). Literacy rates 
have improved for all groups, but in 2011 literacy rates in SCs and STs were 
66 per cent and 59 per cent, respectively, compared with the national average of 
73 per cent. The disparity between social groups can also be seen in the average 
annual dropout rates at all levels of school education. Except for primary educa-
tion, the dropout rates were higher than average for SC children. The rates were 
much higher for ST children at all levels of school education.
7 National University of Educational Planning and Administration (2015).
8 The 2017 Global Hunger Index ranks India in 100th place out of the 119 countries that were 
included.
9 Thorat and Sabharwal (2011) provide evidence on caste-based disparities in nutrition outcomes 
through the 1990s and early 2000s.
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The intersection of gender, location, and social groups exacerbates these gaps. 
In 2011, more than 80 per cent of men were literate, while the rate was only 65 per 
cent for women. Female literacy among STs is even lower, at below 50 per cent. 
The literacy rate of rural women is 62 per cent, while the rate is much higher 
among urban women, at 81 per cent. The corresponding rates for men are 83 per 
cent and 91 per cent, respectively.
3 Inequality at the Village Level: A Granular View
India’s rural population resides mainly in villages—the 2011 Census reports 
roughly 800 million people living in more than 600,000 villages. Most of rural 
India’s workforce (60 per cent) remains primarily involved in agriculture, but in 
recent decades this sector’s growth has lagged behind that of other sectors in the 
economy. The deceleration in agricultural growth has been offset by the emer-
gence and growth of the non-farm sector: in 2011/12 non-farm workers 
accounted for 40 per cent of the workforce, nearly double the ratio observed only 
ten years earlier (Himanshu 2019).
Elbers and Lanjouw (2019) study the distributional impact of this structural 
transformation of the rural Indian economy at the level of an individual village, 
Palanpur, in western Uttar Pradesh. There are grounds for interest in local-level 
distributional outcomes. In rural areas people are likely to see the local village 
population as their reference group. Thinking about the magnitude and direction 
of change in inequality is thus likely to be influenced by village-level trends.
3.1 Inequality in Palanpur: 1957–2015
Palanpur was the subject of intensive study on seven occasions between 1957/8 
and 2015. Surveys were conducted in 1957/8, 1962/3, 1974/5, 1983/4, 1993, 
2008/9, and 2015. In each survey year detailed quantitative and qualitative data, 
covering a very wide range of topics, were collected for the entire village popula-
tion, with fieldwork conducted over an extended period—often a year or longer.10
The population of Palanpur grew from just over 500 in 1957/8 to roughly 1,250 
in 2008/9—an annual population growth rate that was similar to that recorded for 
India as a whole. Both distributional change and structural transformation in 
Palanpur are closely linked to the village caste structure. Although there are eight 
caste groups in the village, the three main castes in the village are Thakurs, 
Muraos, and Jatabs. Thakurs are the largest caste in the village numerically and 
10 Himanshu et al. (2018) provide an in-depth analysis of economic development in Palanpur over 
the seven decades covered by the surveys.
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they continue to be powerful economically. They were the first to move into the 
non-farm sector in a major way but have now been joined by other castes. 
Muraos, on the other hand, are a traditionally cultivating caste and take pride in 
their agricultural skills. Alongside the relative decline of agriculture in village 
income, Muraos have seen their economic status decline somewhat in relative 
terms. Jatabs, at the bottom of the village hierarchy, remained economically and 
socially marginalized until around 2005, but have become increasingly involved 
in casual non-farm wage activities and are now seen as an increasingly important 
community within the village. They have therefore experienced significant 
upward mobility over the years.
Throughout the study period, Palanpur has essentially been a village of small 
farmers, with a relatively low proportion of landless households. Since the late 
1950s, the village has seen agricultural practices transformed in connection with 
the spread of irrigation; the introduction of new seed varieties, fertilizers, and 
pesticides; the emergence of rental markets for agricultural equipment; and the 
introduction of new crops. Key to the agricultural development process has been 
the expansion of irrigation from around half of village land at the beginning of 
the survey period to 100 per cent by the 1974/5 survey, as well as intensification 
of farm mechanization that has been both land-augmenting and labour-saving. 
Additional forces of agricultural change include the shift of cropping patterns 
towards higher-value crops.
Over time, an increasing number of villagers have become involved in the non-
farm sector. Non-farm activities represented roughly two-thirds of total primary 
employment by 2015 and accounted for nearly 60 per cent of average household 
income in 2008/09 (Table 7.2). Better access to towns and cities via improvements 
in railways and communications infrastructure, particularly mobile phones, has 
helped villagers find jobs and has led to a growing number travelling outside 
Palanpur, on a commuting basis, for employment.
Jobs in the non-farm sector can largely be categorized into two kinds: low-
paying casual and menial activities, versus regular jobs (often government-
provided) and some profitable self-employment units. But even the lower-paying 
jobs are more remunerative than agricultural labour, and often offer additional 
spells of employment that can be combined with some continued involvement in 
agriculture. The casual non-farm sector registered the highest growth in employ-
ment over the survey period, notably in activities related to the construction sector. 
Self-employment has seen the fastest income growth in Palanpur by a substantial 
margin. The embrace of entrepreneurship has been striking. Regular wage jobs 
have declined both relatively and absolutely and there has been very little growth 
in the number of these jobs since the early 1990s.
While full migration from Palanpur is not common and has not increased as 
a  proportion of households, the related practice of villagers commuting from 
Palanpur on a daily basis, or for short periods, is now both common and increas-
ing over time. Commuting allows villagers to continue to reside in Palanpur and 
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maintain some involvement in cultivation while they access an ever wider range 
of non-farm job opportunities in the surrounding area and nearby towns 
and cities.
The richness of data covering all households in Palanpur permits an analysis of 
the dynamics of poverty, inequality, and mobility at a level of detail not normally 
available from secondary data sources. Poverty in Palanpur was extensive in the 
early survey years—more than 80 per cent of the population was classified as 
poor during the 1950s and 1960s. The growth in incomes associated with expand-
ing irrigation in the late 1950s and the 1960s, and the green revolution technolo-
gies and methods that evolved in the late 1960s and early 1970s, led to a sharp 
decline in poverty, the headcount ratio falling to less than 60 per cent by 1974/5, 
remaining at roughly that level in 1983/4, and then falling again sharply after 
1983, declining to below 40 per cent by 2008/9.
Table 7.3 indicates that between 1957/8 and 1962/3, inequality represented by 
the Gini coefficient rose from 0.336 to 0.353; it then fell back by 1974/5. The 
decline between 1962/3 and 1974/5 was likely linked to the expansion of irriga-
tion and the intensification of agriculture: by 1974/5, all village land was irrigated. 
Between 1974/5 and 1983/4, inequality increased but remained lower than its 
1957/8 and 1962/3 levels. A combination of factors helps to explain the rise. With 
the ongoing intensification of agriculture, the Muraos as a group experienced 
Table 7.2 Income shares in Palanpur over time (%)
Income source Year
1957/58 1962/63 1974/75 1983/84 2008/09
Household 
income
Cultivation 58.5 56.7 58.4 50.2 30
Livestock income 19.8 21.5 22 13.7 10.4
Non-cultivation 
(see breakdown)
21.7 21.8 19.6 35.4 59.6
Total income share 100 100 100 100 100









Other farm income 1.2 0.6 0.1 2.7 10.7





1.1 1 0 7 6.1
Self-employment 1.3 3.5 1 3 19.8
Regular 
employment
7.5 8.9 15.7 20 16.1
Jajmani income 1.3 0.6 0.4 1 0.2
Remittances 2 1.9 0 0.2 3.6
Other non-farm 0 1.7 0 0.2 0.6
Source: Himanshu et al. (2018), reproduced with copyright-holder’s permission.
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improved relative prosperity due to higher returns from cultivation. By 1983/4 
the Muraos had even surpassed the Thakurs in terms of per capita income. In 
addition, in 1983/4, new non-farm employment opportunities were increasingly 
available, and were taken up mostly by villagers from economically better-off 
backgrounds. In 2008/9, the Gini index, at 0.379, was at a higher level than in any 
other survey year. A decomposition exercise assessing the contribution to total 
inequality of different income sources points to non-farm income as accounting 
for the bulk of inequality in the later survey years.
The Palanpur data can be further analysed to study patterns of mobility. Over 
the entire survey period since the 1950s there is evidence of the increasing mobil-
ity of households across income quintiles, with a falling share of households 
ranked in the same quintile between survey rounds. Among the factors that seem 
to have contributed are the decline in per capita landholding and the expansion of 
non-farm employment opportunities. While access to non-farm jobs has been 
uneven, with the relatively affluent and socially networked being more successful 
in finding regular, high-paying jobs, the spread of non-farm activities to lower-
ranked households in more recent years has also allowed at least some of those at 
the bottom to improve their fortunes.
The long time horizon covered by the Palanpur study offers an opportunity to 
look beyond intra-generational mobility to inter-generational mobility, and 
indeed to compare changes in inter-generational mobility. Elbers and Lanjouw 
(2019) point to a father–son inter-generational income elasticity for the interval 
1983/4–2008/9 that is higher than that for the interval 1957/8–1983/4. This 
implies that inter-generational mobility has fallen: the father’s income is a better 
Table 7.3 Inequality of individual incomes
Measures of inequality Survey years
1957/58 1962/63 1974/75 1983/84 2008/09
Gini coefficient 0.336 0.353 0.272 0.310 0.379
Coefficient of variation 0.650 0.755 0.530 0.578 0.769
Atkinson Index      
e = 1 0.173 0.191 0.137 0.170 0.229
e = 2 0.319 0.344 0.206 0.366 0.444
Theil L measure      
GE(0) 0.19 0.213 0.147 0.186 0.26
No. of observations 529 585 750 977 1,255
No. of households 100 106 112 143 233
No. of individuals (households) 
with missing income
0 0 5(1) 8(3) 37(12)
Source: Himanshu et al. (2018), reproduced with copyright-holder’s permission.
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predictor of his son’s income in the 1983/4–2008/9 interval than in the preceding 
interval.
Elbers and Lanjouw (2019) build a simple model of a village economy that per-
mits the study of drivers of inequality in isolation, with a view to acquiring a bet-
ter understanding of the kind of inequality trends observed in a village like 
Palanpur. They scrutinize how the distribution of welfare has been shaped by the 
key forces of change, and examine a few counterfactual scenarios with a view to 
gauging how welfare might have evolved in their absence. Their simulations sug-
gest that moving out of agriculture has played an important role in contributing 
to poverty reduction, and that it has not necessarily added to village-level inequality. 
If anything, the counterfactual exercise implies that inequality would have been 
even higher if occupational diversification had not taken place. The analysis 
 indicates that the common perception of rural non-farm diversification resulting 
in higher inequality may require nuancing.
4 Dynamics of Spatial and Local Inequality
Analysis of inequality at the village level offers useful insights into the drivers of 
inequality in a country like India. Systematic evidence on the evolution of 
in equal ity in spatial units smaller than districts and states remains scarce, how-
ever. This evidence gap has largely been due to a lack of representative data for 
individual towns and villages. Mukhopadhyay and Garcés Urzainqui (2018) 
implement imputation techniques that draw upon census and satellite data to 
chronicle the evolution of local-level inequality in India over the period 2004–11. 
Their analysis offers estimates of the importance of inequalities that exist within 
and between disaggregated spatial units.
Delving into the spatial distribution of inequality is of interest given the widely 
shared perception that gains from growth in India have been spatially uneven. 
There is a sense that a ‘biased’ growth process is making India ‘look more and 
more like islands of California in a sea of sub-Saharan Africa’ (Sen and Drèze 
2013). Indian cities have been singled out by their contrasting landscape of flour-
ishing well-off residential areas and deprived slums. It is natural to wonder 
whether the national trend of increasing urban inequality is also reproduced at 
small scale—within urban blocks, for example. Concerning rural areas, on the 
one hand, there is evidence that points towards widening differences between 
rural areas—Narayan and Murgai (2016) show that rural poverty is becoming 
increasingly concentrated in poor states—while on the other hand, Li and Rama 
(2015) find substantial spill-overs from proximity to ‘top locations’ in rural areas, 
suggesting the existence of localized patterns of rural development, with some 
villages catching up and others lagging behind. The Palanpur study suggests that 
inequality within villages has been rising. It is not obvious which of these 
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phenomena will predominate when we aggregate up to the national level. It is 
thus well worth tracking the evolution of inequality at the finest spatial level 
possible.
The analysis by Mukhopadhyay and Garcés Urzainqui (2018) defines spatial 
units at the lowest Indian administrative level: blocks (sub-districts) in urban 
areas and villages in rural areas. They estimate a regression model of district-
level real consumption expenditure per capita on a host of district-level char-
acteristics for which information is available, as well as for lower levels of 
aggregation, such as physical geography, demography, structure of employment, 
and night-time luminosity. The analysis is based on consumption expenditure 
data from NSS surveys for 2004/5 and 2011/12 and thus enables temporal 
comparisons. Their prediction model is used to impute per capita consump-
tion expenditure for all rural villages and urban blocks of India. After success-
fully validating the predictions of the model against NSS data at levels where 
such comparisons are feasible, Mukhopadhyay and Garcés Urzainqui (2018) 
compute inequality measures for the country, as well as for its states, based on 
imputed consumption at the village and urban block level. This is tantamount 
to asking how much inequality would exist in India as a whole, and in each state, 
if one were to assume that there was no inequality within villages or within 
urban blocks such that overall inequality arose only because of differences in 
average consumption between villages and blocks. This allows Mukhopadhyay 
and Garcés Urzainqui to then deduct this calculation of spatial inequality from 
their direct measure of total inequality, to arrive at an estimate of the percent-
age of state or national total inequality that can be attributed to within-village 
(or within-block) inequality.
Table 7.4 presents total inequality of India (rural and urban separately), and its 
decomposition into within- and between-spatial units. In rural India, 75 per cent 
of overall inequality is accounted for by within-village inequality. Although 
income inequality has increased slightly in rural areas, the within-village propor-
tion has stayed roughly constant over time. The absence of a rise in inequality 
between villages contrasts with the observation of rapidly rising inequality 
between districts. It seems that while districts may be diverging from one another, 
the villages within the districts have not seen a similar divergence. In urban areas, 
the within-block component accounts for an even larger share—88 per cent—of 
total inequality. This share has also been stable but has been accompanied a sig-
nificant increase in overall inequality. Again, in urban India there is clear evi-
dence of divergence across districts, but little divergence across blocks within 
them. What clearly emerges from these calculations is that national-level in equal-
ity can be viewed as a kind of aggregation of local-level inequalities. Understanding 
inequality trends at the national level requires understanding of what is occurring 
at the local level.
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Section 2, and also Table 7.4, suggest that all-India consumption inequality did 
not increase markedly between 2004/5 and 2011/12. One might conclude that, 
the importance of local inequality as a share of total inequality notwithstanding, 
this period was not associated with significant movements in the inequality 
domain. This conclusion can be questioned once the analysis by Mukhopadhyay 
and Garcés Urzainqui (2018) is taken to the state level. The analysis unveils con-
siderable heterogeneity in the evolution of inequality at the local level. Thus, the 
relative stillness in overall inequality hides a diverse landscape of changing 
in equal ities. In particular, states show very different trends, with between-locality 
and within-locality inequalities often moving in different directions. By way of 
example, Kerala and Bihar show rising within-locality inequality but falling 
between-locality inequality. Overall inequality in Bihar remained stable (and low, 
with a Theil index of 0.08 in 2004/5 and 2011/12) but the share deriving from 
within-locality inequality increased from just over half to nearly three-quarters. 
In Kerala overall inequality increased (the Theil index rising from 0.258 to 0.310), 
with the share attributed to local inequality rising from an already very high 95 
per cent to as much as 97 per cent. This heterogeneity becomes even more evident 
where separate within and between indices are calculated for rural and urban strata.
Having pointed to the heterogeneity of results at the state level, Mukhopadhyay 
and Garcés Urzainqui (2018) move to the district level and explore how changes 
in inequality relate to baseline average consumption and its growth. Their find-
ings suggest that higher growth is strongly associated with increases in overall 
Table 7.4 Decomposing inequality in India
 2004 2011
All India (NSS) 0.188 (100 per cent) 0.210 (100 per cent)
Imputation-based inequality 
(between spatial units)
0.050 (27 per cent) 0.055 (26 per cent)
Residual: within spatial unit 0.138 (73 per cent) 0.155 (74 per cent)
 Rural India (NSS) 0.140 (100 per cent) 0.143 (100 per cent)
Rural inequality based on 
village-level imputation 
(between)
0.035 (25 per cent) 0.037 (25 per cent)
Residual: within village 0.105 (75 per cent) 0.106 (75 per cent)
Urban India (NSS) 0.234 (100 per cent) 0.264 (100 per cent)
Urban inequality based on 
urban blocks (between)
0.028 (12 per cent) 0.033 (13 per cent)
Residual: within urban block 0.206 (88 per cent) 0.231 (87 per cent)
Source: Mukhopadhyay and Garcés Urzainqui (2018). Reproduced here with permission 
of UNU-WIDER.
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inequality, and low growth with reductions in such inequality, both within and 
between spatial units. Mukhopadhyay and Garcés Urzainqui (2018) then move 
on to regress changes in total, within, and between inequalities at the district 
level, on changes in covariates over time. Their results show that increased urban-
ization is correlated with a fall in spatial inequalities between villages. However, it 
has a positive correlation with the rise of overall inequality in rural areas, and 
with rising local as well as spatial inequalities in urban regions. Similarly, employ-
ment—particularly regular employment—is correlated with a fall in inequality 
between spatial units (especially in the rural sector) but is associated with 
increased within-inequality. Increases in literacy rates are unambiguously associ-
ated with slower inequality growth: improvements in literacy are correlated with 
slower growth in total inequality and, especially, within-inequality, both in rural 
areas and overall. The expansion of access to banking services is robustly associ-
ated with slower growth in inequality. In rural areas and for the district as whole, 
the associated decrease takes place through spatial inequality, while it is local 
in equal ities that are most affected in urban areas. Similarly, access to sanitation 
(arguably a strong proxy for pro-poor intervention) is associated with more slug-
gish growth in spatial inequalities. In general, the correlation exercise reveals that 
structural factors are often associated with countervailing developments in spatial 
and local inequalities. They may lower the one while simultaneously increasing 
the other. These opposing forces often lead to a false impression that there is no 
dynamism in inequality in India.
5 Poverty, Vulnerability, and Mobility in India
Beyond studying levels and trends in inequality there is interest also to investigate 
the underlying processes that characterize changes in inequality. Notably, the pat-
terns of relative income mobility that underpin changes in inequality are rarely 
documented in nationally representative studies, let alone well understood. Yet, 
mobility patterns interact closely with inequality levels. As noted by Krugman 
(1992), ‘if income mobility were very high, the degree of inequality in any given 
year would be unimportant, because the distribution of lifetime income would be 
very even’.
Assessing the degree of income mobility requires analysis of panel data, as only 
such data permit the tracking of households over time. Collecting panel data, 
however, can be very costly and can also pose logistical and capacity-related chal-
lenges. Such datasets are accordingly rare. Dang and Lanjouw (2018a) overcome 
this data challenge in India by employing recently developed statistical techniques 
that allow them to construct synthetic panels from repeated cross-sections of the 
NSS surveys (Dang and Lanjouw  2013,  2018b,  2018c; Dang et al.  2014). The 
methods are predicated on strong assumptions which are often difficult to check. 
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In their study of India, Dang and Lanjouw (2018a) validate the synthetic panel 
approach with the IHDS data—the one nationally representative panel dataset 
that has been collected in India in recent years. Finding that the method appears 
to work well, they then appeal to the common timing of the IHDS data with the 
NSS data for 2004/5 and 2011/12, and the representative sampling design of both 
data sources, to suggest that the method is also likely to work well for mobility 
comparisons based on the NSS rounds.
5.1 Mobility Levels and Trends
Dang and Lanjouw (2018a) explore the idea of dividing the Indian population into 
three groups, comprising the poor, the ‘vulnerable’, and the secure. They specify a 
vulnerability line—analogous to a poverty line, but set at a consumption level 
above which one can be safely assumed to be secure from falling back into pov-
erty. The vulnerable are thus those with a consumption level above the poverty 
line, but below this vulnerability line. Dang and Lanjouw (2018a) consider two 
approaches to setting the vulnerability line. The first arbitrarily sets a vul ner abil ity 
line equal to twice the national poverty line. The second estimates a vul ner abil ity 
line associated with an average risk of falling into poverty for the ‘vulnerable’ of 
at least 20 per cent. These two approaches yield similar vul ner abil ity lines. Dang 
and Lanjouw (2018a) then move on to estimate transitions in and out of the three 
categories of poor, vulnerable, and secure, based on synthetic panels that are con-
structed using five ‘thick’ (large-sample) rounds of the NSS for 1987/8, 1993/4, 
2004/5, 2009/10, and 2011/12.
Dang and Lanjouw (2018a) estimate that between the 1987/8 and 1993/4 survey 
years, about 30 per cent of the population experienced some consumption mobil-
ity. Of those that moved, only a very small percentage of the population was asso-
ciated with jumps of more than one cell. For example, only 0.2 per cent of the 
population was secure in 1993/4 having been poor in 1987/8, and only 0.3 per 
cent of the population was poor in 1993/4 having been secure in 1987/8. In terms 
of conditional mobility (i.e. the estimate of mobility conditional on initial pos-
ition), about 75 per cent of the poor in 1987/8 remained poor in 1993/4, and 64 
per cent of the vulnerable remained vulnerable over this period. Interestingly, 
nearly half (45 per cent) of the secure transitioned downward into the vulnerable 
group between 1987/8 and 1993/4.
In the years following 1993/4, poverty decline started to accelerate and welfare 
transitions also increased. Of course, the interval in this case is somewhat longer 
than was considered in the previous period, and one might expect more mobility 
over longer periods. However, the rising average consumption levels occurring 
over this period would suggest, a priori, an increased likelihood of the population 
crossing the fixed standard of living captured by an absolute poverty line (and its 
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associated vulnerability lines). So, the rise in mobility captured in this way is 
likely real. In terms of conditional mobility, just under two-thirds of the poor in 
1993/4 remained poor in 2004/5 (compared with three-quarters in the preceding 
interval), and between 51 and 61 per cent of the vulnerable (depending on choice 
of vulnerability line) remained vulnerable (down from 64 per cent). Downward 
mobility among the secure also declined, from about 45 per cent in the 
1987/8–1993/4 interval to less than a third in 1993/4–2004/5.
Mobility rose further in the 2004/5–2011/12 interval to around 45 per cent of 
the population. Interestingly, however, although conditional mobility by the 
poor into the category of the secure did increase in comparison with the earlier 
intervals, it remained a rather rare event: regardless of the choice of vulnerabil-
ity line, less than 10 per cent of the poor were able to make this transition across 
Table 7.5 Welfare transition dynamics based on synthetic panel data, India 
1987/88–2011/12 (%)
Panel A: Vulnerability line 
equals twice poverty line
2011
Poor Vulnerable Secure Total
1987 Poor 18.4 23.0 4.9 46.4
 (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1)
Vulnerable 6.0 22.4 13.7 42.1
 (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Secure 0.3 3.5 7.7 11.5
 (0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1)
Total 24.7 48.9 26.3 100
 (0.1) (0.0) (0.1)  
Panel B: Vulnerability line  
corresponding to V-index = 0.2
2011
Poor Vulnerable Secure Total
1987 Poor 18.4 19.7 8.2 46.4
 (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1)
Vulnerable 5.6 15.3 15.2 36.1
 (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Secure 0.7 4.2 12.6 17.6
 (0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1)
Total 24.7 39.2 36.1 100
 (0.1) (0.0) (0.1)  
Notes: The vulnerability index is defined as twice the poverty line (i.e. 893.4 rupees) in Panel 
A and that corresponding to a vulnerability index of 0.2 in 2004/05–2011/12 (i.e. 770 rupees) 
in Panel B. All numbers are in 2004 prices for all rural India. The all-rural-India poverty line 
is 446.68 rupees for 2004/05. All numbers are estimated with synthetic panel data and 
weighted with population weights, where the first survey round in each period is used as the 
base year. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses are estimated with 1,000 bootstraps 
adjusting for the complex survey design. Household head’s age range is restricted to between 
25 and 55 for the first survey and adjusted accordingly for the second survey in each period. 
Estimation sample sizes are 95,391 and 55,757 for the first and second period, respectively.
Source: Dang and Lanjouw (2018a). Reproduced here with permission of UNU-WIDER.
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two welfare classes between 2004/5 and 2010/11. The picture of poverty decline 
emerging from this assessment is that, although the poor did see improvements 
in living standards during the 2000s, they generally continued to face a height-
ened risk of falling back into poverty.
Table  7.5 considers consumption mobility over the longer interval of 
1987/8–2011/12, in an effort to enquire into longer-term welfare transitions. 
A  striking observation is that, although poverty declined markedly over this 
entire period, a very significant percentage did not experience mobility out of 
poverty. About 40 per cent of the poor in 1993/4 were still poor in 2011/12 (Panels 
A and B).
Thus, while mobility has risen in India, with growing numbers of the poor 
transitioning upward into the category of the vulnerable (and even some graduat-
ing to secure status), those who were poor in 2011/12 largely comprised the long-
term, or chronically, poor. This picture accords with a narrative of poverty decline 
accompanying accelerating economic growth in India, but with the poor increas-
ingly comprising the structural, long-term poor, who have been non-participants 
in the growth process. It is important to note that, although intuitive, this picture 
is far from inevitable: one could also have imagined a growth process involving a 
great deal of ‘churning’ in which households escape and fall back into their 
respective consumption classes, and the poor in any one year largely consist of 
previously vulnerable and secure households. A potential concern emerging from 
the patterns we observe is that poverty reduction will become increasingly diffi-
cult to achieve through a general growth process that fails to address the struc-
tural factors that prevent the chronically poor from escaping poverty.
6 Inequality of Opportunity and Economic Growth
In a recent global study, Narayan et al. (2018) identify India as a country with 
some of the lowest rates of inter-generational mobility in the world. Prompted by 
this finding, van der Weide and Vigh (2018) provide an in-depth study of inter-
generational mobility for India. They build a database at the state-region level for 
India that tracks socioeconomic mobility and human capital accumulation at the 
subnational (NSS region) level over the past thirty years. The database is built 
using various rounds of the NSS (1983, 1987, 1993, 1999, 2004, and 2011). It 
includes a large range of variables, including household expenditure growth for 
the low, middle, and upper-income classes; inequality in household expenditure 
per capita; demographics; employment variables; domestic infrastructure con-
nectivity; financial inclusion; and selected political variables (i.e. voter turnout 
and political competition). In their analysis, van der Weide and Vigh (2018) focus 
on a measure of ‘upward mobility’ captured by the expected rank of a child (in the 
child education distribution) whose parents are in the bottom 50 per cent of the 
parental education rank distribution.
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6.1 Inter-Generational Mobility in Education
Van der Weide and Vigh (2018) show that there is a positive correlation between 
the father’s and son’s education levels. Their results suggest that gains in human 
capital accumulation at all education levels of fathers were highest in the late 
1980s and 2000s and that increases in average educational attainment are driven 
primarily by increases among the sons of less educated fathers. Importantly, they 
find that while persistence declined at the lower end of the father’s educational 
distribution, it increased at the top end, as high school graduation is becoming 
more common in India.
Van der Weide and Vigh (2018) also capture a different aspect of inter- 
generational education persistence, using the share of education inequality that is 
explained by the father’s education level. They find that the relative importance of 
parental education in education inequality has not changed much in recent 
decades. It has remained at around 10 per cent despite the declining overall 
in equal ity in education. Based on their indicators of mobility, the overall 
assessment of van der Weide and Vigh (2018) is that there is little evidence that 
inter-generational socioeconomic mobility in India has improved over time.
6.2 Impacts of Inter-Generational Mobility  
on Consumption Growth
Van der Weide and Vigh (2018) examine next the impacts of inter-generational 
mobility on per capita consumption growth. In particular, using state-regions as 
the unit of analysis, they attempt to identify the causal effect of inter-generational 
mobility on growth of household expenditure per capita at different percentiles of 
the consumption distribution. They run a regression of the change in log per 
capita household expenditure on a measure of relative inter-generational mobil-
ity, controlling for a number of other variables such as the first lag of log per capita 
household expenditure, other time-varying state-region characteristics, zone 
fixed effects, and year fixed effects. In an effort to mitigate the possibility of endo-
geneity bias, van der Weide and Vigh (2018) implement an IV estimation model 
where the instrument for inter-generational mobility consists of the local share of 
the Brahmin caste in 1931 and the local share of Scheduled Tribes in 1961, both 
interacted with national trends in inter-generational mobility. Specifically, they 
regress inter-generational mobility on the local shares of Brahman and Scheduled 
Tribes interacted with the six time-period dummy variables to allow for non-linear 
time trends, and use the predicted values from this regression as their instrument.
The regression coefficients corresponding to inter-generational mobility are 
plotted in Figure  7.2. Several observations from this stand out. First, inter- 
generational mobility is found to have a positive effect on growth for all percentiles, 
although the effects are not statistically significant. Second, the effect is visibly 
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larger (and almost significant) at lower percentiles. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that higher inter-generational mobility is good for growth, particu-
larly for inclusive growth, as those held back by an uneven playing field tend to be 
concentrated towards the bottom of the income distribution. This finding also 
predicts a negative relationship between inter-generational mobility and inequality: 
higher mobility is associated with inclusive growth, which in turn is associated 
with lower inequality.
Van der Weide and Vigh (2018) further hypothesize that human capital accu-
mulation denotes an important channel via which inter-generational mobility 
impacts on growth and on the degree of ‘inclusivity’ of growth. To explore the 
plausibility of this conjecture, they consider changes in years of schooling for 
individuals with different parental education backgrounds as dependent variable. 
These estimates confirm that mobility has a positive and significant effect on 
human capital accumulation of individuals with less than highly educated par-
ents, while the effect is insignificant for individuals with highly educated parents 
(for whom it matters less whether the playing field is level or not). This result is 
robust to the choice of controls.
7 Conclusion
Following the economic reforms of the early 1990s, India entered the twenty-








10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95%
Figure 7.2 Impacts of upward mobility on consumption growth (at different 
percentiles: IV regression 1 (90% confidence bound)
Note: Reproduced here with permission of UNU-WIDER.
Source: Van der Weide and Vigh (2018).
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reduction also accelerated and was justly celebrated. There is great concern, 
 however, that this growth was being accompanied by rising inequality. This chap-
ter has sought to inform the debate on inequality in India by offering a bird’s-eye 
view of inequality trends and dynamics at the all-India level over three decades 
up to 2011/12 and contrasting this with a ‘granular’ picture at the level of the 
Indian village or urban block. The chapter further unpacks inequality dynamics 
by attempting not just to report ‘snapshots’ of inequality at different periods, but 
also to trace the movement of people within the income distribution over time. 
This analysis of income mobility is motivated by the sense that normative views 
about changes in inequality are likely to vary according to whether a rise in 
 inequality is, for example, characterized by a simple stretching-out of the income 
distribution—leaving individuals in the same relative position but just further 
apart in absolute income—or is also associated with shifts in relative position 
within the income distribution. Again, the assessment of mobility is informed 
both by evidence at the very local level and by aggregate, national-level trends. 
Close attention is paid to the circumstances and fortunes of population groups 
defined in terms of characteristics that should not, ideally, be associated with dif-
fering outcomes. The study attempts to encapsulate these horizontal inequalities 
into a measure of inequality of opportunity as captured by inter-generational 
mobility in education outcomes.
Our evidence points to rising inequality between 1983/4 and 2011/12, but to 
differing degrees depending on the dimension being considered and the meas-
urement method employed. This national trend is consistent with observations in 
the north Indian village of Palanpur over a period of six decades. It is also consist-
ent with the pattern of structural transformation that has been under way in India 
in recent decades. We show further that local-level inequality (within-village in 
rural areas; within-block in urban) accounts for the bulk of overall inequality in 
India. Understanding what occurs at the local level is thus important for under-
standing inequality at the all-India level.
The Palanpur study further provides a window on patterns of income mobility, 
both within and across generations, and suggests that there is evidence that year-
to-year changes in relative position are increasing. Our estimates at the national 
level based on synthetic panel data constructed at the household level confirm ris-
ing intra-generational income mobility over time. This is consistent with the idea 
that inequality of lifetime income may be lower than what is observed in a given 
year. However, the evidence also suggests that while poverty has fallen, most of the 
poor who have escaped poverty continue to face a high risk of falling back into 
poverty. Moreover, those who remain poor are increasingly chronically poor, and 
may be particularly difficult to reach via the introduction or expansion of safety nets.
While intra-generational mobility may be improving, the evidence on 
 inter-generational mobility is less promising. In Palanpur, there is little evidence 
to suggest that mobility across generations has improved: father’s income remains 
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an important, possibly even strengthening, predictor of his son’s income. These 
findings are consistent with our all-India findings of a negative relationship between 
inter-generational mobility and inequality: higher mobility is associated with 
inclusive growth, which in turn is associated with lower inequality. Furthermore, 
inter-generational mobility is found to have a positive effect on growth for all per-
centiles, and specifically stronger effects at lower percentiles. Mobility also has a 
positive and significant effect on human capital accumulation of individuals with 
less than highly educated parents. Although the analysis points to clear welfare 
improvements that could be expected to derive from greater inter-generational 
mobility, both our national-level and our granular-level analysis uncovered little 
conclusive evidence of improving inter-generational mobility in India over time. 
The suggestion is that growth has been less inclusive than might have been hoped, 
and this has been reflected in rising inequality. Looking forward, these findings 
point to tremendous challenges as the overall growth environment deteriorates in 
the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic.
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1 Introduction
Mexico is an upper middle- income country with a Gini coefficient hovering 
around 0.5, which places it in the group of high- inequality countries.1 Since the 
mid- 1980s, Mexico has opened up to international trade and, with the rise of 
computers and digitalization, has experienced changes in production technology. 
In addition, its labour force has become considerably more educated: the 
proportion of individuals with primary levels of education or lower declined from 
67 per cent in 1990 to 33 per cent in 2015 and the share of individuals with a 
college education more than doubled between 1990 and 2015, when it reached 
around 15 per cent. The past thirty years have also been marked by a significant 
increase in social spending and a retooling of social programmes. All these 
changes have affected the demand and supply of labour and the extent to which 
the state has engaged in fiscal redistribution. What has been the evolution of 
income inequality during this momentous period? To what extent have market 
forces and fiscal policy contributed to the observed trends?
After discussing the evolution of income inequality and its components, in 
this chapter we focus on two main drivers of overall inequality: labour markets 
and fiscal redistribution. In particular, we apply state- of- the- art decomposition 
techniques to analyse the proximate determinants of labour income inequality, 
and we apply fiscal incidence analysis to estimate the first- order effects of changes 
in social spending and taxation on the distribution of income and poverty. This 
paper can be viewed as a sequel to Esquivel et al. (2010) and Campos- Vazquez 
et al. (2014). The former studied the dynamics of income inequality in Mexico up 
until 2006 and the latter until 2010.
Using results from Mexico’s National Survey on Households’ Income and 
Expenditures (ENIGH, by its Spanish acronym), Section 2 presents the evolution 
1 The authors wish to thank Alma S. Santillan for her excellent research assistance. Any errors and 
omissions are the authors’ responsibility.
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in overall income inequality from the late 1980s until 2014.2 The evolution of 
income inequality during this period can be summarized as follows: between 1989 
and 1994, inequality increased; between 1994 and 2006, inequality declined; and 
between 2006 and 2014, inequality was again on the rise. Section 2 also identifies 
the influence of the main income components (labour income, capital income and 
pensions, transfers, and remittances) on the evolution of inequality. As will be seen 
in what follows, the key component that underlies the ‘rise–decline–rise again’ pat-
tern was the evolution of labour income inequality. Thus, Section 3 focuses on the 
role of demand, supply, and institutional factors in accounting for the evolution of 
labour income inequality. Lastly, the decomposition exercise in Section  2 also 
shows that transfers were not only an equalizing force, but were increasingly so. 
Hence, Section  4 analyses the evolution of fiscal redistribution with a focus on 
transfers and other relevant characteristics of the fiscal system. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Level and Evolution of Income Inequality  
and Poverty: 1989–2014
2.1 Inequality: Trends and Proximate Determinants
As shown in Figure  8.1, income inequality increased between the late 1980s 
and mid- 1990s and then declined until about 2006. Since then, there appears to 
have been an upward trend. More precisely, the Gini coefficient for per capita 
 disposable monetary income3 rose from 0.534 to 0.555 between 1989 and 1994 
and declined to 0.506 in 2006. It then rose to 0.531 in 2014. It is worth noting that 
during the 1989–2014 period, average incomes sometimes rose and sometimes 
fell, depending on the overall growth performance of the economy. Average 
incomes fell sharply in 1995 as a result of Mexico’s financial crisis. However, 
from 1996, average incomes recovered at the same time as inequality fell. This 
auspicious situation came to a halt after 2008, when Mexico suffered the conse-
quences of the Great Recession. Between 2008 and 2014, average incomes fell, 
and inequality experienced an upward trend.
2.2 Top Incomes: Survey- Based and Administrative Data
Our microdata- based analysis in this chapter uses the National Survey on 
Households Income and Expenditures (ENIGH). However, household surveys 
2 Household surveys and their respective documentation are available in INEGI (1989, 1992, 1994, 
1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014). Household surveys for 2016 and 2018 exist, 
but unfortunately, due to drastic methodological changes undertaken by the National Statistical Institute 
(or INEGI, by its Spanish acronym), the results would not be comparable with previous surveys.
3 See Campos-Vazquez et al. (2014) for income definitions. ‘Income’ here includes labour income 
and non-labour income.
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suffer from serious under- reporting and under- coverage, especially for incomes 
at the top that can yield biased inequality indicators. People at the top may be 
difficult to reach due to statistical and sampling issues; if rich people are a small 
group, then the likelihood of them being captured by the survey is also small. 
Moreover, even if captured in the sampling process, rich people may be more 
reluctant than the average individual to answer the full questionnaire, and this 
may be particularly the case for questions about income.
One common approach for addressing these limitations is to correct the 
information in household surveys using administrative data and generate a new 
distribution and concomitant indicators.5 Alvaredo et al. (2017) combined data 
from ENIGH with the universe of personal income taxpayers, obtained from the 
Mexican Tax Administration Service (roughly 2–2.5 million taxpayers per year), 
and the universe of employer- reported information on wages for formal workers. 
The latter contains information on gross, taxable, and net labour income for 
about 20–25 million workers per year.
Using different correction methods, Alvaredo et al.’s (2017) results indicate that 
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Figure 8.1 Gini coefficient, 1989–2014
Note: Total disposable income, disposable monetary income4 and labour income are in per capita 
terms and include all members of the household regardless of age. Hourly wage is restricted to 
individuals aged 18–65 years. Labour income refers to the income obtained from main job and 
includes own business’ income for the self- employed. Households where head reported zero income 
were excluded.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the National Survey of Household Incomes and Expenditures 
(INEGI 1989, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014).
4 The difference between disposable income and disposable monetary income is that the latter does 
not include imputed rent for owner-occupied housing or consumption of own production. The Gini 
coefficient for disposable income is lower by 2 to 3 Gini points. In the section on fiscal redistribution 
we use disposable income, and that is why the Ginis are lower than those presented here.
5 See Lustig (2018a) for a survey of the issues and correction methods proposed in the literature.
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2010, the survey- based income share of the top 10 per cent equalled 47.6 per cent. 
In contrast, with corrections the share is approximately 60 per cent. This is an 
active area for further research.
2.3 Poverty
Although the task of this chapter does not include the analysis of poverty, the 
persistence of extreme poverty throughout the period analysed is remarkable. 
The incidence of extreme poverty in 2014 (20.6 per cent) was similar to the level 
observed in 1994 (21.2 per cent), and only slightly lower than in 1984 (23.5 per 
cent). The persistence of extreme income poverty is all the more remarkable given 
the expansion of programmes targeted at the poor, a topic that will be discussed 
in the section on fiscal redistribution.
3 The Evolution and Determinants of Labour Income Inequality
As observed in Figure 8.1,6 inequality of labour income per capita, labour income 
per worker, and the hourly wage increased from the late 1980s up to the mid- 
1990s and then declined up to the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. Since then and up to 2014, the data suggest a slight upward trend. 
Understanding the main drivers of labour income inequality is key to the 
understanding of the determinants of overall income inequality.
3.1 Labour Income Inequality: Characteristics and Returns
Labour income inequality is affected by two main factors: the distribution of 
(observable and unobservable) characteristics of workers (education, experience, 
gender, etc) and the returns to those characteristics. Workers’ characteristics, in 
turn, are affected by circumstances (gender, race, talent, and so on), households’ 
decisions (e.g. to enrol or not in post- secondary education, who marries whom, 
and so on), and policy (e.g. expanding access to education). Returns to households’ 
characteristics depend on market forces (i.e. demand and supply of workers of 
different skills and experience) and institutional/policy factors (e.g. minimum 
wage policy and the unionization rate).
In order to separate the contribution of characteristics and returns, research on 
the proximate determinants of labour income inequality relies on decomposition 
techniques. Many decomposition procedures are employed in the literature. Most 
6 Based on Campos-Vazquez and Lustig (2017).
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are variations on the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition.7 In this chapter, we follow 
the same approach. We employ the ‘re- centred influence function’ (RIF) procedure 
proposed by Firpo et al. (2009) to decompose effects into characteristics and 
returns effects (as in the typical Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition).8
As discussed in Campos- Vazquez and Lustig (2017), we start our analysis by 
calculating the difference in average labour income for each quantile between the 
initial and end years for every quantile in segments of 1 per cent (that is, from the 
1st to the 99th percentile). Then we estimate the RIF regression for each quantile 
and the initial and end years. Once the parameters  are estimated, we proceed 
to  apply the basic Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition for each quantile (1st–99th 
percentile). That is, we calculate υβ  where t is the final year and s is the initial 
year. Note that the ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),v v vt s s t s t t sv Y v Y X X Xβ β β− = − + −  are for the entire 
sample, as in the traditional Oaxaca–Blinder. In our application, we set up the 
initial years as 1989, 1994, and 2006 and the final years as 1994, 2006, and 2014, 
respectively. The term − )ˆ (vs t sX Xβ  refers to the characteristics effects, and the 
term −( )ˆ ˆv vt t sX β β  refers to the return or price effects to observable characteristics 
included in X as well as unobservable ones (which is why this term is often 
referred to as the ‘unexplained component’). We use as reference the wage 
distribution in the initial year (for each decomposition).
Research shows that in Mexico changes in labour income inequality can be 
largely linked to changes in the relative wage between skilled and unskilled 
workers, that is, in the returns to skill. In particular, the rise in inequality during 
this period is associated with an increase in returns to schooling.9 Applying the 
RIF method proposed by Firpo et al. (2009) and the Oaxaca–Blinder de com pos-
ition method, Campos- Vazquez et al. (2014) show that the increase in earnings 
inequality between 1989 and 1994 is primarily driven by a rise in the returns to 
characteristics (schooling and experience), as shown by the upward sloping curve 
in Figure 8.2, Panel a. The distribution of characteristics remains almost flat. In 
other words, had relative returns remained at the 1989 level, inequality would not 
have increased.
From the mid- 1990s up to the mid- 2000s, labour income inequality steadily 
declined (Figure 8.1).10 Applying the RIF method, Campos- Vazquez et al. (2014) 
7 We can divide the decomposition into four groups: (i) reweighting procedures (DiNardo et al. 
1996); (ii) residual-imputation procedures (Almeida dos Reis and Paes de Barros  1991; Juhn et al. 
1993) (iii) quantile decomposition procedures (Machado and Mata 2005); and (iv) RIF procedures 
(Firpo et al. 2009).
8 See more details in Campos-Vazquez and Lustig (2017).
9 This result was found in many other studies, including Bouillon et al. (1999), Meza González 
(1999), Bouillon (2000a, 2000b), Legovini et al. (2005), Lopez-Acevedo (2004, 2006), Popli (2011), and 
Campos-Vazquez et al. (2014).
10 It is not only the Gini coefficient and other summary indicators for hourly wages and labour 
income that decline; firm data, for instance, show a decline in the relative wage of white- over blue-
collar workers (Esquivel 2011).
































0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95100
Quantile
Total differential Effects of Characteristics
Effects of Returns
Total differential Effects of Characteristics
Effects of Returns
Total differential Effects of Characteristics
Effects of Returns
















0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95100
Quantile
Figure 8.2 Decomposition of differences in the distribution of earnings: 1989–2014
Notes: Calculations using ENIGH. RIF decomposition method proposed by Firpo et al. (2009), which 
decomposes the change in the monthly wage in characteristics and returns. Smoothed lines with a 
simple moving average with weights 0.4 for the current observation and 0.3 for the lead and lag. Total 
differential is the total change in hourly wages (in logs); effects of characteristics (education and 
experience) and effects of returns are the portions that can be ascribed to changes in characteristics 
and returns, respectively.
Source: Panels a and b: based on Campos- Vazquez et al. (2014: Figure 7.4). Panel c: based on 
Campos- Vazquez and Lustig (2017).
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show that the decline in earnings inequality between 1994 and 2006 is primarily 
driven by a fall in the returns to characteristics (schooling and experience), as 
shown by the downward curve in Figure 8.2 Panel b. The effect of changes in the 
distribution of characteristics (education, experience, female, and urban) was, 
in contrast, unequalizing, as shown by the upward curve for the effect of charac-
teristics. If returns had remained unchanged in this period, the change in 
 characteristics in the population would have resulted in higher levels of inequality. 
The effect of returns to those characteristics contributed to equalizing the labour 
income distribution by such an amount that they compensated for the inequality-
increasing effects induced by characteristics. The puzzle is why changes in charac-
teristics were unequalizing during a period in which, for example, there was 
substantial educational upgrading and the distribution of years of schooling 
became more equal. This seemingly contradictory result was first noted by 
Bourguignon et al. (2005), who called it the ‘paradox of progress’. These authors 
show that this puzzling result is the mathematical consequence of the convexity 
in (i.e. increasing) returns to skill (this result has been found in other Latin 
American countries: Gasparini et al. 2011).
From 2006 to 2014, labour income inequality shows an upward trend. Figure 8.2 
Panel c shows that the characteristics effect is no longer unequalizing but is flat. 
The returns effect is somewhat unequalizing because it is negative, especially for 
the lower centiles. Note that all wages fall but the decline is a bit more pronounced 
for the bottom of the distribution. Thus, the increase in labour income inequality 
during this period appears to be driven by a worsening situation for those at the 
bottom of the distribution rather than an improvement for those at the top, whose 
incomes also appear to fall slightly more than the group in the middle.
3.2 Relative Wages: Demand, Supply, and Institutions
In the previous section we showed that an important determinant of the evolution of 
labour income inequality is the evolution of relative returns to characteristics, that is, 
the relative wages for workers of different skills (with skills measured by years of 
education and experience). Relative wages, in turn, are affected by market forces—
demand and supply of workers of different skills—and by institutional factors such 
as the minimum wage and unionization rate. In order to examine the effect of supply 
and demand on relative wages, we follow the Bound and Johnson (1992) method.
Assuming a simple CES (constant elasticity of substitution) production func-
tion with elasticity of substitution, σ, constant across skills, it is possible to deter-
mine the effect of supply and demand on relative wages:11
11 See formula 3 on page 377 and formula A8 on page 390 of Bound and Johnson (1992).
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The residual term ζ  contains the effect of skill- biased technical change and 
 institutional factors such as the minimum wage and unionization rate (sometimes 
called non- competitive factors).
Changes in demand could come from changes in trade patterns or develop-
ments in technology, for example. However, they are unobserved. Data show only 
labour supply (by years of education and experience) but not real labour demand. 
Researchers then traditionally use the difference between the change in relative 
wages or returns and relative supply as an approximation to changes in demand 
and institutional factors, such as changes in the unionization rate and the value of 
the real minimum wage as well as technical change (where institutional factors 
and technical change are captured by the residual). If institutional factors remain 
unchanged during the period of analysis, the difference can be considered an 
approximation of changes in relative demand and technical change.
What was the evolution of labour supply during the period of analysis? As 
























































Figure 8.3 Relative returns and relative supply of workers by education, college, and 
high school vs rest
Notes: Sample restricted to individuals or workers aged 20–64 years. Base year is 2000. The figure 
calculates the relative return and relative supply of the group mentioned in the subtitle. The relative 
return line is calculated as the log of the ratio in the average labour income of college and high school 
workers over the rest of workers adjusting the weights using administrative data and the relative 
supply is calculated as the log of the ratio of individuals with a college and high school degree over 
the rest).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENIGH (INEGI 1989, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2004, 
2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014).
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education vis- à- vis the rest increased throughout, but the rate was higher between 
1998 and 2006, when labour income inequality declined. As for institutional fac-
tors, both the unionization rate and the real minimum wage declined during the 
period of rising labour income inequality (1989–94) and remained roughly flat 
until 2014, the period in which labour income inequality first declined 
(1996–2006), and then again began to rise from 2006. In other words, if demand 
and technological change had been constant throughout the entire period, one 
would have expected labour income inequality to fall from 1996 onwards because 
of the increase in the supply of skilled workers and its effect on relative wages.
We now turn to the estimates from applying the Bound and Johnson (1992) 
decomposition. The results in Table 8.1 can be interpreted as follows. If we take, 
for example, the period of rising labour income inequality of 1989–94, we see that 
relative wages for skilled workers rose by 24.4 per cent. If the change in relative 
demand and institutional factors had been zero instead of positive, the relative 
wages of skilled workers would have fallen by 5.5 per cent. In contrast, if the 
 supply of skilled workers had not increased, relative wages would have risen by 
30  per cent. Given that the real minimum wage and the unionization rate fell 
 during this period, one cannot ascribe the rise in the skill premium entirely to 
demand factors. Both demand and institutional factors likely played a role.
As discussed in Campos- Vazquez and Lustig (2017), the fact that demand for 
skilled workers increased during the 1989–94 period is considered a rather sur-
prising effect. Given Mexico’s abundance in low- skilled workers, a key question is 
why demand for higher- educated individuals increased at a time when theory 
would have predicted the opposite. Mexico experienced a large opening of its 
economy in 1986 when it joined the precursor to the World Trade Organization, 
Table 8.1 Bound and Johnson decomposition: 1989–94; 1994–2006; 2006–14 
(assuming an elasticity of substitution σ = 2 and comparing college and high 
school-educated workers with rest of workers)12
 Change Log Labour 
Income
Change in Supply 
Effect
Change in Demand 
Effecta
1989–94 0.244 −0.055 0.300
1994–2006 −0.216 −0.336 0.119
2006–14 −0.046 −0.141 0.096
Notes: Labour income for workers aged 20–65 years.
a This effect includes not only demand but also institutional factors and technological change.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENIGH (INEGI 1989, 1994, 2006, 2014).
12 Results for σ = 1 and for college educated versus the rest are qualitatively similar and are available 
upon request.
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the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (or GATT). Due to the relative 
abundance of less skilled labour, the Stolper–Samuelson theorem would have pre-
dicted that liberalization would lead to a decrease in the relative wage of high- 
skilled workers and, therefore, a fall in inequality. However, as noted by Cragg 
and Epelbaum (1996) and Esquivel and Rodríguez- Lopez (2003), the opposite 
occurred. What drove this seemingly contradictory outcome? There are several 
persuasive explanations that offer an answer to the puzzle.
First, there is evidence that the most protected industries during the previous 
period were low skill- intensive sectors (e.g. textiles) and, thus, trade liberalization 
reduced the relative price of these industries and, as a consequence, the relative 
wage of the low- skilled (Hanson and Harrison 1999; Feliciano 2001; Robertson 
2004, 2007). Second, there is evidence that during this period there was skill- biased 
technical change and a change in the composition of output that gave skill- 
intensive industries a higher share (Airola and Juhn 2005; Cragg and Epelbaum 
1996; Esquivel and Rodriguez- Lopez 2003). Third, changes in the pattern of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) favoured skill- intensive firms. With trade liberalization, 
FDI also increased primarily through the expansion of maquiladoras. These 
establishments import most of their inputs and assemble the product to export 
(mainly to the USA). Using industry and state- level data from 1975 to 1988, 
Feenstra and Hanson (1997) track the impact of FDI on employment and wages. 
They find that the outsourcing of US multinationals caused an increase in the 
number of establishments in Mexico that favoured skill- intensive industries 
(Hanson 2003; Kurokawa 2011).
In other words, there is no real contradiction with the standard Stolper–Samuelson 
theorem: trade opening benefited skill- intensive industries relatively more because, 
contrary to expectations, low- skill industries had been relatively more protected 
before. This change, combined with skill- biased technical change and the change 
in the composition of output towards more skill- intensive sectors, favoured wages 
of skilled workers and increased labour income inequality.13
In addition to the positive impact on skilled workers’ wages stemming from 
trade liberalization and skill- biased technical change, the evolution of the 
minimum wage and unionization rate might have played a role. From 1988 to 
1996 the real minimum wage lost close to 50 per cent of its value and the 
unionization rate declined by roughly 40 per cent. If the sharp decline in 
minimum wages and the unionization rate are correlated with workers’ bargaining 
power, they could affect the distribution of labour income because of their 
downward pressure on the wages of the low- skilled. In the case of unionization, 
13 In addition to the impact of trade liberalization and its implications on the demand for skills, 
there may be an adverse effect on their supply: e.g. more job opportunities available in the ma quila-
doras could cause a higher high-school dropout rate. For instance, Atkin (2016) finds that for every 
twenty-five jobs created, one student dropped out of school at grade 9 (final year of middle school).
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there is evidence that its decline before NAFTA affected the wage structure. Using 
ENIGH, Fairris (2003) and Fair ris and Levine (2004) conclude that the fall in the 
unionization rate from 1984 to 1996 explains 11 per cent of the increase in wage 
inequality. In terms of minimum wages, Bosch and Manacorda (2010) analyse the 
effect of the minimum wage on the wage structure and wage inequality dur ing 
the 1989–94 period and in later years. They find that all of the increase in in equal-
ity in the bottom part of the distribution is caused by the fall in the real minimum 
wage. This is mainly due to the fact that the minimum wage affects other wages 
close to the minimum wage (lighthouse effect). In particular, Kaplan and Perez- Arce 
Novaro (2006) argue that although the minimum wage binding process has 
declined over time (at least until 1996), it affects other wages in the distribution (a 
similar result is provided by Fairris et al.  2008). Cortez (2001) analyses both 
aspects (unionization and minimum wages) and concludes that the increase in 
wage inequality can be fully explained by the decline in institutional forces.
During the 1994–2006 period, when labour income inequality (and overall 
inequality) declined, relative wages for the skilled fell by 21.6 per cent. Since 
the real minimum wage and the unionization rate were flat, this result must be 
the  outcome of the relative strength of supply versus demand forces. As can 
be  observed, and in contrast with the 1989–94 period, the dampening effect 
on  the skill premium stemming from the increase in relative supply strongly 
dominates the increase in demand for skilled workers.
Although the RIF method does not disaggregate the returns into their various 
components, the result shown in Figure 8.2 (Panel b) is consistent with the fall in 
the relative returns to education shown in Figure 8.3, where it can be seen that the 
relative supply of college- educated (skilled) workers rose substantially during this 
period while the relative returns declined. This means that: (i) supply of skilled labour 
during this period outpaced demand; (ii) institutional factors moved in favour of 
the unskilled; or (iii) both.14 The real minimum wage and the unionization rate 
remained largely constant during this period. Thus, changes in institutional 
determinants cannot drive the decrease in wage inequality.15 As Campos- Vazquez 
et al. (2014) suggest, the change in the skill premium during this period is the 
result of a combination of a rising supply of workers with college education and a 
slow- down in demand for skilled workers. So, what drove the slow- down in 
demand growth for skilled workers?
Robertson (2004,  2007) argues that although trade benefited more skill- 
intensive industries in the 1980s and early 1990s, with NAFTA this process was 
reversed. After NAFTA, the relative price of tradable goods continued to decline 
over time. This potentially explains the decline in the skill premium given that 
NAFTA favoured skill- intensive industries. Thus, this process drives, in part, the 
14 The gross enrolment rate almost doubled in the 1994–2004 period (Campos-Vazquez 2013).
15 There is evidence that the minimum wage is currently not binding and has not been binding 
since the mid-1990s. For a detailed and recent explanation of the role of minimum wages in Mexico 
see Escobar Toledo (2014).
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decline in wage inequality. Other explanations that have been proposed for 
the decline in inequality include international migration, labour market distortions, 
and technical change that may have hurt older skilled workers. Migration increased 
during this period, probably due to the large negative effects of the 1995 crisis. 
Mishra (2007) shows that the increase of migration to the USA by low- skilled work-
ers caused a decrease in their relative supply (holding everything else constant), 
which in a traditional supply- and- demand model would increase their wages.
Other research has shown that misallocation across firms induced by labour 
market distortions may have contributed to the decline in labour income 
inequality. Levy and Lopez- Calva (2016) argue that these distortions limit the 
growth of the high- productivity sectors, which are also more skill- intensive. As a 
result, there is a ‘surplus’ of workers with post- secondary education, who end up 
having to work in low- productivity firms, where their wages are lower. The 
misallocation of workers with high levels of education into low- productivity firms 
may be one of the drivers of the fall in absolute wages for college- educated work-
ers and the stagnation of wages at the bottom.16 Campos- Vazquez et al. (2016) 
explore the reasons behind the decline in absolute wages for college- educated 
workers. They observe that older cohorts are worse affected than younger cohorts 
and argue that the displacement of older educated workers may have been a result 
not only of technological change making skilled workers redundant but also of 
younger workers, who can be paid lower wages, being more adept in the use of 
the new technologies. Hence, it seems that the changes in the composition of out-
put induced by NAFTA, the misallocation of skilled labour because of labour 
market distortions, and the characteristics of technological change were behind 
the slow- down in demand growth for skilled workers.
During the last period analysed here, when inequality was again on the rise 
(2006–14), the picture is less clear. As was shown above, during this period all 
labour income fell, but it fell more for the bottom of the distribution and for those 
at the very top. The latter is probably due to a continuation—albeit weaker—of 
the supply- and demand- side dampening forces on the skill premium observed in 
the previous period. The higher decline of incomes at the bottom is probably due 
to a decline in the demand for low- skilled workers as a consequence of how 
Mexico’s growth was hit by the Great Recession in the United States. Further 
research is needed to understand the labour market dynamics that prevailed 
 during this recessionary period.
4 Fiscal Redistribution: 1996–2015
Based on results in Scott et al. (2017), here we analyse the redistributive 
and  poverty- reducing effects of the fiscal system—that is, taxes (personal and 
16 Halliday et al. (2016) obtain similar results using firm heterogeneity.
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indirect), transfers (in cash and in kind), and (mainly) consumption subsidies—
for the period 1996–2014 (and a simulation of policy changes for 2015),17 though 
the tax side is only included for the 2008–14 period.
The period of analysis is of particular interest as it covers a number of signifi-
cant changes in social and fiscal policy. First, after contracting during the ‘lost 
decade’ of the 1980s, social and other redistributive spending, such as energy 
consumer subsidies and agricultural subsidies, almost tripled from 1988 to 2012 
(they have since declined from this historical maximum—by 17 per cent by 2018). 
Second, cash transfers became significantly more pro- poor, benefiting the rural 
poor in particular. The crown jewel of social policy reforms was the launch of the 
flagship conditional cash transfer programme PROGRESA in 1997 (which has 
changed its name and scope several times since).18 PROGRESA involved a re allo-
ca tion of costly generalized food subsidies from urban (particularly metro pol-
itan) areas with low impact on extreme poverty and malnutrition, to cash 
transfers targeted at the extreme poor in rural areas.19 In addition, some agricul-
tural transfers were delinked from prices and output levels and, thus, they were 
able to reach poor, non- commercial farmers; also, a self- targeted temporary 
workfare programme was introduced to address seasonal and disaster- related 
unemployment. In addition, the coverage of basic education increased signifi-
cantly both through supply- side measures and the demand- side increase in 
attendance that resulted from the conditions attached to the PROGRESA cash 
transfers.
Finally, in the 2000s, an important effort was made to increase social protec-
tion for the uninsured by increasing financing and access to health services and 
 medicines for this population through a non- contributory health insurance 
 programme, the Seguro Popular (People’s Insurance), and through a basic, non-
contributory, universal pension, the Programa de Adultos Mayores (Programme 
for Senior Citizens). Both of these programmes expanded their coverage gradually 
and are aiming to achieve universal coverage of uninsured households and senior 
citizens, respectively.20
Despite these pro- poor reforms in social transfers, a much larger share of 
growth in social spending has been absorbed by transfers to the contributory 
pension systems in this period. A small share of these transfers represents statu-
tory government contributions or minimum pension guarantees but most are 
devoted to payments of current pensions, fully financed by the government, in 
the transition towards defined contribution systems, as well as from unfunded 
17 In addition to the ori gin al research, Scott et al. (2017) draw on Komives et al. (2009), Scott (2002, 
2004, 2005, 2009a, 2009b, 2014), and Scott and Hernandez (2018).
18 For an overview of the extensive PROGRESA evaluation literature, see Parker and Todd (2017).
19 For a detailed description of the programmes, see Scott et al. (2017).
20 For an overview of the evolution of multi-dimensional poverty and Mexico’s social programmes, 
see CONEVAL (2017a, 2017b), respectively.
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benefits of systems yet to be reformed (such as the one associated with the state-
owned oil company PEMEX). Of note is the fact that, in the context of austerity 
measures, between 2015 and 2017 total spending by the Ministry of Social 
Development (mainly the two flagship cash transfers) declined by 10 per cent 
while transfers to fill the financial gap of the contributory pensions system rose by 
18 per cent.
It is important to note that the expansion of social spending (including the 
transfers to contributory pensions) was not financed through new taxes (as 
repeated attempted fiscal reforms failed to pass), but through a reallocation of the 
functional distribution of public spending, from economic to social development, 
in the 1990s—in terms of share of central government spending, social spending 
doubled from 30 to 60 per cent—and through rising but short- lived oil revenues 
associated with the oil boom in the 2000s. The reallocation of public spending 
from the economic function was mostly achieved through a significant reduction 
in public investment and privatization of public enterprises of lesser importance.
In order to estimate the redistributive and poverty- reducing effects, Scott et al. 
(2017) rely on standard fiscal incidence analysis.21 As stated in Lustig and Higgins 
(2018: 15):
Fiscal incidence analysis consists of allocating taxes (personal income tax and 
consumption taxes, in particular) and public spending (social spending and con-
sumption subsidies, in particular) to households or individuals so that one can 
compare incomes before taxes and transfers with incomes after taxes and transfers.
That is, starting from pre- fiscal income—which here we call market income plus 
(contributory) pensions22—taxes and transfers are sequentially subtracted and 
added to construct three additional key income concepts: disposable income 
(subtracts direct personal income taxes and adds cash transfers to market income 
plus pensions), consumable income (subtracts indirect taxes and adds subsidies 
to disposable income), and final income (adds government spending on education 
and health to consumable income) (Figure 8.4).
21 For a detailed description of the methodology, data, and caveats, see Scott et al. (2017).
22 As discussed in Lustig and Higgins (2018: 16), ‘social insurance contributory pensions are partly 
deferred income and therefore should have a portion of them added to Market Income (and contribu-
tions subtracted from factor income); and partly government transfer and therefore a portion of them 
should be included with the rest of government transfers (and contributions treated as any other 
direct tax). However, since at this point there is no conventional method to determine which portion 
should be allocated to Market Income and which to government transfers when the only information 
available is a cross-section household survey’, one should calculate the impact of the net fiscal system 
under the two extreme scenarios: (1) contributory pensions are pure deferred income (also known as 
replacement income) and (2) contributory pensions are a pure government transfer. Here we present 
results for the first scenario. Results with contributory pensions as pure transfers should be requested 
from John Scott, lead author of Scott et al. (2017). Note that non-contributory pensions are always 
treated as a pure government transfer.
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4.1 Revenues and Spending: Size and Composition
As discussed in Lustig (2018b), the redistributive and poverty- reducing effects of 
the fiscal system depend on the size and progressivity of the various components 
that integrate the fiscal system. In terms of revenue collection, Mexico’s fiscal 
capacity has been historically limited. In contrast to many middle- and high-
income countries, where tax revenues expanded significantly over the century, 
(non- oil) tax revenues in Mexico have remained stagnant at around 10 per cent of 
GDP (mostly below this) over the past forty years (1974–2014).
Social spending expanded over the past two decades, reaching around 10 per 
cent of GDP by 2015 excluding contributory pensions, and 13 per cent including 
Contributory Pensions as Deferred Income
PREFISCAL INCOME (i.e., income used to rank households before
state action through taxes and transfers) =
Market Income plus Pensions =
Factor Income (wages and salaries and income from capital) PLUS
private
transfers (remittances, private pensions, etc.)
PLUS imputed rent and own production
BEFORE taxes, social security contributions, government transfers
AND
PLUS contributory social insurance old-age pensions
MINUS contributions to social insurances old-age pensions
TAXESTRANSFERS
Direct cash and near cash transfers:
conditional and unconditional cash
transfers, school feeding programmes,
free food transfers, etc.
Indirect subsidies: energy, food and
other general or targeted price
subsidies
Monetized value of in-kind transfers
in education and health services at
average government cost
Co-payments, user fees
Indirect taxes: VAT, excise taxes,






– Personal income taxes AND
contributions to social security




Figure 8.4 Fiscal incidence analysis, core income concepts
Source: Lustig and Higgins (2018), reproduced under CC BY- NC- ND 4.0.
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pensions (Figure  8.5). Total redistributive spending (including agricultural and 
energy subsidies) reached 15 per cent of GDP in 2012. Since 2015, social spending 
has declined to 8.3 per cent of GDP, excluding pensions (2017 and 2018 federal 
budgets), and redistributive spending to 12.6 per cent. Mexico’s size of social 
spending in relation to GDP is below the average for a group of thirty low- and 
middle- income countries (Lustig 2018b).
4.2 Redistributive Effects of the Fiscal System:  
Inequality and Poverty
Figure 8.6 shows the effects of fiscal policy on the Gini coefficient for the period 
1996–2014. From 1996 to 2006, the analysis includes the spending side only. 
From 2008 to 2014, the effects of taxes (personal and indirect) have been in corp-
or ated. The results for 2015 are produced by simulating the switch from subsidiz-
ing to taxing gasoline consumption implemented in this year on the 2014 fiscal 
incidence exercise. In the figure, we show the change in the Gini coefficient from 
market income plus pensions to the income concepts described in Figure 8.4. For 
the period 1996–2008, one can observe a notable increase in the equalizing effect 
of direct cash transfers up to 2000 followed by a reduction of this effect (shown 
by the line that traces the change from market income plus pensions to gross 
income). In contrast, the equalizing effect of education and health spending 




























































Social spending (incl. pensions)
Social spending
Figure 8.5 Government transfers (% of GDP), 1988–2018
Source: Based on Scott et al. (2017).
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For the 2008–14 period, in which the analysis comprehends both the tax and 
the spending sides, the total redistributive effect is modest and declines after 
2010: with respect to market income plus pensions, inequality in disposable 
income fell by 2.3 percentage points in 2010 and 2 percentage points in 2014, 
while consumable income inequality fell by 3 percentage points in 2010 and 1.9 
percentage points in 2014 (1.6 in the 2015 simulation). Adding in- kind transfers 
such as education and health valued at average cost to the government has a larger 
redistributive effect. The latter was estimated at 6.9 percentage points in 2008 and 
declined thereafter, but it is still considerably higher than it was in 1996, as shown 
by the solid line for final income with respect to net market income.
The marginal contribution of direct transfers (measured by the change in gross 
income Gini with respect to market income plus pensions) is equalizing; it rose 
during the 1996–2000 period and remained unchanged for the rest of the period. 
In contrast to previous years, by 2014 the marginal contribution of net indirect 
subsidies is unequalizing: that is, the fiscally induced decline in inequality would 
have been higher if there were no net indirect taxes.
How does Mexico compare with other low- and middle- income countries? 
Lustig (2018b) shows results for a set of thirty countries from around 2010 from 




















































Final income with respect to net market income (right scale)
Final income (right scale)
Figure 8.6 Fiscal policy and inequality, 1996–2015
Note: *The 2015 estimate considers the effect of the increase in net indirect taxes in that year, using the 
2014 survey and assuming the rest of the fiscal system remains the same as in 2014. The redistributive 
effect for final income appears on the right- hand scale. The definition of income concepts is shown in 
Figure 8.4. Gross income equals market income plus pensions plus direct transfers. ‘ppt’ means 
percentage points.
Source: Based on Scott et al. (2017).
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the top third of countries and, for the scenario with contributory pensions 
as  deferred income, its redistributive effect is slightly above the average (blue 
 horizontal line); it is about average for the scenario that assumes contributory 
pensions are a pure government transfer (red horizontal line).
It is important to stress that the effects of a fiscal system on inequality and pov-
erty are distinct. As shown in Lustig (2018b), while fiscal systems are equalizing 
for a group of thirty low- and middle- income countries, they are poverty-increasing 
in a number of them because what the poor pay in taxes exceeds what they receive 
in transfers. In Mexico, the fiscal system has been both equalizing and poverty-
reducing. However, as shown in Figure 8.7, the effect on poverty has been falling 
over time and, if the simulated results for 2015 are an accurate description of the 
effects of switching from subsidizing to taxing gasoline consumption, the fiscal 
system may have switched to a poverty- increasing one (consumable income 
poverty surpasses market income poverty).
The effect of direct transfers on extreme poverty increased from a reduction of 
less than 0.5 percentage points in 1996 to more than 2 percentage points in 2012 
and 2014 (using the US$2.5 international poverty line). This represents some 2.4 
million persons out of poverty as an effect of direct transfers. Once we add net 
indirect taxes (consumable income), however, this gain is significantly reduced, 
except in 2008, when gasoline subsidies reached an all- time high and net sub sid-
ies actually reduced poverty with respect to disposable income (Figure  8.7). 
By  2014, when gasoline subsidies had been almost completely eliminated, net 
indirect taxes erased the poverty effect of direct transfers and increased extreme 
























Market income + pensions Disposable income Consumable income
Figure 8.7 Fiscal policy and poverty, 2008–15
Note: Poverty measured by the incidence (headcount ratio). *The 2015 estimate considers the effect of 
the increase in net indirect taxes in that year using the 2014 survey and assuming the rest of the fiscal 
system is constant as in 2014.
Source: Authors’ illustration based on Scott et al. (2017).
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gave way to a large gasoline tax, the impoverishing effect of net indirect taxes 
increased by 2.5 percentage points, with some three million persons added to the 
extremely poor category.
5 Main Conclusions and Policy Implications
With a Gini coefficient hovering around 0.5, Mexico belongs to the group of 
countries in the world with high levels of income inequality. When data is corrected 
for under- coverage and under- reporting of top incomes using tax registries, 
concentration at the top becomes even more pronounced.
The evolution of income inequality during the 1989–2014 period can be sum-
marized as follows: between 1989 and 1994, inequality increased; between 1994 
and 2006, inequality declined; and between 2006 and 2014, inequality seemed to 
be on the rise again. The key component that underlies the ‘rise–decline–rise 
again’ pattern is the evolution of labour income inequality. Labour income 
in equal ity seems to be influenced in particular by the evolution of the skill pre-
mium. During the period 1989–94, driven by both market forces (demand for 
skills) and institutional factors (real minimum wage and unionization rate fell), 
the skill premium rose. During the period of declining labour income inequality 
(1994–2006), the skill premium declined. The latter was not driven by institu-
tional factors because the real minimum wage and unionization rate remained 
flat. The increase in supply of workers with at least high school degrees, over and 
above the increase in their demand, appears to have driven the decline in returns 
to higher skills. Lastly, during the 2006–14 period, as we saw, inequality appeared 
to be on the rise again.
Given the patterns observed in the dynamics of labour income inequality, two 
key policy implications emerge. First, continuing the expansion of access to 
higher levels of education is key, as long as it is of reasonable quality. Second, 
minimum wages should be gradually increased towards the levels they were at 
before they started to decline in the 1980s. Given the large size of Mexico’s infor-
mal labour market, however, care must be taken that the minimum wage increases 
do not exacerbate it. There are a whole set of reforms that should be undertaken 
in social policy to address informality, as discussed by Levy (2018).
Direct cash transfers are largely targeted at the poor. However, in spite of the 
expansion of targeted programmes since the second half of the 1990s, their 
effect remains limited because of their small scale (relative to the fiscal system 
and to market household income). As a result, while the combination of taxes, 
transfers, and spending on education and health has a significant redistribu-
tive effect on final income inequality, it has a relatively more modest one on 
disposable or consumable income inequality (which only captures the effect of 
direct cash transfers and direct and indirect taxes, not spending on education 
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and health). Moreover, the redistributive effect has declined significantly 
since  2010, as transfers have become less progressive and net indirect taxes 
have increased.
The modest redistributive impact of Mexico’s fiscal system is not due to a par-
ticularly high indirect tax burden (even after the recent increase, Mexico lags 
behind most countries), nor to limited revenues, but to a minimal allocation of 
these resources to cash transfers benefiting the poor. Even at their peak (2014), 
these transfers represented just 0.8 per cent of GDP, transferring 0.35 per cent of 
GDP to the poorest quintile (which roughly corresponds to the extreme poor). 
However, the expansion of net indirect taxes after 2012 has in effect cancelled out 
the increase in benefits to the poor associated with the expansion of direct 
transfers over the previous decade (2002–12).
What would be an optimal redistributive fiscal reform for Mexico in this 
context? An obvious reform would be to increase cash transfers through the 
flagship conditional cash transfer programme (PROSPERA), until recently the 
most effectively targeted transfer instrument available in Mexico, with significant 
coverage. Given the coverage that this programme had achieved (six million 
households, or a fifth of the population), and the possible economic disincentives 
that a significant expansion in the level of transfers per beneficiary might entail, a 
major expansion, which preserves its current targeting and effectiveness, may be 
difficult to implement. Recent efforts to introduce new components into the 
programme to increase the productive capacities of its beneficiaries have been 
frustrated by the institutional and operational difficulties of implementing such a 
complex component on a large scale.
Perhaps the time has come to consider more universal transfers. Based on Scott 
(2017), Scott et al. (2017) simulate the redistributive potential of the  simplest, 
cheapest (in terms of targeting, administrative, and participation costs), and least 
distortionary transfer possible: a universal, non- targeted,  non- conditional transfer. 
This may be interpreted as a universal basic income designed to eliminate extreme 
poverty or as a universal, non- contributory, social protection system designed to 
achieve full coverage and eliminate the gaps in social protection associated with 
informality. The authors find that in spite of the absence of targeting, if all the 
resources devoted to non- progressive transfers could be reallocated to the universal 
basic income scheme, this reform would be highly progressive in the context of 
Mexico’s high market income inequality.
An alternative and bolder policy scenario would be to increase the size of 
the universal basic income to equal the average poverty gap in 2014 (instead of 
keeping it equal to the total current budget allocated to transfers divided by the 
population). According to Scott et al. (2017), the fiscal cost of this basic income 
would be 2.87 per cent of GDP. Although this would represent a significant 
commitment in the context of Mexico’s limited tax revenues, it is still below 
both the recent increase in net indirect taxes and the current tax- financed 
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transfers to the contributory pension systems. To make this change budget neutral, 
the authors consider two scenarios: relying on the use of oil revenues or increasing 
direct taxes. Under either, extreme poverty measured with consumable income 
would be reduced by an estimated 2 percentage points, taking approximately two 
million additional people out of extreme poverty. The incidence of direct personal 
income taxes for the top 10 per cent would have to rise from roughly 8 per cent to 
13 per cent, an order of magnitude which seems reasonable given the enormous 
concentration of income and wealth at the top and the relatively low burden of 
direct personal and wealth taxes for the richest group within the top.
A more realistic and potentially effective alternative would be to combine the 
best of both worlds by targeting the poorest and most vulnerable as population 
groups—poor localities, indigenous population, senior citizens, infants, the dis-
abled, unemployed youth—but offering transfers universally within these groups.
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1 Introduction
South Africa is widely recognized as one of the most unequal countries in the 
world.1 This has been the case since the advent of the post-apartheid era. 
Throughout, inequality has been seen as a clear indicator of a society with a long 
history of explicitly privileging a small minority of its population and explicitly 
disadvantaging the vast majority in every aspect of its socioeconomic development.
The contemporary inequality literature is unambiguous about the fact that 
such extremely high levels of inequality are detrimental to a country’s development 
path and stifle a country’s potential. Although much of this literature is recent, in 
1994 there was an intuitive sense of the social and economic sub-optimalities of 
the embedded spatial inequalities and many inequalities of op por tun ity that 
 history bequeathed to South Africa’s new democracy. It is hardly surprising, then, 
that clear evidence of substantial progress in transitioning to a more equal society 
has served as the key metric of progress on building a new, inclusive South Africa. 
Given this, the post-apartheid period has seen substantial policy attention being 
devoted to addressing this situation and a substantial lit era ture has developed to 
measure and track progress on inequality reduction.2
In the context of a South African economy that was mostly in a slow but steady 
growth phase from the mid-1990s until the late 2000s, a number of proactive policies 
1 The authors are especially grateful to UNU-WIDER for the support, and participants at a special 
session on the Inequality in the Giants project at the UNU-WIDER Development Conference Think 
Development—Think WIDER held in Helsinki, Finland, September 2018, for their helpful comments 
and insights. Murray Leibbrandt acknowledges support from the Research Chairs Initiative of the 
South African National Research Foundation, and from the South African Department of Science and 
Technology, which funds his Chair in Poverty and Inequality Research.
2 See Leibbrandt et al. (2016) for a detailed summary of the research work, and Inchauste et al. 
(2015) for a detailed review of fiscal policy.
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were put in place. As reviewed by Leibbrandt et al. (2010), cash grants were rolled 
out for millions of pensioners and children; housing, water, and electrification 
 policies saw rapid improvements in access to these assets; and education policies 
led to levels of educational attainment increasing markedly among younger cohorts.
These policies are important prongs in any anti-inequality programme. Yet 
despite this, there was little or no progress in reducing income inequality. The 
evolution of the labour market is key to understanding this lack of success. 
During the growth phase, the number of net new jobs also increased significantly, 
but labour force participation rates increased faster than the rate at which new 
jobs were created. Thus the unemployment rate increased from 14 per cent in 
1993 to 23 per cent in 2008 using the narrow definition.3 At the same time, the 
skills composition of labour demand changed in such a way that unskilled work-
ers saw a net decline in jobs. While unskilled workers were more likely to become 
unemployed, the returns to a tertiary qualification increased, which resulted in an 
even wider earnings distribution among those who were employed.
These dynamics had a direct bearing on rising inequality and led to a situation 
in which extensive policy efforts did not translate into equivalent results. Levy 
et al. (2014: 26) point out that ‘relative to other middle-income countries, South 
Africa has an unusually small fraction of the population that gains directly from 
sustained economic growth’.
Table 9.1 shows that annual growth has slowed significantly since the global 
financial crisis in 2007–8. The decline in the growth rate limits the freedom for 
further possible expansion of progressive social spending. Coupled with the pre-
viously high levels of fiscal debt and a large fiscal deficit, these macro indicators 
suggest, at most, limited room for further expansion of existing fiscal policies to 
effect greater redistribution. In order to significantly reduce poverty, unemploy-
ment, and inequality, the National Development Plan (National Planning 
Commission n.d.) planned for an average annual growth rate of 5.4 per cent until 
2030. It is clear from Table 9.1 that recent growth rates have fallen short of this.
3 This statistic masks the full extent of the unemployment problem, as discouraged workers are 
excluded from the official unemployment rate. Including discouraged workers in the definition of 
unemployment raises the 2008 statistic to about 32 per cent.
Table 9.1 Real annual growth rates in South Africa since 1990
Year Growth rate (%) Year Growth rate (%)
1995–9 2.59 2011 3.28
2000–4 3.61 2012 2.21
2005–7 5.41 2013 2.49
2008–10 1.56 2014 1.85
Source: Based on data in Hundenborn et al. (2018b: Table 1).
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Thus, rather than making progress, the past decade has been a time of economic 
hardship for many South Africans. The unemployment rate increased to nearly 
28 per cent in 2018, up from 22 per cent in 2007. Unemployment has affected 
young people disproportionately: just over half of all young people are unemployed. 
This is a much more unfavourable environment in which to have to ramp up a 
strategy to overcome inequality. Indeed, this most recent decade has seen no 
additional substantial interventions and even some loss of focus and progress on 
the matrix of policies that were put in place in the 1990s.
This is the socioeconomic context within which the studies were produced for 
the South African case study within the Giants project.4 We have sought to make 
two major contributions through our studies for this project. First, we contribute 
to the descriptive literature on contemporary South African inequality by using 
new data in best-practice ways. Second, in our analysis we try to move from 
description to understanding the drivers of income and earnings inequality. This 
is more analytically challenging, but it is these drivers that are the key bridge into 
policy.5 This chapter synthesizes findings from these studies on South African 
income inequality as well as other recent relevant literature on South Africa.
We start by profiling changes in household income inequality over the post-
apartheid period. Static and dynamic decomposition methods show there have 
been a number of changes to labour demand and supply, but that these labour 
market dynamics continue to dominate and drive South Africa’s income in equal ity. 
This would have had an even more pernicious effect had it not been for the 
equalizing effects of the roll-out of our social grants, although the impact of these 
grants has plateaued over the last decade.
By merging tax data with income and earnings data from household surveys 
we are able to add analysis of the upper tail of the income distribution. Analysis of 
this augmented income distribution makes it clear that, since the 2008 recession, 
people at the top end of the income distribution have experienced much higher 
growth rates in both real labour-market earnings and real household incomes 
compared with those in the middle or bottom of the income distribution. This 
implies a worsening of South African inequality prior to taxes and transfers. We 
add further detail on the drivers of this market income distribution by modelling 
changes in earnings inequality. The key drivers of a widening earnings distribu-
tion are seen to be increasing returns to experience combined with an increased 
rate of return to tertiary qualifications.
Moving to policy, the redistributive impact of the contemporary fiscal system 
is described through a fiscal incidence study that updates earlier studies of a 
4 There are four core studies: Hundenborn et al. (2018a, 2018b); Maboshe and Woolard (2018); 
Finn and Leibbrandt (2018).
5 Many of these exercises are similar to those undertaken in other country studies, thus allowing 
for comparability of within-country inequality dynamics. See the project’s page on the UNU-WIDER 
website: www.wider.unu.edu/project/inequality-giants.
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similar nature and then probes new areas. This work confirms that the substantial 
system of social grants is well targeted and highly progressive. On the tax side, 
direct personal income taxes are seen to be highly progressive. However, our 
research shows that the allowance of certain tax benefits (exemptions) for health 
insurance and pension fund contributions is regressive in terms of their impact 
on inequality.
The aggregate conclusion from this systematic stock-take confirms that South 
Africa has not made progress over the past decade in the fight against inequality. 
We probe this further, drawing on research that uses nationally representative 
panel data to explore social mobility over this period.
In concluding, we reflect on further research and potential policy options that 
may undergird more successful strategies to overcome South Africa’s inequality.
2 The Drivers of Post-Apartheid Income Inequality
As a useful framing of how inequality has changed over the post-apartheid 
period, Hundenborn et al. (2018a) use nationally representative household sur-
veys from 1993, 2008, and 2014 to describe levels of inequality and analyse 
changes in inequality. The 2008 and 2014 situations are derived from National 
Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) data, and 1993 is described using data from the 
Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development, collected at the dawn 
of the democracy. Both datasets collect detailed information on different income 
sources for both households and individuals.
Table  9.2 draws on these datasets to show that households potentially have 
multiple sources of income. In South Africa the predominant sources of house-
hold income are labour market income, government grants, remittances, and 
investment income. Of these, the single largest component (on average) by far is 
labour market income, followed by government grants. Comparable data for 
income from subsistence agriculture and rental of property are not available and 
these sources are omitted from this comparison and all analysis in this chapter.6
Labour market income is earned as salaries or from self-employment of house-
hold members. It accounts for the largest proportion of household income, and 
the proportion of households who earn some income in the labour market has 
increased since 1993, from 60.5 per cent of income to 73 per cent. Measured in 
2014 real rands per capita, average labour market income in households has 
increased over this interval from R1,078 to R1,972.
6 From periods in which we have decent data for these income sources, it seems that neither con-
tribute substantial sources of household income. That said, it is important to note that, by rental 
income, we mean income from properties that have been let out for cash. The effects of imputed rental 
income—i.e. the implicit income derived from living in one’s own property—may well be substantial. 
This income source is also excluded as its measurement cannot be made comparable over time.
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Government grants include the child support and old-age grant most notably, 
but also include a sickness and disability grant, a veterans’ grant, and a social 
relief of distress grant. The proportion of households receiving grants has 
increased from 23.5 per cent in 1993 to 68 per cent in 2014, suggesting a sub-
stantial increase in access to grants since the end of apartheid. Moreover, grant 
income has increased as a proportion of total income, from 3.4 per cent in 1993 
to 16.4 per cent in 2014. Investment income is a source of income for an 
increasing proportion of households over the period, up from 3.5 per cent of 
households in 1993 to 23 per cent of households in 2014. Although the average 
income from this source has increased since 1993, it has declined as a share of 
overall income. This implies that the returns to other sources of income have 
grown more rapidly.
Overall, remittances account for a very small share of household income. 
Nonetheless, the share of household income accounted for by remittances 
increased from 4.6 per cent to 6.1 per cent by 2014.
Table 9.2 Income components in per capita terms (real 2014 prices, rand)
Variable 1993 2008 2014
Total household (HH) income    
 Mean of HH income 1,328.17 2,062.68 2,398.57
 Gini of HH income 0.68 0.69 0.66
Labour income    
 Mean of labour income 1,078.18 1,659.86 1,971.98
 Share in total HH income (%) 83.6 74.5 73.0
 Proportion of HHs receiving labour income (%) 60.5 64.4 72.6
 Gini of labour income 0.73 0.76 0.73
Income from government grants    
 Mean of government grants 86.17 161.31 187.34
 Share in total HH income (%) 3.4 15.6 16.4
 Proportion of HHs receiving government grants (%) 23.5 56.3 68.0
 Gini of government grants 0.92 0.78 0.76
Income from remittances    
 Mean of remittance income 50.56 86.69 93.94
 Share in total HH income (%) 4.6 3.6 6.1
 Proportion of HHs receiving remittances (%) 22.2 13.9 38.3
 Gini of remittances 0.91 0.97 0.91
Investment income    
 Mean of investment income 113.28 154.81 145.31
 Share in total HH income (%) 8.3% 6.3 4.5
 Proportion of HHs receiving investment income (%) 3.5 5.6 23.3
 Gini of investment income 0.99 0.97 0.98
N unweighted 39,180 28,225 37,965
N weighted 39,020,805 49,295,750 54,941,051
Source: Based on data in Hundenborn et al. (2018b: Table 1).
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Household income is also affected by changes in household composition. 
Table 9.3 profiles these changes. While the number of people of working age per 
household has decreased, the share of working-age people in households has 
increased. This implies that households have become smaller, and that working-
age persons account for a larger proportion within them. There has not been any 
significant change in the number of employed people per household, although 
the decrease in household size results in an increase in the share of those 
employed per household.
Coupled with the changes in income, where the average amount of all sources 
increased over the period, the changes in household composition result in even 
greater increases in mean household income per capita. On average, as shown in 
Table 9.2, mean household income per capita has grown from R1,328 to R2,399. 
Inequality decreased slightly between 1993 and 2014, although it remained remark-
ably high. Income inequality increased from 1993 to 2008, with cor re spond ing Gini 
coefficients of 0.68 and 0.69. The coefficient then dropped to 0.66 by 2014.
There is a long tradition in South Africa of using static income source decom-
position techniques to extend these income profiles to look at the drivers of 
in equal ity.7 This chapter replicates this static analysis for 1993, 2008, and 2014, 
and affirms the standard results of this literature. From the static decompositions, 
we estimate that between 1993 and 2014, labour market income is highly cor re-
lated with overall inequality and accounts for 84–90 per cent of the overall 
Gini coefficient.8 Labour market income was by far the most important deter-
minant of household income inequality. This replication work was not our 
 primary focus in this chapter. Rather, we applied some newly developed dynamic 
decomposition techniques that allow us to add an understanding of how the 
various changes in income sources explain the changes in inequality.9 These results 
7 See review in Leibbrandt et al. (2012).
8 This table is not included in this chapter. The estimates are from Hundenborn et al. (2018a: 
Table 3).
9 This methodology was obtained from Azevedo et al. (2013), and essentially involves piece-wise 
and cumulative micro-simulations of the effects of observed changes in the various sub-categories of 
income on the aggregate Gini coefficient.
Table 9.3 Household composition from 1993 to 2014
Variable 1993 2008 2014
Household size 4.38 3.53 3.21
Number of adults in HH 2.81 2.70 2.59
Number of employed in HH 1.08 0.96 1.02
Share of adults in HH 0.73 0.88 0.95
Share of employed in HH 0.37 0.38 0.46
Source: Based on data in Hundenborn et al. (2018b: Table 2).
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are reported in Table  9.4. Given that income per capita is being used as the 
measure of well-being, these dynamic techniques can separate out the effects 
of demographic changes—driving the denominator—from the income changes—
driving the numerator. While these demographic changes are not always 
highly  influential in and of themselves, separating them from the contribu-
tions of the income sources decreases the contributions of these income 
sources substantially.
We turn now to the findings from the dynamic decompositions. The de com-
posi tions from 1993 to 2008 and from 2008 to 2014 are presented in Table 9.4. 
In the 1993–2008 period there is a very small total change in the Gini, from 
0.68 to 0.69. In the 2008–14 period there is a sharper reduction in the Gini, 
from 0.69 to 0.655.
Despite the fact that the Gini barely changes in the first period, the dynamic 
decomposition shows that, on their own, labour market changes would have 
increased the Gini very strongly, by 6.6 per cent and even 7.3 per cent if allowance 
is made for the fact that improvements went to those higher up the distribution of 
labour incomes. After 2008, the disequalizing effect of labour-market income 
decreased. This does not mean that they became equalizing. Rather, the reduced 
impact of wages has a large role (almost half of one Gini point) to play in explaining 
the reduction in the Gini from 0.69 to 0.66.
Table 9.4 Dynamic decompositions including household composition and re-rankings, 
1993–2008
Variable 1993–2008 2008–14
  Gini change % change Gini change % change
Share of adults in HH 0.002 0.3 0.006 0.9
Share of employed in HH –0.025 –3.7 0.007 1.0
One over employed 0.02 2.9 –0.003 –0.4
One over adults 0.007 1.0 0.004 0.6
Labour income        
 Ranked by total HH income 0.045 6.6 –0.046 –6.7
 Ranked by labour income 0.05 7.3 –0.046 –6.7
Government grants        
 Ranked by total HH income –0.041 –6.0 –0.006 –0.9
 Ranked by government grants –0.044 –6.5 –0.008 –1.2
Remittances        
 Ranked by total HH income 0.005 0.7 –0.004 –0.6
 Ranked by remittances 0.003 0.4 –0.006 –0.9
Investment        
 Ranked by total HH income –0.016 –2.3 –0.011 –.6
 Ranked by investment –0.02 –2.9 –0.002 –0.3
Source: Based on data in Hundenborn et al. (2018b: Tables 6 and 7).
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Although government grants are a relatively small proportion of overall house-
hold income, they have played an important role in reducing inequality. Since 1993, 
the government has improved the targeting of grants and extended eligibility. 
These improvements in grant access were able to almost exactly offset the 
 inequality-increasing effects of labour market income that took place between 
1993 and 2008. This equalizing effect was even larger when allowance is made for 
the fact that the correlation of grant income with households in the bottom half 
of the income distribution improved between 1993 and 2008. From 2008 to 2014, 
grants continued to contribute to the overall decline in inequality, although their 
impact on further change was much smaller. Again, that this does not mean that 
grants are not a crucial equalizing income source. Rather, it means they did not 
become much more equalizing after 2008.
The effects on inequality of changes in remittance and investment income 
sources are found to be relatively small. Investment income contributed to 
in equal ity reductions and this effect was larger from 1993 to 2008 than it was 
from 2008 to 2014. Remittances are found to have the potential to reduce in equal-
ity because, in South Africa, they are an income source flowing to the bottom half 
of the distribution. But they have a small overall effect on changes in inequality. 
Between 1993 and 2008, remittance income actually increased inequality, while 
from 2008 to 2014 remittance income reduced inequality. This accords largely 
with the decrease in the share of households with remittance senders over the first 
period, and the reversal of this trend over the second. The average effect of the full 
period from 1993 to 2014 was negligible as the positive and negative effects can-
celled one another out. Household composition changes also affected overall 
in equal ity. The increase in the number of adults in a household increased in equal-
ity by a small amount over the full period, while changes in the proportion of 
employed adults in a household were inequality-reducing from 1993 to 2008 and 
inequality-increasing from 2008 to 2014.
Nonetheless, the overall changes in inequality are largely driven by changes in 
the different income sources rather than by the demographic changes. Government 
grants have been shown to have been very important in dampening the increasing 
inequality between 1993 and 2008 and have continued to play a role in reducing 
inequality over the past decade. This recent role has been smaller, corresponding 
to the massive roll-out of the child support grants in the 2000s and their later sta-
bilization. Both the strong inequality-reducing role of social grants and the plateau-
ing of these are strongly affirmed in the paper by Maboshe and Woolard (2018) 
which we discuss later. This suggests that in addressing the in toler ably high levels of 
inequality that remain after grants have been paid, the government will need to 
investigate policy alternatives beyond these existing cash transfers. As the most 
prominent contributor to the overall Gini coefficient, the labour market has to be a 
core focus of policies aiming to reduce inequality. We undertook detailed analysis 
of these labour market dynamics in this project and discuss this later in the chapter.
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Before we shift the focus to the labour market and the distribution of earnings, 
we augment the discussion of household income inequality by summarizing 
and discussing new work that addresses the top end of the household income 
distribution. This is an important gap to fill in the discussion of income sources 
and total household income derived as the aggregation of these sources. Our 
analysis of these income sources has been based on survey data. Any frailties or 
omissions in these data are effectively embedded in the income source de com-
pos itions. There has been increasing recognition in recent years that the income 
sources that are particularly important to those at the top end of the income 
distribution—investment income being a good example—are likely to be under-
stated by household survey data.
3 A New Focus on the Top End of the Income Distribution
Two recent studies, one produced for this project (Hundenborn et al. 2018b) and 
another produced alongside this project (Bassier and Woolard 2018), have added 
substantially to our understanding of two key dynamics: one is on the way the 
growth in top incomes have diverged from those of the rest of the population; the 
other is on the effects this particular growth path has had on inequality.
The effect of top incomes on income inequality is analysed in Hundenborn 
et al. (2018b), who use the same NIDS survey data that were used in earlier studies, 
as well as an important second source of data from the South African Revenue 
Services (SARS). This latter dataset comprises aggregate tax records as well as 
micro-files of anonymized individual records. The advantage of this second 
source is that the tax data are expected to measure top incomes more precisely 
(Alvaredo et al. 2017). Household surveys often miss or are forced to impute high 
earnings because many top earners either refuse to participate in the surveys, 
understate their incomes, or avoid the questions on income.
Figure 9.1 reflects the different details revealed by the NIDS and SARS data. 
In line with the international literature, we see that in 2014, for all individual 
incomes above R1 million per annum, NIDS underestimates incomes relative to 
the tax data by about 12 per cent for those over R5 million. Interestingly, it 
underestimates incomes consistently by about 30 per cent compared with the tax 
data from the 91st percentile of the income distribution upwards, though it 
appears to pick up a few large incomes at the top. South Africa has a relatively 
high mandatory filing threshold for personal income tax (PIT). Unsurprisingly, 
the figure shows that the PIT data do not reliably capture income below this 
threshold. The mandatory filing threshold in 2014 was R250,000 per year; in 
2011 it was R120,000 per year. This represents the very top percentiles of income. 
Hundenborn et al. (2018b) write that, in 2014, the mandatory filing threshold 
was at the 97.5th percentile.
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The careful work in the paper by Hundenborn et al. reveals some subtlety in 
the merging of the two datasets. We see that in some cases the household sur-
veys actually overstate a particular bracket of top incomes: those between 
R750,000 and R1 million. Hundenborn et al. argue that this may be because 
NIDS is a panel survey with a high attrition rate of top earners. This results in 
the relatively few surviving individuals in the sample being more heavily 
weighted. This weighting effect will also accentuate any mismeasurement of 
these incomes in the surveys.
Table 9.5 reflects the impact of this data work on measured inequality using the 
Gini constructed from both survey data and administrative income tax data from 
SARS. It is important to remember that this measure only considers taxable 
income, which does not include income received as part of a government transfer 
(typically a payment from the government as part of a welfare programme).
The effect of combining the data on taxable income with household surveys is 
complex. The Gini coefficient of taxable income from household survey data fell 
marginally from 0.823 in 2011 to 0.813 in 2014. When these survey datasets were 
augmented in 2011 and 2014 to improve the statistical description of the taxable 
income at the top end, the augmented Gini was 0.832 in 2011 and 0.790 in 2014. 
The picture is very similar if the data are combined at the 99th percentile rather 
than at the tax threshold.
This chapter is complemented by recent work by Bassier and Woolard (2018), 
who drill down into the SARS data and household survey data to make two crit-




































































































































































Figure 9.1 Difference in estimated mean taxable income between NIDS and PIT by 
income bracket
Source: Hundenborn et al. (2018b: Figure 1).
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of the population earned zero taxable income.10 Over the same period, the 
incomes of the top 5 per cent of income earners increased by 5.1 per cent per 
annum. The second is that the growth in real incomes of the top 5 per cent after 
the 2008–9 recession was more than double the rate of growth of gross national 
income (GNI). In contrast, the incomes of the other 95 per cent either stagnated 
or, in the case of the bottom of the distribution, showed only slight growth. 
Between 2003 and 2016, the real incomes of the top 1 per cent almost doubled. 
And in the six years between 2010 and 2016, the income share of the top 1 per cent 
increased from 10.5 per cent to 12.6 per cent of GNI.
In addition, the top percentile in the income distribution, which starts at a tax-
able income of R800,000 per annum, has a much higher wealth-to-income ratio 
than the rest of the earnings distribution. Income from sources other than sal ar ies 
increases rapidly in the top two percentiles. This is especially interesting given its 
salience with the argument made by Piketty (2014) that inequality increases when 
the rate of return to capital is greater than the rate of growth. So, the owners of 
capital accrue wealth faster, with the divergence growing stronger in periods of low 
growth. A second component of this fast, post-recession growth in top incomes is 
due to labour market dynamics in which high-skilled professionals at the top end 
of the income distribution have more bargaining power as they are not easily 
replaced. Also, technical changes in the economy may further favour this group.
In sum, then, the SARS data have been critical in understanding income 
in equal ity because the growth of top incomes relative to the rest of the distribu-
tion has a large but previously underexplored impact on measured in equal ity. The 
use of this database has also helped identify a greater number of top earners than 
was previously thought. For instance, in 2016 Credit Suisse estimated that there 
were about 45,000 dollar millionaires in the country, but Bassier and Woolard 
10 Some would have been recipients of government grants or would have been supported by other 
household members.
Table 9.5 Gini coefficients at different thresholds
Threshold 2011 2011 data at the  
2014 threshold
2014
Combining datasets at different filing thresholds
 Overall 0.832 0.826 0.790
 Below filing threshold (NIDS) 0.762 0.783 0.735
 Above filing threshold (PIT) 0.367 0.326 0.349
Combining datasets at the 99th percentile
 Overall 0.826 – 0.791
 NIDS 0.782 – 0.742
 PIT 0.328 – 0.343
Source: Based on data in Hundenborn et al. (2018b: Table 6).
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(2018) put the number at about 182,000. Hundenborn et al. (2018b) calculate that 
the number of people who earned over R10 million per year had more than 
 doubled from 482 in 2011 to 1,048 in 2014.11
4 Earnings and the Labour Market: The Drivers of 
Earnings Inequality
The attention that we have given to assets and wealth at the top end of the income 
distribution is not meant to discount the importance of the labour market for the 
well-being of most of the South African population. Earlier our income decom-
position analysis showed the dominance of labour market income in driving both 
levels of income inequality and changes in this inequality. Alongside its status as 
the highest income inequality country in the world, South Africa also has the 
highest earnings inequality. Thus, there is a clear need to understand the key fac-
tors driving this earnings inequality.
Finn and Leibbrandt (2018) start by reviewing a growing literature on earnings 
inequality in South Africa.12 To add to this available literature, the chapter pro-
vides an in-depth study of the key changes in the South African earnings distri-
bution over the period 2001–14 and then uses some modelling work to discern 
the impact of various factors on these changes on the inequality of earnings.
From 2001 to 2014, South Africa saw the average real earnings of workers rise 
from R5,740 to R7,951. Over the same period, however, wage increases went 
mostly to top earners, so overall inequality increased. As measured by the Gini 
coefficient, inequality was raised from 0.552 to 0.634, an atypically large increase. 
Before trying to analyse these changes, Finn and Leibbrandt (2018) flag an anom-
aly in the earnings data, which seem to change substantially after 2012. By Finn 
and Leibbrandt’s measurements there is a sudden jump—of some 18 per cent—in 
inequality between 2011 and 2014. This is almost certainly an indication of a 
change in the method of data collection rather than actual forces in the 
labour market.
Indeed, in 2012 South African officials changed the way they measured key 
earnings variables, and Finn and Leibbrandt find that the earnings Gini floated in 
a band from 0.54 to 0.57 up to 2011, and in a much higher band between 0.63 and 
0.66 after 2011. The chapter proceeds on the assumption that the trends in each of 
these sub-periods are correct but that the jump in inequality in 2012 is an artefact 
of the change in measurement. Thus, any analysis of trends in earning and earn-
ings inequality that spans this break will overstate the change in inequality. Finn 
11 However, it should be borne in mind that, adjusting for inflation, R10 million in 2011 was valued 
at just below R8 million in 2014, which may account for some of this growth.
12 Additional good reviews are provided by Wittenberg (2017a, 2017b, 2017c).
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and Leibbrandt illustrate this point by showing that their modelling work yields 
notably different answers when it is allowed to span the break in the data. With 
due regard to this periodization, they use a re-centred influence function approach 
(Fortin et al. 2011) to establish which factors drive changes in the Gini coefficient 
of earnings between 2001 and 2014. Eight potential explanations are evaluated. 
These are: education, experience, unionization, informal sector, race, gender, 
geographic location, and sector.
Table 9.6 profiles the labour market over the relevant period. We see that mean 
years of education of wage earners increased by almost two full years between 
2000–14, while unionization rates decreased by 5 percentage points, or by about 
15 per cent. Female labour force participation increased by 15 per cent, from 40 
per cent to 46 per cent, while the proportion of wage earners in urban areas 
increased from 0.68 to 0.77. We further see substantial decreases in the share of 
workers employed in mining, agriculture, manufacturing, and domestic work, 
which have been historically large sectors employing relatively unskilled labour. 
At the same time, we observe the increasing importance of the finance and services 
sectors, both of which reflect an increase in the share of workers of 5 percentage 
points. This points to important inequality-enhancing forces in an increasingly 
Table 9.6 Labour market summary statistics, 2000, 2011, and 2014
 2000 2011 2014
Years of education 8.77 10.54 10.75
Potential experience 22.25 21.33 21.52
Union member 0.34 0.30 0.29
Formal employment 0.79 0.75 0.78
African 0.70 0.70 0.73
Coloured 0.12 0.12 0.12
Asian/Indian 0.03 0.03 0.02
White 0.14 0.14 0.13
Female 0.40 0.45 0.46
Urban 0.68 0.79 0.77
Sectoral shares    
 Agriculture 0.10 0.05 0.06
 Mining 0.07 0.03 0.03
 Manufacturing 0.14 0.14 0.12
 Utilities 0.01 0.01 0.01
 Construction 0.06 0.07 0.07
 Trade 0.15 0.18 0.17
 Transport 0.05 0.06 0.06
 Finance 0.08 0.13 0.13
 Services 0.20 0.24 0.25
 Domestic services 0.13 0.10 0.10
Earnings (rand) 5,740 7,418 7,951
Log earnings 8.06 8.31 8.18
Observations 24,276 67,235 63,845
Source: Based on Finn and Leibbrandt (2018: Table 1).
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difficult labour market for relatively less skilled workers. The rest of the chapter 
substantiates this.
The post-2011 period saw a flattening of earnings increases for the lowest earners, 
which had been robust between 2001 and 2011; a decline in real earnings for 
middle earners; and a continuation of the trend of earnings increases for top 
earners—all factors that indicate that real inequality rose over this sub-period.
Most of the changes profiled in Table 9.6 are inequality-reducing for most work-
ers, except for those at the very top of the earnings distribution. Africans increased 
their rate of labour force participation by 3 percentage points and saw the gap 
between their earnings and the earnings of whites shrink by 10 percentage points. 
Women increased their labour force participation rate by 6 percentage points and 
saw a 5 percentage point reduction in the gender wage gap. The difference between 
earnings of unionized and non-unionized workers also fell by 6 percentage points, 
alongside an overall reduction in unionization of 5 percentage points.
The statistical modelling examines two impacts on earnings inequality stem-
ming from these changes. The first is the impact of changes on the distribution of 
characteristics of members of the labour force, sometimes called endowment 
changes. The second is the changing relative earnings values of these characteris-
tics, sometimes called changing price effects or changes in the returns to endow-
ments. This modelling shows that the equalizing effects of the changing 
characteristics of workers listed above are offset by the effects of growing com-
pensation for both educated and more experienced South African workers that 
exacerbate inequality. Figure 9.2 shows that prior to 2011, the returns to experi-
ence actually reduced inequality, but after 2011 this dynamic was reversed. It also 
shows that the biggest driver of inequality since 2012 is educational attainment, 
and particularly the returns to tertiary education. This return accrues dispropor-
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Figure 9.2 Total effects of different variables over the distribution of earnings
Source: Finn and Leibbrandt (2018: Figure 12).
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Thus, on the one hand, changes in the composition of the labour force have 
offset inequality in South Africa, but on the other, structural factors continue to 
drive it. From 2000 to 2011, the net increase in the earnings Gini was 1.1 percentage 
points. From 2011 to 2014, the net increase was 7.13 percentage points. Overall, 
structural changes accounted for 7.99 of the 8.24 net percentage point increase in 
measured Gini from 2001 to 2014. The increase in the number and general level 
of education of workers resulted in increasing the Gini coefficient only slightly, 
by 0.42 percentage points, while increases in the earnings of tertiary-educated 
workers contributed to an 11.17 percentage point increase. Most of this effect was 
observed from 2011 to 2014, as prior to 2011 the impact on inequality had been 
offset by wage stagnation. Increases, when they were granted, mostly went to top 
earners, who are more likely to have had higher levels of education. In spite of 
decreasing inequality between racial groups, it is important to remember that the 
earnings gap between African people and white people is still large, at 57 per cent. 
Holding these other effects constant, racial disparity in earnings continued to 
drive growth in inequality of nearly 3.5 percentage points over the period.
This picture from Finn and Leibbrandt is complemented by findings from a 
number of other recent studies on earnings inequality. Wittenberg (2018) shows 
that earnings have narrowed at the bottom end of the distribution, possibly due to 
wage setting through collective bargaining and minimum wage determinations, 
but they have widened at the top end. Mean real earnings have increased but the 
median has not; this implies an increase in earnings inequality in the top half of 
the earnings distribution, while the bottom half has become more compressed. 
Wage earners ‘stuck’ at a median level of earnings—which has not moved since 
the end of apartheid—are especially vulnerable to forces driving the demand for 
labour and wage setting in the contemporary labour market. This is despite the 
fact that they have far higher levels of education than median earners in 1993.
Median earners are predominantly African, male, and in their thirties. Those 
earning below the median are most likely to be women. Median earners are also 
less likely to be unionized than in 1993 or even 2000. They comprise a mix of 
occupations including elementary, craft workers, and service and clerical posts, 
while the proportion of manufacturing workers at the median has dropped. 
Median earners are now less likely to be members of a trade union than they were 
in 1993, while 40 per cent of those in the top half of the earnings distribution are 
unionized. The average age of the median band has not changed markedly, but 
it has increased in the top half. This indicates that younger entrants are finding it 
harder to move into higher-paying jobs. Nor has it changed much in the bottom 
half, indicating that young people are finding it difficult to enter the labour 
force at all.
Kerr and Wittenberg (2017) show that the public sector, which employs about 
18 per cent of all employees, reflects earnings consistently above the median. 
Public sector employment has increased since 2007, and then more sharply since 
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2010 after a slight dip around the 2008 recession. In 2014, it employed about 
2.7 million people. Kerr and Wittenberg establish that from 1997 to 2007, median 
and mean earnings in the public sector grew by 33 per cent and 25 per cent 
respectively. The mean in the private sector grew by 25 per cent in the same 
period, while the median remained unchanged. Clearly, those working in the 
public sector have generally done better than those employed in the private sector. 
In an examination of occupationally similar positions in the private and public 
sectors, Kerr and Wittenberg found that at almost every rung—except at the very 
top of the ladder—public sector workers did better in terms of wages, especially 
those who were unionized. At the same time, the premium attached to union 
membership in the private sector has declined, suggesting a weakening of union 
power here.
Finally, as in the case of household income, there is important recent work 
using tax data to address measurement issues at the top end of the earnings distri-
bution. Wittenberg (2017a) used two datasets, one based on four waves of 2010 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) data and the other on 2011 PIT data. 
His findings are unequivocal: earnings inequality has widened since the end of 
apartheid. Wittenberg estimates that the Gini coefficient (for earnings), when 
measured by the tax data, could be 3 percentage points higher than previously 
thought, increasing from 0.567 to 0.599. The Gini coefficient for self-employment, 
measured by the QLFS, also goes up by 3 percentage points to 0.716. The widening 
inequality is driven mainly by a rise in top earnings. In 2014, the incomes of the 
top 2.5 per cent increased the Gini coefficient by 5.5 percentage points.
5 Towards Policy: Evidence from Fiscal Incidence Studies
Inequality-enhancing trends in the labour market place a substantial responsibility 
on the taxes and transfers of the fiscal system to serve as a counterweight. Despite 
the fact that post-apartheid South Africa has been one of the most un equal so ci-
eties in the world, several studies have shown that the fiscal system is well 
designed to be strongly redistributive.13 For this project, the fiscal incidence 
analysis by Maboshe and Woolard (2018) updates earlier work using 2017 data 
and adds new analysis of the incidence of tax benefits. The largest component of 
direct taxation is PIT, accounting for R353 billion in 2015 tax receipts, or 36 per 
cent of total revenue. As shown in Figure 9.3, direct taxes on income are progres-
sive. In South Africa, the top 20 per cent of income earners contribute 96 per cent 
of all PIT. In terms of indirect taxes, such as VAT and the fuel levy, Inchauste et al. 
13 Inchauste et al. (2015) provide a very thorough example and also a good review of earlier fiscal 
incidence work.
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(2015) have shown they are progressive. However, excise taxes on alcohol and 
tobacco are regressive.
Maboshe and Woolard also analyse tax credits, allowances, and deductions for 
the first time. These benefits allow taxpayers to reduce their PIT. The largest of 
these deductions are for interest earned on savings and investments, credits for 
the use of private medical services, and allowances for private pension contributions 
and retirement savings. Figure 9.4 shows that these policies are highly regressive 
in absolute terms, with 85 per cent of the total benefit accruing to the top 30 
per cent. The poor lack access to private or non-subsidized medical care and do 
not accumulate large savings.
The racial and gender dimensions of these deductions are also clear. Whites 
receive 80 per cent of the total interest exemption benefits although they repre-
sent only 8 per cent of the population. They also receive the largest share of the 
deductions for contributions to private pensions. Expenditures for medical  credits, 
though, benefited more black than white people in absolute terms (44 per cent of 
the total compared with 39 per cent), reflecting the fact that most formal sector 
workers have private medical aid coverage. However, this is still racially skewed in 
relative terms, as black people comprise 80 per cent of the population.
Maboshe and Woolard also analyse South Africa’s extensive social spending, 
which, in South Africa, is nearly twice the median for developing economies. 
Spending amounts to 10.2 per cent of the annual budget or 3.1 per cent of annual 
gross domestic product. The number of social-grant beneficiaries has also grown 
from 9.4 million in 1994 to 16.5 million in 2014. The largest transfers by aggre-
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Figure 9.3 Concentration curves for direct taxes
Source: Maboshe and Woolard (2018: Figure 3).
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Figure 9.5 The progressivity of each of the three main social cash transfers in 
South Africa
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Source: Maboshe and Woolard (2018: Figure 4).
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and foster-care grants, at R43.4 million. The size of the benefit, per person, is much 
larger for the old-age pension than it is for the child support grant, meaning that 
11.6 million children receive similar support to 3.07 million elderly  people. 
Disability grants are another significant transfer.
Figure 9.5 shows that these transfers are well targeted by income group. More 
than 70 per cent of the direct transfers goes to the poorest half of the population, 
with 50 per cent of spending going to the bottom 30 per cent. Disaggregating, 
74 per cent of the children’s benefit, 73 per cent of the disability grant, and 65 per 
cent of the pension benefit go to the poorest half of the population.
Transfers are also mainly progressive when accounting for the intersection of 
gender, race, and class. For example, 76 per cent of transfers going to female-
headed households and 64 per cent going to male-headed households go to the 
bottom halves of these, respectively. In sum, this study confirms that tax policy 
remains progressive in general and budgeted expenditures on social grants are 
well targeted to reach those who need them. However, the chapter also highlights 
the fact that some important tax benefits are sharply regressive.
6 Disappointing Outcomes: Inequality Persistence  
and Low Social Mobility
Despite some well-designed and well-targeted policies, South Africa’s inequality 
has remained persistent. Indeed, new research shows that, over the past decade, 
progress has slowed and even stalled. An important study by Schotte et al. (2018) 
shows that the stable middle class in contemporary South Africa is much smaller 
than previously thought, and that the poor make up almost half of the popula-
tion. In fact, a significant proportion of South Africans have for the past decade 
been in a game of ‘snakes and ladders’. Schotte et al. use five waves of the NIDS to 
track movements into and out of poverty between 2008 and 2017, and to de lin-
eate five major socioeconomic classes in South Africa: the chronically poor, the 
transient poor, the vulnerable middle class, the stable middle class, and the elite.
A key finding is that the stable middle class is relatively small—only one in four 
people can be considered to be part of either the stable middle class or the elite. 
Another is that poverty, over time, is much more pervasive than a cross-sectional 
analysis tells us. StatsSA estimates that in 2015 55 per cent of the population lived 
in poverty (Statistics South Africa 2017). Schotte et al. (2018) refine this, estimat-
ing that about 49 per cent live in chronic, persistent poverty. In addition, another 
11.4 per cent can be classified as ‘transient poor’, and about 19 per cent are part of 
a ‘vulnerable middle class’. Both of these groups are at risk of falling back into 
poverty from one wave to the next. Figure 9.6 reflects this picture.
What are the triggers that propel people from one state to another? Two key 
triggers are either a labour-market event—losing or gaining a job—or a demo-
graphic event—gaining or losing a member of the household. Job gains accounted 
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for one-third of all exits from poverty, while a change in household size accounted 
for half of all poverty entries or exits. Although getting a job can be important in 
lifting people out of poverty, it is not sufficient. Those with unstable jobs—without 
contracts or union protection—are more vulnerable to falling back into poverty 
than those with permanent, generally formal sector employment.
Chronic poverty has clear characteristics associated with it: poor education 
(less than matric), larger households, female-headed households, unemployment, 
geographic location, and race. The legacies of apartheid, which forced many 
African people to live in poverty-stricken rural ‘homelands’ far from economic 
opportunities, are still deeply felt. So, for instance, only 2.5 per cent of rural 
households remained non-poor through all five waves from 2008 to 2017, while 
nearly 83 per cent were poor in four or five waves.
In contrast, about one-quarter of urban households remained stably non-poor 
(and 34.2 per cent were non-poor in four or five periods), and 42.7 per cent were 
poor in four or five periods. For the non-poor who live in an urban area, the risks 
of falling into poverty are less than for similar people residing in rural areas. But 
for the poor, the chances of escaping it are not significantly different from those of 
their counterparts in rural areas. In fact, the urban African population is more 
affected by transient poverty over the five waves of NIDS.
The other striking feature of poverty is its female, and youthful, face. Nearly 
72 per cent of households that were female-headed in all five waves remained in 
poverty in four or five waves, compared with only 29 per cent of those in male-
headed households. It is also worth noting that female-headed households are 
three times as likely as male-headed households to be single-parent households.
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Figure 9.6 Socioeconomic class sizes, 2008–17
Source: Authors’ illustration, based on data from Schotte et al. (2018).
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Race is another persistent legacy. Although the sample of white people was 
relatively small—just 274 individuals who were tracked in all five waves—the vast 
majority, 93.6 per cent, were observed to be consistently non-poor. By contrast, 
about 63 per cent of Africans were poor in four or five waves, with only about 
9 per cent remaining non-poor in all five waves.
The stable middle class, comprising about 21 per cent of the population, shows 
characteristics that set it apart from the vulnerable middle class. One key indicator 
is the level of education: two-thirds of middle-class household heads are educated 
at matric level or higher. The other is employment: three-quarters are employed, 
typically as formal sector employees in more secure jobs. They also earn on aver-
age twice as much from the labour market as households in the vulnerable class 
(R13,127.37 compared with R5,366.17).
The elite is almost three-quarters white, predominantly urban-based, and has 
an expenditure level much higher than the stable middle class (R25,659 compared 
with R4,536, average per capita). This class earns much more from the labour 
market than the stable middle class—R38,223 compared with R13,127. As 
reported earlier in this chapter, though, its members also get a significant amount 
of their income from capital investments.
7 Conclusion
This synthesis chapter began with a very brief summary of the findings from the 
literature on income inequality that existed prior to our most recent research con-
ducted within the Inequality in the Giants project. We then built on this to dis-
cuss some of our key findings and contributions from more recent studies, and to 
consider how the bigger picture has become sharper and more coherent.
Knowing that inequality has remained exceptionally high in post-apartheid 
South Africa, we used dynamic decomposition methods to investigate the drivers of 
income inequality and compare the static and dynamic decompositions. The key 
finding, which corroborates the existing literature, is that the labour market remains 
key to understanding the evolution of inequality in South Africa. A secondary find-
ing was that while government grants played an important role in reducing inequal-
ity in earlier periods, the effects of this mitigating force have become weaker.
We then reviewed some new empirical work that incorporates tax data, which 
is better able to measure the incomes of high-income individuals. This provides 
us with potentially better estimates of the overall income distribution, as there are 
several reasons why survey data may not adequately capture the incomes of a 
small proportion of high-income people. This work highlighted two important 
points. First, about 60 per cent of the population earn no taxable income. Second, 
those at the top end of the income distribution have experienced much higher 
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rates of real income growth than the remainder of the population. Their growth 
has also been higher than the growth rate of GNI, which means that this group is 
receiving a greater ‘share of the pie’ than was previously the case. This has put 
upward pressure on South Africa’s inequality levels, which partly explains why 
inequality has remained so persistent.
Another methodological innovation has been to decompose the sources of 
changes in earnings inequality into changes in the distribution of endowments 
and returns to these endowments, while explicitly allowing for heterogeneity in 
these returns. This work required a caveat due to some implausibly large changes 
in the measured Gini coefficient of earnings, likely due to a change in definitions 
or survey methodology. Nonetheless, the method highlighted that despite the 
increased average education level, which would have reduced inequality by itself, 
there were structural changes in the economy that enhanced earnings inequality. 
In particular, the increased returns to education accrued primarily to those with a 
tertiary qualification, and this interacted with a change in the returns to experi-
ence that caused an increase in earnings inequality.
In the policy space, we reviewed some of the fiscal incidence literature in South 
Africa by incorporating additional information on tax exemptions. This work 
confirmed that while the direct tax system is progressive and social benefits well 
targeted, some of the tax benefits are indeed regressive. This suggests there may 
still be room for further fiscal policy to target inequality, although the authors are 
cautious in their interpretation as the benefits involve healthcare and pension 
contributions, which are likely valuable for welfare in direct ways over and above 
the implications for inequality.
We concluded our review by considering some of the most recent work on 
social mobility in South Africa using the country’s most recent nationally repre-
sentative household- and individual-level panel data. The main finding is that the 
stable middle class is very small in South Africa. This has implications for social 
and political stability, among other things. A large proportion of South Africans 
are vulnerable to periods in poverty. This includes a large fraction of middle-class 
people who remain extremely vulnerable to a negative shock that can, and fre-
quently does, push them back into poverty.
Where does all of this leave us, either as academic researchers who work on 
inequality or as concerned individuals who would like to make a contribution to 
reducing the unacceptably high levels of inequality? As researchers, we feel inad-
equately answered questions remain about the roles and importance of assets and 
wealth in perpetuating the high levels of inequality. With our focus on the top 
end of the income and earnings distribution, we have shown very clearly that 
those at the top end have flourished even when others have struggled. They have 
done this by being able to draw on a far broader array of income sources and 
physical, financial, and human assets. But we need to know more about exactly 
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how wealth is transferred inter-generationally and, more generally, about the 
drivers of social mobility.
A key question that remains unanswered, even though it has been flagged since 
the late 1990s, is why the South African labour market continues to display such 
extraordinary levels of unemployment. This would require a better grasp of the 
demand for labour, in conjunction with market structure and market power. Our 
analysis of the labour market has shown that the finance and services sectors have 
grown substantially faster than the more traditional sectors of mining, manufac-
turing, agriculture, and domestic work; it may be a useful line of enquiry to con-
sider longer-run, historical, and holistic views of the labour market to understand 
our particular challenges.
At the top end of the labour market, there are questions relating to the 
 earnings and income of the very high earners. Why do South African CEOs earn 
so many multiples more than the median workers relative to their counterparts 
in other countries? Is this a social norm in a society that has historically justified 
high  levels of inequality? Is it a failure in corporate governance processes? Or is it 
due to policies that may themselves be related to a relatively well-paid public sec-
tor? These are questions that we could only make conjectures about at present.
From the policy side, there are some key lessons. All the evidence points to 
the importance of social grants for reducing both poverty and inequality. 
However, there is evidence that the ability to raise taxes further may be limited, 
and at the same time it may be harder to extend substantively the inequality-
reducing effects of grants. This suggests two different policy approaches. First, there 
may be value in aiming to extract better and higher-quality service delivery from 
the existing  budgets. An increase in such efficiency may improve welfare even if 
the budget constraint is binding. Second, one needs to consider policies that can 
positively shape the distribution of productive assets and the returns to these 
assets that would raise the market incomes of people who are economically 
vulnerable and marginalized. Such policies would include those dealing with 
education, and market regulations that stimulate competition between firms, 
encourage new players, support in nov ation and dynamism, and reduce the market 
power of the larger incumbents.
So, there are several possible ways forward. While it is not clear which subset of 
these is necessary to place South Africa on a more positive, transformative, 
dynamic trajectory, there is widespread and growing acceptance that levels of 
inequality such as those that prevail in South Africa are unsustainably high. They 
threaten the social fabric of society, they increase the risks of political and eco-
nomic upheaval, and they prevent the majority of people from living up to their 
full potential. All of these are likely to harm the country’s long-term developmen-
tal prospects. Significantly reducing inequality in South Africa warrants sustained 
attention and effort from all sections of society.
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Economic Inequality and Subjective  
Well- Being Across the World
Andrew E. Clark and Conchita D’Ambrosio
1 Introduction
There is widespread consensus that economic inequality influences individual 
well- being through a number of different channels.1 Living in a society where the 
gap between the rich and the poor is wide has both economic and social conse-
quences. As Van de Werfhorst and Salverda (2012) report in the introduction of 
the special issue they edited on the consequences of economic inequality, in 
un equal societies crime rates are higher, population health is worse, child bully-
ing occurs more often, housing conditions are more disparate, social trust erodes, 
and political participation deteriorates. We refer the reader to the references 
therein, and to the excellent discussion that appears in the articles making up this 
special issue, for details on these findings.
Our aim here is to contribute to this literature and focus on the study of the 
relationship between subjective evaluations of individual living conditions and 
economic inequality. We aim to explore empirically whether individuals’ evalu ations 
of their present and future living conditions are influenced by the level of economic 
inequality pertaining in their country of residence. We do so using data for seventy-
six different countries across the world, observed at a number of  different points in 
time between 1998 and 2015. We use all of the available Barometers data, which 
allows us to consider a spatial analysis of this relationship for different continents to 
see whether our findings are universal or whether they differ by region. To the best 
of our knowledge, our work here is the first to offer a complete global picture of how 
differences in control over economic resources are reflected in individuals’ subjective 
evaluations of their living conditions, both current and future.
There has been an upsurge of interest in subjective measures of well-being, 
as  complements to the more traditional income- or resource- based objective 
1 We are very grateful to Anthony Lepinteur for excellent research assistance. Conchita D’Ambrosio 
gratefully acknowledges support from the Fonds National de la Recherche Luxembourg (Grant C18/
SC/12677653).
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measures. For data reasons, this analysis has most often concentrated on OECD 
countries. However, more recent work has extended these analyses to developing 
countries. Some examples in this respect are presented by Akay and Martinsson 
(2011), Bookwalter and Dalenberg (2010), Lentz (2017), Clark and D’Ambrosio 
(2017), the contributions in the volume by Clark and Senik (2014), and the chap-
ters in the recent World Happiness Reports that describe the analysis of Gallup 
well- being data covering every country in the world.
There are a number of reasons to expect a relationship between economic 
in equal ity and subjective well- being. Here we use the term ‘economic inequality’ 
to refer to any disparities in the command over economic resources between in di-
vid uals (i.e. there is economic inequality when individuals have different levels of 
command over resources). As opposed to many of the other variables that have 
been related to individual well- being, economic inequality does not exist at the 
individual level and is rather measured only at an aggregate, often societal, level. 
The key axiom in the measurement of inequality is the Pigou–Dalton principle of 
transfers, according to which inequality increases whenever there is a transfer of 
resources from a poorer to a richer individual. Even though economic inequality 
as such is not an individual- level concept, any distribution of economic resources 
will have individual- level effects due to the way it changes the individual’s own 
access to economic resources and her standing with respect to those who are 
richer or poorer.
The theoretical framework we follow here was introduced in some of our pre-
vious work (Clark and D’Ambrosio 2015). We postulate that the effects of in equal-
ity on individual well- being are both normative and comparative. The latter 
channel is based on the observation that individuals do not live in isolation, and 
when assessing their own social standing they will compare themselves to in di-
vid uals in their reference group. When the individual is a member of this group, 
her well- being is commonly assumed to be negatively affected by those who pos-
sess more due to a sentiment of relative deprivation; in a similar vein, the com-
parison with those who possess less affects her well- being positively due to 
relative satisfaction. When the individual is not currently a member of the refer-
ence group, but aspires to be part of the group in question, comparisons with 
respect to richer individuals in the group may give rise to positive feelings, as the 
individual anticipates being as well- off as the group members once she joins the 
group. This idea is akin to that of the tunnel effect presented by Hirschman 
(1973). As is obvious from the above discussion, the measurement of deprivation 
and satisfaction requires individual- level data.
The normative channel between inequality and well- being works via the indi-
vidual’s disinterested evaluation of economic inequality without her making any 
comparisons to others: depending on the attitudes and social norms prevailing 
within a group, the individual can evaluate the income gaps in the group as being 
either fair or unfair. As such, the summary level of inequality in the individual’s 
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country of residence may have an independent effect on her evaluation of living 
conditions, in addition to that reflecting her comparisons of her own situation to 
better- off and worse- off individuals. For the analysis of the normative channel, 
aggregate inequality data are sufficient. The following section describes how we 
measure inequality in the various Barometer datasets.
2  Measuring Inequality
Our analysis requires information on three different types of inequality measures: 
(1) an aggregate overall index of differences in the command over economic 
resources; (2) an individual- level measure that captures the gaps between the 
individual and all relevant individuals who are better- off than her; and (3) an 
analogous individual- level measure of the gaps between the individual and those 
who are worse- off. The most popular type- 1 inequality measure is the Gini 
coefficient at the country/year level. The two best sources of cross- country and 
over- time Gini indices available to researchers are the SWIID dataset 
(Standardized World Income Inequality Database; see Solt 2013) and the WIID 
dataset (World Income Inequality Database), which is compiled and maintained 
by UNU- WIDER. There is a third well- known source, the LIS (Luxembourg 
Income Study Database), but its coverage in terms of both countries and years is 
lower, which will prevent us using it in the current analysis. Jenkins (2015) and 
Ferreira et al. (2015), in their evaluation of cross- country inequality datasets, rec-
ommend using the WIID. We follow their recommendation and use data from 
WIID 3.4, released in January 2017, containing Gini indices of income inequality 
for all the countries and years of our sample.
For the measures of inequality of types 2 and 3 we rely on the information 
available in the Barometer surveys on the command over economic resources 
(see also D’Ambrosio and Rodrigues (2008) for a similar application to the study 
of deprivation in the city of São Paulo). Unfortunately, information on income is 
not available in many of the Barometer surveys. In order to be able to analyse as 
many countries and years as possible, we consider different measures of well- being 
in a non- income framework. These items differ by Barometer, and Table 10.A1 
lists the items that we describe in what follows. In each round of the Afrobarometer 
in our sample, individuals are asked the following questions: ‘Over the past year, 
how often, if ever have you or your family gone without _____?’ The interviewer 
asks this question for each of the following four basic necessities: ‘Enough food to 
eat’, ‘Enough clean water for home use’, ‘Medicines or medical treatment’, and 
‘Enough fuel to cook your food’. The possible answers to this question are: 0 = 
never, 1 = just once or twice, 2 = several times, 3 = many times, and 4 = always. 
While there is information on a fifth item, ‘A cash income’, we decided to exclude 
the latter as the availability of sufficient cash income will very likely determine the 
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answers to all of the other items: someone who does not have enough cash income 
will also probably not have enough food to eat, clean water for home use, medical 
treatment, or fuel with which to cook food, leading to an over- count of the 
sources of deprivation. We use the answers to these four questions to first con-
struct an indicator of functioning failure for each individual as the sum of their 
scores in these four basic domains of a decent life. This indicator thus takes on 
values between 0, for individuals who are never deprived in any of the domains, 
and 16, for individuals who are always deprived in all domains. See Shenga (2010) 
for an alternative dummy approach using the same dataset, recoding the 
responses so that 0 refers to never or just once or twice, and 1 refers to several 
times, many times, or always.
In the Asianbarometer, individual are asked ‘Do you or your family own the 
following?’, with possible answers of Yes or No. Among the listed items, we here 
focus on the answers to the questions regarding the following items, which appear 
in all of the waves: mobile phone, electric fan/cooler, fridge, telephone, TV, cable 
TV, radio, and camera. The indicator of functioning failure we construct for the 
Asianbarometer therefore takes on values between 0, for individuals who have 
access to all items, and 8, for individuals who are deprived in every dimension. 
The questions are similar in the Latinobarometer, and the items we consider here 
are TV, refrigerator, computer, washing machine, telephone, car, drinking water, 
and sewerage system. The indicator of functioning failure in the Latinobarometer 
then also takes on values between 0, for individuals who have access to all items, 
and 8, for individuals who are always deprived (although the domains that are 
evaluated in the Asianbarometer and Latinobarometer are not the same—only 
three items appear in both lists). The same question is asked in the Eurobarometer 
and the list of items we include are TV, DVD player, computer, internet access, 
car, laptop, tablet, and smartphone. This again produces an indicator of function-
ing failure that takes on values between 0 and 8.
We formally define the individual indices of relative deprivation and satisfac-
tion by introducing the following notation. Let N denote the set of all positive 
integers and R (R+) the set of all (all non- negative) real numbers. The distinct 
levels of functioning failures are collected in a vector (q1, . . ., qk), where k N∈ \ { }.1  
Let πj indicate the population share of individuals who have the same qj level of 
functioning failures. The distribution is ( , ) ( , , , , ),  q q qk k  1 1; ≠i jq q  for all 
i,j  { , , }.1 k  Let Ω be the space of all distributions. Define q  as the illfare- ranked 
permutation of the vector q, so that q q qk1 2  .  In the second step, we calcu-
late well- being indices over these distributions, which we describe in what 
follows.
The first measure we use in the analysis of individual well- being is the trad-
ition al indicator of individual command over economic resources given by the 
number of functioning failures, qi (see, among many others, Alkire and Foster 
2011; Bossert et al. 2013). Here, the higher the value of qi, the more deprived is 
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the individual. As noted previously, in the Afrobarometer this variable ranges 
from 0, corresponding to the situation of no deprivation (no functioning fail-
ures), to 16, the maximum possible value referring to individuals who are always 
deprived in all dimensions. For the other three Barometer datasets, this variable 
ranges between 0 (no functioning failures) and 8 (deprivation in all dimensions).
The second group of measures aims to capture the feelings of relative de pri va-
tion and satisfaction that an individual experiences from their comparisons to 
others. Yitzhaki (1979) was the first to introduce the measurement of income 
deprivation in the economics literature. Rewritten in terms of functioning failures, 
the index of individual relative deprivation, a function Di : R , is given by:
 
D q q qi
i
j







for all ( , ) q  . The deprivation from which individual i suffers here is defined 
as the sum of all functioning- failure differentials with respect to in di vid uals who 
are less deprived in the society under consideration (i.e. who have fewer func-
tioning failures). Analogously, we can measure the complement to de pri va tion, 
satisfaction Si: R , as:
 
S q q qi
j i
k
j i j( ) ( ),   
 1  
(2)
for all ( , ) q  . This reflects the sum of the functioning- failure differentials with 
respect to individuals who are more deprived than individual i.
The second type of measure we consider with respect to comparisons aims to 
capture the individual sentiment due to comparisons to others who do not share 
the exact level of functioning failure, without any further distinction. If we sum 
the two indices of relative deprivation and satisfaction at the individual level, we 
obtain the measure of individual alienation, Ai : R , defined as:
 
A q q qi
j
k
i j j( , )   
1  
(3)
While deprivation and satisfaction are asymmetric measures, based on compari-
sons only to those who are better- off or worse- off respectively, alienation is 
assumed to be experienced with respect to everybody. Davies (2016), interpreting 
the Gini coefficient, highlights that the individual sum of differences with respect 
to everyone else, which corresponds to the alienation measure introduced above, 
Ai , is the basis for an individual inequality index. The (absolute) Gini coefficient 
can be interpreted as the average value of this index across the population. Davies 
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also shows that this personal inequality index can be further decomposed into 
two components corresponding to the relative deprivation and satisfaction meas-
ures introduced above, Di  and Si .
3 Data, Methods, and Results
3.1 Data
Our empirical analysis is carried out using data from four different Barometer 
series, which are repeated cross- section regional surveys on public attitudes 
towards democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues.2 
Tables 10.A2–A5 list the years we analyse and the size of the sample per country 
per wave. Our samples of individuals between the ages of 18 and 90 contain infor-
mation on 43,385 Africans living in eighteen countries of the continent in 
Table 10.A2’s Afrobarometer, 13,542 Asians from nine countries in Table 10.A3’s 
Asianbarometer, 168,278 Latin and Central Americans from eighteen countries 
in Table 10.A4’s Latinobarometer, and 100,379 Europeans living in thirty- one dif-
ferent countries in Table 10.A5’s Eurobarometer. The datasets are cross- sectional, 
and not every country appears in every year.
Our dependent variables are self- assessed current and future living condi-
tions, which we will denote by wbitc  for individual i in year t in country c. In the 
Afrobarometer, individuals are asked the following question about their current 
living conditions: ‘In general, how would you describe your own present living 
conditions?’, with the possible answers ‘Very Bad’, ‘Fairly Bad’, ‘Neither Good 
nor Bad’, ‘Fairly Good’, and ‘Very Good’. Regarding the future, the question 
reads ‘Looking ahead, do you expect your living conditions in twelve months’ 
time to be better or worse?’, with the possible answers ‘Much Worse’, ‘Worse’, 
‘Same’, ‘Better’, and ‘Much Better’. In the Asianbarometer the two analogous 
questions are ‘As for your own family, how do you rate your economic situation 
today?’ and ‘What do you think the economic situation of your family will be a 
few years from now?’ The possible answers to the first question are ‘Very Bad’, 
‘Bad’, ‘Neither Good nor Bad’, ‘Good’, and ‘Very Good’, and to the second ‘Much 
Worse’, ‘A Little Worse’, ‘About the Same’, ‘A Little Better’, and ‘Much Better’. The 
answers to the two questions in the Latinobarometer are exactly the same, 
although the wording of the questions is slightly different: ‘In general, how 
would you describe your present economic situation and that of your family?’ 
and ‘And in the next twelve months do you think that your economic situation 
and that of your family will be much better, a little better, about the same, a little 
2 See www.afrobarometer.org, www.asianbarometer.org, www.latinobarometro.org, and http://
ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm (the last of these is the Eurobarometer).
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worse or much worse compared to the way it is now?’ Two similar questions are 
asked in the Eurobarometer: ‘How would you judge the current financial situation 
of your household?’ with possible answers ‘Very Bad’, ‘Rather Bad’, ‘Rather 
Good’, and ‘Very Good’; and ‘What are your expectations for the next twelve 
months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes 
to the financial situation of your household?’
To homogenize the analysis as far as possible between different regions, we 
regroup the first two and last two answers on future living conditions in the 
Afrobarometer, Latinobarometer, and Asianbarometer to correspond to the cat-
egor ies in the Eurobarometer. The same procedure is not possible for the answers 
to the current living conditions question, as the median category ‘Neither Good 
nor Bad’ does not appear in the possible answers in the Eurobarometer. The dis-
tributions of the dependent variables averaged over all the years are shown in 
Figure  10.1; the distributions for each separate year are very similar and have 
been omitted. Current living conditions are evaluated as neither good nor bad by 
the majority of Asians and Central and Latin Americans, followed by around 20 
per cent of the sample who answer ‘Good’. A similar finding holds in Europe, 
where the majority answer ‘Rather Good’. The African distribution is more 
 polarized. The two most common answers are ‘Fairly Bad’ and ‘Fairly Good’. 
Notably, just under one in five Africans judge their present living conditions as 
‘Very Bad’, a figure that is far higher than that observed in any other region.
Expectations regarding future living conditions reveal a generalized level of 
optimism everywhere but Europe, where only around 20 per cent expect the future 
financial situation of the household to be better than it is today. The analogous 
optimism figures are at least 60 per cent in Asia and Africa, and 45 per cent in 
Central and Latin America. Only around 20 per cent of Africans, Central and 
Latin Americans, and Europeans expect the future to be worse than today, 
while among the more optimistic Asians this figure is closer to 10 per cent. (For a 
discussion on optimism and poverty in Africa, see Graham and Hoover 2007.)
3.2  Method
When we carry out our multivariate regression analyses of current and future 
 living conditions, we will control for a number of individual- level variables so 
that we compare like with like. In particular, we will control for age, age- squared, 
gender, the highest level of education achieved (with three levels: at most primary, 
at most secondary, and at least post- secondary), and labour- force status 
(un employed, employed, and out of the labour force). In Asian and African coun-
tries we will include an additional control for living in urban or rural areas. All 
regressions will include wave and country dummies, although their associated 
coefficients will not be reported for space reasons.
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Figure 10.1 The distribution of the dependent variables
Source: Authors’, based on data from the Afrobarometer, Asianbarometer, Latinobarometer, and 
Eurobarometer.
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The descriptive statistics for the variables that appear in our sample are shown 
in Tables  10.1–4 for our four different Barometer surveys. The majority of the 
sample are of working age and employed (except in the Afrobarometer). In the 
Afrobarometer and Asianbarometer surveys that provide information on the area 
of residence, the majority live in rural areas. Regarding education, the most 
Table 10.1 Descriptive statistics: Afrobarometer
  Mean SD Min. Max.
Present living conditions [1–5] 2.67 1.16 1 5
Future living conditions [1–3] 2.46 0.79 1 3
No. functioning failures [0–16] 4.25 3.76 0 16
Deprivation 1.86 2.17 0 13.90
Satisfaction 1.86 1.52 0 9.29
Alienation 3.72 1.51 0 13.92
Gini 46.31 9.60 24 64.79
Age 36.98 14.43 19 89
Female 0.50 0.50 0 1
At most primary education 0.56 0.50 0 1
At most secondary education 0.34 0.47 0 1
At least post- secondary education 0.11 0.31 0 1
Employed 0.34 0.47 0 1
Unemployed 0.30 0.46 0 1
Out of the labour force 0.36 0.48 0 1
Urban 0.37 0.48 0 1
Source: Authors’ illustration based on the Afrobarometer.
Table 10.2 Descriptive statistics: Asianbarometer
  Mean SD Min. Max.
Present living conditions [1–5] 3.18 0.73 1 5
Future living conditions [1–3] 2.49 0.68 1 3
No. functioning failures [0–8] 3.87 2.12 0 8
Deprivation 0.90 0.84 0 6.05
Satisfaction 0.90 0.95 0 5.96
Alienation 1.81 0.70 1.02 6.05
Gini 39.88 3.79 33.44 46.05
Age 41.85 14.34 20 89
Female 0.50 0.50 0 1
At most primary education 0.40 0.49 0 1
At most secondary education 0.45 0.50 0 1
At least post- secondary education 0.15 0.36 0 1
Employed 0.69 0.46 0 1
Unemployed 0.08 0.28 0 1
Out of the labour force 0.22 0.42 0 1
Urban 0.39 0.49 0 1
Source: Authors’ illustration based on the Asianbarometer.
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common category in Africa and Central and Latin America is having at most 
achieved a primary level of education, while in Asia and Europe the most com-
mon cat egory is at least secondary level.
The general model of subjective well- being we estimate is of the following form:
 wb M Gini Xitc itc tc itc c t itc           1 2 3 4   (4)
Table 10.3  Descriptive statistics: Latinobarometer
  Mean SD Min. Max.
Present living conditions [1–5] 2.91 0.85 1 5
Future living conditions [1–3] 2.29 0.73 1 3
No. functioning failures [0–8] 3.31 2.04 0 8
Deprivation 0.92 0.94 0 6.90
Satisfaction 0.92 0.90 0 6.51
Alienation 1.83 0.73 0.30 6.90
Gini 51.08 4.52 36 59.10
Age 41.00 15.67 20 90
Female 0.51 0.50 0 1
At most primary education 0.46 0.50 0 1
At most secondary education 0.36 0.48 0 1
At least post- secondary education 0.18 0.38 0 1
Employed 0.59 0.49 0 1
Unemployed 0.07 0.25 0 1
Out the labour- force 0.35 0.48 0 1
Source: Authors’ illustration, based on the Latinobarometer.
Table 10.4 Descriptive statistics: Eurobarometer
  Mean SD Min. Max.
Present living conditions [1–4] 2.64 0.78 1 4
Future living conditions [1–3] 2.04 0.59 1 3
No. functioning failures [0–8] 3.21 2.19 0 7
Deprivation 1.16 1.17 0 5.62
Satisfaction 1.16 0.98 0 5.05
Alienation 2.31 0.70 1.17 5.62
Gini 30.56 4.15 23.70 38.60
Age 52.37 16.70 18 90
Female 0.55 0.50 0 1
At most primary education 0.32 0.47 0 1
At most secondary education 0.42 0.49 0 1
At least post- secondary education 0.26 0.44 0 1
Employed 0.51 0.50 0 1
Unemployed 0.10 0.30 0 1
Out of the labour- force 0.39 0.49 0 1
Source: Authors’ illustration, based on the Eurobarometer.
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where qitc is the count of functioning failures (which here is a measure of the 
absolute living standards of the individual); Mitc refers to one of the relative 
in equal ity measures discussed in Section 2 to assess the comparative perspective 
of inequality; and Ginitc is the Gini index, capturing individuals’ normative reac-
tions to inequality.
The specification in equation 4 allows us to estimate the absolute, comparative, 
and normative components of subjective well- being with respect to economic 
resources. For the indices in which a comparison group has to be specified, we 
impose that this group consists of individuals living in the same country at a 
given point in time. The vector Xitc includes individual- level control variables 
(age, gender, urban residence, education, and labour- force status), while αc and λt 
are respectively the country and wave fixed effects. We present results here based 
on linear (OLS) estimation: the pattern of results is the same using non- linear 
estimation techniques such as ordered probit or ordered logit. We standardize 
both the dependent variable and all of the objective measures of deprivation, so 
that the estimated coefficients are βs, representing the effect in terms of the stand-
ard deviation of the dependent variable of a one standard deviation change in the 
objective measure on the right-hand side. All regressions have standard errors 
clustered at the country/year level.
3.3 Results
The control variables attract the following estimated coefficients (see Tables 10.
A6–A9). As in the subjective well- being literature, the relationship between age 
and current living conditions is U- shaped, with the lowest level at around age 50. 
Women and those living in urban areas have a more negative evaluation of their 
living conditions. With respect to labour- force status, we find a negative estimated 
coefficient for the unemployed and a positive coefficient for the employed, as 
compared to our reference category of individuals who are out of the labour force. 
Education is very strongly correlated with current living conditions, which is to 
be expected if it is acting as a proxy for income. Similar results hold for the evalu-
ation of future living conditions, even though the size of the coefficients is smaller.
Tables 10.5–8 show the estimated coefficients of our key explanatory variables 
(which also appear at the head of the full set of results in Tables 10.A6–A9). There 
are two specifications, depending on how the comparative component is specified: 
as two separate sums of the differences with worse- off and better- off in di vid uals 
(deprivation and satisfaction in columns 1 and 3), or as a global sum of differences 
with respect to everybody (alienation in columns 2 and 4). The first coefficient in 
each regression refers to the absolute component of standards of living, the 
number of functioning failures, qitc; the following three entries then capture the 
comparative effect of inequality via relative deprivation and satisfaction together, 
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Table 10.5 Economic conditions and inequality: OLS results in the Afrobarometer
  Present Future
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
No. functioning failures –0.203*** –0.231*** –0.169*** –0.144***
  (0.050) (0.012) (0.044) (0.012)
Deprivation 0.017   0.053*  
  (0.034)   (0.031)  
Satisfaction 0.037*   0.017  
  (0.021)   (0.019)  
Alienation   0.028**   0.027**
    (0.012)   (0.012)
Gini 0.100 0.097 0.128* 0.130*
  (0.076) (0.076) (0.074) (0.074)
No.observations 43,865 43,865 38,514 38,514
Adjusted R2 0.140 0.140 0.135 0.135
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The controls include the variables in Table 10.1, 
and wave and country fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Afrobarometer.
Table 10.6 Economic conditions and inequality: OLS results in the Asianbarometer
  Present Future
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
No. functioning failures –0.002 –0.173*** 0.075 –0.053***
  (0.068) (0.027) (0.054) (0.011)
Deprivation –0.098**   –0.064**  
  (0.039)   (0.032)  
Satisfaction 0.034   0.036  
  (0.029)   (0.022)  
Alienation   –0.027   –0.012
    (0.017)   (0.015)
Gini –0.064*** –0.067** –0.038** –0.040*
  (0.013) (0.026) (0.015) (0.021)
No. observations 13,542 13,542 13,542 13,542
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.110 0.240 0.240
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The controls include the variables in Table 10.2, 
and wave and country fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Asianbarometer.
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Table 10.8 Economic conditions and inequality: OLS results in the Eurobarometer
  Present Future
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
No. functioning failures 0.019 –0.202*** 0.143 –0.074***
  (0.095) (0.006) (0.136) (0.008)
Deprivation –0.099*   –0.100  
  (0.052)   (0.072)  
Satisfaction 0.115***   0.110*  
  (0.041)   (0.062)  
Alienation   0.011**   0.009**
    (0.005)   (0.004)
Gini 0.035 0.020 0.061 0.048
  (0.035) (0.034) (0.040) (0.036)
Observations 100,379 100,379 97,778 97,778
Adjusted R2 0.305 0.305 0.082 0.082
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The controls include the variables in Table 10.4, 
and wave and country fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Eurobarometer.
Table 10.7 Economic conditions and inequality: OLS results in the Latinobarometer
  Present Future
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
No. functioning failures –0.144*** –0.165*** –0.082*** –0.068***
  (0.022) (0.009) (0.021) (0.007)
Deprivation 0.002   0.022**  
  (0.011)   (0.009)  
Satisfaction 0.024**   0.006  
  (0.012)   (0.011)  
Alienation   0.010**   0.011***
    (0.005)   (0.004)
Gini –0.035 –0.035 0.138*** 0.137***
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.046) (0.046)
No. observations 168,279 168,279 135,216 135,216
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.135 0.077 0.077
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The controls include the variables in Table 10.3, 
and wave and country fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Latinobarometer.
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or alienation where the gaps between the individual and the better- off and worse- off 
individuals are treated symmetrically; the final estimated coefficient is that on the 
Gini coefficient that measures the normative effect of inequality.
Functioning failures reduce the evaluation of current living standards, as might 
be expected: the more objectively deprived the individual is, the lower the evalu-
ation of their current life. The effect size is large here: a one standard deviation 
rise in the index in question reduces the evaluation of current living conditions 
by around one- quarter of a standard deviation. The results for the expectations of 
future living conditions are similar, although the effect size is, on average, lower, 
and in one instance, for the Eurobarometer in the first specification, positive.
When relative comparisons are introduced in the form of deprivation and satis-
faction in the evaluation of the present, they are both separately significant only in 
the Eurobarometer. Here, seeing oneself as better- off than others increases the 
evaluation of current living conditions while comparisons with the better- off have 
the opposite effect. In the other continents, only one of the two is significant. In 
Asia it is the negative effect of relative deprivation that matters, while in Africa and 
Central and Latin America what counts is the positive effect of satisfaction with 
respect to those who are worse- off. The results for expected future living conditions 
for Europeans and Asians are not qualitatively different from those with respect to 
their current living conditions, while in the Afrobarometer and Latinobarometer 
being more deprived now attracts a positive and significant coefficient (with the 
coefficient on deprivation being twice as large as that on satisfaction).
While the (positive, but not always significant) satisfaction result is to be 
expected, the positive effect of comparisons to the better- off, as measured by Di, is 
more commonly found in volatile socioeconomic environments, such as in the 
earlier stages of economic development, which can be argued to apply to many of 
the African and Central and Latin American countries in our sample. This posi-
tive effect of others’ good fortune on the individual’s own evaluation of their life is 
known in the literature as the ‘tunnel effect’ of Hirschman (1973): the presence of 
better- off individuals here does not produce a sentiment of relative deprivation 
due to social comparisons, but rather a positive signal that the individual may 
improve their own situation in the future (see Senik (2004) for a similar result in 
Russia during the 1990s, and Grosfeld and Senik (2010) for the analysis of atti-
tudes to inequality in a growing country, Poland; see also D’Ambrosio and Frick 
(2012) for a dynamic version of the tunnel effect).
When relative comparisons are introduced in the form of differences to others 
without further distinction between the better- off and worse- off, the positive 
effect prevails everywhere except in Asia, which was to be expected from the pre-
vious results where only relative deprivation mattered (the satisfaction coefficient 
in columns 1 and 3 is insignificant). Europe is of particular interest here, where 
both deprivation and satisfaction had independent and significant effects: when 
added together, what prevails is the positive effect of satisfaction.
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The normative effect of inequality is measured by the coefficient on the Gini 
index. This is not calculated from within the Barometer data, but is matched in as 
an aggregate measure of income inequality from an independent source, the 
WIID. The coefficient on the Gini index captures the effect of the individual’s dis-
interested evaluation of economic inequality without making any comparisons to 
others. The results are very mixed across our regions of the world—arguably 
mirror ing the wide variety of findings in the existing literature summarized by 
Clark and D’Ambrosio (2015).
Aggregate inequality in the country of residence attracts a positive, but insig-
nificant, estimated coefficient in the Afrobarometer and the Eurobarometer, and a 
negative, but insignificant, estimated coefficient in the Latinobarometer. The only 
significant estimated coefficient on inequality for current living conditions is 
negative in the Asianbarometer. The results regarding the correlation between the 
Gini and future living conditions are more significant in general, but still not uni-
form: this correlation is positive for Africans and Central and Latin Americans, 
negative for Asians, and insignificant for Europeans.
4  Conclusion
We have appealed to repeated cross- section information on well- being, as cap-
tured by current and future evaluations of standards of living, from across the 
world in four different Barometer series. We relate these well- being measures to 
not only one’s own economic resources but also the distribution of resources at 
the country–year level. With respect to the latter, we divide this distribution up 
into a comparative component (as measured by the gaps between those who are 
richer than the individual—deprivation—and the sum of gaps between those who 
are poorer—satisfaction) and the normative evaluation of distribution (condi-
tional on these gaps), given by the Gini coefficient.
We find that all of the absolute, comparative, and normative components of 
inequality matter for individuals’ evaluations of their current and future living 
conditions, which underlines the multi- faceted nature of the evaluation of stand-
ard of living. While the positive correlation between one’s own resources and life 
evaluations is unsurprising, the relationship of the latter to the distribution of 
resources is anything bar standard across the four regions of the world that we 
have considered. The ‘typical’ pattern of a negative effect of gaps to the better- off 
but a positive effect of gaps to the worse- off turns out to hold only in Europe. In 
some other parts of the world, gaps to the better- off either have no correlation 
with life evaluations or, in Africa and Central and Latin America, are associated 
with more positive expectations of one’s future life. The positive estimated coeffi-
cient on gaps to the worse- off is found more often, but is notably absent in Asia, a 
result that surely bears further research. Last, the Gini coefficient itself exhibits a 
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wide variety of estimated coefficients, being negatively correlated with current life 
evaluation in Asia only, and attracting insignificant coefficients everywhere else. 
The story is somewhat more uniform regarding future life evaluations, where the 
Gini coefficient attracts a positive and significant estimated coefficient in Africa 
and Central and Latin America (in line with the positive effect of gaps to the 
better- off noted previously), but a negative significant coefficient in Asia. Clearly 
the nature of the relationship between the distribution of the resources and meas-
ures of individual well- being over time is not universal, and merits substantial 
separate research in different regions of the world.
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Appendix
Table 10.A1 List of items per dataset
Afrobarometer Asianbarometer Latinobarometer Eurobarometer
Food Mobile phone TV TV
Water Cooler Refrigerator DVD player
Medical care Fridge Computer Computer
Cooking fuel Telephone Washing machine Internet access
  TV Telephone Car
  Radio Car Laptop
  Camera Drinking water Tablet
  Cable TV Sewerage system Smartphone
Source: Authors’ illustration based on the Afrobarometer, Asianbarometer, 
Latinobarometer, and Eurobarometer.
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Table 10.A2 Number of observations per country per wave: 
Afrobarometer
 2003 2004 2008 2010 Total
Botswana 1,112 0 0 1,126 2,238
Burkina Faso 0 0 1,080 0 1,080
Cape Verde 1,140 0 1,189 0 2,329
Egypt 0 0 0 1,148 1,148
Ghana 0 1,128 0 0 1,128
Kenya 0 1,209 0 0 1,209
Lesotho 1,156 0 0 0 1,156
Liberia 0 0 1,143 0 1,143
Madagascar 0 0 0 1,138 1,138
Malawi 0 1,073 1,086 2,252 4,411
Mali 1,189 0 1,171 0 2,360
Mozambique 1,044 0 1,016 0 2,060
Namibia 1,126 0 1,141 1,112 3,379
Nigeria 2,253 0 2,157 2,215 6,625
Senegal 1,045 1,101 0 0 2,146
South Africa 0 2,256 2,258 0 4,514
Tanzania 1,162 0 0 0 1,162
Uganda 0 2,294 2,345 0 4,639
Total 11,227 9,061 14,586 8,991 43,685
Source: Authors’ illustration based on the Afrobarometer.
Table 10.A3 Number of observations per 
country per wave: Asianbarometer
 2006 2010 Total
Cambodia 716 1,098 1,814
Indonesia 0 1,286 1,286
Japan 767 1,465 2,232
Malaysia 972 1,034 2,006
Mongolia 1,086 0 1,086
Philippines 0 1,042 1,042
Singapore 0 666 666
Thailand 970 946 1,916
Total 4,819 5,825 13,542
Vietnam 1,075 419 1,494

























Table 10.A4 Number of observations per country per wave: Latinobarometer
 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Argentina 1,054 1,067 1,008 1,053 1,095 1,080 1,057 0 1,076 1,097 1,084 1,110 11,781
Bolivia 539 879 934 1,088 0 1,068 1,018 1,050 1,052 1,056 1,077 0 9,761
Brazil 876 876 860 863 1,045 1,042 1,059 1,050 1,040 1,067 1,063 1,067 11,908
Chile 1,072 1,066 0 0 1,106 0 0 1,103 0 0 1,113 0 5,460
Colombia 0 1,118 1,105 1,087 1,099 1,101 1,089 0 1,094 1,112 1,066 1,108 10,970
Costa Rica 513 808 892 922 0 928 906 841 856 861 898 875 9,300
Dominican Rep. 0 0 0 0 0 925 912 805 794 856 799 905 5,996
Ecuador 0 1,081 1,051 1,087 1,111 1,106 1,078 1,114 1,100 1,108 1,108 1,103 12,044
El Salvador 782 900 899 913 940 929 926 905 828 826 826 877 10,565
Guatemala 0 788 0 876 903 911 0 808 0 0 0 893 5,179
Honduras 726 0 905 904 912 906 918 820 747 858 858 891 9,475
Mexico 1,044 0 0 1,132 0 1,047 1,061 1,103 0 1,118 0 1,128 7,633
Nicaragua 537 0 843 0 0 0 841 0 0 0 889 0 3,110
Panama 0 907 879 928 910 933 930 914 872 903 903 900 9,979
Paraguay 0 0 515 514 531 540 1,079 1,034 1,025 1,066 1,082 1,065 8,451
Peru 885 895 917 1,099 1,100 1,100 1,082 1,094 1,073 1,064 1,091 1,086 12,486
Uruguay 1,090 1,116 1,124 1,109 1,088 1,102 1,119 1,119 1,074 1,121 1,091 1,071 13,224
Venezuela 0 1,088 1,098 1,091 1,100 1,100 1,101 1,111 1,093 1,093 0 1,082 10,957
Total 9,118 12,589 13,030 14,657 12,940 15,818 16,176 14,871 13,724 15,206 14,989 15,161 168,279
Source: Authors’ illustration based on the Latinobarometer.
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Austria 852 941 927 921 3,641
Belgium 921 949 913 929 3,718
Bulgaria 930 921 951 922 3,724
Croatia 888 889 890 894 3,561
Cyprus 455 443 447 459 1,804
Czech Republic 978 976 920 928 3,802
Denmark 927 900 932 905 3,664
Estonia 926 895 890 893 3,604
Finland 913 901 913 897 3,624
France 913 929 893 940 3,675
Germany 1,340 1,449 1,376 1,422 5,587
Greece 921 922 927 922 3,692
Hungary 930 1,009 979 986 3,904
Ireland 1,203 1,193 0 0 2,396
Italy 871 880 872 870 3,493
Latvia 890 897 894 909 3,590
Lithuania 892 892 895 906 3,585
Luxembourg 446 459 456 465 1,826
Macedonia 0 942 0 0 942
Malta 470 471 467 455 1,863
Montenegro 0 416 0 0 416
Netherlands 943 940 921 952 3,756
Poland 898 876 858 787 3,419
Portugal 857 901 908 866 3,532
Romania 906 882 877 865 3,530
Serbia 0 838 839 771 2,448
Slovakia 893 939 928 936 3,696
Slovenia 940 956 897 900 3,693
Spain 922 939 884 892 3,637
Sweden 994 950 969 957 3,870
United Kingdom 871 917 889 919 3,596
Total 24,902 27,414 24,516 24,470 100,379
Source: Authors’ illustration based on the Eurobarometer.
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Table 10.A6 Economic conditions and inequality: OLS results in the Afrobarometer—all 
controls
  Present Future
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
No. functioning failures –0.203*** –0.231*** –0.169*** –0.144***
  (0.050) (0.012) (0.044) (0.012)
Deprivation 0.017   0.053*  
  (0.034)   (0.031)  
Satisfaction 0.037*   0.017  
  (0.021)   (0.019)  
Alienation   0.028**   0.027**
    (0.012)   (0.012)
Gini 0.100 0.097 0.128* 0.130*
  (0.076) (0.076) (0.074) (0.074)
Age –0.013*** –0.013*** –0.011*** –0.011***
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age- squared/100 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.008***
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female 0.002 0.002 –0.004 –0.003
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
At most secondary education 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.033* 0.034*
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020)
At least post- secondary education 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.074*** 0.074***
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025)
Employed 0.040** 0.039** 0.058*** 0.058***
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021)
Unemployed –0.108*** –0.109*** 0.009 0.009
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019)
Urban 0.019 0.015 –0.055*** –0.052***
  (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019)
Observations 43,865 43,865 38,514 38,514
Adjusted R2 0.140 0.140 0.135 0.135
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Wave and country fixed effects are included but 
the coefficients are not reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Afrobarometer.
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Table 10.A7 Economic conditions and inequality: OLS results in the Asianbarometer—all 
controls
  Present Future
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
No. functioning failures –0.002 –0.173*** 0.075 –0.053***
  (0.068) (0.027) (0.054) (0.012)
Deprivation –0.098**   –0.064*  
  (0.039)   (0.032)  
Satisfaction 0.034   0.036  
  (0.029)   (0.022)  
Alienation   –0.027   –0.012
    (0.017)   (0.009)
Gini –0.064*** –0.067** –0.038** –0.040
  (0.013) (0.026) (0.015) (0.026)
Age –0.029*** –0.029*** –0.018*** 0.010***
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Age- squared/100 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.010*** –0.001
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.016)
Female –0.004 –0.003 –0.002 –0.002
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018)
At most secondary education 0.019 0.021 0.033 0.035
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.034) (0.034)
At least post- secondary education 0.120*** 0.122*** 0.067* 0.069*
  (0.030) (0.031) (0.036) (0.036)
Employed 0.010 0.011 0.015 0.015
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.019) (0.019)
Unemployed –0.139** –0.137** 0.063*** 0.064***
  (0.052) (0.052) (0.020) (0.020)
Urban –0.079 –0.082 –0.015 –0.018
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.024) (0.024)
Observations 13,542 13,542 13,542 13,542
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.110 0.240 0.240
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Wave and country fixed effects are included but 
the coefficients are not reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Asianbarometer.
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Table 10.A8 Economic conditions and inequality: OLS results in the Latinobarometer—
all controls
  Present Future
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
No. functioning failures –0.144*** –0.165*** –0.082*** –0.068***
  (0.022) (0.009) (0.021) (0.007)
Deprivation 0.002   0.022**  
  (0.011)   (0.009)  
Satisfaction 0.024**   0.006  
  (0.012)   (0.011)  
Alienation   0.010**   0.011***
    (0.005)   (0.004)
Gini –0.035 –0.035 0.138*** 0.137***
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.046) (0.046)
Age –0.023*** –0.023*** –0.017*** –0.017***
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age- squared/100 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.010*** 0.010***
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female –0.031*** –0.031*** –0.006 –0.006
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
At most secondary education 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.052*** 0.053***
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
At least post- secondary education 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.025* 0.025*
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Employed 0.012* 0.012* 0.020** 0.020**
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Unemployed –0.204*** –0.206*** –0.010 –0.010
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 168,279 168,279 135,216 135,216
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.135 0.077 0.077
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Wave and country fixed effects are included but 
the coefficients are not reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Latinobarometer.
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Table 10.A9 Economic conditions and inequality: OLS results in the Eurobarometer—all 
controls
  Present Future
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
No. functioning failures 0.019 –0.202*** 0.143 –0.074***
  (0.095) (0.006) (0.136) (0.008)
Deprivation –0.099*   –0.100  
  (0.052)   (0.072)  
Satisfaction 0.115***   0.110*  
  (0.041)   (0.062)  
Alienation   0.011**   0.009**
    (0.005)   (0.004)
Gini 0.035 0.020 0.061 0.048
  (0.035) (0.034) (0.040) (0.036)
Age –0.032*** –0.032*** –0.031*** –0.031***
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age- squared/100 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.022*** 0.022***
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female –0.024*** –0.024*** –0.023*** –0.023***
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
At most secondary education 0.145*** 0.144*** 0.046*** 0.045***
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
At least post- secondary education 0.263*** 0.263*** 0.108*** 0.108***
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Employed 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.043*** 0.043***
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
Unemployed –0.480*** –0.480*** –0.009 –0.009
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 100,379 100,379 97,778 97,778
Adjusted R2 0.305 0.305 0.082 0.082
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Wave and country fixed effects are included but 
the coefficients are not reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Eurobarometer.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/02/21, SPi
Roy van der Weide and Ambar Narayan, China and the United States: Different Economic Models But Similarly Low Levels of 
Socioeconomic Mobility In: Inequality in the Developing World. Edited by: Carlos Gradín, Murray Leibbrandt, and Finn Tarp,  
Oxford University Press (2021). © United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER).  
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198863960.003.0011
11
China and the United States
Different Economic Models But Similarly  
Low Levels of Socioeconomic Mobility
Roy van der Weide and Ambar Narayan
1 Introduction
The US and China are the world’s largest economies, accounting for about one-
third of the world’s economic output.1 The two giants are different in a multitude 
of ways, including in population size, political system, and level of development. 
The US has historically ranked among the world’s richest countries in per capita 
terms. But China has been catching up. While output per capita is still notably 
lower in China, rapid economic growth sustained over multiple decades has 
brought China to parity with the US in terms of aggregate output (Cheremukhin 
et al. 2015; Song et al. 2011; Zhu 2012; Zilibotti 2017).
The unprecedented economic development in China is said to have fuelled a 
level of optimism in the country. A recent op-ed in the New York Times 
(Hernandez and Bui 2018) observes:
China is still much poorer overall than the US. But the Chinese have taken a 
commanding lead in that most intangible but valuable of economic indicators: 
optimism . . . the Chinese are now among the most optimistic people in the 
world—much more so than Americans and Europeans, according to public 
opinion surveys. What has changed? Most of all, an economic expansion with-
out precedent in modern history.
On the other hand, the US of course is home to the American Dream, which 
embodies a certain degree of optimism. The American Dream represents the 
1 The authors are most grateful to John Giles, Branko Milanovic, Finn Tarp, Colin Xu, and Li Yang 
for providing valuable inputs and comments. We also wish to thank Rakesh Gupta Nichanametla 
Ramasubbaiah for excellent research assistance. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions 
expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—World Bank and its affiliated organiza-
tions, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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belief that with hard work and determination anyone can achieve success and 
prosperity. In 1931, James Truslow Adams defined it as meaning that ‘life should 
be better and richer for everyone, with opportunity for each according to ability 
and achievement’ regardless of the social class one is born into (Adams 1931).
Are these two economic giants indeed lands of opportunity where individuals 
have the best chances of realizing their human potential? A land of opportunity is 
a society where an individual’s chances of success depend little on the socioeco-
nomic status of the family into which he or she is born. The extent to which this is 
true for a country can be measured using indicators of intergenerational mobility. 
A country with higher intergenerational mobility is one where an individual’s 
chances of success are more aligned with one’s innate ability and efforts than with 
one’s family background (a circumstance that is beyond a person’s control). Low 
mobility, on the other hand, indicates an uneven playing field, which leads to a 
waste of human capital when talented individuals are not given the opportunity 
to realize their potential, and misallocation of resources when rewards are not 
matched with ability. Resolving this is therefore likely to raise the stock of human 
capital, improve efficiency, and stimulate economic growth.
Levelling the playing field to stimulate socioeconomic mobility is costly. The 
large national incomes of the US and China, however, give these giants the neces-
sary fiscal space to achieve exactly that. Yet, the existing empirical literature ranks 
the US as a country with a relatively low level of intergenerational mobility when 
compared to other high-income countries, mostly from Europe (Björklund and 
Jäntti  1997; Corak  2013). How does the US compare to China? And how has 
mobility co-evolved over time for these two giants?
First, we examine estimates of intergenerational mobility in income for the US 
and China along with estimates for seventy-three other countries that have 
recently been compiled by Equalchances (2018) and Narayan et al. (2018). Having 
estimates of income mobility for seventy-five countries representative of more 
than 80 per cent of the world’s population allows us to put the difference in 
income mobility between the US and China in a global perspective. Second, we 
estimate how intergenerational mobility in the two giants has co-evolved over 
time by focusing on mobility in education for individuals born in the 1940s up to 
those born in the 1980s (the youngest cohort that would have had a chance to 
complete their education at the time the survey data was collected).
The data used to estimate education mobility are the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) from 2015, for the US, and the China Family Planning Survey 
(CFPS) from 2012. We will focus on measures of intergenerational mobility that 
evaluate the degree to which individual socioeconomic success is independent of 
the socioeconomic success of one’s parents (the success of any one individual is 
contingent on the family background they are born into; also referred to as ‘ori-
gin independence’). Our findings are summarized in the concluding remarks.
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the different measures 
of inter-generational mobility and the data we use to estimate these measures. 
Section 3 places the estimates of income mobility for the US and China in a global 
context and confirms the strong relationship between income mobility and edu-
cation mobility. A study of the co-evolution over time of intergenerational mobil-
ity in education is presented in Section 4. Section 5 provides a history of policy 
changes and economic conditions in the US and China that will help put the 
observed trends in economic mobility into context. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Measuring Inter-generational Mobility
2.1 Measures of Inter-generational Mobility
Socioeconomic mobility has been interpreted in the social science literature in 
several ways. In this chapter, we will focus on indicators that measure the degree 
to which one’s success is contingent on the success of one’s parents. Estimates for 
an alternative concept of intergenerational mobility, measuring the extent of pro-
gress that one generation as a whole has made in comparison to the previous 
generation, are presented in Van der Weide and Narayan (2019).
Let yi
c  denote the socioeconomic status of individual i. Similarly, let yi
p  denote 
the socioeconomic status of their parents. Examples of socioeconomic status include 
one’s level of income, education, and occupational prestige. The inter-generational 
transmission of socioeconomic status is often described by the following 
 linear model:




i= + + ,  
where ui  denotes an error term with mean zero. Empirical estimates of b gener-
ally lie between the values 0 and 1.
We consider a variety of different indicators of intergenerational mobility: (a) 
1-b, that is, one minus the regression coefficient from eq. (1); (b) 1-ρ, that is, one 
minus the Pearson correlation ρ between yi
c  and yi
p ;  (c) BHQ4, that is, the likeli-
hood that an individual reaches the top quarter of their generation given that he/
she is born to parents from the bottom half of their generation; and (d) µ 500 ,  that 
is, the expected rank of a child (in the child education distribution) whose parents 
are in the bottom 50 per cent of the parent education rank distribution. All these 
measures are common choices in the literature on inter-generational mobility, 
and each have their own pros and cons. The last measure is one that is advocated 
by Asher et al. (2019).
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Note that all four measures of intergenerational mobility capture the degree to 
which one’s socioeconomic status is determined by the socioeconomic status of 
one’s parents. The highest values of mobility are obtained when individual success 
is independent from the parental background one is born into, in which case 1-b 
and 1-ρ would both reach unity (as the regression and correlation coefficients 
both tend to zero) and all individuals, including those whose parents rank in the 
bottom half of their generation, would have a 25 per cent likelihood of reaching 
the top quarter of their generation with an expected rank of 50.
The different inter-generational mobility indicators capture different aspects of 
the relationship between parental and individual socioeconomic status. The 
measures 1-b and 1-ρ focus on the strength of the relationship between parental 
and offspring outcomes, while BHQ4 and µ 500  are also sensitive to the direction 
of mobility from one generation to the next. Between the four measures, ρ is the 
only measure that is invariant to the marginal distributions, that is, it is the only 
measure that is not sensitive to changes in the levels of inequality in socioeco-
nomic outcomes across generations.
2.2 Estimating Inter-generational Mobility
2.2.1 Education Mobility
yi
c  and yi
p  in this case denote the level of education of individual i and their 
parents, measured by years of schooling. Boys and girls are pooled. Parental edu-
cation is measured by the education level of the parent with higher education. 
Focusing on education in the measurement of intergenerational mobility has 
advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is that an individual’s educational 
attainment does not change after a certain age when all education is likely to be 
completed. The same is not true for income, which varies across a person’s life-
cycle as he/she accumulates experience.
A potential disadvantage, however, is that education data can be relatively 
coarse, particularly in countries where large shares of the population have little to 
no education. This particularly affects the estimation of BHQ4 and µ 500 ,  which 
requires the identification of individuals whose parents are in the bottom half of 
the parent education distribution. If most parents have no education, for ex ample, 
then it is not clear which parents should be considered for the bottom half. Asher 
et al. (2019) put forward an approach to estimate upper and lower bounds for 
these mobility measures using coarse parental education data. We will use the 
midpoint between those two bounds as our point estimate.
2.2.2 Income Mobility
Intergenerational income mobility is commonly measured by 1-b. Recall the linear 
intergenerational regression:
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i= + + ,  
where yi
c  and yi
p  now denote log permanent income of individual i and their 
parents, respectively. The regression coefficient b is often referred to as the income 
elas ti city; b = 0.4 indicates that 40 per cent of differences in parental incomes are 
transmitted to the next generation.
We use retrospective data on parental education and age to predict parental 
earnings, which can then be used as an instrument in the intergenerational 
 earnings regression. This two-sample two-stage least squares (TSTSLS) approach 
involves the following steps (see e.g. Björklund and Jäntti 1997): (i) estimate an 
income equation from an older sample that is representative of the current popu-
lation of parents when they were younger (a sample of ‘pseudo-parents’); (ii) use 
the estimated model coefficients (i.e. returns to education and experience) to pre-
dict parent income earnings at reference age using the retrospective data on the 
age and education of the parents as predictors; and (iii) regress offspring earnings 
at reference age on predicted parent earnings at reference age. Further details on 
the estimation of the income elasticity b can be found in the Appendix of Van der 
Weide and Narayan (2019).
2.3 Data
Estimates of intergenerational income elasticity are obtained directly from 
Equalchances (2018) and GDIM (2018).2 These sources also provide estimates of 
the income elasticity for seventy-three other countries (making seventy-five 
countries in total, including the US and China), allowing us to place the esti-
mates for the US and China in a global context. To facilitate cross-country com-
parability, all estimates have been compiled using TSTSLS as outlined in 
Section 2.2 with parental education and occupation serving as instruments for 
parental income, including for countries where parental income is in fact 
observed in the data (the US included). This database includes one estimate of 
the income elasticity per country, measuring the intergenerational transmission 
of income between the generation born in the 1950s/1960s and their offspring 
born in the 1970s/1980s. These data however do not allow us to track income 
mobility over time. To estimate intergenerational mobility in education in China 
and the US, we will be using the China Family Planning Survey (CFPS) from 
2012 and the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 2015, 
2 The Global Database of Intergenerational Mobility (GDIM) was compiled by Narayan 
et al. (2018).
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respectively. Both surveys are nationally representative and include parental 
education data for individuals of all ages.3
In both surveys, individual education is recorded in two complementary vari-
ables: years of schooling completed and grade completed.4 In the PSID, parental 
education is also available as both a continuous (years of schooling) and a cat-
egor ic al (grade completed) variable. In the CFPS, however, parental education is 
only available as a categorical variable. We convert the latter to years of schooling 
using UNESCO sources containing country- and year-specific mappings on the 
duration of educational programmes.5
Using these data, we will track inter-generational mobility in education from 
those born in the 1950s to those born in the 1980s. The decade cohorts are 
defined as all individuals born between the first and the last day of the relevant 
decade; for example, individuals from the 1980s cohort are born between 
1 January 1980 and 31 December 1989. The 1980s cohort denotes the youngest 
cohort for which all members would have had the chance to complete their edu-
cation at the time of survey data collection. Note however that individuals born 
in the 1980s will have benefited from public policies effective in the 1990s and 
2000s, which means that estimates of inter-generational mobility for the 1980s 
cohort provide a measure of the extent to which recent policy interventions 
have been able to level the playing field.
3 Income versus Education Mobility
In a 2012 speech, the Council of Economic Advisers’ chairman, Alan Krueger, 
observed the negative relationship between income inequality and intergenera-
tional income mobility using data from Miles Corak for a select number of mostly 
developed and emerging countries. This relationship has become known as the 
Great Gatsby Curve (GGC); see for example Corak (2013). Social democracies 
such as Denmark, Norway, and Finland stand out as countries with low levels of 
3 The sample size of individuals aged 21 or older is about 16,000 in the PSID and 33,000 in the 
CFPS. In the case of China, the sampling frame does not include Hong Kong, Hainan, Inner Mongolia, 
Macao, Ningxia, Taiwan, Tibet, Qinghai, and Xinjiang. Data on father’s education is available for 
85 per cent of the PSID sample and 90 per cent of the CFPS sample. Coverage of mother’s education is 
higher still; about 90 per cent of the PSID sample and 93 per cent of the CFPS sample.
4 While each survey distinguishes between eight different grades, the choice of grades does not 
correspond perfectly, most notably the higher levels. The grades used in the PSID (CFPS) are: (1) less 
than primary (idem), (2) primary (idem), (3) lower secondary (junior high school), (4) upper second-
ary (senior high school), (5) post-secondary non-tertiary (three year college), (6) short-cycle tertiary 
(bachelor degree), (7) bachelor (masters), and (8) masters or doctorate (doctorate).
5 Two sources of information are used. The first source (http://uis.unesco.org/en/isced-mappings) 
for the most part only conveys the duration of ISCED categories in 1997 and 2011. This source is sup-
plemented with information from UNESCO’s online database (http://data.uis.unesco.org/), which 
outlines the length of durations of ISCED categories by year from 1970. For further details, see 
Narayan et al. (2018).
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inequality and some of the highest levels of mobility. At the other end of the curve 
are Brazil and Chile, countries with some of the highest levels of inequality and 
lowest levels of mobility.
It should be noted that the GGC describes a correlation, not a causal relation-
ship. Factors that may be driving both inequality and socioeconomic mobility 
include large differences in quality of schooling and healthcare and differential 
access to these elementary services depending on the socioeconomic background 
children are born into, discrimination in the labour market, imperfect credit 
markets, and so on. One could argue that a country’s position on the GGC is (in 
part) determined by how that country ranks in terms of inequality of op por tun ity, 
fairness, and meritocracy. In a 2013 column on the GGC, The Economist invokes 
these concepts as it compares the positions of the US with that of European coun-
tries along the curve (Suleyman 2013):
The argument over the Great Gatsby curve is an argument about whether 
America’s economy is fair . . . whether you are rich or poor in Europe or America 
depends to a great extent not on your own qualities of efforts, but on where you 
happen to be born. America is not a meritocracy . . . not only do those born rich 
tend to stay rich and vice versa, just being born in one state or another makes a 
huge difference to your lifelong earnings.
This observation is also highlighted in a recent study by Milanovic (2015).
How does the US compare to China in terms of inequality and socioeconomic 
mobility? Figure 11.1 shows an updated version of the GGC that provides global 
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Figure 11.1 Great Gatsby curve
Source: Authors’ illustration based on GDIM (2018), Equalchances (2018), and PovcalNet data.
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developed, emerging, and developing countries. The size of the dots is proportional 
to the size of the country’s economy. The US and China, standing out as the 
world’s two largest economies, are seen to closely fit the curve, with remarkably 
little space between them. China is slightly more mobile and reports lower levels 
of inequality during parents’ generation. But the differences are small when 
viewed from a global perspective, and inequality in China has since caught up: 
present generations in China and the US experience very similar levels of 
 inequality (see e.g. Piketty et al. 2019 and Li et al. 2018).6 The US, with income 
mobility com par able with selected emerging and developing countries, is notably 
less mobile than most high-income countries.
How has intergenerational mobility co-evolved over time? We will try to 
answer this question by examining intergenerational mobility in education for 
both countries. This allows us to estimate and compare time-trends in mobility 
between the two countries over an extended period of time. Education denotes an 
important aspect of economic well-being, and education mobility arguably has a 
strong association with income mobility as human capital is a key determinant of 
individual wage earnings.
The last statement is confirmed in Figure 11.2, which plots estimates of income 
mobility against estimates of education mobility for the same set of seventy-five 
6 In both the US and China, present inequality levels are high by international standards. This 
could negatively impact on future growth prospects (Benjamin et al. 2011; van der Weide and 
Milanovic 2018), particularly where high inequality reflects high inequality of opportunity and low 
intergenerational mobility. In the case of China, inequality at the national level has also been found to 
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Figure 11.2 Income mobility versus education mobility
Source: Authors’ illustration based on GDIM (2018), Equalchances (2018) data.
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countries. The two distinct measures of mobility are seen to be strongly, but not 
perfectly, correlated. The imperfect correlation seems intuitive. Abstracting away 
from estimation error(s), income mobility is also a function of whether factor 
markets are creating a level playing field in terms of economic opportunities 
(such as jobs, wages, and access to credit) in addition to reflecting differences 
in human capital, while education mobility solely captures the degree to which 
human capital accumulation is fair and efficient.
4 Intergenerational Mobility in Education over Time
A country with high relative intergenerational mobility is a country where an 
individual’s chances of success are not contingent on the socioeconomic success 
of his or her parents. Governments may have several reasons for seeking to 
improve intergenerational mobility. In addition to arguments of fairness, there 
are economic arguments. When mobility is low, individuals are not operating on 
a level playing field. The odds of someone born to non-affluent parents will be 
stacked against him or her. This is not only unfair, but it also leads to a waste of 
human capital, as talented individuals may not be given the opportunity to reach 
their full potential. Reducing this inefficiency will arguably raise the stock of 
human capital and thereby stimulate economic growth. Since the waste of human 
capital tends to be concentrated toward the bottom of the distribution, the growth 
brought about by mobility-promoting policy interventions will more likely than 
not be of an inclusive nature.
Using a novel dataset for the US, Chetty et al. (2014) are able to estimate rela-
tive intergenerational mobility down to the commuting zone and county level, 
observing that mobility varies considerably within the country and within states.7 
Some parts of the US are found to be just as mobile as some of the most mobile 
countries in Europe, while in other parts of the country children face a steep 
uphill struggle to escape poverty when born into it. The researchers also find that 
the more mobile areas within the US tend to be areas that are less residentially 
segregated (i.e. households from different socioeconomic backgrounds and dif-
ferent races reside in the same neighbourhoods), have less inequality, and have 
higher quality public school systems, stronger social networks, and stronger 
 family structures.
Focusing on intergenerational mobility in education, we are able to compare 
the time-trends in intergenerational mobility between the two giants, the US 
and China (see Figure  11.3). While the three different measures of mobility 
show slightly different trends for the US, we identify a number of conclusive 
7 Corak (2019) has extended this analysis to Canada.
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Figure 11.3 Intergenerational mobility in education
Source: Authors’ illustration based on GDIM (2018) data.
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observations: (1) intergenerational mobility is declining in China while it is 
stagnating in the US (mobility in the US is increasing by one measure (the cor-
relation coefficient) and decreasing by another (the two measures of relative 
upward mobility)); (2) intergenerational mobility was historically higher in 
China but the two giants appear to be converging to a similar level of mobility. 
The stagnation in intergenerational mobility observed in the US for individuals 
born after 1950 is consistent with estimates obtained in the existing literature: 
see e.g. Hilger (2015). For perspective, Narayan et al. (2018) establish that the 
developing and emerging world dominate the list of countries with the lowest 
rates of relative upward mobility (BHQ4) for the 1980s generation. Among the 
bottom fifty countries, forty-six are developing or emerging countries while only 
four are high-income, including the US. In the median developing and emerging 
country, less than 15 per cent of those born into the bottom half make it to the 
top quarter, while more than two-thirds stay in the bottom half.
The observation that intergenerational mobility in China has steadily decreased 
over the past decades is consistent with the existing literature. Fan et al. (2015) 
study intergenerational mobility for two cohorts—individuals born between 1949 
and 1970 and those born after 1970—and find that mobility is lower for the 
younger cohort. Using the 1990 and 2000 Chinese Population Censuses, Magnani 
and Zhu (2015) find that intergenerational persistence in education increased 
between individuals born in the period 1966–70 and individuals born in the 
period 1976–80. Chen et al. (2015) find that intergenerational mobility has been 
declining for individuals born after 1950, but that it was increasing before that 
(i.e. for older generations). Golley and Kong (2013) similarly observe a decline in 
mobility  during that period, most notably for rural households.
Interestingly, the decline in intergenerational mobility in China and stagnation 
in the US was accompanied by large economic expansions in both countries (see 
Figure 11.4). This contrast is particularly obvious in China, which is one of only a 
few countries where mobility has declined significantly during a time of rapid 
economic growth (see e.g. Narayan et al. 2018). In general, a larger economic out-
put and national income implies an increased fiscal space that would permit the 
funding of policy interventions that would stimulate socioeconomic mobility. It 
may of course be the case that the latter has not been a policy priority in either 
China or the US.
China underwent a massive expansion in educational attainment and achieved 
an unprecedented reduction in poverty over the past three to four decades 
(Montalvo and Ravallion  2010; Ravallion  2009; Ravallion and Chen  2007). 
Several explanations have been suggested as to why inter-generational mobility in 
education has worsened while educational attainment has increased. Chen et al. 
(2019) argue that the expansion of education has not sufficiently reached children 
from disadvantaged backgrounds. Conceivably, the expansion of higher educa-
tion in particular would have primarily benefited the elites. Chen et al. (2019) 
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argue that many children did not meet the requirements for enrolment in higher 
education establishments.
The move from a planned to a market economy may also have played a part. 
It has shifted responsibility from the state to the individual and the family, which 
may have led to an increase in the importance of family networks impeding inter-
generational mobility (Gong et al. 2012). The decline in inter-generational mobil-
ity could also be related to rising returns to higher education and rising costs of 
higher education. Magnani and Zhu (2015) and Fan et al. (2015) both find that 
returns to education have increased in recent decades, which can increase incen-
tives for better-off parents to invest even more in children’s education. Fan et al. 
(2015) find that tuition fees for tertiary education have increased significantly, 
which can make it harder for children from low-income backgrounds to access 
and complete higher education.
5 Policy Changes in China and the US Underlying  
the Trends in Socioeconomic Mobility
The objective of this section is to provide an overview of changes in policy and 
economic conditions in the US and China that will help put the observed trends 
in economic mobility into context. Li et al. (2018: Section 6) provide a compre-
hensive overview of the public policies China has started to put in place in an 
effort to moderate inequality and stimulate socioeconomic mobility, some of 
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Figure 11.4 Intergenerational mobility versus GDP per capita
Source: Authors’ illustration based on GDIM (2018) and Maddison Project Database data.
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Improving socioeconomic mobility requires public policies that equalize 
opportunities, that is, interventions that reduce disadvantages faced by in di vid-
uals because of circumstances over which they have no control, such as parental 
education or economic status, gender, ethnicity, or location. The success of such 
interventions will naturally depend on their magnitude and on how they are tar-
geted. A growing empirical literature concludes that public interventions are 
more likely to increase socioeconomic mobility when: (a) public investments are 
sufficiently large (Iyigun  1999); (b) they are targeted to benefit disadvantaged 
families/neighbourhoods (Blankenau and Youderian  2015; Herrington  2015; 
Mayer and Lopoo  2008); (c) they focus on early childhood (Blankenau and 
Youderian 2015; Herrington 2015); and (d) political power is not captured by the 
rich unless the rich have the interests of the poor at heart (Uchida 2018).
For an inclusive review of the literature on the determinants of socioeconomic 
mobility and the public interventions that have been considered across the world 
to improve mobility, we refer the interested reader to Section 7 of Van der Weide 
and Narayan (2019). While most of the evidence on the drivers of mobility 
reviewed in what follows comes from research on the US and other developed 
economies, it is relevant for a middle-income country such as China, particularly 
as the Chinese economy rapidly approaches high-income status. Pursuing these 
policy objectives sits well with the growth strategy advocated by Stiglitz (2018), 
which underscores that future economic growth is more likely to be sustained if it 
is inclusive.
5.1 United States
Socioeconomic mobility in the US has historically been low relative to high-
income countries with comparable levels of national income per capita, and has 
shown little to no progress over the past three decades. Chetty et al. (2017) also 
find that there has been a large decline in the rate of absolute upward mobility in 
income across successive US birth cohorts—just half of children born in 1984 were 
earning more than their parents, compared to 92 per cent of children born in 1940. 
The stagnation in mobility (and decline in absolute income mobility) has occurred 
along with rising income inequality. Katz and Krueger (2017), for ex ample, link 
the decline in absolute mobility to the well-documented stagnant growth in real 
median household income and rise in income inequality beginning in the mid-
1970s. Public debate on the causes of stagnating socioeconomic mobility and ris-
ing income inequality in the US has focused on several overlapping explanations—a 
vast body of literature that is selectively summarized in what follows, focusing on a 
few key explanations on which there appears to be broad consensus.
The literature suggests that interplay between an intricate set of factors related 
to supply and demand for human capital have contributed to rising income 
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in equal ity and declining economic mobility in the US. On the supply side, Katz 
and Krueger (2017) highlight slower growth of human capital among children 
from low-income families across generations. While children born in the early 
1940s had around two more years of average schooling at age 30 than their par-
ents’ generation, this advantage drops to 0.75 years of schooling for children born 
in the early 1980s. This decline may in part stem from the fact that the average 
cost of college in the US has more than doubled between 1974 and 2012, with real 
implications for higher education equity (Cahalan and Perna 2015). In 2012, the 
average net price of college less grants and aid as a percentage of average family 
income was 84 per cent for low-income families (bottom quartile), compared to 
15 per cent for high-income families (top-quartile). Children from high-income 
families were on average eight times more likely to obtain a bachelors’ degree by 
the age of 24 than children from low-income families in 2012 (77 per cent versus 
9 per cent), up from four times more likely in the early 1970s (34 per cent versus 
8 per cent). As a result of this trend, ‘the US has gone from leading the world in 
educational attainment for those born in the mid-20th century to being in the 
middle of the pack for rich nations for those born since the 1970s’ (Katz and 
Krueger 2017: 382).
The steep growth in wage premium to college education in the US has been 
identified by many researchers as the most important contributor to rising 
income inequality. By some estimates, roughly two-thirds of the overall rise of 
earnings dispersion between 1980 and 2005 in the US is ‘proximately accounted 
for by the rising returns to schooling—primarily the growing premium to post-
secondary education’ (Autor 2014: 2). The wage premium for college education 
reflects not just returns to investment in higher education but also a fall in real 
earnings among non-college-educated workers, which is a cause for particular 
concern. While real hourly earnings of college-educated males in the US rose 
substantially between 1980 and 2012, real hourly earnings of males with high 
school or lower educational levels fell by 11–22 per cent, alongside modest growth 
in real earnings among females without at least some college education. The wage 
premium was not the only labour market driver of rising inequality. There was 
also a large drop in labour force participation rates among less educated males 
relative to males with post-secondary education between 1979 and 2007 
(Autor 2014: 16–17).
From the perspective of socioeconomic mobility in the US, the rising college 
premium arguably denotes an important factor, in addition to the rising cost of 
college and the decline in higher education equity. Cross-country evidence as 
well as economic theory suggest that countries with higher returns to education 
are likely to have lower intergenerational mobility of income (Corak  2013; 
Narayan et al.  2018). Intuitively, the main reason for this is the link between 
children’s educational attainment and parental education and income. Higher 
returns to education provide multiple advantages to children of more educated 
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parents—with educated parents and more resources available for investments in 
education, along with higher incentives for parents to make those investments.
Earning declines for less educated workers in the US have been linked to 
labour-demand shifts against middle-skill jobs, which have polarized the US 
labour market. Increased domestic outsourcing and use of independent contrac-
tors have limited the availability of good jobs that offer a path of upward mobility 
(Katz and Krueger 2017). Technological change has led to machines being substi-
tuted for workers for some routine medium-skill occupations and has reduced 
the demand for less educated workers (Autor 2014). Globalization, particularly 
the rapid increase in imports from China, has led to large-scale job losses in local 
labour markets where the industries exposed to foreign competition are concen-
trated (Autor et al. 2016). A decline in unionization has reduced the bargaining 
power of labour unions—the share of private-sector workers belonging to unions 
in the US saw a decline of almost 70 per cent between 1973 and 2011 (Autor 2014). 
The different demand-side factors work in tandem to reinforce each other. Policy 
choices have also played a role in strengthening these trends, such as policies that 
have contributed to the decline in minimum wage in real terms and in the bar-
gaining power of unions, and the successive declines in top federal marginal tax 
rates that have increased both post-tax inequality and the incentives for highly 
paid workers to seek still higher compensation (Autor 2014).
There is an extensive literature examining other possible drivers of rising 
economic inequality and stagnating social mobility in the US. Katz and Krueger 
(2017) associate rising US income inequality with residential economic segrega-
tion, which is likely to reduce economic mobility, given the evidence of neigh-
bourhood effects on long-run outcomes of children (Chetty et al.  2016). Local 
drivers of social mobility are clearly important in the US, and there is some evi-
dence to suggest they matter in many other parts of the world as well (see Narayan 
et al. 2018). For the US, at least half of the high variance in mobility across geo-
graphic areas is attributable to the causal effect of location. Neighbourhood char-
acteristics that matter for mobility include income segregation and concentrated 
poverty, racial segregation, quality of schools, crime rates, and the share of two-
parent families (Chetty and Hendren 2018a, 2018b). Kearney and Levine (2016) 
find that youth from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds are more likely 
to drop out of school if they live in a place with a greater gap between the bottom 
and middle of the income distribution, suggesting that they perceive a lower rate 
of return to investment in their own human capital when living in a more unequal 
place.8 Family structures also matter for inter-generational mobility. People raised 
outside stable two-parent homes are relatively likely to become low-income 
8 Evidence is unclear on whether there has been an increase in social (or racial) segregation of 
schools since the 1970s, although there is some evidence that students are more segregated by income 
across schools and districts today than in 1990 (Reardon and Owens 2014).
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adults, and are less likely to become high-income adults than people from stable 
two-parent homes (Bloome 2017).
Finally, the rising prevalence of economic rents and a shift in rents away from 
labour to capital is likely to have contributed to rising income inequality in the 
US (Stiglitz  2015). Stiglitz (2016) links the rise in inequality to the growth in 
rents, including what he calls ‘land and exploitation rents’, which arise from 
monopoly power and political influence. People who enjoy privileged connec-
tions to rent-providing assets or jobs tend to become more well-off, which in turn 
reduces social mobility by increasing the incentives among parents to pass on 
such connections to their offspring. Furman and Orszag (2018) argue that 
increased income inequality in the US is also linked to increased dispersion 
of  earnings between firms, with more and more firms enjoying super-normal 
returns to capital. Increasing market consolidation may be contributing to the 
increasing prevalence of firms with unusually high returns to capital.
A potential consequence of increased rent-seeking in the US economy could 
be a reduction in the overall dynamism of US labour markets, which can reduce 
social mobility over time. Several studies have documented that job creation and 
job destruction in the US fell from the late 1980s or 1990s to the late 2000s.9 
Long-distance migration, which often implies changes in employer and industry, 
has fallen by as much as 50 per cent since the late 1970s (Furman and 
Orszag 2018). Katz and Krueger (2017) argue that declining geographic mobility 
in the US may have contributed to reduced income mobility, since internal migra-
tion to locations with better opportunities has traditionally provided a path to 
upward mobility.
Given the rise in income inequality, it is interesting that educational mobility 
in the US, while consistently lower than comparator countries, has not declined 
between the generations born in the 1950s and 1980s. Autor (2014) finds that 
rising income inequality has not reduced intergenerational income mobility so 
far, although that may change as income among those born after 2000 is able to be 
observed.10 While the stability of socioeconomic mobility can be seen as positive, 
it is a worrying trend when combined with rising income inequality, as it implies 
that ‘the lifetime relative disadvantage of children born to low- versus high-income 
families has increased substantially . . . the rungs of the economic ladder have 
pulled farther apart but the chance of ascending the ladder has not improved’ 
(Autor 2014: 15). The decline in absolute upward mobility in income mentioned 
earlier heightens this concern (Chetty et al. 2017).
9 Decker et al. (2017); Davis and Haltiwanger (2014); and Hyatt and Spletzer (2013).
10 Autor (2014: 15) cites data from Chetty et al. (2014) to conclude that there is ‘no evidence that 
mobility in the US has appreciably changed among children born prior to the historic rise of US 
in equal ity (1971–1974) and those born afterward (1991–1993)’.
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Bloome et al. (2018) offer some explanations for why intergenerational income 
mobility in the US did not decline in recent decades even though education-
based inequalities in the labour market increased. They find that growing educa-
tional inequality by parental income and rising returns to education did reduce 
income mobility, as one would expect. This effect was only partly offset by the 
expansion of higher education that improved upward mobility among low-
income children. The other key offsetting factor was parental income becoming 
less predictive of adult income within educational groups. Thus, an increase in the 
‘indirect effect’ of parental income on adult income via education occurred along-
side a decreasing ‘direct effect’ of parental income on adult income via pathways 
other than education. The latter implies a decline in the effect of parental status 
on the earnings of offspring through channels such as connections and networks 
in the labour market.
Some also argue that mobility in the US could have declined had it not been for 
other policy initiatives, such as expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
for low-income workers in the 1980s and the early childhood education Head 
Start programme in the 1990s, and increasing federal support to college-going 
low-income students (Autor  2014). Narayan et al. (2018) find compelling evi-
dence in the literature that exposure in teenage years to EITC has a positive effect 
on test scores, high school and college completion, being employed, and earnings 
as a young adult.11 The Head Start programme—one of the largest pre-school 
programs in the world for low-income children—is found to have positive impacts 
on several long-term outcomes for children, such as high school gradu ation, 
college attendance, behaviours (self-control and self-esteem), and social outcomes 
(crime, teen parenthood, and health status).12
A decline in racial and gender discrimination in the US over the past five 
 decades, which was at least partly aided by social policies, is also likely to have 
been a positive force for socioeconomic mobility. Hsieh et al. (2019) document 
big changes in the distribution of social groups among high-skilled occupations 
between 1960 and 2010, such as a fall of more than 30 per cent in the share of 
white men among doctors and lawyers. They interpret this to suggest that many 
of the innately talented black people and women in 1960 were not pursuing their 
comparative advantage, which amounts to a severe mis-allocation of talent for a 
society. The improved allocation of talent between 1960 and 2010, they estimate, 
explains about one-quarter of growth in aggregate output per person over this 
period, suggesting that improving fairness in a society produces economic 
 benefits for the society as a whole.
11 See Narayan et al. (2018: Chapter 6) citing evidence from Dahl and Lochner (2012); Chetty et al. 
(2011); and Bastian and Michelmore (2018).
12 See Narayan et al. (2018: ch5) citing evidence from Bauer and Schanzenbach (2016); Carneiro 
and Ginja (2014); Garces et al. (2002); Deming (2009).
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Katz and Krueger (2017) summarize broad priorities for policy action to 
improve social mobility that are consistent with the overall evidence for the 
US. Their overarching message, echoing Chetty et al. (2017), is that faster growth 
is necessary but not sufficient to restore higher intergenerational income mobility 
in the US. They highlight five classes of policy intervention: fostering faster prod-
uct iv ity growth; raising investment in human capital for children born into low-
income families; raising wages and employment of low-income households; 
updating taxes and transfers to make them more progressive; and making place-
based policies to strengthen local drivers of mobility and improve geographic 
mobility. Bloome et al. (2018) advocate for reforms that address all stages of the 
education pipeline in the US, including transitions both before (graduating from 
high school) and after (e.g. completing graduate degrees) college, as well as pro-
gression within levels of education.
5.2  China
In the decades prior to the late 1970s, the first part of our period under con sid er-
ation, China adopted social planning that involved collective farming, price con-
trols, state-directed labour allocation and setting of wages, and limited labour 
mobility (either across occupations or geographically)—but also the provision of 
universal healthcare, child care, pensions, and schooling. Social planning allowed 
for relatively high levels of intergenerational mobility (IGM) and low levels of 
income inequality; IGM was notably higher and inequality notably lower than 
what was observed in the US. During the Maoist period, China went to extremes 
to eliminate the advantage of being born into a privileged family background 
(reflected in parental education). During the Cultural Revolution, which affected 
individuals born between the late 1940s and the early 1960s, admission to higher 
education favoured children from the poor or ‘lower’ social classes (considered 
the ‘good class’ backgrounds) and punished children from the rich or upper 
classes (‘bad class’ backgrounds) by restricting their access to higher education 
institutions and limiting their opportunities (see e.g. Giles et al.  2019). During 
this period, access to education in China expanded at the elementary and middle 
school levels, and lower classes gained preferred access to limited higher educa-
tion opportunities, both of which led to positive human capital accumulation. 
At the same time, continued reliance on collective farming under the commune 
system and central planning in industry led to declining productivity.
In 1978 China initiated a transition from social planning towards a more 
market-oriented system. Agrarian reforms came first, moving the rural economy 
away from collective farming. This involved the privatization of land rights and 
relaxing of agricultural price controls, providing incentives by shifting responsi-
bilities for farming to households (Li et al. 2018; Ravallion 2009; Ravallion and 
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Chen 2007; Zhang et al. 2005). Mid-1980s China’s reform agenda addressed the 
non-farm sector. The first wage reform introduced in 1984 allowed firm wages to 
reflect firm profitability. Labour contracts were formally introduced shortly 
thereafter, with reforms that ended the system of permanent employment. The 
percentage of contract workers increased from 4 per cent of workers in the mid-
1980s to almost 40 per cent ten years later. Subsequent reforms included enter-
prise restructuring, privatization, laying-off of state-sector workers, internal and 
external trade liberalization, and the liberalization of the foreign direct invest-
ment regime (Ravallion 2009; Zhang et al. 2005; Zhu 2012).13 Milanovic (2020) 
observes:
In 1978, almost 100 per cent of China’s economic output came from the public 
sector; that figure has now dropped to less than 20 per cent. In modern China, 
as in the more traditionally capitalist countries of the West, the means of pro-
duction are mostly in private hands, the state doesn’t impose decisions about 
production and pricing on companies, and most workers are wage laborers.
Shortly before China initiated its economic reform agenda, it also started a cam-
paign to reduce fertility. China formally began its one child policy (OCP) in 1979, 
but the campaign started in 1971 (Rosenzweig and Zhang 2009). The policy was 
relaxed in late 2013. The smaller number of children allowed for larger private 
investment per child. While this has been confirmed empirically (see also Li et al. 
2008), the effect on the overall development of China’s human capital has been 
relatively modest (Rosenzweig and Zhang 2009).
The reforms put China on a path of unprecedented economic growth as they 
fostered investment, more efficient allocation of resources, and technology 
 adoption from abroad (Song et al.  2011; Zilibotti  2017). China’s high growth 
rates primarily reflect productivity growth (Zhu  2012). With wages no longer 
set by the government, workers’ earnings have become more aligned with workers’ 
prod uct iv ity. While human capital accumulation and the increase in labour 
participation also contributed to growth, their impacts are believed to have been 
more modest. The increase in the demand for skilled workers was seemingly 
large enough to offset the increase in the supply of skilled workers, leading to an 
increase in the returns to education that was most notable in the 1990s (Zhang 
et  al.  2005). Economic growth and efforts to stimulate labour absorption by 
non-farm sectors, in addition to the growth of opportunities for migrant 
employment (de Brauw and Giles 2018), has lifted a large share of China’s popu-
lation out of poverty. Ravallion (2009) reports that headcount poverty declined 
from around 65 per cent in 1981 to 10 per cent in 2004. For comparison, for the 
13 During this period China also made large investments in infrastructure, including the construc-
tion of its national highway system (Faber 2014).
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developing world excluding China, poverty declined from 30 to 20 per cent 
 during this period.14
The effect of OCP on economic growth is more debatable. While it has 
increased average human capital, it has arguably depressed the overall stock of 
human capital (Wang and Zhang  2018).15 Estimating the exact magnitude of 
OCP’s impact is complicated in part by the fact that it coincided with China’s 
reforms towards a more market-oriented system, which also may have impacted 
on fertility, to the extent that fertility is influenced by economic wellbeing 
(Zhang 2017). The OCP is not without costs. Its unintended consequences include 
rapid aging of the population and imbalanced gender ratios, and it has almost 
certainly increased inequality in private investment in the human capital of 
children.
Milanovic (2020) highlights that China’s economic reforms and efforts to 
reduce fertility have had distributional implications:
The flipside of China’s astronomical growth has been its massive increase in 
inequality. During 1985–2010, the country’s Gini coefficient leapt from 0.30 to 
around 0.50—higher than that of the US and closer to levels found in Latin 
America. Inequality in China has risen starkly within both rural and urban 
areas, and it has risen even more so in the country as a whole because of the 
increasing gap between those areas.
This trend is confirmed by Li et al. (2018) and Piketty et al. (2019). Key drivers of 
this increase in inequality include the rise in returns to education and increased 
wage differentials based on productivity, the emerging inequalities in schooling 
and health, and the geographic disparities in public investments (see e.g. Zhang 
et al. 2005; Ravallion 2009; Li et al. 2018).
The decline in socioeconomic mobility can similarly be rationalized by China’s 
transition to a more market-oriented system. Socialism provided universal 
healthcare and schooling, and comparatively low levels of income inequality. As 
China departed from socialism, inequalities in access to schooling and healthcare 
and gaps in their quality emerged, with children from more privileged back-
grounds arguably having access to higher quality education compared to children 
born into less privilege. Other plausible determinants of the decline in socioeco-
nomic mobility include rising costs of education, geographic disparities in public 
14 China’s transition entailed large urbanization and substantial growth in the export-oriented 
manufacturing sector. Labour absorption by non-farm sectors has been a key driver of this poverty 
reduction, with poverty declining faster in areas and time-periods where the manufacturing sector 
was labour-intensive (Lin and Liu 2008; Montalvo and Ravallion 2010; Ravallion 2009).
15 As OCP was more strictly enforced in urban areas (where high human capital investments are 
comparatively high) than in rural areas, it may have negatively impacted on the overall human capital 
stock (Wang and Zhang 2018). Beyond this urban–rural divide, the OCP and its enforcement also 
exhibited notable variation over time and across provinces.
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investments, increased income inequality, and reductions in fertility, which, com-
bined with the increases in income inequality, enabled an increase in inequality in 
private investment in children. The high levels of mobility prior to the transition 
were perhaps unlikely to prevail, ‘given the concentration of ownership of capital, 
the rising cost of education, and the importance of family connections—the 
intergenerational transmission of wealth and power should begin to mirror what 
is observed in the West’ (Milanovic 2020).
Another factor that may contribute to lower socioeconomic mobility for in di-
vid uals born after the 1980s is incentives created by opportunities to migrate 
from rural to urban areas for work (see e.g. Giles and Huang 2020 and de Brauw 
and Giles 2017). Some youth from less advantaged rural areas, with middle-school 
education, choose to pursue job opportunities in urban China over en rol ling in 
high school. Migration of parents also has implications for education mobility, to 
the extent that it has negative impacts on the human capital accumulation of the 
children they leave behind (Meng and Yamauchi  2017). Children that migrate 
together with their parents will similarly be negatively impacted as they face 
obstacles to enrolling in urban public schools (Chen and Feng  2013). Public 
 policy options that could help reduce these negative effects include sub sid iz ing 
higher education and eliminating barriers to enrolling children of migrants in 
urban schools.
Low levels of IGM and equality of opportunity may slow down the accumula-
tion of human capital when individuals are not given the opportunities needed to 
reach their full potential, which in turn may become an impediment to future 
growth. ‘High inequality is a double handicap; depending on the sources of 
in equal ity—notably how much comes from inequality of opportunity—it means 
lower growth and that the poor share less in the gains from that growth’ 
(Ravallion 2009). As observed in Li et al. (2018), after pursuing economic growth 
during the first decades of the economic reforms, China has recently shifted its 
development strategy to address concerns about rising inequality and declining 
socioeconomic mobility. Examples of these policy changes include efforts to 
expand rural secondary education and increase university enrolments, increasing 
the affordability of healthcare, cash transfers to the poor, increases in minimum 
wage, and extending pensions to rural China (see e.g. Li et al. 2018). This policy 
shift, while designed to address inequality, may ultimately also help increase the 
stock of human capital and future economic growth.
6 Concluding Remarks
The US and China are found to exhibit remarkably similar levels of inter- 
generational ‘origin independence’ mobility for individuals born in the 1980s, 
both in income and education, with mobility levels that are considered low by 
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inter nation al standards. Before China embarked on its transition from planned to 
market economy, inter-generational mobility in education was relatively high—
notably, higher than it was in the US at the time. Since then, inter-generational 
mobility has declined significantly in China and has been stagnating in the US, 
such that the two giants have now converged to a comparable level of both mobil-
ity and inequality.
The decline in inter-generational mobility in China and the stagnation in the 
US happened during a time of robust economic expansion in both countries. This 
contrast is particularly strong in China, which is one of only a few countries in 
the world where mobility underwent a significant decline during a time of rapid 
economic growth. Since an economy that is getting richer has access to more 
resources for funding policy interventions that could stimulate socioeconomic 
mobility, it would seem that improving mobility has not been a policy priority in 
either country in recent decades. This could, however, be changing, as rising 
in equal ity in both countries is increasingly drawing attention to the need to raise 
economic mobility as a pathway to a more fair and equitable society over time. 
Examples of policy changes that have been adopted in China in recent years can 
be found in Li et al. (2018: Section 6).
To promote economic mobility, governments can play a proactive role in 
‘compensating’ for differences in individual and family starting points, to level 
the playing field in opportunities. This includes policies that aim to equalize 
op por tun ities across space, given the contribution of location to inequalities in 
most countries. The state also has a prominent role to play in making markets 
work more efficiently and equitably, since discrimination, anti-competitive 
behaviour, and market concentration are likely to constrain economic mobility. 
Fiscal policy is an important tool for realizing many of these objectives, by rais-
ing resources for investment in public goods and reducing inequality through 
redistribution.
Local characteristics that influence pathways to socioeconomic mobility 
include socioeconomic integration, the quality and availability of educational 
institutions, childcare, healthcare, recreational facilities, safety, and access to good 
jobs and opportunities. All of these are shaped by public policy. Interventions 
aimed at reducing the concentration of poverty and the socioeconomic segrega-
tion of neighbourhoods can be particularly beneficial for mobility. Going beyond 
the more traditional interventions, programmes can also attempt to bridge the 
deficit of role models and mentors in poor communities that constrain the 
 aspirations of youth, possibly in partnership with the private sector and civic 
organizations.
A policy agenda that promotes economic mobility sits well with the growth 
strategy advocated by Stiglitz (2018), which underscores that future economic 
growth is more likely to be sustained if it is inclusive. Ignoring the timeliness of 
such a policy shift in the case of the US and China, and leaving inequality and 
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lack of mobility unchecked, may end up undermining future growth. Milanovic 
(2020) makes a similar observation:
What does the future hold for Western capitalist societies? The answer hinges on 
whether liberal meritocratic capitalism will be able to move toward a more 
advanced stage, what might be called ‘people’s capitalism’, in which income from 
both factors of production, capital and labour, would be more equally distrib-
uted. This would require broadening meaningful capital ownership way beyond 
the current top ten per cent of the population and making access to top schools 
and the best-paying jobs independent of one’s family background.16
Implementing public interventions that would increase socioeconomic mobility 
and reduce inequality naturally requires the necessary political support. This 
applies equally to the US and to China.
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From Manufacturing-Led Export  
Growth to a Twenty-First Century  
Inclusive Growth Strategy
Explaining the Demise of a Successful  
Growth Model and What to Do about It
Joseph E. Stiglitz
1 Introduction
Export-led growth was the model behind the twentieth-century growth  mir acles.1 
There was unprecedented growth in East Asia, closing the gap in income per 
capita and standards of living with the advanced countries.2 In the future that 
model will not work in the same way, or at least to the same extent, as it did in the 
past. This chapter explains why that is the case (Section 2) and what developing 
countries and the global community that supports development can do about it. 
It sets this new development strategy within the context of the broadening of the 
development agenda. With widespread recognition of the failures of the Washington 
Consensus policies, there was a need for a new ‘consensus’ concerning the ob ject-
ives of development and how they might be achieved, as recently articulated in 
the Stockholm Statement (Section 3).
To formulate a new development strategy, we begin by deconstructing manu-
facturing export-led growth, and asking why it was so successful (Section 4). We 
argue in Section 5 that what is needed to replace that strategy is a multi-pronged 
1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the UNU-WIDER conference Think 
Development—Think WIDER, Helsinki, 15 September 2018. An earlier version was presented at the 
Economic and Social Research Foundation Annual National Conference, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, 
2 May 2018. I am indebted to Kaushik Basu, my discussant; to Haaris Mateen for research assistance; 
and to Debarati Ghosh and Eamon Kircher-Allen for editorial assistance. Various parts of this chapter 
are based on joint work with Martin Guzman, Bruce Greenwald, and Akbar Noman, to whom I am 
greatly indebted: see, in particular, Noman and Stiglitz (2012a, 2012b, 2015a, 2015b); Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (2006, 2010, 2013, 2014); and Stiglitz and Greenwald (2010, 2014, 2015).
2 See the World Bank’s report The East Asian Miracle, of which I was a co-author (Birdsall et al. 
1993), and Stiglitz (1996) and the references cited there for an account of the East Asian miracle.
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strategy, entailing a combination of manufacturing, agriculture, services, and natural 
resources. To implement that strategy, countries will require active industrial 
policies (Section  6) based on a new understanding of dynamic comparative 
advantage (Section  7). Section  8 describes how developed countries can assist 
developing countries as they embark on these new strategies, and, in particular, 
explains how the creation of a global reserve system can help provide the finance 
that will be especially important if developing countries are to succeed in this 
twenty-first century inclusive growth strategy.
2 Explaining the End of Manufacturing-Led Growth
Manufacturing is a victim of its own success: the rate of growth of productivity 
(output per worker) exceeds that of demand. The result is that the share of manu-
facturing in GDP is declining everywhere, as Table 12.1 shows, and that in turn 
implies that the share of manufacturing in employment is declining even more 
rapidly, as we illustrate later in this chapter.3
Moreover, what happened to agriculture in the advanced countries is now hap-
pening globally. Productivity increases in agriculture meant that a smaller and 
smaller fraction of the labour force was required to produce the food that people 
needed and wanted; the advanced countries went from a situation in which some 
70 per cent of the population was engaged in agriculture and related services to 
one in which a very small fraction of the workforce (in the US, less than 3 per cent) 
3 Some vertical disintegration of service components of manufacturing has given the appearance of 
more rapid disappearance of jobs and output than is in fact the case. Still, vertical disintegration can 
have real consequences (e.g. for wages and flows of knowledge).
Table 12.1 Manufacturing share of GDP (%)
 2000 2005
World 19 15
E. Asia and Pacific 25 23
Europe and Central Asia 19 16
Latin American and the Caribbean 17 14
North America 16 12
South Asia 15 16
Sub-Saharan Africa 11 11
Low income 10 8
Lower middle income 17 16
Upper middle income 24 21
High income 18 15
Source: Author’s construction based on World Bank Group (2018).
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can produce more than even an obese society can consume.4 This means that if 
current trends continue unabated, a very large fraction of the labour force will 
have to be deployed elsewhere.
In the advanced countries, in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the 
first half of the twentieth, these workers were largely absorbed by manufacturing. 
But now, with the decline globally in manufacturing employment, this will be 
problematic. Even with emerging markets taking a larger share of global manu-
facturing jobs, and with a shift of jobs from China to Africa, new manufacturing 
jobs will absorb only a fraction of new entrants into the labour force in Africa.5
Manufacturing can, of course, still have impacts that are disproportionate to its 
size. And some countries may have a natural comparative advantage in some 
niches (or in some cases, they may even be able to create a comparative advan-
tage). But it is unlikely that manufacturing export-led growth will have the impact 
that it had in China and East Asia. It cannot be the sole development strategy, or 
even at the heart of a country’s strategy. This is especially so because the advan-
tages of cheap labour will diminish as labour becomes of lesser importance in 
manufacturing itself—for example, as robots replace humans. The developing 
countries’ advantage in low labour costs will, at least in many cases, be outweighed 
by locational disadvantages: an increasing fraction of production will be located 
near points of consumption. These are major changes that will affect development 
strategies going forward.
2.1 New Thinking about Development
As we think of a new strategy to replace manufacturing export-led growth, we 
need to incorporate the insights from earlier developmental experiences, includ-
ing the global failures of the Washington Consensus policies and the successes in 
East Asia, and from advances in economic understandings. There are five key 
insights in particular that have led to a rethinking of development policies.
 • What separates developing countries from developed is not just a disparity 
in resources, but a disparity in knowledge and institutions; see, for instance, 
the 1998 World Development Report (Dahlman et al. 1998).
 • Development entails a structural transformation (Stiglitz 1998b).
4 See Roser (2018) for historical employment in agriculture; current US data are available at the US 
Department of Agriculture’s website, www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ag-and-food-statistics-chart-
ing-the-essentials/ag-and-food-sectors-and-the-economy/. The economic implications of this trans-
formation are explored in Delli Gati et al. (2012a, b).
5 At most, some 85 million jobs could be freed up (Lin 2011), but the working-age population of 
Africa is expected to grow by 450 million people, or by 70 per cent, from 2015 to 2035 (World 
Economic Forum 2017).
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 • There can be growth without structural transformation—especially com-
mon in resource-dependent countries—but such growth will be neither 
sustainable nor equitable. All countries are, of course, in need of structural 
transformation—in advanced countries, in response to technology and glo-
balization and the move from the manufacturing to the service sector; in 
China, from export-led growth to domestic demand-driven growth and 
from quantity to quality growth; in natural-resource economies, to diversify 
away from dependence on natural resources; and in all countries in response 
to the need to address problems of climate change (both mitigation and 
adaptation) and changing demographics. But the need for structural trans-
for ma tion is at the heart of development.
 • Markets on their own don’t manage these transformations well. There are 
critical impediments imposed by capital market imperfections, and im port-
ant externalities and co-ordination failures. Government needs to assume 
an important role. How best to do this is one of the central themes of this 
chapter.
 • Successful development and structural transformation entails a change in 
norms and mindsets, including the mindset that change is possible—a 
movement away from traditional society towards modernization. In the 
West, these changes are especially associated with the Enlightenment 
(Stiglitz and Greenwald 2014, 2015). For our purposes, the two critical ideas 
are (a) the mechanisms by which a society/economy learns (closing the 
knowledge gap to which we referred earlier) and (b) the insights about 
social, political, and economic organization, including the rule of law, sys-
tems of checks and balances, and the balance between the market, the state, 
and civil society (the subject of my 2015 WIDER Lecture, on the occasion of 
its thirtieth anniversary).6
These new understandings have led to a movement from a focus on developmen-
tal projects to policies and then to institutions, corresponding to the realization of 
the importance of not just physical capital, but human capital, social capital, and 
knowledge capital.
3 The Stockholm Statement
In an attempt to capture in a brief form these and other new understandings 
about development, a group of thirteen economists, including four former chief 
economists of the World Bank, put forward the Stockholm Statement of 
6 See Stiglitz (2016b). The original talk was given in September 2015.
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development principles in 2016 (Alkire et al. 2016; Stiglitz 2016a), with eight key 
notions:
 1. GDP growth is not an end in itself.
 2. Development has to be inclusive.
 3. Environmental sustainability is a requirement, not an option.
 4. There is a need to balance market, state, and community.
 5. Successful development requires providing macroeconomic stability, but 
this does not just mean balancing budgets or focusing exclusively on inflation.
 6. One has to attend to the impact of global technology and inequality. It will 
be especially important to assess impacts on labour, in both developed and 
developing countries. Successful responses require investment in human 
capital, rewriting the rules of the economy to achieve a more equalitarian 
distribution of market income,7 and creating new instruments of redistri-
bution within and between countries.
 7. Social norms and mindsets matter. One especially needs to bring the 
insights of modern behavioural economics to bear in development policies. 
These may provide effective ways of altering behaviour (savings, fertility, 
etc), and often at very low cost (Hoff and Stiglitz  2016; World Bank 
Group 2015).
 8. Global policies have significant effects on developing countries. The inter-
nation al community, and especially the advanced countries, have a respon-
sibility to ensure that global policies and international agreements are 
equitable and pro-development.8 The Stockholm Statement recognized the 
interdependence of countries, and that the policies of the large, rich coun-
tries have large externalities on the rest of the world, which they often don’t 
take into account (including their monetary, regulatory, trade, and migration 
policies). Tax havens, which the regulatory policies of the advanced coun-
tries tolerate, affect all countries, not just the developing countries. Still, the 
flow of money out of Africa has particularly adverse effects on Africa’s 
growth (African Development Bank and Global Financial Integrity  2013). 
International agreements cover only parts of these arenas where there are 
global externalities, and where there are agreements (such as on climate) they 
often do not go far enough. And, of course, developed countries have not 
lived up to their commitments of 0.7 per cent of GDP in aid.
7 That is, the rules of the game—including those of governing–labour relations, competition, and 
corporate governance—are critical in determining both the distribution of income and efficiency: see 
Stiglitz et al. (2015).
8 Section 7 explains why current arrangements often stymie development.
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3.1 Key Differences with the Washington Consensus
The eight principles of the Stockholm Statement represent a marked change from 
the Washington Consensus, with its primary emphasis on markets, its inadequate 
attention to market failures, its narrow view of macro-stability, and its narrow 
conception of the goals and instruments of development.9
3.1.1 Broader Goals to Reflect Challenges of the Twenty-First Century
The Washington Consensus focused on increasing GDP. But GDP is not a good 
measure of well-being, as the International Commission on the Measurement of 
Economic Performance and Social Progress has pointed out (Stiglitz et al. 2009). 
It takes, for instance, inadequate or no note of sustainability, whether environ-
mental, social, political, or even economic. With climate change presenting an 
existential challenge to the planet, no responsible developmental strategy should 
ignore its impact on the environment. GDP also says nothing about how the 
fruits of the economy are being shared: GDP could go up even though most citi-
zens are worse off. So another objective of a well-designed development strategy 
is inclusive growth. This is especially important because we have learned that 
trickle-down economics—which holds that if GDP goes up, the incomes of all (or 
most) will, too—simply doesn’t work. Indeed, globalization (as it has been man-
aged), while it may have simultaneously contributed to the increase in GDP, 
almost surely also contributed to the lowering of incomes of unskilled workers.
We have learned also that greater inclusivity can lead to more robust growth, 
especially when inequality reaches the extremes that it has in some countries 
(such as the US and many developing countries), and when it originates in the 
way it does, from rent-seeking on one hand to lack of opportunities for the poor 
on the other hand (Berg and Ostry 2011; Ostry et al. 2014; Stiglitz 2012, 2015). 
Thus, there are policies that can simultaneously increase equality and growth.
Seeing equality and growth as complements rather than substitutes is a major 
change in development thinking.
Employment generation is central to inclusive growth—especially where the 
labour force is expected to grow rapidly, as in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Leaving 
large fractions of the labour force underutilized or unutilized not only leads to 
large inequities, but is also inefficient. And again, growth itself does not necessar-
ily lead to the growth of employment, especially of jobs in the formal sector. In 
recent years (2004–9), for instance, India has had rapid growth, but in a period in 
9 For an earlier discussion of the limitations of the Washington Consensus, see my 1998 WIDER 
Annual Lecture (Stiglitz 1998a); see also Stiglitz (2002).
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which 50 million have entered the labour force, only about 1.1 million formal 
sector jobs were created.10
3.1.2 More Instruments
This new development thinking is also characterized by making use of more 
instruments. The Great Recession, of course, led even developed countries to 
embrace more instruments for monetary policy, such as quantitative easing (QE) 
and macroprudential regulation. But there is a need for more instruments for 
macrostability (now embraced in the new Institutional View of the IMF on cap-
ital controls; see IMF 2012); and more instruments for developmental trans for-
ma tion—including industrial policies (to be discussed in Section 6), promoting 
not just manufacturing but also agriculture and services; and those making use of 
the insights of behavioural economics.11
3.1.3 Clearer Distinctions between Means and Goals
One of the central failures of the Washington Consensus was the confusion 
between means and goals. Privatization, liberalization, deregulation, or even mar-
kets and GDP growth are not ends in themselves (see, for instance, Kanbur et al. 
2018), but may be means to higher living standards or achieving the broader 
goals described earlier—or they could have just the opposite effects. The latter 
can especially arise because some policies that may increase static efficiency (like 
trade liberalization) may impede dynamic learning (Greenwald and Stiglitz 2006).
Other variables, such as inflation, budget deficits, and current account deficits, 
also need to be looked at through this lens. But not attending to some of these 
variables in a timely way may make it difficult to achieve the real goals of 
development.
3.1.4 Greater Participation: A Balance between Markets,  
Government, and Society
One of the most important differences between the Stockholm Statement and 
earlier articulations of development strategy involves broadening the range of 
participants in the development process. The narrowness of the Washington 
Consensus, a consensus between 15th Street (the US Treasury) and 19th Street 
10 According to India’s National Sample Survey Office data (ICSSR Data Service 2016). A United 
Nations Development Programme report suggests that over a longer period of some two decades, 
India’s employment performance, while still better than in the high-growth period, was disappointing: 
‘In India, the size of the working-age population increased by 300 million during the same time 
[1991–2013], while the number of employed people increased by only 140 million—the economy 
absorbed less than half the new entrants into the labour market.’ See UNDP (2016).
11 There is a large literature on industrial and LIT (learning, industrial, and technology) policies; 
see references, including Greenwald and Stiglitz (2006,  2013,  2014), Stiglitz (2011), Stiglitz and 
Greenwald (2014, 2015), and Noman and Stiglitz (2012a, b, 2015a, 2015b) for Africa. For the behav-
ioural economics policies, see World Bank Group (2015).
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(the IMF), shaped its perspectives: its focus on markets was too narrow; develop-
ment entails not just markets, but government and civil society; and it is essential 
to understand the roles each needs to play, how each can play these roles more 
effectively, and how best to facilitate the appropriate interactions. For instance, all 
successful development has entailed government playing an important role—the 
development state. It has a multiplicity of jobs to do: providing enabling  conditions 
for markets to work, including good physical and institutional infrastructure and 
an educated labour force; regulating markets—preventing negative externalities, 
including exploitation and excessive volatility; promoting development more 
directly, including through the industrial policies to which we referred earlier; 
understanding the ‘big picture’, including the problems posed by excessively rapid 
population growth; and co-ordinating more broadly developmental strategies 
among the many different participants in a country’s development process.
One of the consequences of the Washington Consensus’ single-minded focus 
on markets, with policies that restricted what the government could and should 
do, was that it undermined the institutional development of the state, impeding 
its ability to be as effective an instrument for development as it could be 
(Khan 2012). Even when it was finally recognized that there had to be a role for 
the state, it was a very circumscribed role. The state was described as enabling the 
private sector, with the real responsibility for development conferred on the pri-
vate sector.12 But for reasons I explained in my 2015 WIDER Lecture, there are 
many arenas, even in developed countries, in which the private sector is likely to 
fail to meet societal needs, and this is even more so in developing countries.
As we come to understand the importance of market failures and the need for 
collective action, especially in the societal transformations that are central to 
development, government is pivotal, so development efforts have to focus on 
increasing the efficiency and efficacy of government, and that includes, im port-
ant ly, how to improve governance (Khan 2012; Noman et al. 2012; Stiglitz 2016b). 
Here, the systems of checks and balances to which we referred earlier are critical, 
and in this, media and civil society play a pivotal role.13
Critics of government action cite the numerous instances of government fail-
ure, where government fails to accomplish what is intended, or, perversely, serves 
the interests of the elites. Of course, ‘to err is human’, and all human institutions 
are fallible. Over the years, we have learned how to reduce the risks of failure and 
increase the chances of success; there have been important institutional innovations. 
These are part of the process of societal learning. Importantly, critics of government 
12 For a discussion of this point in the context of Africa, see Noman and Stiglitz (2012b) and the 
other papers in Noman et al. (2012).
13 As I argue in Stiglitz (2019), there cannot be an effective systemic system of checks and balances 
in a world of excessive inequality: almost inevitably, those at the top will ensure that the political sys-
tem serves their interests. Economic inequality gets translated into political inequality. See also 
Stiglitz (2012).
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action tend to overestimate the extent of government failure, suggesting that it is 
inevitable, and underestimate the extent of market failure. Successes in East Asia 
and elsewhere show that government failure can be overcome—governments can 
play and have played a pivotal role in developmental transformation. By contrast, 
there are few if any instances of successful development where government did 
not play an important role.
4 Deconstructing the Success of the  
Manufacturing Export-Led Model
In this section we ask what made the manufacturing export-led growth model so 
successful, as a prelude to asking: if that model is dead, is there some other way of 
getting the benefits that it provided?14
Exports (more broadly, an open economy) allowed developing countries to 
avoid several of the complexities that were at the centre of earlier developmental 
debates. On the supply side, the problem of material balances (ensuring that 
internal demand for each good was equal to internal supply) did not have to be 
addressed—all one had to have was enough foreign exchange. When some input 
was needed, it could always be obtained in international markets.15 Export-led 
growth generated the necessary foreign exchange. On the demand side, there was 
a problem of ensuring that there was adequate demand for the goods that no 
longer were produced. At the right exchange rate, there was unlimited demand 
for a country’s exports, especially for small countries.
Exports also provided the basis for learning, so necessary for the developmen-
tal transformation discussed earlier. As we also noted earlier, what separates 
developed and less developed countries is a gap in knowledge, and export-led 
growth facilitated the transfer of that knowledge. Those engaging in trade had to 
interact with others, and those seeking to compete in export markets had to learn 
about manufacturing technology and international standards. Manufacturing is 
particularly well suited for learning, because it occurs in large and long-lived 
institutions (in contrast to, say, agriculture, where, especially in developing coun-
tries, the unit of production is a small farm). There are large economies of scale in 
14 For discussions of the East Asian manufacturing export-led growth model, see Amsden (1989), 
Birdsall et al. (1993), Stiglitz (1996), and Wade (1990) and the references cited there.
15 Except for China and perhaps India, even developing countries that have large populations have 
a relatively small GDP. Standard trade models that assume perfect competition assume that at the 
right exchange rate, there is an infinite demand. Demand curves are horizontal. In practice, demand 
curves are downward-sloping (partly because of imperfections of competition, partly because there 
are large transport costs, partly because of imperfections in information).
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the production and absorption of knowledge, and greater incentives for large 
institutions to engage in learning.16
Most important in the process of learning is learning by doing.17 One can best 
(and sometimes only) learn how to increase productivity in manufacturing by 
manufacturing. Most relevant for development is that there are important spill-
overs of the learning and development in manufacturing to other industries. 
These spillovers include not just the direct technological spillovers (which may 
occur when processes in other sectors have some overlap with those in 
 manufacturing), but also institutional spillovers (e.g. from the development of 
educational and financial institutions). The production of better-educated indi-
viduals and more of them, a requisite for success in manufacturing, is of  benefit 
elsewhere in the economy. So, too, financial institutions, which may have originated 
to finance commerce or manufacturing, can expand their reach into other sectors 
of the economy. Of course, some transfer of technology could be accomplished in 
numerous other ways (buying technology or foreign direct investment), but these 
mechanisms are likely to have fewer deep learning benefits and spillovers.
Because of the importance and pervasiveness of learning and other spillovers 
from manufacturing exports, ‘leaving it to the market’ does not lead to the 
 maximization of welfare or growth. Some form of government intervention is 
necessary to achieve desirable outcomes, including the industrial policies that we 
discuss at greater length in what follows.
Exports also provided the basis for tax revenues. Finance is needed for govern-
ment expenditures—for the publicly provided goods that are essential for devel-
opment, including infrastructure, education, and the acquisition, adaptation, and 
dissemination of technology. It is hard to tax the informal sector, including small 
farmers. That is why, traditionally, tax authorities relied heavily on taxes imposed 
on trade: it was easier to monitor the flow of goods that went through the limited 
number of ports.
Finally, the manufacturing exports generated employment in the urban sector, 
which was key in supporting structural transformation and widely shared growth. 
They generated jobs for new entrants into the labour force and those leaving 
 agriculture, and the (relatively) high and increasing wages in manufacturing 
(resulting from ever-rising levels of productivity as an effect of learning and educa-
tion) led to increasing demand for non-traded goods and higher standards of living.
Not only did manufacturing exports generate this panoply of benefits, but 
there were also numerous ways in which East Asian countries could promote 
manufacturing exports. They provided limited direct support (e.g. through 
16 See Stiglitz and Greenwald (2014). The next paragraph highlights that because of the importance 
of learning by doing, openness, when not well managed, may have adverse effects on learning and 
productivity increases. For an empirical discussion, see Navaretti and Tarr (2000).
17 See Arrow (1962). Moreover, one not only learns how to do things by doing them, one learns 
how to learn by learning: see Stiglitz (1987). Stiglitz (2011) shows how one can use tax and subsidy 
policies to promote learning and development.
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subsidies) but did provide access to credit at near-commercial rates to firms that 
were successful in exporting. This provided incentives for entrepreneurs to 
increase exports. And they had other instruments of industrial policy, including 
restrictions or taxes on competing imports and subsidies or credits for exports. 
Perhaps most important, though, was their provision of an enabling environment, 
including good infrastructure and an educated labour force.
5 A Multi-Pronged Strategy
With the limited prospects for manufacturing exports for those countries that did 
not take advantage of manufacturing export-led growth when it was available as 
the prime strategy for development, similar outcomes will require a multifaceted 
growth strategy, with different facets reflecting different aspects of what contributed 
to the success of manufacturing export-led growth. The region for which this is 
most true is, of course, SSA. For Africa, the last twenty-five years of the twentieth 
century was a lost quarter-century. Per capita income in 2000 was barely at the 
level of the mid-1970s. Economic decline was particularly sharp during the 
period 1980–95, years in which East Asia was growing rapidly under the influ-
ence of manufacturing export-led growth. Africa’s decline was partially a result of 
a plethora of conditionalities imposed on SSA in the years after independence. At 
independence, of course, the colonial powers had failed to leave a legacy of either 
physical or human capital that would have enabled SSA to have prospered. In the 
currency, debt, financial, and economic crises that followed, these countries felt 
they had no choice but to turn to the Bretton Woods institutions for help, and in 
return for that help these institutions extracted a high price.
While the weakness in the agricultural sector was due largely to neglect, the 
fate of the industrial sector was the result of policies that were imposed on much 
of SSA. The share of manufacturing in GDP was once so highly correlated with 
per capita income that, until some fifteen or so years ago, the IMF used the term 
‘industrial countries’ to refer to high-income countries. Reflecting the diminished 
importance of manufacturing, the relationship became an inverted U-shaped one 
some two decades or so ago, and more recently the height of the inverted U has 
been declining (i.e. the peak level of income at which manufacturing’s share 
begins to shrink has been falling) (see Figure 12.1).
But under the IMF/Washington Consensus programmes, SSA began its dein-
dus tri al iza tion in the 1980s much too prematurely and rapidly. Manufacturing as 
a share of value added to GDP decreased from 14.7 per cent in 1975 to 10.1 per 
cent in 2010 (see Table 12.2 for data from the Africa Sector Database by de Vries 
et al. (2015); Figure 12.2 has the corresponding numbers from the World Bank, 
starting from 1981).
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Figure 12.1 Simulated manufacturing output shares
Source: Rodrik (2015), reproduced with permission.
This history has one important implication for SSA relevant to the multi-
pronged strategy that we are about to describe: this ‘underindustrialization’ of 
SSA has rightly been interpreted to mean there is more scope for ‘catch-up’ in dus-
tri al iza tion, notwithstanding the headwinds posed by global technological 
trends. There is indeed more scope for catch-up, and especially so for the kind 
of  high-transport-cost goods that are particularly targeted at consumers and 
producers in the continent. Still, industrialization will, as we have already 
 emphasized, not be able to play the role it did for East Asia.
We now turn to a more detailed look at each of the prongs of our  multi-pronged 
strategy.
5.1 Manufacturing
Manufacturing, as we have noted, will continue to play a role, but it will be more 
limited and will need to be more directed, where possible taking advantage of 
natural advantage (such as mineral resources). (As we have also already noted, 
though, because of robotization and artificial intelligence, developing countries’ 
advantage in manufacturing, arising out of cheap labour, will diminish, and even 
if there is some success in expanding manufacturing, in most countries this 
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expansion will not suffice to create enough jobs for those seeking employment in 
the modern economy.18)
Moreover, from now on manufacturing’s ability to generate tax revenues (one 
of its strengths) may be hampered, as competition for low-skilled manufacturing 
among developing countries may result in a race to the bottom. This race would 
result in developing countries reaping, at most, limited benefits. The implication 
is that developing countries need to be careful in giving tax breaks and, more 
18 There is another reason why manufacturing may play a less important role in Africa’s develop-
ment than it did in East Asia’s. The construction of global value chains has, some would argue, enabled 
more of the value of the economic activity occurring within a country to be extracted by the multi-
nation als, and has structured production in ways in which there is less learning and less linkage to the 
rest of the economy: see Andreoni (2019).
Table 12.2 Deindustrialization in sub-Saharan Africa
Value added by sector (% of GDP)
 1960 1975 1990 2010
Agriculture 37.6 29.2 24.9 22.4
Industry 24.3 30.0 32.6 27.8
Manufacturing 9.2 14.7 14.0 10.1
Services 38.1 40.7 42.6 49.8
Share of employment (%)
  1960 1975 1990 2010
Agriculture 72.7 66.0 61.6 49.8
Industry 4.6 5.3 5.4 5.1
Manufacturing 4.7 7.8 8.9 8.3
Services 18.0 20.9 24.1 36.8
Source: Author’s construction based on de Vries et al. (2015).
18
















































Figure 12.2 Manufacturing value added (% of GDP) in sub-Saharan Africa
Source: Author’s construction based on World Bank Group (2020).
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importantly, to work together co-operatively to reach agreements that restrict the 
scope for this race to the bottom.19 Instead of this race-to-the-bottom tax compe-
tition, it would be far better to have a race-to-the-top competition to provide 
good physical and ‘institutional’ infrastructure, which enhances the productivity 
of the economy and returns capital.
This will be especially important because of restrictions imposed by inter-
nation al (World Trade Organization) trade agreements. A striking feature of 
these agreements is that they allow agriculture subsidies (harming the developing 
countries, which depend heavily on agriculture), while prohibiting manufactur-
ing subsidies. And even the structure of tariffs has traditionally been designed to 
inhibit developing countries from moving up the value-added chain into manu-
facturing (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005). Of course, in the earlier stages of advanced 
countries’ development, they engaged in both manufacturing subsidies and 
 protection; but now that they have succeeded, they want to ‘pull up the ladder’ 
(Chang  2002). Thus, the instruments that are at the disposal of developing 
 countries today are more limited—and they will have to make all the use of these 
limit ed instruments that they can. Industrial policies should be at the centre of 
these efforts. Section 6 will discuss these policies in greater detail.
5.2 Agriculture
Agriculture will continue to provide the most important basis of employment for 
most developing countries, but should be restructured in ways that are more 
dynamic, with more learning and learning to learn—a kind of transformation in situ.
The neglect of agriculture, with its resulting lag in productivity (Block, 2016), 
means that, as in manufacturing, there is scope for catch-up and modernizing. 
(There is, in fact, a long history of development efforts being structured to the 
disadvantage of those in the rural sector.  See Sah and Stiglitz, 1992.) Productivity 
is markedly lower than in East Asia, and an increase in agricultural productivity 
comparable to East Asia would have an enormous impact on incomes. Thus, the 
African Center for Economic Transformation, in its second major report released 
in October 2017, argued:
Agriculture presents the easiest path to industrialization and economic trans form-
ation. Increasing productivity and output in a modern agricultural sector would, 
beyond improving food security and the balance of payments (through reduced 
food imports and increased exports), sustain agro-processing, the manufacturing 
of agricultural inputs, and a host of services upstream and downstream from farms, 
creating employment and boosting incomes across the economy. (ACET 2017)
19 The Independent Commission on Reform of International Taxation (ICRIT) has emphasized the 
adverse effects of this race to the bottom and has been urging an international agreement against tax 
competition: see ICRIT (2018).
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Agriculture can have further benefits: for the many developing countries that 
import large amounts of foodstuffs, it can reduce the need for foreign exchange—
leaving foreign exchange to be used for areas where it cannot be replaced. In some 
cases, there are opportunities for increasing exports of agricultural goods; the 
transformation should entail identifying high-value-added crops for which there 
is a demand elsewhere. Moreover, modern agriculture can be very ‘advanced’, 
serving as a basis of learning, with some of the skills having applicability to other 
areas.20 Indeed, there are ample opportunities for non-labour-saving in nov-
ations—better crop mix, better fertilizers, better seeds, better planting patterns. 
The transformation of farming from traditional practices to modern farming can 
be an exemplar of general societal transformation entailing modernization.
Moreover, successful agricultural transformation will reduce the pressure 
 arising from urban migration and the dilemmas it poses—for instance, whether 
to use scarce resources to build urban infrastructure, including housing. With 
limitations on the ability to create urban manufacturing jobs, excessive migration 
can be very destabilizing, giving rise to a large coterie of unemployed. And finally, 
the increase in productivity in agriculture will result in higher incomes, giving 
rise to multiplier effects and supporting an expanding non-traded service sector.
In short, the neglect of agriculture in development over the past four decades 
should always have been seen as a mistake. But the cost of this neglect will 
increase as developing countries struggle to find an alternative to manufacturing 
export-led growth.
5.2.1 Mechanisms for Promoting Agriculture
With small-scale production, private investments cannot provide needed 
advances in technology. Government will have to provide the necessary research, 
and transmit that research to farmers through extension services. Since agricul-
tural conditions can vary greatly from one locale to another, the relevant applied 
research has to be done at the local level (as it was in the US, through the land-
grant colleges and universities).
Education systems need to be changed. Today, to too great an extent, education 
is directed at enhancing the skills and knowledge required for urban jobs, rein-
forcing the expectation that success entails leaving the rural sector rather than 
becoming more productive within it. Success in modern agriculture, by contrast, 
requires a better-educated labour force, and more educational resources should 
be directed at enhancing the productivity of the large fractions of the population 
that will remain within the rural sector.
One way in which the landscape has changed since the Second World War is in 
the growth of intellectual property rights, with large multinational giants selling 
20 Indeed, some aspects of modern agriculture (e.g. the growing of flowers) are, in many respects, 
industrial in nature: see Cramer (2019).
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seeds (often genetically modified), herbicides, pesticides, and fertilizers, with 
often very adverse economic and social consequences. Developing countries need 
to be sure they adopt the right intellectual property regime—not the one foisted 
on them by the multinationals and Western governments (Cimoli et al. 2014a, b; 
Jayadev and Stiglitz 2010; Maskus and Merrill 2013).
There are also significant problems of information asymmetries in providing 
key inputs like seed and fertilizer to farmers. It is hard, if not impossible, to ascer-
tain the quality at the point of purchase. In developing countries, reputation 
mechanisms often work imperfectly, and to the extent that they do work they can 
result in high degrees of imperfections of competition. When regulations fail it 
may be desirable to, at a minimum, have the government certify the quality of the 
inputs, and perhaps market them directly, because incentives and opportunities 
for scamming often seem just too irresistible to the private sector.21
Another crucial input is credit, and this is another arena in which the private 
sector has excelled in exploitation. Non-profit micro-credit schemes have met 
with enormous success in Bangladesh, but when the ‘model’ was taken up by 
 for-profit lenders there was a massive failure (Haldar and Stiglitz  2013,  2016). 
Government should encourage these not-for-profits and co-operative lending 
programmes and encourage the private sector to lend (at strictly controlled rates) 
to agriculture, for example by requiring that a minimal fraction of loans goes to 
small farmers (analogous to the Community Reinvestment Act requirements for 
lending to minorities in the US).
Finally, in many developing countries there are serious problems in marketing, 
with middlemen with market power taking a disproportionately large fraction of 
the value. At one time, the World Bank and IMF railed against government 
 marketing boards, which proved often inefficient and sometimes corrupt. The 
assumption was that with government out of the way, a competitive market would 
flourish, and farmers would get full value for their crops. What happened instead 
was the growth of monopolistic middlemen (part of the original reason for the 
growth of government marketing boards). They might have been more efficient; 
they were certainly more efficient in exploiting farmers: in some cases, what the 
latter received went down (Wilcox 2006; Wilcox and Abbott 2004).
5.3 Mining and Other Natural Resources
Mining and hydrocarbons will continue to be important for foreign exchange for 
those countries that are lucky enough to have these resources. But the develop-
ment of a country’s resources should be, to the extent possible, more than just a 
source of foreign exchange; it should be a central part of the development strategy.
21 Reflecting a more general point noted by Akerlof and Shiller (2015).
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The standard lessons of the resource curse22 have not yet been learned by most 
countries. Countries that are rich in natural resources not only grow more slowly 
than one would have expected; they also have more inequality, partly as a result of 
the rampant rent-seeking that is so often associated with natural resources. Four 
central insights have emerged on how developing countries that have natural 
resources can best manage this prong of the multi-pronged development strategy.
 • They need to maximize the revenues that they obtain from natural resources. 
When the resources are held by the government, this means having well-
designed auctions (of the right to develop the resource) and contracts. It 
may be necessary to auction off different parts of the production process 
rather than to have a bid for an overall ‘manager’ of the resource. Contracts 
need to exhibit ‘time consistency’; in particular, when the quantities of the 
resource or the cost of extraction turn out particularly favourably, the con-
tract has to be designed so that the oil or mining company does not walk off 
with an unwarranted bonanza. When the resources are held in private 
hands, there should be as close as possible to a 100 per cent tax on the ‘pure 
rents’ associated with the resource. The resource should be thought of as 
belonging to all the people—it was part of the geography. The principle that 
pure rents should be taxed at 100 per cent is well established (see, for 
instance, George  1871). When the government has sold or leased the 
resource at a below-market rate (sometimes as a result of corruption, some-
times out of pure incompetence), the terms need to be renegotiated. A coun-
try is always sovereign over the resources that lie within it. Botswana’s 
remarkable development was only possible because at the time of independ-
ence it renegotiated its diamond leases (see Stiglitz 2002).
 • Contracts need to be complemented by excess profit taxes. Contracts will 
never be perfectly designed, so the foreign oil or mining company may well 
get substantial excess profits. Countries need to be careful not to sign invest-
ment agreements that circumscribe their ability to change taxes and regula-
tions. Those that have signed such agreements should exit or renegotiate (as 
South Africa is doing).
 • Countries need to establish sovereign wealth funds—both to manage cyc-
lic al variability and to prevent exchange-rate appreciation. Too often, the high 
exchange rate associated with natural resources weakens the development of 
other sectors of the economy, including agriculture and manufacturing. 
22 The natural resource curse is the observation that countries with more resources, by and large, 
do more poorly and have greater inequality than those without. Ensuring that natural resources are a 
blessing rather than a curse requires more than just the economics measures described below. It also 
requires managing the politics to prevent the kind of rent-seeking that is endemic in natural-resource 
economies. For a broad discussion, see Stiglitz (2007) and the other chapters in Humphreys 
et al. (2007).
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These other sectors generate more jobs and more learning. A well-managed 
sovereign wealth fund can also be an important instrument for ensuring 
that the fruits of the country’s resources (which are typically limited in 
amounts) are shared equitably across generations.
 • Countries should look for linkages with other sectors, and industrial pol-
icies should include strategies that enhance those linkages (Jourdan 2013; 
Stiglitz and Greenwald  2014). Sometimes there has been a concern that 
fostering such linkages would entail less growth. But that is a short-run 
perspective. There can be long-run benefits in learning and developing a 
dynamic comparative advantage. There needs to be a careful appraisal of 
the trade-offs. Countries should also look for good partners, willing to 
participate in this kind of broader development strategy. While the 
 technical knowledge associated with mining may have limited relevance 
to other sectors, the organizational knowledge of a foreign partner can 
be of broader relevance. Moreover, there can be a variety of linkages to 
other sectors that can be enhanced: the fact that in the past such link-
ages appear to have been weak may only reflect the lack of effort in devel-
oping them. It simply says that these linkages have not been developed 
under previous developmental strategies. At the very least, domestic firms 
can supply many of the required inputs, for example, construction of 
housing. Private mining or hydrocarbon firms, of course, may have little 
incentive to do so. Government intervention may be required, and the 
contracts with resource extraction companies have to be designed to 
 better align private incentives with societal needs. Writing a formal 
 contract embedding all of this may be nearly impossible, which is why, 
where government has the required competencies, state agencies may 
be preferable.
5.4 Services
Services will be the growth sector of the future, but there will be many ramifica-
tions of the move to the service sector that developing countries need to be 
aware of.
Production units will be smaller. For developing countries, this is a good thing: 
it is easier for entrepreneurs in nascent stages of development to manage small- 
and medium-sized enterprises. But productivity growth may be more limited. 
Traditionally, productivity growth in the service sector is lower than in manufac-
turing. While this may be partially a measurement problem, it is partially real and 
expected: with smaller production units, each has less incentive for investment in 
research and development (R&D), and the benefits of learning by doing are less 
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widely shared. But this lower rate of productivity growth is not inevitable.23 More 
to the point, there is enormous scope for developing countries to catch up to 
prod uct iv ity levels in the service sector in the advanced countries. With the ser-
vice sector comprising such a large fraction of the economy in advanced coun-
tries, disparities in productivity in the service sector are an important component 
of disparities in standards of living, and closing the gap in productivity should 
thus be an essential part of the development strategy.
As in agriculture, there is more need for co-operative and government 
R&D. (There are a few places around the world, such as Tuscany, where co-operative 
ventures have proved successful.)
The move towards a service sector economy is likely to be associated with other 
changes to the structure of the economy, which will require more active govern-
ment intervention. The transition to a service sector economy may be associated 
with greater inequality, for several reasons. There will not be the kind of wage 
compression that typically occurs in large manufacturing enterprises (where wage 
differences across individuals are smaller than productivity differences). The 
result is that compensation is likely to be more linked to individual productivity. 
Moreover, there are likely to be larger productivity differences across firms (in 
turn, because the enterprises themselves will be less able and willing to invest 
in the acquisition of frontier knowledge). Finally, monopoly power may increase. 
The level of competition in local services is often lower than that of product com-
petition among large international manufacturing firms, and this is especially so 
when there is a link between local services and the large manufacturing firms—
there is likely, for instance, to be a single service provider for any car or tractor in 
a given locale. Indeed, many large manufacturers may generate much of their 
profits from these local services, precisely because there is limited competition 
there. Location matters. Moreover, in developing countries with high levels of 
unemployment, the imbalance of market power between firms and workers is 
likely to be even greater than in developed countries.
Again, there is an increased need for government action: to combat the 
increase in monopolization here, as in other areas of modern economies; to 
ensure that there is a greater balance of power between workers and firms 
(encouraging, for instance, unions among smaller enterprises and even in di vid-
uals, such as taxicab drivers); to redistribute income to curb excesses of inequality 
and address poverty; and to promote advances in technology. There is an 
increased need for government to push to create a learning society, to reduce 
prod uct iv ity differences.
Many services can be more easily inserted into the global economy through the 
internet, especially if there can be standard-setting, with quality certification, 
23 There is an important caveat: there are limits to increases in productivity in some service sectors, 
e.g. in the creation of works of art or in haircuts. This is sometimes referred to as Baumol’s disease 
(Baumol 2013).
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either through peer monitoring or certification services possibly provided by the 
government. Success will entail an increasing need for skills training, including 
languages. But the dominance of a few tech giants and the role that the advanced 
countries play in setting international standards may result in an uneven playing 
field, enabling the advanced countries to receive a disproportionate share of the 
value of these advances in technology and inhibiting the ability of those in devel-
oping countries to become meaningful participants in the marketplace. At the 
very least, developing countries will need to resist demands by the US and other 
developed countries to accede to international agreements reflecting the economic 
interests of the tech giants; and they will have to find ways to tax the rev enues 
generated within their countries by these digital multinationals.24
5.4.1 The Multiple Forms of Services
The term ‘services’ embraces a wide range of economic activities, with quite different 
characteristics. Some developing countries, for instance, have successfully promoted 
tourism. Developing a tourist industry can promote jobs and learning and generate 
considerable foreign exchange. Countries such as Bhutan and Namibia have, more-
over, managed the sector in ways that minimize impacts on the environment and 
the domestic culture.
Government plays an important role in many key service sectors (housing, 
education, and health), and understandably so. This means that as economies 
move towards a service sector economy, the role of the government should nat-
ural ly increase.25
5.4.2 Housing Services
The process of urbanization will require large investments in housing, with a large 
job creation potential. Government will need to take an active role, including in 
planning ‘livable cities’ (an important part of well-being), in providing finance 
and local public transportation, and in ensuring that there is affordable housing 
for all income groups. In many cities, there is no affordable housing for low-
income residents anywhere near the city centre, forcing people to travel long 
 distances—a hidden tax. The benefits of agglomeration are often captured by 
those who happen to own real estate in the centre; a high tax on this real estate 
can recapture these windfall benefits for the public, and be used to ensure that 
cities are more economically integrated.
24 Even European countries have become worried about the loss of tax revenues and are beginning 
to explore the best way to impose taxation.
The new tech giants pose serious problems not only for competition policy and taxation but also for 
privacy policies and democratic processes. A discussion of how these can and should be addressed 
would take us beyond the scope of this chapter.
25 Earlier, we described the important role for the government in providing agricultural services, 
in  marketing of output, in the provision of inputs (credit, seeds, and fertilizers), and in extension 
 services, improving agricultural technology.
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Private financial markets have, in many countries, done a dismal job of provid-
ing mortgages at low rates, and in forms that help individuals manage well the 
risks of home ownership. Governments should at least consider the possibility of 
providing income-contingent, long-term mortgages (when incomes fall below a 
certain level, payments are postponed and the mortgage is paid back over a longer 
period) to those who have paid income taxes for a number of years. Such a pro-
gramme would encourage home ownership, reduce defaults, and have the further 
benefit of encouraging formality in the labour market.
5.4.3 Education
Good systems of education can both create jobs and enhance development. In many 
developing countries, recruitment of new enterprises is hindered by a lack of educa-
tion—not just ‘quantity’ (average level of attainment: see Figure  12.3) but quality. 
Making education economically accessible through state support is an important 
step, but there have to be corresponding efforts to ensure quality. Otherwise there 
will be disappointment. Low education levels also present an increasing challenge to 
continued modernization, as the importance of learning grows.
5.4.4 Other Service Sectors
Many service sectors, such as telecommunications and business services, can be 
as modern and hi-tech as manufacturing, with learning benefits similar to those 
Nigeria (2012)
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Figure 12.3 Distribution of active population according to education level
Notes: Only countries with data after 2009 are included. Numbers are in %.
Source: Chevalier and Le Goff (2014), reproduced with permission.
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in manufacturing. Unfortunately, many developing countries have allowed 
 foreign companies to develop these sectors without any focus on encouraging 
learning. Maximizing the development potential from foreign investment 
requires maximizing these learning spillovers. That may entail requiring joint 
ventures, as China has, or imposing local content and employment requirements.
6 Industrial Policies and Dynamic Comparative Advantage
We have already made clear that there is a need for government to take a large 
role in development and the associated structural transformation. Development 
and structural transformation are rife with market failures. It is costly to move 
from the ‘old economy’ to the new. Imperfections of capital markets become par-
ticularly evident in the process of transformation: the value of the assets of those 
in the ‘old economy’ are diminished, so firms and workers in the old economy do 
not have resources to make necessary investments or the collateral with which to 
obtain finance. Moreover, there are important learning externalities, which those 
making investments and production decisions do not take into account.
The need for government was made evident in the earlier transition in devel-
oped countries from agriculture to manufacturing, where the failure of govern-
ment to assist in the movement of individuals out of an agrarian–rural economy 
to an urban manufacturing economy contributed to the Great Depression. It was 
only through an unintended government industrial policy—moving people to the 
urban sector as part of the war effort26—that the Great Depression was overcome 
and a successful transition was accomplished. But as we have already explained, the 
role of government in this transition to a service sector economy, through the 
multi-pronged approach described in the previous section, will need to be even 
greater, for example in closing the knowledge gap between the small production 
units in the service sector and the best-managed enterprises around the world, and 
in promoting technological advances in both the service sector and agriculture.
Industrial policy is one of the important instruments that government will 
need to employ. It simply entails actions that aim to alter the allocation of 
resources (or the choice of technology) from what the market would bring about 
on its own. As we noted earlier, industrial policies are not confined to industry 
but include policies aimed at other sectors, such as finance or IT and agriculture. 
Modern industrial policies might more accurately be called learning, industrial, 
and technology (LIT) policies. These policies are, in part, about creating a learn-
ing society, an essential part of modernization. Creating a learning society is more 
than just a matter of education; it entails trade and investment policies, labour 
26 Including the subsequent GI Bill, which provided education to returning veterans and helped 
them get housing.
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policies, competition policies, and labour market policies—indeed, it touches on 
every aspect of a country’s legal and economic framework. There is often a con-
flict between policies that enhance static efficiency and those that contribute to 
learning, and thus to long-term growth. Striking the right balance is at the core of 
success. One of my criticisms of the neoliberal Washington Consensus policies is 
that they paid no attention to learning, seemingly unaware of the potential con-
flict, and thus failed to strike the right balance. Allocating resources in a way that 
is consistent with static efficiency, as desirable as it may seem, may actually 
impede development and growth.27
LIT policies take many different forms. Rwanda used such policies to promote 
IT, Kenya to promote tea and flowers, Ethiopia to promote modern agriculture 
and shoes. The green revolution in South Asia was facilitated by agricultural 
price supports (setting a floor on output prices, thereby affecting the risk of 
using the new technology) as well as input subsidies, including, notably, for 
electricity, which enhanced the profitability of tube-well irrigation that was 
critical for the success of the new seeds. Industrial policies were central to 
almost all countries that ‘caught up’ (or nearly so) with the technological frontier 
and became developed.
These policies have, of course, played an important role even in advanced 
countries. As Mazzucato (2013) emphasizes in her book The Entrepreneurial 
State, government has played a central role in all of the major advances, including 
the internet. But the role of government in shaping the economy is pervasive. 
Because there is a widespread perception that without government assistance 
there would be an undersupply of credit to small enterprises, most advanced 
countries, including the US, have lending programmes directed at this ‘market 
failure’.28 Industrial policies arise naturally in response to the multiple market fail-
ures that characterize development and structural change, from the capital mar-
ket imperfections to the learning spillovers of which we have already made note.
Greenwald and Stiglitz (2014) go further: they argue that all countries have implicit 
industrial policies, though citizens in some countries don’t realize it. Markets do 
not exist in a vacuum, and the way they are structured gives advantages to some, 
disadvantages to others. The priority given derivatives in bankruptcy in the US 
encouraged derivatives; and the rule that said that student loans could not be dis-
charged, even in bankruptcy, encourages imprudent private lending to students. 
Moreover, governments have to make decisions about what infrastructure to con-
struct or how to design the educational system. These decisions about public 
expenditures help shape the economy. When citizens aren’t aware of this, it means 
that the rules and patterns of expenditure are more likely to be determined 
27 These ideas are elaborated upon in Stiglitz and Greenwald (2014).
28 In the US, through the Small Business Administration. For the underlying theory, see Emran 
and Stiglitz (2009).
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by special interest groups, which are typically very aware of the consequences of 
these government actions. When these decisions are made in an open and trans-
parent way, with full discussion of the implications for the country’s growth strat-
egy, the scope for this kind of rent-seeking is reduced.
Thus, we are arguing here that government must ask how the structure of its 
rules and regulations and expenditures can be used to promote those sectors and 
technologies that most enhance the country’s long-run development strategy, 
such as promoting learning, with broad societal spillovers, and generating foreign 
exchange and jobs.29
The identification of which particular forms/subsectors of manufacturing, ser-
vices, or agriculture (or which particular technologies) are most conducive to 
development is a broader question, beyond the scope of this chapter (see Stiglitz 
and Greenwald  2015). Here, we simply note that there is a growing body of 
research associating development with complexity: more advanced countries 
have the ability to produce a wide range of products, including, in particular, 
products entailing greater complexity (Hausmann et al. 2011; Tacchella et al. 2012). 
Thus, it may make sense for a country to consciously think about how it can move 
up the complexity scale, and how the knowledge associated with such production 
can be absorbed into the economy. China’s strategy of joint ventures may perhaps 
best be thought of in this light. It was not (or not just) about stealing intellectual 
property, as the Trump administration has claimed. It was not about obtaining, 
for instance, otherwise secret blueprints. It was about learning, especially about 
tacit knowledge—the kind of knowledge that isn’t written down, that one can’t 
learn from a textbook. One only learns it through the process of production itself.
Some sectors are more amenable to learning, and some learning in specific sectors 
has more spillovers to others. The general principles of industrial policies apply in 
each area of the multi-pronged strategy, that is, not just to manufacturing, but 
to agriculture, services, and natural resources. Governments need to identify, for 
instance, ‘learning’ and ‘learning spillover’ service sectors and agricultural activities. 
These can have many of the benefits of the learning provided by  manufacturing. 
And as we have noted, industrial policies need to exploit linkages with natural 
resources—one of the key comparative advantages of many African countries.
7 Reassessing Comparative Advantage
Older theories of development were based on countries exploiting their static 
comparative advantage. This implied, for instance, that in the 1960s, when Korea 
29 This paper focuses on development. Industrial policies can and should be used to promote other 
societal objectives, such as protecting the environment and reducing inequality. See also Cimoli, Dosi, 
and Stiglitz (2009a, b).
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was formulating its development strategy after the Korean War, it should have 
focused on growing rice. But Korea realized that even were it to become the best 
rice grower in the world, it would still be poor, or at least poorer than the more 
advanced countries. To close the gap in incomes between itself and the more 
advanced countries, it had to close the gap in knowledge, and that entailed heavy 
investments in education and knowledge. It also meant, at that time, in dus tri al-
iza tion. Korea realized that a country’s comparative advantage could change.
Thus, the focus of a country’s development strategies must be on dynamic com-
parative advantage, not static comparative advantage. But assessing dynamic 
comparative advantage is difficult; indeed, even assessing static comparative 
advantage in today’s global economy is not so easy. Traditionally, using the 
Heckscher–Ohlin model, it has been argued that developed countries have a 
comparative advantage in capital-intensive, high-technology (skilled labour)-
intensive goods, and developing countries in unskilled labour-intensive goods. 
But capital is highly mobile, and many aspects of technical knowledge (especially 
when embedded in machines) are relatively mobile. So, too, skilled labour is 
relatively mobile.
What, then, is the real source of comparative advantage? It can’t be based on 
mobile factors. It must rest on place-based characteristics, the immobile ‘factors’—
most importantly, the embedded knowledge of society, its institutions and norms, 
the institutional infrastructure (its political system, and its stability; its rule of 
law; its systems of checks and balances), its physical infrastructure, its reputation 
(‘branding’), and the skills, health, and discipline of its workforce. All of these 
affect the ability to attract and retain talent and capital. Young people care about 
the environment—about ‘meaning’ in their work, and co-operation and challenge 
(including intellectual challenge) in the workplace.
It is hard—but essential—to change these in constructive ways. It is also 
essential not to change them in adverse ways: the move in many countries, in 
recent years, to more authoritarian governments has increased the uncertainties. 
It is a change that alters both long-run (dynamic) comparative and absolute 
advantages.
8 How Can Developed Countries Help?
Having characterized a new multi-pronged development strategy, the natural 
question is: how can developed countries help? There is a role that they can play 
in trade, finance, investment, and knowledge, in closing the resource and know ledge 
gaps that separate developed and developing countries. A fairer pro-development 
global trade regime would obviously help, especially in both agriculture and 
manufacturing. The current regime has agricultural prices depressed by massive 
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subsidies in the developed countries, and yet inhibits the developing countries 
from assisting their economies in making transitions out of agriculture.30
The investment regime that developed countries are attempting to impose is 
also adverse to development. It impedes the imposition of domestic requirements, 
which can facilitate learning. Investment agreements also impede renegotiation 
that would allow developing countries to get a fair share of the value of their nat-
ural resources. They also impede the imposition of regulations that protect the 
environment, health, and safety and promote economic stability (Stiglitz 2018).
The global intellectual property rights (IPR) regime is also adverse to develop-
ment. This was recognized in 2004, when the World International Properties 
Rights Organization (WIPO) called for a development-oriented intellectual 
property regime. But the failure to achieve this parallels the failure to get a 
 development-oriented international trade regime. While international trade 
agreements typically have provisions for compulsory licences, the advanced 
countries have put pressure on developing countries not to exercise those rights. 
The developed countries need to recognize that the IPR regime that is appropriate 
for a developing country is different from that appropriate for an advanced 
 country—and the intellectual property regime in the advanced countries itself, a 
variant of which they have tried to impose around the world, is designed not to 
promote in nov ation but to promote profits in certain politically powerful sectors. 
The combined effects of the international trade and intellectual property regime 
hurts the ability of developing countries to industrialize and to create a modern 
agriculture sector, and it leads to increasingly large transfers from the developing 
countries to the developed.31
Moreover, the developed countries (especially the US) refuse to recognize the 
valuable environmental services (biodiversity) provided by the developing 
countries. The result of all of this is that there is a risk either of a growing knowledge 
gap or of a large flow of money from developing countries to developed—rather 
than the other way around. At the same time, the developed countries have not 
done what they should to stymie the flow of corrupt funds out of developing 
countries—providing safe havens both in offshore secrecy havens and in onshore 
centres for money laundering.32 The developed countries have, at the same time, 
not lived up to their commitment to provide support for developing countries, 
30 While the international community came together in 2001 seemingly with a commitment to 
promote development through what was called the development round of trade negotiations, by the 
end of 2015 the development-round negotiations were abandoned. The problems with the existing 
regime are set forth, e.g., in Stiglitz and Charlton (2005).
31 See, e.g., Cimoli, Dosi, Nelson, and Stiglitz (2009); Cimoli et al. (2014b), including the conclud-
ing chapter summarizing the findings; and Dosi and Stiglitz (2014). See also Baker et al. (2017) and 
the references therein.
32 See, for instance, Peith and Stiglitz (2016) and Global Justice Now (2017). See also African 
Development Bank and Global Financial Integrity (2013).
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either in general assistance or in assistance targeted at climate change adaptation 
and mitigation.
There is a simple way of providing the resources that will, at the same time, 
promote global stability and growth (Greenwald and Stiglitz  2010; Stiglitz and 
Greenwald  2010). Every year, countries around the world put aside several 
hundred billions of dollars in reserves—as protection against the economic 
volatilities and uncertainties they face. These amounts increased significantly in 
the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, when developing countries saw the conse-
quences of not having enough reserves: crisis and a loss of economic sovereignty, 
as the IMF imposed harsh and unreasonable conditions in return for assistance. 
But this money—income not spent—depresses global aggregate demand. At 
times, this is offset by countries spending beyond their means, but most countries 
have realized the dangers of doing so, so that overall there is a bias towards weak 
global aggregate demand.
Today, most countries hold their reserves largely in dollars (though also in 
gold, euros, and yen). This creates a problem known as the Triffin Paradox: as the 
reserve currency owes more and more money to those abroad, confidence in the 
country may erode (Triffin  1960). Thus, the current reserve system risks both 
weak aggregate demand and global macro-instability.
These problems can be easily rectified by creating a global reserve system—
where countries agree to convert the global reserve currency into their own cur-
rency. The annual emissions of new global reserves can be designed to offset the 
amounts put into reserves, maintaining the global economy at near full employ-
ment. And the emissions can be transferred to the accounts of the developing 
countries, increasing their purchasing power but without subtracting from the 
purchasing power of those in the developed countries. The provision of these 
funds to developing countries should be done with minimal conditionality, for 
example only requiring that they not engage in actions that harm the global 
community, such as excessive carbon emissions or nuclear proliferation.33
9 Concluding Remarks: Reformulating  
Development Thinking
Success in development over the past sixty years was greater than anyone antici-
pated. Simply contrast Myrdal’s predictions for Asia (he anticipated that the con-
tinent would continue to be mired in poverty, as it had been for centuries) with 
33 There are a variety of institutional arrangements by which this could be done, including expand-
ing the existing system of SDRs (special drawing rights): see the report of the Commission of Experts 
on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System (2010). See also Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (2010), Ocampo and Stiglitz (2018), Stiglitz (2006), and Stiglitz and Greenwald (2010), and the 
references cited therein.
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what happened (Myrdal 1968). There is an enormous gap that must be closed in 
both knowledge and resources. Most of the advanced countries are engaged in the 
service sector—in the US that sector accounts for 80 per cent or more of GDP. So 
if there are disparities in standards of living, they relate to productivity in these 
service sectors. There are huge disparities in productivity within countries, even 
greater between countries.
The basis of the success of growth over the past half-century was export-led 
growth. We have deconstructed what enabled manufacturing to provide this 
growth spurt, this structural transformation. It won’t be able to do so in the future 
to anything like that extent. There has to be another strategy, one that performs 
some of the essential roles that manufacturing export-led development did.
Successful development policy will need to be explicitly more multi-pronged, 
addressing the separate ‘challenges’ that the manufacturing sector took on simul-
taneously. We have shown how a co-ordinated (agriculture, manufacturing, min-
ing, service sector) strategy has the prospect of attaining the same success as the 
old manufacturing export-led strategy.
9.1 Comprehensive Development Strategy
In short, what is needed is a comprehensive development strategy34 leading to 
inclusive growth with inclusive participation, including a balance between mar-
kets, government, and society, based on the new understandings of what leads to 
successful economic and societal transformation, responding to the particular 
strengths of the country, and addressing the particular challenges, including 
those posed by demographics and climate change. Most importantly, it must 
 create new dynamic comparative advantages.
The challenge facing the less developing countries in the coming decades is 
enormous. Even when successfully implemented, the multi-pronged strategy we 
have outlined is unlikely to provide successes of the magnitude experienced in the 
East Asian miracle. And it is not an easy strategy to implement. It is far more 
complex than the manufacturing export-led strategy. The developed countries can 
provide substantial help. Helping the developing countries is a moral issue. But 
beyond that, there will be enormous economic and political consequences of not 
helping the developing countries, not the least of which will arise from the inevitable 
migration pressure that will result from an ever-increasing gap in income.
The central message of this chapter is one of hope: there is hope for develop-
ment in a post-industrial world. It will be harder. And it will require more as sist-
ance from the developed countries, or at least that they take down some of the 
34 This was an idea popularized in the late 1990s by the president of the World Bank, Jim 
Wolfensohn; see also Stiglitz (2001).
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impediments that they have placed in the way of developing countries’ structural 
transformation. But it can be done.
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Synthesis and Policy Implications
Carlos Gradín, Murray Leibbrandt, and Finn Tarp
1 Introduction
We began this volume by drawing out of the prevailing body of work a strong 
weight of evidence and analysis stressing that inequality is a key development 
challenge. It holds implications for economic growth and redistribution and 
translates into power asymmetries that can endanger democratization and 
human rights, create conflict, and embed social exclusion and chronic poverty. 
Inequalities of income and wealth and inequality in access to basic services 
undermine social cohesion and economic progress.
From this point of departure, the specialist contributors to this book proceeded 
to bring together an analysis of global inequalities and a new and comprehensive 
view of the trends and drivers of inequality in five of the world’s largest developing 
countries—Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa—jointly accounting 
for more than 40 per cent of the world’s population. Perspectives on global 
in equal ity set the scene for the syntheses of the five case studies that, in turn, 
build on a large set of background papers prepared under UNU-WIDER’s 
Inequality in the Giants project. Following the case studies, the discussion of 
in equal ity is brought back into a broader developmental context. Throughout, the 
contributions gave explicit attention to the data and measurement choices that 
undergirded their analyses of the forces and drivers of these measured levels and 
trends in inequality. Now we consolidate and synthesize all of this detailed work 
and then conclude by briefly outlining the main implications for policy.
2 New Perspectives on Global Inequalities
The analysis of global inequality, ignoring national boundaries and treating the 
world as one country (or one global village), is a complex task, as was made clear 
by all three chapters in Part II. Assessing whether inequality has declined or 
increased will depend on value judgements. Relative global inequality declined 
over recent decades, according to many inequality indices. This decline was 
mainly driven by the large income growth rates experienced by the global poor 
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and middle-income groups. These unprecedented growth rates mostly reflect the 
fact that emerging economies, containing large shares of the world’s population, 
have been growing faster than the industrialized world. Therefore, declining 
in equal ity between countries constituted by far the main component of declining 
global inequality.
This being true, Martin Ravallion points out that additionally there are two 
very important trends in these same global datasets. First, they show a stagnation 
in incomes of the global very poor, with this floor of the global income distribu-
tion therefore showing a declining income share. Second, in the other tail of the 
income distribution, there have been above average growth rates of top-end 
incomes, leading to increasing concentration of income at the top of the income 
distribution. Given these two trends, any analyst with special sensitivity to changes 
at these two ends of the income distribution can reasonably claim that global 
inequality increased rather than fell, with support from well-known in equal ity 
measures that are built on exactly these value judgements. The same riding trend 
is measured for people thinking of inequality in absolute rather than relative 
terms. This is because the proportionately large increases of incomes among the 
global poor and middle classes are still modest, when measured in dollar terms, if 
compared with the more substantial gains of the global rich. In addition, people 
with more nationalistic views, giving more weight to within-country inequality 
than to inequalities between countries, could make similar claims.
This discussion makes clear how important it is to clearly identify the set of value 
judgements under which each analysis assesses specific trends in global inequality. 
Such transparency makes clearer how it is possible that such an im port ant debate 
has been characterized by influential groups loudly starting out from an orthogonal 
set of stylized facts about what has happened to global in equal ity. This surfaces at 
the broadest level, with one of the recurring lessons from the volume: measures do 
not speak for themselves. The assessment of in equal ity and the framing of policies 
to overcome inequality require understanding of the processes driving the levels 
and changes in measured inequality.
The relationships between income and wealth lie at the heart of many of the 
debates on the processes of inequality generation and persistence. James Davies 
and Anthony Shorrocks contributed to this debate in the context of global 
in equal ity by measuring in a consistent framework the levels and trends in the 
global income and wealth inequality. Using the between-country and within-
country frameworks, they show that the trends in both cases are dominated by 
the decline in inequalities between countries, the main component of global 
in equal ity, with relatively small changes in within-country inequality not being 
enough to revert that trend. They go on to question whether this trend is sustain-
able over time, given that future growth in a few populous, now emerging econ-
omies will push inequality between countries upward in the future as they 
become richer.
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Changing the focus to building a picture of global inequality from the bottom 
up, Daniele Checchi, Andrej Cupak, and Teresa Munzi emphasized for us all that 
useful measurement of global inequalities has to be built on good comparable 
data across countries. They went much further to show that such harmonization 
of income and socioeconomic characteristics is not straightforward and raises 
many challenges, especially in developing countries. They discussed the solutions 
implemented in the context of the Luxembourg Income Study, originally collect-
ing information from mainly rich countries but recently expanded to incorporate 
middle-income countries, and used the resulting data to discuss the trends across 
the developing giants (and Russia).
The era of strong economic growth and substantial lowering of poverty that 
the world has seen during the past decades is unambiguously encouraging. At 
the same time, in many country contexts, the associated changes in well-being 
have not been unambiguously good, or have not been nearly as good as they 
should have been. It was Francois Bourguignon who first made it clear that one 
needs to understand inequality to understand why this is the case, when he put 
forward his ‘iron poverty-growth-inequality triangle’ (Bourguignon  2004). 
The same processes that have driven rising average incomes and falling pov-
erty rates within countries have led to increasing inequality in many of these 
countries.
3 Inequality in Five Developing Giants: Common Patterns?
The case studies in the volume further substantiate this point by making it clear 
that relative inequality trends over the past years have shown heterogeneous 
 patterns across countries and regions, although in a context of predominantly 
increasing or stagnating inequality in many countries, including the most popu-
lous. Understanding the driving factors of inequalities is essential in all country 
contexts to identify and fully understand these trends and their progress, or the 
lack thereof, in making growth inclusive. This is a difficult task due to both data 
and analytical challenges. While most developing countries have developed a 
consolidated set of household surveys over time, these data also present many 
comparability issues both over time within a country and across countries. In 
addition, the lack of accurate information for tracking progress of important 
population sub-groups remains a difficulty, particularly at the top or at the bot-
tom of the distribution. Furthermore, income inequality is the result of complex 
processes in which several driving forces may play significant roles and interact 
with each other. The trends in these driving forces need to be measured, too, in 
understanding income inequality. Accordingly, coming better to grips with the 
inequality issue, which is at the core of SDG 10 and its relationship to other 
goals—especially reducing poverty (SDG 1), achieving gender equality (SDG 5), 
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and promoting decent work (SDG 8)—requires an effort to mobilize all available 
data and to combine different complementary approaches.
Part III of the present volume summarizes, as already noted, a larger UNU-
WIDER project that analysed the main determinants of levels and trends in 
income distribution in five developing economies. In this project, we put spe-
cial focus on the role of the labour market, particularly on how the evolution of 
the skills premium shaped the inequality of earnings. Related to these labour 
market dynamics, and adding to them a range of other matters, inequality 
issues were brought to bear in the country studies, such as social mobility, spa-
tial inequalities, and the gender gap. Different country contexts put different 
degrees of emphasis on these ranges of factors in explaining both the inequality 
of market income and the inequality of broader national income inequality. 
Each study also assessed non-market income by evaluating the growing role of 
the public sector in middle-income countries, especially with regard to the 
redistributive effect of taxes and social benefits. This discussion in the volume is 
particularly rich because each of the case countries have been very active and, 
in some cases, innovative in these areas during the past decades. All of this 
work was only possible by making the most, not only of common living condi-
tions and labour force surveys, but also of censuses and different administrative 
and reported data. These include social security, tax records, national accounts, 
housing prices, and lists of richest people.
We proceed to discuss some of the challenges in addressing these data issues 
and how they were dealt with, highlighting the strengths and the limitations of 
using each of these data sources in the context of developing countries. Then, 
with sufficient confidence in the underlying data, we discuss the heterogeneous 
trends seen in the five countries studied, and the main determinants identified.
4 Common Challenges in Measuring Inequality:  
Making the Most of Data
Investigating inequality in developing countries faces a number of challenges. The 
first and most obvious is that there is no specialized inequality survey imple-
mented across countries in the same way as the World Bank Living Standard 
Measurements Surveys (LSMS) with regard to poverty. Consequently, much of 
what we say and know about inequality comes from a variety of income or 
expenditure household surveys that are not fully standardized in methods and 
concepts used across countries or over time, or that in some cases have been 
designed for other purposes. This means that we work with known shortcomings 
for which there are in many cases no clear-cut solutions. While Bourguignon’s 
iron triangle is very helpful in thinking through the links between growth, pov-
erty, and inequality, there are, as carefully argued by Arndt, McKay, and Tarp 
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(2016: chapter 2), several mechanisms which could ‘break’ the triangle. Thus, the 
challenge of assessing inequality trends is by no means a simple deduction 
exercise.
The UNU-WIDER project therefore used several complementary data sources 
and methods: for example, national accounts to analyse falling labour shares in 
Mexico; public accounts to analyse redistribution also in Mexico; a tax-benefit 
microsimulation model to analyse redistribution in Brazil; social security admin-
istrative data to investigate earnings inequality in Brazil; and census and satellite 
data to study spatial inequalities in India. A special case was the emerging issue of 
adjusting top incomes (or expenditures) to known shortcomings in household 
survey data. Our contributing authors addressed this, using personal income tax 
tabulations in Brazil, individual tax records in South Africa, super-rich lists in 
China, and house price public listings in Mumbai (India).
The first issue to worry about when analysing inequality using household sur-
veys is lack of response. Our results show that correcting for zero or missing values 
had virtually no effect on the well-known downward trend in inequality in Brazil 
(Hecksher, Neri, and Silva 2018). In contrast, a similar exercise partially helped to 
explain the inconsistent trends observed in Mexico after 2006 in the different sur-
veys. The declining trend in inequality according to the labour force surveys van-
ishes after the corrections, getting closer to the increasing trend found in income 
and expenditure surveys (Campos-Vazquez and Lustig 2017). High and variable 
levels of non-response are not the only element to consider when assessing 
in equal ity trends. Unclear methodological changes in the design of the South 
African labour force surveys, for example, are likely to be responsible for a sharp 
increase in inequality in this country case after 2012 (Finn and Leibbrandt 2018).
The use of matched employer/employee administrative data in Brazil (Registro 
Anual de Informações Sociais, RAIS) helps to more accurately represent the earn-
ings distribution and worker characteristics at a very detailed level and over a 
long period of time thanks to its nature and the huge amount of observations. 
This is especially useful in identifying the large contribution of firm-specific 
effects to the fall in inequality in Brazil before the last economic recession, and in 
showing that this trend is compatible with an increasing share obtained by very 
rich workers (especially the top 1 and 0.1 per cent). It also helps to analyse the 
gender earnings gap throughout the life cycle for different birth cohorts, identify-
ing the important contribution of differences in occupation, industry and estab-
lishments (Neri, Machado, and Neto 2018). The fact that a large share of the 
Brazilian labour force is informal, with changes in formalization rates over time, 
and thus not represented in the universe of this dataset poses the main limitation 
to its use.
The Mexican case study includes another method of complementing labour force 
surveys; in this case, by combining these surveys with information from national 
accounts on wages, employment, value added, intermediate consumption, and 
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capital stock. These augmented data highlight the falling share of labour in 
national income and identify the lagging productivity of the informal non-tradable 
sector of the economy as the main driving force (Ibarra and Ros 2017).
The country cases emphasize the importance of taxes and social expenditure 
policies in tackling inequality. In analysing the redistributive impacts of taxes and 
benefits, case country authors employed different strategies. The South African 
team studied the effect of reported direct taxes and cash transfers using a national 
household survey, the Living Conditions Survey, matched with administrative tax 
and expenditure data (Maboshe and Woolard 2018). The Mexican team followed 
a more complex approach, imputing in-kind transfers and adjusting for income 
underreporting in income and expenditure surveys using information from pub-
lic accounts (Scott, de la Rosa, and Aranda 2017). The Brazilian team applied a 
tax-benefit microsimulation model (BRAHMS/UPFE) on the expenditure survey 
(Neri, Siqueira, Nogueira, and Osorio  2018). In all cases, these exercises both 
identify the important contributions of public policies deployed in emerging 
countries in shaping the income distribution, and define their limits in compen-
sating the strong forces originating in the labour market.
When it comes to dealing with the impact on inequality of the misrepresenta-
tion/underestimation of the top incomes, once again different teams followed dif-
ferent strategies based on combining household surveys with other sources. In 
Brazil, the team combined household survey (PNAD) data with personal income 
tax tabulations for 2007 and 2015, showing a large impact on the level and trend 
of inequality. Yet, this administrative dataset also shows unrealistic increases in 
income over time, thus making the important point that tax data have their flaws 
as well, and also require careful interrogation (Neri and Hecksher 2018). For 
South Africa, the team combined the fifth wave of the National Income Dynamics 
Survey (NIDS) with individual tax records, showing a surprisingly small impact 
on both the level and the trend of inequality. This could be the result of this wave 
of the survey having corrected for the attrition suffered after the first wave, by 
refreshing the panel with additional affluent households (Hundenborn, Woolard, 
and Jellema 2018). Therefore, the survey estimated the top decile fairly well. 
Nonetheless, the survey did less well in flagging the fact that those at the very top 
of the distribution (1 per cent) had done extremely well through income sources 
not well captured in the survey. In the case of China, due to the lack of tax infor-
mation, the team followed the innovative approach of constructing for this pur-
pose a dataset combining information for 2016 from different lists of super rich 
people (Li, Li, and Wan 2018). This had a large impact on inequality levels in 
2016, thus indicating the extent of under-measurement at the top end in Chinese 
survey data. Unfortunately, the analysis could not estimate the top end trends in 
this way. Such lists were not available in other years. In the case of India, the team 
followed yet another approach: combining the national consumption survey with 
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house price data based on public listings on the online platform Makaan in 
Mumbai (Rongen 2018). Surprisingly, and contrary to previous evidence from 
Egypt (Van der Weide, Lakner, and Ianchovichina 2018), there was no sign of 
underestimation of expenditure inequality in these surveys after the corrections.
Finally, given the great importance of spatial inequalities in India and the lack 
of geographically disaggregated data, the Indian team combined the national NSS 
surveys and information from the census with satellite data (weather and precipi-
tation, forest cover, share of land under cultivation, night-time luminosity) from 
the World Bank’s Spatial Database for South Asia (Mukhopadhyay and Garcés-
Urzainqui 2018). By imputing average per capita expenditure, they estimated 
spatial inequality between villages and blocks, and local inequality within these 
spatial units (as the difference between total and spatial inequality). The main 
result is that the divergence observed for states and districts does not amplify at 
small units. That is, the increase in inequality in urban India is mostly due to ris-
ing inequality within urban blocks.
In summary, the detailed country studies underlying the country synthesis 
chapters reported in Part III of the book show that analysts pursue very different 
strategies in developing countries to make the most of existing data to improve 
and complement available household surveys. These are and will continue to be 
the basis for most analyses of inequality, assuming the global research community 
and its funders do not take an initiative along LSMS lines for poverty, focused 
explicitly on inequality issues and their associated requirements.
5 Inequality Trends and Drivers
The five developing countries in focus in this volume are, or have recently become, 
countries with highly unequal levels of aggregate inequality. Their characteristics 
also include large divides among population groups, such as differences between 
urban and rural areas, between most and least developed regions, by ethnicity or 
race, by gender, etc. They have all undergone large structural economic and polit-
ical changes over the past three decades: the end of apartheid in South Africa; the 
opening up of the Mexican and Indian economies; China’s (incomplete) transi-
tion to a market economy; and the long period during which the Workers’ Party 
ruled Brazil. Typically, these processes accentuated tensions in already existing 
horizontal inequalities. In Brazil, and less so in Mexico, they contributed to 
reducing existing inequalities. Other than China, these developing countries have 
largely depended on the vagaries of the commodities cycle and have, during the 
last decades of strong growth, been able to expand and re-design the public sector 
even if it is still far from comparable to the public sectors in most developed 
economies.
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A number of chapters in the volume make it clear that developing countries do 
not follow a common trend in terms of inequality. Even within the broader land-
scape sketched above, this is also so for the five giants considered here. Several 
heterogeneous patterns emerged from the analysis.
Inequality steadily increased in China until 2008, when the trend seems to 
have reached an inflexion point that only future research can confirm. Inequality 
also increased in India following the structural reforms. The opposite trend, 
however, occurred in Brazil, with a long and unprecedented decline in in equal-
ity since the early 1990s, following the commodities boom and expansion of 
social programmes, until the last economic downturn. South Africa achieved 
only modest progress in the twenty-five years after the end of apartheid in spite 
of applying a wide range of redistributive policies that put an end to institution-
alized racial stratification. Mexico shows long-term persistency, with an N-shaped 
trend with inequality first increasing, then declining, and finally increasing again 
(1989–1994–2006–2014). These trends refer to disposable income (or consump-
tion in India), which by construction ignore important in-kind components of 
final income with an impact on living conditions of the populations that have 
significantly improved in all these countries, such as access to basic services like 
education, health, and water.
The labour market plays the most fundamental role in driving inequality trends 
(up or down) in all cases. This highlights the importance of how markets generate 
primary income in the first place, especially in countries characterized by extreme 
initial inequalities in education and in the access to productive assets (e.g. land) 
and wealth. These inequalities feed into labour markets that are highly segmented 
along a number of dimensions: informal versus formal; rural migrants versus 
urban citizens; and by gender, race, and region.
Consistent across the country studies, the returns to skills (education and 
experience) are a dominant driver of earnings inequality, in a context of expand-
ing education and increasing demand for highly educated workers as the result of 
globalization and technological change. Moreover, there is increasing evidence 
of high concentration at top incomes, indicating that this process is not exclusive of 
high-income countries.
In Mexico, there was an initial period characterized by a higher demand for 
skills, the result of the opening-up of the economy and technical change, 
aggravated by various institutional factors, such as the falling minimum wage 
and de-unionization that led to an increasing skill premium, and thus increasing 
earnings inequality. Another period followed in which the growing supply of skilled 
workers outpaced the demand, and consequently the skill premium fell. After 
2006, the process is less clear, with contradictory trends between household and 
labour force surveys. Nonetheless, the evidence is clear that the general income of 
all workers fell during the Great Recession, especially for low-skilled workers.
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In South Africa, sluggish economic growth was in general not pro-poor, with 
finance and services sectors growing faster than traditional sectors (manufactur-
ing, mining, agriculture, and domestic help). This produced unbalanced changes 
in supply and demand of skilled and unskilled workers despite very large increases 
in average years of schooling. In Brazil, similarly sharp increases in average years 
of schooling resulted in an earnings decompression below the ninetieth per cen-
tile, along with higher concentration among the very rich. Wage inequality 
increased over time in urban China, despite important wage growth at the bot-
tom of the distribution. In the latter case, experience was more important than 
education in explaining wage inequality in 1988, while education was the single 
largest contributor (of the much larger level) in 2013. China has also witnessed 
large gender gaps in earnings and employment. Changes in the wage setting 
mechanism, rapid increase in demand for qualified labour and large inflows of 
relatively unqualified rural migrants to urban areas have all contributed to this 
trend. After 2007, however, highly paid workers’ wage growth was limited within 
state-owned enterprises, and new rules were introduced in 2009.
With primary income driving increasing trends in inequality, the redistributive 
effect of taxes and benefits becomes more important. All countries have witnessed 
an expansion in the scale of the public sector, as well as remarkable improvements 
in design. While social benefits have in general become more progressive (re du-
cing urban bias and being more inclusive of vulnerable groups), some policies can 
be more regressive or weakly progressive, such as contributory Social Security or 
tax exemptions for health care or private pensions. Policies were well targeted, as 
in the outstanding case of conditional cash transfers, even if its small scale does 
not significantly reduce inequality.
South Africa is an example of a country implementing large-scale public pol-
icies which are quite progressive and well targeted to the poor, even if they have 
had a diminishing impact over time. There was a massive improvement in access 
to basic services such as housing, electricity, and water. A very large set of uncon-
ditional cash transfers benefited pensioners, disabled, and children. More than 
half of means-tested benefits accrued to the poorest 30 per cent, with an increase 
from 24 to 68 per cent in the share of households with government grants. This 
represents an increase from 3 per cent to 16 per cent in the share of total income, 
with the largest increase right after the end of apartheid, between 1993 and 2008, 
smaller in subsequent years. Direct taxes are mostly borne by the richest 30 per 
cent, although some regressive deductions reduce the progressivity of the system. 
The Gini reduced from 0.73 (market income) to 0.66 (disposable income), with 
an important impact in reducing horizontal inequalities as well, such as by age, 
location, race, or gender.
Mexico is another example, with crucial changes in fiscal policy undertaken in 
the 1990s which were quite progressive and pro-poor. Several well-known and 
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effective programmes such as Progresa, Seguro Popular, Adultos Mayores, and 
Apoyos Directos al Campo were deployed and, as in South Africa, saw large 
improvements in access to basic services. Thus, social spending increased and, 
alongside this, progressivity improved, correcting a previous strong urban bias 
(based on food subsidies). This process, however, reversed after 2008/10, with 
a sharp decline of net indirect subsidies. As a result, the redistributive effect 
has declined significantly since 2010; transfers have become less progressive 
(recent efforts have fuelled the expanding contributory pension schemes). This 
situation was aggravated by increasing indirect taxes to replace oil revenues. 
As a result, while the fiscal system has a significant redistributive effect on final 
income in equal ity, the effect on disposable (and consumable) income inequality 
is more modest.
6 Conclusion and Policy Implications
The UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) reflect widespread and valid 
academic, public, and policy concern with issues of inequality in all of its many 
interrelated dimensions and differing interpretations. The contemporary em pir-
ic al and analytic picture supported by this volume is unequivocal in showing that 
the present levels of inequalities of income and wealth and inequality in access to 
basic services, such as health and education, are undermining socio-economic 
progress. There has been enormous economic progress over recent decades; yet 
this progress has been very uneven within and across countries, and it is re vers-
ible. To understand and deal with this situation, inequality has to be analysed and 
addressed. The aim of this volume was to make a significant contribution to this 
effort through better understanding of global inequality trends, within-country 
trends—focusing on five key developing countries accounting for more than 
40 per cent of the world’s population—and the broader setting in which inequality 
issues are situated. The volume details exactly such unevenness and reversibility in 
many contexts in very recent times. Rising and persistent inequality in many places 
means that improved data, better inequality analysis, and concerted policy action 
at global, regional, national, and local levels are needed now as never before to 
address the level and changes in inequality.
In spite of significant improvements over the recent past, data quality and the 
measurement of inequality remain critically constrained. This is especially the 
case in developing countries. The way that inequality is measured bounds the way 
it is understood and addressed. In both theory and practice, many assumptions 
have to be made and it is important that these assumptions are explicit. Chapters 
2 to 4 set out and discussed these data problems and issues in detail. They also 
showed that the conflicting narratives on the trend in global inequality in the 
public debate are often plausible with reference to differing definitions of how to 
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measure inequality. Value premises are far from uniform, and how the bottom and 
the top of the distribution are treated matter significantly for the insights derived. 
Chapter 2, in particular, revealed that while commonly used inequality measures 
suggest that global inequality has gone down for several decades this assessment is 
subject to challenge, especially if the focus shifts from relative to absolute measures 
of inequality. This is not to deny, as is made clear in Chapter 3 for both income and 
wealth, that for all the inequality indices considered, the degree of inequality 
attributable to differences in mean income and wealth across countries accounts 
for much, if not most, of the level of global inequality measured this way. Moreover, 
as regards changing inequality over time, changes in mean income and wealth and 
population sizes have induced a strong downward element to the trend in global 
inequality regardless of the inequality index selected.
Turning explicitly to within-country relative inequality, it has often gone up, 
but this picture is quite heterogeneous. Chapter  4 cautions that comparing 
in equal ity across countries in a way that is based on harmonized income and 
consumption data continues to face thorny empirical challenges. Unless these are 
carefully addressed, robust conclusions will be elusive. Some of these measured 
differences may be artefacts of data incompatibility rather than differences in 
inequalities. In this regard, the chapter provides strong value to the volume by 
showing that the within-country national trends discussed in detail in each of 
Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa remain in place in the harmonized 
data. Therefore, there is some validation in place for careful comparison across 
these countries from the detail that they distil. As was made clear earlier in this 
concluding chapter, the authors of the country syntheses in Chapters 5–9 inte-
grate information from a number of the different UNU-WIDER background 
papers and draw on as many data sources as are available to understand in equal-
ity in each of the five countries. In general, triangulation of data, including new 
data sources, was key in producing this volume and it illustrates the importance 
of this practice for in-depth analysis of the level and change in inequality in any 
given context.
Such data triangulation leads to a more robust picture of inequality, which 
accentuates rather than narrows the heterogeneities that emerge in the country 
syntheses and in the volume as a whole. In turn, this emphasizes the awkward 
reality that there is not a simple ‘grand’ narrative that captures inequality in the 
same way in all of our five country cases or globally. This in no way diminishes 
the importance of inequality. Rather, it acknowledges that because of the policy 
imperative to address inequality, the complexities of its production and reproduc-
tion have to be reflected and respected in the analysis.
This balance is well illustrated in Chapter 10, in Part IV of the volume. Here, 
Andrew E. Clark and Conchita D’Ambrosio examined subjective well-being as 
measured by the perceptions of current and future living conditions across four 
large, populous regions of the world. Specific attention is given to how levels of 
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subjective well-being are linked to both personal, subjective inequality and 
broader income inequality. The analysis starts by examining the role of capability 
levels in subjective well-being. It is clear that capabilities are positively correlated 
with perceptions of well-being. Perceptions of inequality or subjective inequality 
are measured by an individual’s assessment of their position relative to those in 
their immediate community. Controlling for this capabilities effect, the relation-
ship between subjective well-being and this self-assessed inequality is mixed. 
Being relatively better off correlates (accurately) with perceptions of higher pre-
sent and future living conditions. However, being relatively worse off is either not 
correlated with subjective well-being or even is positively correlated, seeming to 
imply the presence of Hirschman’s famous tunnel effect. When estimated care-
fully, the relationship between subjective well-being and subjective inequality is 
never simple and differs markedly in different regions of the world. The relationship 
between subjective well-being and income inequality is much clearer. The higher 
the aggregate level of income inequality in the country of residence, the higher the 
expectations of future living conditions. Clearly, inequalities have important con-
sequences for the formation of expectations about the future. Other contributions 
in the volume make it clear that these expectations are often not realized for the 
most vulnerable and one speculates as to whether this will end up feeding discon-
tent when expectations end up unfulfilled.
Acknowledging that the careful analyses of the volume caution against grand 
or simple narratives in no way implies that there are not strong commonalities 
and central lessons for policy to be pulled from the five country case studies and 
from the volume as a whole. Indeed, there are a number of such lessons.
It is clear that labour market inequalities are central as a driver of overall 
in equal ity. Above we discussed evidence from the country studies of both 
declining and increasing labour market inequalities and the processes through 
which they feed through into declining and increasing national inequalities. 
Consequently, the imperative to understand the functioning of labour markets 
stands out as an important insight derived from our five cases. There is no doubt 
that all of these countries have functioned in the same increasingly integrated 
world and that this has pulled strongly through each labour market. Nevertheless, 
this has not been inexorable and the case studies show both the potential and 
the limitations of active labour market policies in mediating these forces.
Some of these limitations arise from the role of external circumstances, 
whether negative, as with the Great Depression, or sometimes positive, as with 
the commodities cycle. It is clear from many contexts that there is strong reason 
to highlight the importance of globalization and technological change. In many 
contexts, this has increased earnings inequalities by increasing the demand for 
skilled labour. It has also contributed to increasing profit shares, which is a rising 
and important concern in both developed and developing country contexts as it 
reinforces concentration of income and wealth among the best off. These are the 
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forces that have increased inequality by those at the top end, and often only the 
very top end, pulling away from the rest of the income distribution.
Other limitations on labour market policies arise from the local context itself. 
The intergenerational perspective that is pursued in our country cases brings 
out the importance of prevailing pre-market conditions and policies that impact 
on the realized capabilities that individuals in each country carry into their 
re spect ive labour markets. People with differing endowments and assets in terms 
of family background, skills, and education (as well as wealth and assets) do not 
participate in the labour market on an equal footing. These inequalities feed into 
labour markets that are highly segmented along a number of dimensions: infor-
mal versus formal; rural migrants versus urban citizens; and by gender, race, and 
region. These circumstances, if left untouched by policy, dampen the income 
growth of those at the bottom or, worse still, marginalize them altogether.
However, in each of the country cases, these circumstances have not been left 
untouched and fiscal policy (including both expenditure and tax policy related to 
income as well as wealth) has played an important role in modifying their 
in equal ities. The country studies provide valuable and detailed learnings from 
their menu of successful and unsuccessful policies and results. However, standing 
out as important here is that even in cases where quite ambitious redistribution 
programmes and policies were pursued, they have either not been sustained or 
are yet to make a major dent in inequality of disposable incomes and inequalities 
in living conditions. To reach higher levels of redistribution, much more remains 
to be done through the budget, and much more needs to be done beyond the 
budget, with a direct focus on the roles of assets and wealth.
Thus, the inequality processes and policy impacts have not been simple. As 
countries have engaged with the globalized world, top-end incomes have moved 
away from the rest of the distribution. Yet, there is more to this than a top end 
that is flourishing more than the rest. Not everyone has flourished. In most coun-
tries, it seems that the higher average incomes were pulled up by raising the top-
end incomes and, to varying extents, raising middle and lower-end incomes. 
Nevertheless, in many contexts, substantial sections of society were left out of 
these processes. The social mobility perspective of Chapter 11 consolidates and 
sharpens this view. Its striking conclusion is that rapid growth is by no means a 
guarantee of social mobility across generations. In fact, mobility may decline to 
very low levels if market forces are unchecked. Roy van der Weide and Ambar 
Narayan arrive at this conclusion by studying social mobility in two high-growth 
contexts, China and the United States. China had high but rapidly falling mobility 
and the US had persistently low social mobility. Both had rising inequality over 
the study period and the authors use this to infer support for the Great Gatsby 
Curve, linking low inter-generational mobility to high inequality. They confirm 
that this relationship has applicability that is more general across the globe by 
examining the relationship in seventy-three additional countries. The chapter 
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concludes that both of the world’s major economic powers have converged to a 
low level of socioeconomic mobility where talent from disadvantaged back-
grounds is excluded from opportunities, implying unrealized human potential 
and misallocation of resources on a large scale. These relations go to the heart of 
this volume’s concern over inequality.
At a general level, then, our study strongly confirms that to make a dent in 
inequality, policies must be socially and economically inclusive and sustained. 
In  this sense, our volume lends comprehensive and support to the Stockholm 
Statement about the principles of policy-making for the contemporary world, 
from a study that covers more than 40 per cent of the world’s population. More 
specifically, we argue that addressing inequality is essential for future growth and 
development and policies must include a variety of initiatives that work through, 
respectively, the labour market and redistributive social policies, keeping in 
mind throughout the long-term goal of promoting social mobility to break inter-
generational inequalities. Governments must set the rules of the game and regulate 
markets that do not work well, in ways that will further social inclusion and 
greater equality.
Clearly, overcoming inequality requires associated macroeconomic and broader 
development policies too. In Chapter  12 Stiglitz provides us with an excellent 
framework for these policy implications by reminding us that the world of the 
twenty-first century is quite different from the world of the twentieth century. The 
global economy is no longer the same and the export-led manufacturing devel-
opment models that have promoted economic growth in the past are no longer 
viable and are becoming increasingly less inclusive.
An important driver of rising within-country wealth inequality since 2008 has 
been the rise in equity prices, which has raised the share of the top 1 per cent in 
particular. In part, that rise has been due to low interest rates. If interest rates rise 
towards more normal levels, stock market performance would change. These 
trends could stabilize and improve within-country inequality. On the other hand, 
the decline of between-country inequality may slow or come to a halt. Further 
increases in China’s mean income and wealth, both now above the global means, 
will begin to raise between-country inequality, and we cannot expect that all the 
poorest countries will follow the same path considering that the initial conditions 
and the international context they face will be very different.
Understandably, widespread concern about rising inequality of incomes and 
wealth and the trends of top-end income, as detailed in this volume and else-
where, has drawn attention to the need to consider higher taxes on top incomes 
and wealth. Some worry about the possible consequences for growth of progres-
sive policies and, no doubt, there is a need for care. That said, this volume has 
highlighted the negative consequences for pro-growth policies if no con sid er ation 
is given to these policies. There are many lessons from good and bad pol icy-
making in this area from around the world to draw on and overlay with detailed 
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interrogation on local inequality circumstances. Fortunately, there is another set 
of policies that should be able to both reduce inequality and stimulate growth. 
Building human capital of the poorest is an obvious policy, as is social policy to 
support those in need. The same can be said for efforts to further economic trans-
formation and an economy where returns to labour equalize across sectors. 
Balancing macroeconomic stability with guaranteeing equal access to productive 
assets, and making health care and education universally accessible at all levels, 
for example, are also sound policies that can make ordinary people better off and 
increase both their income and wealth.
Within a stable macroeconomic framework, there is a need to change how the 
economy works for all of its citizens. Economics justifies the need to crack down 
on crony capitalism and rent-seeking, and break up monopolies and oligopolies. 
The weight of evidence in this volume affirms that this would reduce income and 
wealth concentration at the top and increase growth by fostering stronger compe-
tition and equal access to economic opportunities. These policies are likely to 
reduce within-country inequality and between-country inequality as well, since 
they would have their most dramatic impact in poor countries. At a global level, 
the policy toolbox also includes foreign aid policies designed and employed to 
attack between-country inequality. International trade policies have been and will 
continue to be key to give poor countries opportunities to develop faster, linking 
up with the obvious need for effective domestic and international agricultural and 
industrial policies, in a context of increasing concern with socially and environ-
mentally sustainable development. As stated repeatedly in this volume, well-
functioning labour markets that promote job creation, decent pay and social 
inclusion, removing any legal or de facto discrimination based on gender, race, 
ethnicity, or place of origin, providing equal access to human and physical capital, 
and empowering the most disadvantaged population groups, are a key driver of 
increased equality. On this note, we conclude.
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